Zambia State Insurance Corporation Limited and Anor v Alisand Singogo (Appeal No. 02 of 2007) [2008] ZMSC 168 (29 September 2008)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA, ' HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) Appeal No, 02 Of 2007 AND ALISAND SINGOGO RESPONDENT Coram: Sakata, CJ., Mumba, Chitengi, JJS 24th June 2008 and 29th September 2008 For the 1 et Appellant Mr G. J. Kalokoni of Messrs Kalokoni & Co. For the 2nd Appellant No Appearance For the Respondent Mr Eric Silwamba, S. C. of Messrs Eric Silwamba & Co. with Mr. L. Zulu of Messrs Malambo & Co. JUDGMENT Mumba, JS, delivered the Judgment of the court. Cases referred to: 1. 2. 3. Zam~ia ~ational Tender Board Vs Jason Sonpe, Appeal No. 155 of 2006 Taylor Vs Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, QB Attorney-General Vs Marcus K ampamba Achiume {1983) Z. R.1 -J2- I I I F. C. Shepherd & Co. Ltd Vs V Jerom:-(1987). Q. B 301 Zambia Privatization Agency Vs Japhet Jeff Mutwale, Appeal No. 172/2004 (Unreported) Rodgers Nyirenda and 2 Others Vs James Mwila Kwalala, . . Appeal No. 32 of 1993 (Unreported) •," l 4. 5. 6. 7. Zambia Privatization Agency Vs James Matale (1995-97) Z. R. 157 8. Attorney-General and Development Bank of Zambia Vs Gershom Moses Mumba, Appeal No. 50 of 2002 (Unreported) 9. Kitwe City Council Vs William Ng'uni, Appeal No. 57 of 2003 (Unreported) 10. Kafue District Council Vs Chipulu ( 1995-97)) Z. R. 190 ~ 11. Gondwe Vs Bp Zambia Limited 1995-97 Z. R. 178 12. Jacob Nyoni Vs Attorney-General (2001) Z. R. 65 13. Joseph Chintomfwa Vs Ndola Lime Company Limited (1999) Z. R. 172 Legislation referred to: 14. Insurance Act No. 27 of 1997 15. Industrial and· Labour Relations Act, Cap 269 of the Laws of Zambia. Works referred to: 16. Law of Contra t· p f E · c · ro • • Mckendrick 3 rd Ed"t· , 110n, 997 I f 1st appellant has appealed against the judgment of the Industrial Relations Court of 20th November 2006, whereby damages were awarded to the respondent for breach of contract. Briefly, the facts in this case are that the respondent was a civil servant who worked as Treasury Counsel in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, the sole shareholder of the 1st ppellant, a wholly owned State entity. On 11th April 2001, he was appointed acting Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of st appellant. The salary and other conditions of service were spelt out in the letter of appointment signed by the Permanent Secretazy, Ministry of Finance and National Planning. On 22nd October 2001, the respondent's appointinent was confirmed. He was appointed Managing Director by the decision of the Board of Directors of the · · appellant. The letter of appointment was signed by the chairperson of the Board who also served as Pennanen t Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. Conditions of service were spelt out in th · · . e contract of service which was signed by the respondent and the 1st appellant. For purposes of this appeal, it is pertinent to note that both letters of appointment of the - - - - - . J .. J4. respondent were signed by the same person at first as Permanent Secretary and in _the confirmation letter as Chairperson of the Board of 1 et appellant. The contract of service was to run for two . years. Among other conditions was, three months notice by either side, for termination of the · contract. A shorter notice period of termination was also provided for in the same con tract. The contract provided that certain facilities, including a motor vehicle used by the respondent in office, would be purchased at th e end of the said contract. On 8 th April 2002, the respondent's appointment was terminated by letter signed by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and National Planning. The letter directed redeployment of the respondent into the, Civil Service. Thereafter, 1st appellant wrote to the respon~ent and asked him to surrender the motor vehicle, among other items he used in th e office of Managing Director. After commu · ti n1ca ons between the respondent, 1 st appellant and the Ministry of Fin . ance and National Planning fr.:,ed t WJ. o reso ve I I -J5- the respondent's grievances, the resp,o~dent filed a complaint in the Industrial Relations Court for damages for breach of contract. In his complaint, the respondent sought relief as follows: ••• (i) A declaration that he is entitled to two years salary and other perquisites as set out by Law (ii) A declaration that he is entitled to a self liquidation loan of Kl 70,000,000.00 (One Hundred and Seventy Million Kwacha) (iii) A declaration that he is entitled to an Option to purchase the personal-to-holder Motor Vehicle and other items incidental to his employment (iv) Further and other reliefs: and (v) Costs " Evidence of events from the appointment of the respondent, the signing of the contract of service up to termination of the contract, as o:1tlined above, is common to both parties. The st appellant's contention in the court below was that while the respondent was a ppo1n e service was signed by 1 st - · t d b y let appellant and the contract of . appel ant the letter of termination of .the contract of service did n t . . . . o originate from the 1 st appellant, it crune from the Ministry of Finan d N . ce W'?- . atlonal Planning. Thus, the l 8t --------- -JB- /J5 appellant could not be held liable for damages· .for breach of contract as claimed by the respondent. There was evidence before the court below on the terms of the contract of service which provided, in clauses relevant to this appeal, as follows: ,, " 1. That the Employee shall serve the . Corporation as Managing Director and"' Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation and shall be responsible and accountable to the Board of Directors. 2. That the period of employment will commence on 1•t November 2001 and will continue for a period of two years to 1 st November 2003 subject to renewal as agreed between the parties at the end of its expiry . ••• . . 3b. That the Corporation shall provide and the Employee shall be entitled to a persona~-~o-holder vehicle for business and , , inevitable personal use of a vehicle not exceeding the value price of USDS0,000.00. The Employee will be entitled to 600 litres of fuel per month and shall have the option to purchase the vehicle at the end of the contra~t at book value. f f ; : ' -Jl- 3c. The Corporation shall purchase or build a house for the employee by way of loan entitlement not exceeding the total purchase or building price of the total value of Kl 70,000,000.00. The loan amount will be extended in a lump sum figure and shall be a self liquidating loan . ••• 3h. The Corporation shall pay the employee at the end of th·e contract a gratuity calculated at the· rate of thirty percent (30%) of his terminal gross salary by the number of months covered by the contract. The gratuity shall be paid in preference to other payments. In the event that the contract is terminated by the employer not on disciplinary grounds, before its normal expiry date gratuity and any such other payments shall be paid prorate and shall take preference over all other payments the corporation may have to settle . • • • Except where the employment shall be terminated under Clause 4 of the contract, either party may terminate the contract by giving not less than three (3) months written notice. Either party may terminate the contract by a shorter period of notice by pay ng to the other party immediately . .. i 5a. 5b. on termination such sum in li . eu o notice, as the Employee would h . ave rece ved in basic salary if the con tract had been termin~ted after notice in terms of clause Sa above wh h f i . ' ere t e termination is at the , t ins ance ' ' ' -JB• of the Employer the Employee shall immediately be pai.d . in full all monetary benefits and be able to exercise the . option to purchase any. articles items or such related equipment the Employee would have benefited if the contract had run its full term. ,, ••• There was evidence in the court below, that the motor vehicle and other facilities were withdrawn, the respondent was not given the option to purchase the same. There was also evidence that on the directive of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, the respondent was paid "one month salary, fuel and talk time as appropriate". The motor vehicle, a Landrover Discovery, registration no. AAX 6059, among other items, was withdrawn by 1st appell_ant by letter dated 7 th May 2002, reproduced on page 97 of the record of appeal. On the evidence ~~ recor_tj, and, as submitted by Mr Kalokoni, the 2nd appellant did not participate in the proceedings in the court below and also declined to participate in this appeal. I I -J9· After trial, the court below pronounced judgment in favour of the respondent, awarded salaries and allowances for the remainder of the contract term less whatever was paid. It also awarded six months salary for trauma suffered by the respondent but declined the self liquidatio~ loan of Kl 70 million entitlement as per contract of service. According to the court below it was guided by Clause 5 of the terms of contract, and held 1st appellant liable. The 1st appellant filed seven grounds of appeal as follows: " 1. The Lower Court erred in Law and fact in finding the Appellant liable for breach of Contract contrary to the applicable Law and the evidence on record 2. The Lower court misdirected itself in Law in failing to appreciate the fact that the Contract of employment between the 1 •t Appellant and the Respondent was frustrated by the intervention of the Ministry of Finance a:nd National Planning who were the appointing Authority and sole shareholder in the 1st Appellant Corporation. 3. The Lo~er Court erred in Law and fact in treating the 1st Appellant as though they acted collectively with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in terminating the Contract of employment of the Respondent. ,· . .. Jf0- 4. The Lower Court erred in Law in failing .. to apportion liability between the Appellant contrary to the current legal practice. 5. The Lower court misdirected itself in Law in awarding the Respondent benefits for the unexpired period of the fixed term contract of employment and for awarding him perquisites enjoyed as an incident of the contract of employment. 6. The Lower Court erred in Law in awarding the Respondent damages of six months salary for the trauma allegedly suffered by the Respondent. 7. The Lower Court misdirected itself in ·Law in failing to \;" consider the provisions of the Insurance Act Number 26 of 1994. " Both parties filed written heads of argument on which they relied. In addition, they both augmented their written submissions with oral submissions which were mainly a repeat of the written submissions. First and second grounds of appeal were argued together. The gist of submissions in support of the first and d secon grounds of appeal was that 1st app 11 e an t d 'd · I not terminate the services of the respondent, it was the Ministry of F' . inance an National Planning d who terminated the services. It was submitted that the actions of , -- -J11 · the Ministry of Finance and National Planning frustrated the contract, therefore, 1st appella.rit. had to withdraw facilities offered to the respondent as Managing Director as was provided in the contract of service. Cases were cited in support of these arguments which were detailed as to the stages this case went through as already narrated. The case of Zambia Nation~l Tender Board Vs Jason Songwe(l), was cited with reference to the status of seconded officers in the Public Service; that . such secondment persisted regardless of any position in the institution seconded to. " The case of Taylor Vs Caldwel1(2) where three elements of frustration were identified as similar to the situation in which 1st appellant and respondent found themselves in because the employment contract was terminated without fault on the part of st appellant or re~pondent. The law of contract on frustration the 1 as per Professor. Mckendrick's(l6) works, was discussed extensively. In response to the first and second grounds of appeal, it was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that the trial "court was -:..,l -J12- correct in law in not finding that the contract was frustrated. Respondent's submissions at trial to the effect that frustration could not be pleaded to escape liability were relied on. The -1 respondent also submitted that the trial court made findings of fact on the evidence available to it and the same could not be interfered with. The case of Attorney-General Vs Marcus Kampamba Achiume(3) was cited in support of this submission. It was submitted that the trial court found that the Ministry of Finance and National Planning was not a party to ~he contract of employment, a fact which was conceded by the sole witness for the \, 1st appellant, Mr Kasongo Obote Kamfwa. It was further submitted that the frustration pleaded by the 1st appellant was self induced and could not absolve it from fault. The case of F. C. Shepherd & Co. Ltd Vs V Jerom(4) was relied on in support of the submissions. It was finally submitted that submissions on "assignment" or "secondment" by 1st appellant in relation to the respondent's status, ~ere futile and misconceived as letters of appointment were clear on the status of the respondent vis-a-vis his employment as Managing Director of 1st appellant. .. J13- We have carefully considered submissions by both parties on the 1st and 2nd grounds of appeal. It is not in dispute that 1st appellant is wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, who are the sole shareholder. It is also not disputed that the letter of termination was by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. We agree with the submissions on behalf of the respondent that the appointment of the respondent as Managing Director was revisited, more so, there was a contract executed. The contract spelt out entitlements and a specific duration of engagement. When the letter of termination was issued, the 1st appellant was still bound by the contract of service, and, 1n releasing the respondent, 1 st appellant should have complied with termination clauses spelt out in the contract it had signed with the respondent. 1st appellant did not do so, instead, it went ahead and acted in breach of termination clauses. The trial court cannot be faulted for finding 1st appellant liable. We find no merit in the first and second grounds of appeal and we dismiss them. In arguing the third and fourth grounds of appeal, which were combined, it was submitted that .the trial court erred in law in .. J14• awarding damages against 1st appellant when ·it played no role in the termination of the respondent's contract. It was submitted that there was no evidence that 1st appellant acted collectively with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in terminating the contract for 1st appellant to be held liable for breach of contract. The case of Zambia Privatization Agency Vs Japhet Jeff Mutwale(5), was cited in support of these submissions. It was further submitted that 2nd appellant had conceded and had admitted liability and 1st appellant wondered why the trial court failed to hold the State liable for breach of contract or to apportion . ~ liability according to the evidence. In support of this submission, the case of Rodgers Nyirenda and 2 Others Vs James Mwila Kwalala(6)~ was relied on. It was finally submitted that all that was directed to be paid by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning was paid, there was, therefore, no further liability. In response to the 1:hird and fourth grounds of appeal, it was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that the trial court was on firm ground when· it found 1st appellant liable collectively with 2nd appellant on breach of contract. It was submitted that the trial /~h that there was a binding con tract between 1st 7 -J1s- court established appellant and respondent which contained all terms of service and termination. It was submitted that the continued imposition of blame on the Ministry of Finance and National Planning would not absolve the 1st appellant from liability for damages for breach of contract as 1st appellant had withdrawn the respondent's entitlements without adherence to contractual terms. In support of this submission, the case of Zambia Privatization Agency Vs James Matale(7), was cited where in principles of law on termination of employment were discussed in accordance with Friedman's Modern Law of Employment. After discussing the relevant passages in the works cited, it was submitted that having held that 1st appellant had entered into a binding contract with the respondent, the trial court was on firm ground in holding that termination of the contract was unlawful as there was no compliance with the termination clause as was discussed in James Matale(7). It was submitted that the trial court rightly awarded reliefs sought by the respondent. It was pointed out that the case of Zambia Privatization Agency Vs Japhet Jeff Mutwale(S) cited by 1st appellant was distinguishable in that, in the case herein, 1st -J16· appellant had executed a contract with the respondent for a fixed period of two years, yet failed to abide by the contractual terms ·. when employment was terminated; It was submitted that by failing to terminate the contract within the provisions of the law, but in accordance with the directives of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 1st · appellant acted collectively with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in terminating respondent's employment unlawfully. It was submitted, further, that the trial court was right in maintaining that 1st appellant acted collectively with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in terminating the respondent's contract of employment. After scrutinizing the record of appeal in light of submissions of the parties on the third and fourth grounds of appeal, we have -- observed that the contract of employment and its terms, including its duration, were cle·ar as it appears on pages 88, 89, 90 and 91 of the record of appeal, • We have also examined the evidence as to what happened after the letter of termination was issued, Instead of complying with the terms of termination according to the contract 1st appellant had signed, 1st appellant did not do so. 1st , I ,~ -J17 .. - appellant went ahead and acted in breach of contractual terms arguing that it had to comply with the dir~ctives of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. That was a lame excuse which cannot absolve 1st appellant from liability because the contract terms on termination should have been complied with, they were not subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. Shifting the blame on any other party is totally misconceived. The Mutwale case151 cited in aid was totally irrelevant in that the Privatization Agency did not sign Mutwale's( 5) employment terms and, therefore, could not be held liable for breach of those terms; The Rodgers Nyirenda case161 is misplaced as it dealt with insurance policy limitations on damages. Today's development in employment law has provided for equality of arms in order to avail an employee a reasonable expectation of remaining in employment for a reasonable time in order to support survival, It should be frowned upon that an employer, who is, in most cases, ___________ " ' - -_____ :_ ____ ___:::. the stronger p arty, should be left to act impervious to the well-being of an employe~ who has a settled hope of a reasonable tenure of office. It is in support of these principles that the Industrial Relations Court is empowered to do substantial justice. After the -J18- /9:f- contract was terminated, i st appellant was b gund to comply~ the termination clause but failed to do so. The respondent, hav~ng signed the contract which includ~d the termination clause, had a reasonable expectation that in the event of termination, those provisions would be complied with by 1st appellant. Labour law is now protective of employees' interests which are within reasonable parameters, depending on the circumstances of each case. We find r-. no merit in the third and fourth grounds of appeal and we dismiss them. For convenience, we propose to deal with the last ground of appeal which is the seventh ground, first, before we deal with the fifth and sixth grounds of appeal. In support of the seventh ground of appeal, 1st appellant relied on their submissions in the court below and submitted that Section 26(4) of the -~nsurance Act No. 27 of 1997(14) outlines mandatory qualifications for a Chief Executive Officer of an Insurance company and that the respondent admitted at trial that he did not meet those requirements and that he was paid benefits .. J19- on a pro-rata basis. On these submissior:is the 1st appellant urged the court to allow the appeal. In response to the submissions on the seventh ground of appeal, it was submitted that 1st appellant selectively quoted provisions of Section 26 of Insurance Act No. 27 of 1997 in its submissions in the court below. It was submitted that Section 28 allowed the Registrar to dismiss a Chief Executive of an Insurance company but that there was provision for a hearing to be conducted before dismissal. It was submitted that no evidence was laid by 1st appellant in the court below linking termination of the contract of employment of the respondent to the Registrar of Insurance companies. It was also submitted that besides, Section 29 allowed the Minister to modify provisions relating to suitability of a person to be appointed Chief Executive of an Insurance company and submitted that the said provisions were not cast in concrete but were subject to modification by the Minister. The respondent invited the court to consider the submissions in the court below on pages 71 to 78 of the record of appeal. It was submitted that 1st appellant's submission that the respondent was paid on a pro-rata -J20- basis was not sustainable in view of the findings of the trial court that 1 at appellant was in breach of termination clauses of the · contract. The case of The Attorit'ey .. Qeneral and Development Bank of Zambia Vs Gershom Moses Mumba(S), was cited 1n support of the submissions in reply to the seventh ground of appeal. The court was urged to dismiss the appeal and to uphold the awards by the lower court. We have considered the seventh ground of appeal and the submissions by both parties. The submission on behalf of 1s t "' " appellant in support of this ground is misconceived in that though pleaded, there was no evidence that the Registrar was involved in the termination of the respondent's contract. The letter of termination did not refer to ineligibility of r espondent for the office --- he held. Submissions on b'ehalf of the respondent, that it should be assumed that the Minister did modify the requirements for appointment of the respondent cannot be sustained either because there was no evidence to that effect. We find that this ground is I I -J21- untenable for the reasons we have o-µtlined against the 1st appellant's submission. The seventh ground of appeal also fails. The fifth and sixth grounds of appeal were also argued together. In support of these grounds of appeal, it was submitted that if it were accepted that the contract was frustrated when the respondent was recalled for redeployment into the civil service, the · award of damages for the unexpired term of the contract was illegal ·and ought to be set aside. It was submitted that where a contract of employment was frustrated, what was payable was what was due up to the date of the frustrating event, and nothing more. It was submitted that payment was supposed to be on quantum meirut basis, and that that was paid as shown by the evidence of the respondent on record. It was submitted that even assuming that the contract was not frustrated, the current law did not allow payment of terminal benefits in terms of salary for the unexpired term of the contract of employment as there would be no consideration for such payment. The case of Kitwe City Council Vs William Ng'uni(9), was cited in support of these submissions. It was submitted further that the award for mental torture was a , 8, -J22- _ misdirection and was contrary to the law as·-was de:rµonstrated in the case of Kafue District Council Vs Chipulu( 10). It was submitted that the award of six',month's salary was too excessive and ought to be set aside considering the fact that 1st appellant did not terminate the contract. It was submitted that any perquisites enjoyed as an incidence of employment, also ceased with employment. 1st appellant submitted that on that basis, the order to purchase the personal-to-holder motor vehicle and other entitlements to perquisites, were against the current law and should be rescinded. "' The "case of Gondwe Vs Bp Zambia Limited( 11), was cited in support of these submissions. In response to grounds five and six, Mr Silwamba submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that the 1st appellant had lamentably failed to show that th~ contract of employment was frustrated by intervening events. It was submitted that the trial court was on firm ground in awarding the respondent benefits for the unexpired portion of the contract of employment. The case of Kitwe City Counci1(9) cited by 1st appellant was distinguished in that that case involved an employee who was facing disciplinary charges and who .. J23. decided to resign but later alleged co,nstructive dismissal. It was submitted that the distinction with the respondent's situation was that whereas the employee in the Kitwe City Council case(9 ) terminated the contract of employment, in this appeal, it was the employer, the 1st appellant, who terminated the contract of employment and who was, therefore obliged to comply with the clause of termination but who had failed to do so. It was submitted ,,_ that the main purpose of damages was to place the aggrieved party in a position the party would have been in had there been . no breach of contract. It was submitted that the case of Kafue District Council(lO) cited by 1st appellant clearly stated the law regarding awarding damages for inconvenience and mental torture and that that case was in support of the respondent's position. After citing several passages in the case, it was submitted that the law supported the respondent's situation in that the contract of employment entered into with 1st appellant provided, inter alia, peace of mind and freedom from distress. It was submitted that the evidence showed that respondent was only paid one month salary, talk time and was evicted from the house which was provided for him. The motor vehicle, among other perquisites, was also ' . ' ' -J24- withdrawn. It was submitted that the respondent suffered mental distress and was greatly inconvenienced; that the trial court; .was; · therefore, on firm ground whep it awarded the respondent six months salary for the trauma suffered. In support of these submissions, the case of Jacob Nyoni Vs Attorney-Genera1(12) was cited, in particular, what the court stated, as follows: "This is a case of wrongful termination of employment and in awarding damages in such cases, this court has rarely taken the remaining period of services as a basis of calc:!ulating damages. Depending on the circumstances of each case we have been awarding damages ranging from notice required under terms of contract to, as to date, two years salary ... In line with our awards in the case of Chintomjwa v Ndola Lime, (2), and Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines v Mutale, (3) we award the appellant two years salary, calculate~, at the scale he was holding at the time of his premature retirement. " It was submitted that, on the basis of the cases. cited above, the trial court was on firm ground when it decided that the respondent was entitled to purchase the personal-to-holder motor vehicle. It was submitted that provision of the personal-to-holder , I -·' · - -J25- I&; motor vehicle was not only an incident qf ymployment which ceased on termination of employment but that it formed part of the conditions and benefits of employment which entitled the respondent, at the end of the contract, to acquire the right to purchase the same and that if respondent's contract had not been prematurely terminated, the respondent would have had the benefit of purchasing the said vehicle. In fortifying these submissions, the case of Gondwe Vs BP Zambia Limited(13) was cited in particular what this court held in discussing issues of entitlements and incidents of employment and whether certain employee rights had accrued even at termination of such employment. We have considered the heads of damages and other awards in light of the submissions by both parties. We can only reiterate what we stated in the cases of Chintomfwa(13), Matale(7) and Gershom Moses Mumba(8). There is need to consider peculiarities in individual cases and there is need for caution in deciding the measure of damages to avoid virtual rei-nstatement without consideration and runaway damages of "near vengeance". Far more important, are provisions of Section 85 of the Industrial and ros . ,: -J26- Labour Relations Act(15) which allow us to ga,_ behind the termination·, with or without notice. We find resolve in subsection 5 where the Industrial Relations t~ourt is required to do substantial justice which requirement, we have stated in the cases cited above, has ousted the normal measure of damage at common law. With these views in mind, we looked at the awards in the court below in line with what has been awarded in previous cases. On the perquisites such as the option to purchase the personal-to-holder motor vehicle and the decline to allow the self \, "' liquidation loan of Kl 70 million, we uphold the decision of the court below. However, the awards for the remainder of the contract term and for torture cannot be sustained because of the principles enunciated in our previous decisions, the two awards are therefore set aside. In order to take care of all the inconvenience suffered by the respondent, and to condemn the malice of sudden termination of employment, we are of the view that payment of twelve months salary inclusive of all allowances, adequately compensates the respondent. The fifth and sixth grounds of appeal succeed to that extent. We order interest on the award at the Bank of Zambia short r I .. J27,. term deposit rate from the date of the complaint up to judgment, thereafter, at the lending rate until payment. There shall be no .• order on costs. .,..-.._, _ _) --------~--------------- . E. L. SAKALA CHIEF JUSTICE F . N. M. MUMB~ SUPREME COURT JODGE ·. .. P.,.._._.-....... TE GI SUPREME COURT JUDGE