Republic Vrs Emmanuel and Another [2021] GHACC 2 (20 October 2021)

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT HELD AT MPRAESO ON THURSDAY 20TH OCTOBER 2021 BEFORE HIS HONOUR STEPHEN KUMI, ESQ CIRCUIT JUDGE. CASE NO: B7/ 85 / 2021. THE REPUBLIC V 1. KWAME EMMANUEL 2. EMMANUEL KISSI J U D G M E N T: The Accused persons herein, are before this court on one count each of conspiracy to commit crime to wit stealing, unlawful entry, causing unlawful damage and stealing contrary to sections 23 ( 1), 152, 172 and 124 ( 1 ) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 ( Act 29 ) respectively. The accused persons were initially put before this court on 11th September, 2020. And upon their arraignment, each of them denied the charges against them by pleading not guilty to the three counts, to essentially join issues with the prosecution on the said charges/counts. The brief material facts surrounding the allegations or charges against the Accused are that on the date in question, the Complainant locked his door and left the house and that in his absence the accused persons broke his door, entered his room and succeeded in taking away some items. The Complainant was quickly informed and went to his room to confirm the theft of his 42 inches LG Plasma television set valued GHC 3,000.00, an MP3 player and a decoder. It happened around that same time , the accused persons were spotted and confronted by some Good Samaritan about the items. He raised an alarm, which led to the arrest of the accused persons, who were sent to the police station. As has been indicated above, the accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Obviously, legal consequences flow from such a plea in criminal proceedings of this form and hue: The effect of their pleas of not guilty to the charges is not far-fetched; and it is as follows: “On a plea of not guilty, the statutory duty of the court as imperatively set down in Act 30, S. 172 (1) required that the court should proceed to hear such evidence as the prosecution might adduce. That duty was mandatory. The trial judge therefore erred by not complying with that compulsory statutory duty….”. See the case of Dabla and Others v The Republic [1980] GLR 501. Owing to this requirement of the law, the case proceeded to trial for the court to take evidence from the prosecution. It was mandatory and non-negotiable. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: The prosecution in proving their case called two ( 2 ) different witnesses; comprising the complainant, and the police investigator in the case. The first prosecution witness was the complainant, Samuel Appiah Nuamah. He told the court that on 8th September, 2020, he left home for work after securely locking his door. While he was working at a building site, he received a phone call from a neighbor that some thieves had broken into his room and had made away with the above-mentioned items. The neighbor also added that unfortunately for the thieves, some persons came across and confronted them while they carrying the items to the roadside to board a taxi to Nkawkaw, and eventually took them to the police station. He recalled that he rushed home and found his room broken into and upon inspection found the above- mentioned items missing or stolen. He next rushed to the police station to identity the items as his and lodged a complaint. The second and last prosecution witness was the police investigator in the case, Detective Sargeant Agyenim Boateng; of the Mpraeso police station. But he was not the original police investigator. He came to tender into evidence the witness statement of one Detective Sgt. Christine Kumah Gogobli. However, it happened that after she had prepared and filed the disclosures for and on behalf of the prosecution, she was transferred to the Greater Accra Region. Thereafter, it became difficult to get her to court to testify. Following an application from the prosecution, the court gave leave to Sgt. Agyenim Boateng to testify. The court had ruled that he was “ unavailable witness” within the intendment of section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323. Besides, Sgt. Agyenim Boateng had explained on oath that he assisted the original investigator in the investigations and thus had personal knowledge of the case; which the court accepted, thus satisfying the requirement of personal knowledge under section 60 of the NRCD 323 (supra). That section 60 (1) of NRCD 323, provides as follows: “A witness may not testify to a matter unless sufficient evidence is introduced to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.” The material part of the evidence of the investigator was that the accused persons were arrested and brought to the station together with the items. That subsequently, the PW1 came to the station and identified the items as his. Meanwhile, the police investigator also tendered into evidence the cautioned and charge statements of the two accused persons in which they had admitted or confessed to the crimes. However, the accused persons raised separate objections to their admissibility on the grounds that they had been beaten up and threatened by the Sgt. Christine Kumah Gogobli to give the statements. The court conducted a mini trial and took evidence from both sides. At the end of the day, the court accepted the case of the accused persons and accordingly upheld the objection to reject the admission of the said statutory statements into the evidence. CASE OR THE DEFENCE OF THE ACCUSED PERSON: At the close of case of the prosecution, the court determined pursuant to section 174 of Act 30 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1960, Act 30, that the case of the prosecution has succeeded to raise a prima facie case against the accused persons to warrant them opening their defence. The section reads as follows: “Where at the close of the evidence in support of the charge, if it appears to the court that a case is made out against the accused person sufficiently to require the accused to make a defence, the court shall call on the accused to make a defence and shall remind him the accused of the charge and inform the accused of the right of the accused to give evidence personally on oath or to make a statement” Similarly, in the case of Michael Asamoah and Another v The Republic, Civil Appeal No. J3/4/2017, delivered on 26th July, 2017, Adinyira JSC ( as she then was ), quoted for approval and relied on the dictum of Lamer CJ in the Canadian case of R v P(MB) [1994] 1 SCR 555 as follows: “Perhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminal law is the right of the accused not to be forced into assisting in his or her own prosecution. This means, in effect, that an accused is under no obligation to respond until the state has succeeded in making out a prima facie case against him or her”. The accused persons in their defence testified in turns but none of them called a witness. Similarly, the nature or even substance of their respective defences was the essentially the same. They both testified that on the date in question, they- as footballers and residents of Nkawkaw- had jogged to Abetifi and upon reaching Obomeng, they were accosted by some persons, who accused them of being thieves, an allegation they denied. According to the accused persons, the said persons- who were holding clubs- then threatened and forced them into a car and took them to the police station and reported that they were thieves. They added that they denied the allegations before the police but they were detained for some time and that it was not until after three days time that the items in question were brought to the station. Their defence therefore is that they did not commit the instant offences. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: On the whole of the evidence before the court at the end of trial, the following are the three ( 3 ) main issues for determination in this judgment: i. Whether or not the two accused persons conspired to go and steal from the PW1. ii. Whether or not they caused unlawful damage to the doors to the room of the PW1 iii. Whether or not it was the two accused persons unlawfully entered the room of the PW1 to commit a crime. iv. Whether or not the Accused stole the above-mentioned items of the PW1. ADDRESSING THE ISSUES: As has been stated above, the two accused persons came to the court and pleaded not guilty on the four ( 4 ) charges. The effect their pleas was as follows in law, especially in a criminal case of this nature: “Unless it is shifted, the party claiming that a person has committed a crime or wrongdoing has the burden of persuasion on that issue”. See section 15 of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323. It may also be important to mention section 11 ( 2 ) of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323, which provides as follows:- “11(2) in any civil or criminal action the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the prosecution as to any fact which is essential to guilt requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond reasonable doubt.” Meanwhile, in terms of judicial pronouncements on this burden and standard of proof in criminal trials, in the case of Donkor v The State [1964] GLR 598, SC, it was held inter alia by the Supreme Court of Ghana that in criminal trials, the burden of proof in the sense of the burden of establishing the guilt of an accused is generally on the prosecution, which burden must be discharged beyond reasonable doubt. This burden of proof that the prosecution must satisfy in the present proceedings was famously captured in the following ipsissima verba of Viscount Sankey, LC in the case of Woolmington v. DPP (1935) AC 462. The learned Lord Chancellor delivered of himself thus; “No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained….”. In order to satisfy the Constitutional, statutory and Common Law threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the law is that “the prosecution has a duty to prove the essential ingredients of the offence with which the appellant (accused) and the others have been charged…” See the case of Frempong alias Iboman v The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297, SC per Dotse JSC. So, the natural question to be asked at this juncture is whether the prosecution succeeded to prove the essential ingredients of the offences of conspiracy, causing unlawful damage, unlawful entry and stealing with which the accused persons have been charged. In order to make the determination, it is necessary that this court sets out in some reasonable detail the essential ingredients of the offences in question and relate them to the facts and evidence before this court. I will start with the offence of conspiracy. It is provided for under section 23 (1) of Act 29/1960 (supra) as amended by the Statute Law Review Commissioner per the Revised Edition Act, 1998, Act 562, as follows: “Where two or more persons agree to act together with a common purpose for or in abetting a criminal offence, whether with or without a previous concert or deliberation, each of them commits a conspiracy to commit or abet the criminal offence”. See also the case of Republic v Augustina Abu and Others, (Unreported) Criminal Case No. ACC/15/2013; per Marful-Sau J. A, (as he then was). This definition is admittedly different from the old definition of conspiracy which was defined in section 23(1) of the old Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29) as follows: “If two or more persons agree or act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime, whether with or without any previous concert or deliberation each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet that crime as the case might be.” In the case of Francis Yirenkyi v The Republic, (Unreported) Criminal Appeal No. J3/7/2015, Dotse JSC held inter alia that the new formulation no doubt reinforces the view that conspiracy is an intentional conduct; observing that under the new formulation, a person could no longer be guilty of conspiracy in the absence of any prior agreement. So that the mere acting together of two or more persons in a criminal enterprise is not enough to sustain conviction. Beyond that, there must be proof that the accused persons agreed to act together to commit the crime. It is however not a defence for an accused person who is charged for conspiracy to state that he did not have prior or previous concert or deliberation with the other accused persons to commit the offence where there is evidence that they agreed to act together to commit the offence, even if just before the commission of the substantive offences. See Dennis Dominic Adjei: “Contemporary Criminal Law in Ghana” at page 89; as well as the case of The Republic v Kwame Amponsah and 6 Ors; Unreported; CC. No. FT/0066/2016; delivered on 18th April, 2019; per Asare-Botwe J. The second offence is causing unlawful damage. The offence of causing unlawful damage is provided for under section 172 (1 ) of the Act 29/1960 ( supra ). That section or provision essentially requires that for a person or an accused to be guilty for that offence, the evidence should show that an accused caused the damage intentionally and unlawfully. See the case of Yeboah and Another v The Republic (1999-2000 ) 1 GLR 149, CA, per Gbadegbe J (as he then was ). Section 172(1) of Act 29 which creates the offence of unlawful damage provides in subsection (1) (a) that where the value of the damage does not exceed “GHC100 or to no pecuniary value” the offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanour; but where the value exceeds GHC100, the person shall, according to subsection (1) (b), be guilty of a second degree felony. In the instant case, the accused persons herein was charged under section 172 without making a distinction, even though the facts and the charge state the value of the two doors to be GHC 180.00. In addition, it is realized that the prosecution, mainly through the PW1 and PW2, also failed to lead any evidence as to the value of the said doors of the PW1. Despite the above deficiencies in the evidence of the prosecution, it is my considered opinion that they cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution on the charge of causing unlawful damage. This is because section 172(1) of Act 29 creates only one offence of unlawful damage, and only distinguishes between a minor type, i.e. 172(1) (a) and a serious/major type, i.e. 172(1) (b). See the case of Homenya v The Republic ( 1992 ) 2 GLR 305 ( HC ). In the Homenya v Republic case ( supra ), Acquah J ( as he then was ), held and delivered himself as follows to state and show that even if the prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence as to the specific value of the damaged two doors to be GHC180.00, same cannot be fatal and that an accused can appropriately and lawfully be convicted and found guilty on the misdemeanour or minor type of unlawful damage even when the true value of the damage was not proved to the satisfaction of the court: “Furthermore, in respect of the minor type, it is still an offence even if the damaged property has no pecuniary value. Thus where there is no evidence on the value of the damaged property, the appellant could lawfully be convicted under section 172 (1)(a) by virtue of section 154(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). In Asante v The Republic ( 1972 ) 2 GLR 177, Anterkyi J., faced with a similar problem, reasoned in the manner I have stated above. He said at 197 of the report: “In the present case there was no evidence with regard to the value of the damage to the trousers. But section 172(1) (a), as to the value of the damage states, ‘to a value not exceeding £100 or to no pecuniary value.’ And it can therefore be inferred from the fact of the value of the damage to the trousers not having been established in evidence that the damage thereto was of no pecuniary value, and, therefore, such value suffices to secure conviction.” Thus if the conviction of the appellant herein is valid, I can by virtue of section 154 (2) of Act 30 acquit him under section 172(1) (b) and convict and sentence him under section 172(1) (a) of Act 29”. The third charge or count is unlawful entry; which is provided for under section 152 of Act 29/1960 ( supra ) as follows; “A person who unlawfully enters a building with the intention of committing a criminal offence in the building commits a second degree felony”. However, the immediately succeeding section 153 explains the offence of unlawful entry thus; “A person unlawfully enters a building if that person enters otherwise than in the exercise of a lawful right, or by the consent of any other person able to give consent for the purposes for which that person enters”. From the above provisions, it appears that for the prosecution to succeed at obtaining conviction for the offence of unlawful entry, the prosecution must prove or establish beyond reasonable doubt that a person charged for the offence entered the building or premises not only in the absence of exercise of any lawful right or by the consent of any person able to give consent, but it must also be proved that the person charged entered the room or building with the intention to commit a criminal offence. So that in the case of Kanjarga v The State ( 1965 ) GLR 479, SC, it happened that a servant who broke into his master’s room and made away with the master’s property, was convicted of stealing and unlawful entry. His appeal against the conviction for unlawful entry was allowed on the grounds that the servant had access to the room in the perfomance of his servant duties. It was held accordingly that the prosecution had failed to establish that the appellant entered the room with the intention of committing a crime. Meanwhile, section 124 (1) of Act 29/1960 creates the offence of stealing. It states that “a person who steals commits a second degree felony”. However, section 125 of Act 29/1960, defines the offence of stealing under our statute: Stealing is defined under that section as; “A person steals who dishonestly appropriates a thing of which that person is not the owner”. So that in the case of Brobbey and Others v The Republic [1982-83] GLR 608, Twumasi J ( as he then was ) stated the essential elements of stealing under Ghana laws were stated to be as follows: (i) The person charged must have appropriated the thing allegedly stolen. (ii) The appropriation must be dishonest (iii) The person charged must not be the owner of the thing allegedly stolen. So, the main two (2) conditions that must exist or be established in a case of stealing is dishonesty and appropriation; or dishonest appropriation. In the case of Anang v The Republic [1984-86] 1 GLR 458, dishonesty in the offence of stealing was stated to connote “moral obloquy ……. such a nature as to cast a slur on the character revealing him as a person lacking in integrity or as a plainly dishonest person….” Meanwhile, appropriation is defined under section 12 (1) of Act 29/1960 (supra) to mean “dealing with the thing by the trustee, with the intent of depriving a beneficiary of the benefit of the right or interest in the thing, or in its value or proceeds, or a part of that thing”. Similarly, under section 122 (2) of the same Act 29/1960 (supra), appropriation of a thing in any other case means “any moving, taking, obtaining, carrying away, or dealing with a thing, with the intent that a person may be deprived of the benefit of the ownership, of that thing, or of the benefit of the right or interest in the thing, or in its value or proceeds, or part of that thing….” Now, with the benefit of the above little discussions on the nature of the offence of stealing and the essential ingredients that the prosecution ought to prove in a case of stealing, I would now go ahead and determine the issues in this case which essentially resolves into the question whether or not the case of the prosecution succeeded to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons herein committed the alleged offences. Sometimes people charged with a crime are caught “red-handed”; which is popularly or colloquially referred to as “feeli feeli" ( in flagrante delicto). Therefore in proving the guilt of an accused, the evidence that the prosecution would rely on in such a scenario is the direct evidence of the witnesses who have sworn to have used their eyes seeing an accused commit the stated offence. At the other end of the spectrum, other times, allegations of criminal wrongdoing may be supported by what authorities may refer to as circumstantial evidence. From the evidence adduce by the prosecution through their three witnesses- as captured above- it can be safely be said and accepted that none of the prosecution witnesses saw the two accused persons person herein conspiring to steal from the PW1 nor causing the damage to the doors to the room of the PW1. None of them also saw the duo entering the room of the PW1 with the intention to steal; and certainly none of the prosecution witnesses saw them stealing the above-mentioned items of the PW1 from the room. Rather, the evidence the prosecution adduced and relied on in their attempt to prove their case against the two accused persons is this: For the Complainant ( PW1 ), after he was informed by a neighbour of a break in at his room, he went to confirm that the door and locks to his room had been broken and that upon inspection of his room, he found his 42 inches LG television set and other items stolen. He would then go to the police station to find the two accused persons arrested and who were in possession of his above-mentioned items. The police investigator’s evidence corroborated that of the PW1 to the extent that the two accused persons were arrested and brought to the station together with the said items which the PW1 moments after came to the station to identity them as his. So from the above pieces of evidence as adduced by the prosecution, their evidence against the accused persons is in the nature of circumstantial evidence; in that although none of the prosecution witnesses saw them committing the alleged crimes, they were found with the items of the PW1; which had been stolen from the room of the PW1. What then is circumstantial evidence? In the case of R v Taylor ( 1928 ) 21 CR. App. R. 20 @ 21, Lord Hewart LCJ (as he then was) explained the nature of circumstantial evidence as follows: “It has been said that the evidence against the applicants is circumstantial: so it is but circumstantial evidence is very often the best. It is evidence of the surrounding circumstances which by undersigned co-incidence is capable of proving a proposition with the accuracy of mathematics. It is no derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial ”. See the also the case of Duah v The Republic [1987-88] 1GLR 343; A typical example of circumstantial evidence is afforded by a statement of a witness at a murder trial that he saw the accused carrying a bloodstained knife at the door of the house of the victim. On even the case of the existence of the accused’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime or on the murder weapon. Despite the importance of circumstantial evidence in criminal proceedings, it is not without its own frailties and limitations. In the case of State v. Anane Fiadzo [1961] GLR 416 at 417, Sarkodee-Adoo, JSC (as he then was ) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court said: “Presumptive or circumstantial evidence is quite usual, as it is rare to prove an offence by evidence of eye-witnesses, and inferences from the facts proved may prove the guilt of the appellant. A presumption from circumstantial evidence should be drawn against the appellant only when that presumption follows irresistibly from the circumstances proved in evidence; and in order to justify the inference of guilt the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the appellant, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. A conviction must not be based on probabilities or mere suspicion…” Meanwhile, the version of the accused persons however, in their sworn evidence in court, is essentially that they did not commit the offences but that they only came upon some unidentified persons who accused them of being thieves, who threatened them and pushed them into a car to the police station, only for the items to be brought to the police station some three days later. From the evidence before the court, the court finds that the two accused persons were found with the television set and other items when they were spotted, confronted and arrested by the said persons and taken to the police station, where the PW1 arrived soon after to lodge a complaint of a break in and theft of his television set and other items, and subsequently identified the television set and other items as the ones stolen from his room. All the above pieces of evidence were overwhelmingly against the two accused persons, shifting the evidential burden on them to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of guilt against them as they were the persons who had been found in possession of stolen items, which the PW1, shortly after the break in and theft at his room, had followed it up to the police station to identify the television set and the items as his. That being the case, the above facts and very circumstances also raise the doctrine of recent possession in criminal law against the accused persons. That doctrine of recent possession proceeds on the basis that:- “If it is proved that premises have been broken into and certain property has been stolen from the premises and that very shortly afterwards, a man is found in possession of the property, that is certainly evidence from which the jury can infer that he is the housebreaker or shopbreaker; and; if he is, it is inconsistent to find him guilty of receiving, because a man cannot receive from himself. That is what is so often done. It is perfectly good evidence of the prisoner being the housebreaker that he is found in possession of property stolen from a house quite soon after the breaking.' – per Lord Chief Justice of England Goddard CJ in R V JAMES LOUGHLIN [1951] Criminal Appeals Report of 1951 – 1952 at pg 69. Similarly, In R v Bailey (1917) 13 CrAppR 27 Avory J, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 30: 'It is true that in some cases where the housebreaking takes place one day and the property stolen is found in the possession of the prisoner on the following day, it is open to the jury to infer that he broke into the premises; but not where he is not found in possession until three or four weeks later; it may, however, be evidence that he was guilty of receiving the goods knowing them to have been stolen.' The law is that before the doctrine can be applied the court must ensure that possession of the recently stolen items is positively proved and that such recently stolen property was found with the suspect; the complainant must also prove the ownership of such stolen property and of course that the property is recently stolen. In applying the above authorities to the facts of this case and the whole of the evidence before the court, I find that all the ingredients of doctrine of recent possession have positively and amply been proved in this case against the accused by the prosecution; to wit, the PW1 is the owner of the above-mentioned items, the items were found with and in possession of the two accused persons shortly after the PW1 found a break in at his room and the items were recently stolen. It is my considered opinion that the above pieces of evidence and principles give support for the court to arrive at and make the above inferences to link the crimes to the two accused persons. The Supreme Court in Logan and Laverick v. The Republic [2007-2008] SCGLR 76 quoted with approval the dictum by Lord Wright in Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 at 169 by as follows: “There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer other facts which it is sought to be established. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with certainty as if they had actually been observed. In other cases the inferences does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation and suspicion.” The court is satisfied that the acts of the two accused persons on the date and time of their arrest were such that it can be inferred with certainty that they went to the room of the PW1 to steal his above- mentioned items. In the light of the above findings of the court on the issues herein, the court finds and holds that the prosecution succeeded to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused persons who unlawfully caused damage to the doors to the room of the PW1; after which they unlawfully entered the room of the PW1 on the date and time in question. The court also find and hold that on the evidence, they did not have any lawful right to have entered the room of the PW1 and they also failed to show he entered the room with the consent of the PW1. It is thus resolved in favour of the prosecution that they proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons unlawfully entered the room of the PW with the intention to steal. On the basis on the foregoing, and particularly due to the decision of the court on the issue 2, the court accordingly resolves the issue 3 that it was they, who upon unlawfully entering the room of the PW1, went ahead to steal the above-mentioned items or properties of the PW1. SENTENCING: Now sections 152 and 124 (1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960, Act 29 categorizes the crime of unlawful entry and stealing as second degree felonies. But those provisions do not specify or provide for punishments for the said offences. However, sub-section 5 of section 296 of Act 30, mentions or lists specific offences involving the sections or provisions on stealing, fraudulent breach of trust, defrauding by false pretences, unlawful entry etcs and stipulates that in such cases the sentence should not exceed 25 years. Therefore in this case, upon the conviction of the two accused persons for the two offences of unlawful entry and stealing, as the trial judge I have the power and discretion under the law to impose a custodial sentence of up to twenty-five ( 25 ) years on each of the stated two counts. As a corollary to that, it must be said that the conspiracy charge which is an inchoate offence takes its source from the substantive offence of stealing; meaning upon conviction for the conspiracy charge, the two accused persons can be sentenced up to 25 years imprisonment. Meanwhile, as has been stated above, even if the prosecution failed to prove the pecuniary value of the damaged locks, the court can still properly convict and sentence him on the minor type of causing unlawful damage under section 172 (1 ) ( a ) od Act 29/1960, which is a misdemeanor, with a maximum sentence of three ( 3 ) years. With the benefit of the above statutory provisions, in determining the appropriate sentence for the convict herein, I have had to consider the authority of Kwashie v The Republic ( 1971 ) 1 GLR 488, which provides for the factors to be considered by a court before imposing the length of sentence on a convict. In that regard, I have taken into consideration mitigating factors such as the youthful age of the convicts. They have also pleaded for leniency from the dock. The court has also taken into consideration the some few months that they have spent in lawful police custody. Despite that, the court also notes the above aggravating factors that go against the convict; in terms of how he moved from Nkawkaw to Obomeng- which is of decent distance- to break into and steal the items of the PW1. It would only take real criminals to have planned and executed that. Most importantly, they are not first offenders. Each of them have previous convictions against them for similar offences; showing that they have failed to reform. They thus deserve some decent custodial sentence to both reform him and to serve as a deterrent both to them and other criminal elements within the jurisdiction. Such break- ins- while residents are at work- are a commonplace within this jurisdiction and there is a need to curb or nip them in the bud. To that end, each of the convicts is hereby sentenced to serve 3 years, 2 years, 3 years and 5 years imprisonment in hard labour on each of the counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The sentences are to run concurrently. The convicts are informed of their statutory right to appeal SGD: ……………………… H/H STEPHEN KUMI (CIRCUIT JUDGE) 15