KONADU VRS ABLORDEPPEY (H1/81/2020) [2022] GHACA 113 (17 March 2022)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL ACCRA AD. 2021 CORAM: SENYO DZAMEFE J. A. (PRESIDING) JENNIFER A. DODOO (MRS) J. A. JANAPARE A. BARTELS-KODWO (MRS) J. A. CIVIL APPEAL No: H1/81/2020 17TH March, 2022 AUGUSTINE KONADU - PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT VRS CYNTHIA ABLORDEPPEY & 3 ORS - DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS DODOO, JA (MRS) JUDGMENT The Plaintiff/Appellant instituted suit against the Defendants/Respondents in an amended writ and statement of claim (see p. 432 of the Record of Appeal {ROA}) claiming the following reliefs: i. A declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Kwashieman, Accra, bounded on the North-East by a proposed road measuring 70 feet more or less, on the South-West by a property of the Ahiaku family measuring 70 feet more or less, on the North West by a proposed road measuring 100 feet more or less and comprising an approximate area of 0.16 acre more or less. ii. An order of injunction restraining the Defendants herein either by themselves, servants, agents, workmen of whatever description from entering the disputed land or to cause any further acts of trespass on the said land. iii. An order for the cancellation of land title No. GA 31773 issued in the name of the 4th Defendant. iv. An order for recovery of possession. v. Damages for trespass. It was the Plaintiff’s case that in 2007, he rented the disputed land from the Defendants’ late father. Two years later, the said late father sold the land to him at an agreed price of GH¢21,000.00. It was his case that the vendor became ill and instructed his brother, one V. K. Ablordeppey to receive the purchase price on his behalf. He stated that on his vendor’s demise, the Defendants entered onto the land that he was in possession of and that the 4th Defendant even claimed ownership of the land. He averred that it was during the pendency of the suit that the 4th Defendant applied for and obtained land title certificate asserting that the disputed land had been gifted to him by his father. The Plaintiff averred that the said land certificate was obtained by fraud which he particularized as follows: i. That the said land certificate was procured without complying with the requirement for registration and acquisition of land title. ii. The said certificate was obtained at a time when the matter was pending before the Honourable Court and at the time when there was an injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the disputed land. iii. That the lease which gave birth to the 4th Defendant’s title certificate was also obtained during the pendency of the order of interlocutory injunction. The Defendants in a joint statement of defence averred that the land had been given as a gift to the 4th Defendant as far back as 1995 and that the said 4th Defendant had exercised acts of ownership over the land. It was their case that the Plaintiff had made claims of ownership only after their father’s demise. They claimed that at the time their father was said to have instructed V. K. Ablordeppey to negotiate and have any dealing with the disputed land, he had suffered a massive stroke and could not have so instructed due to his incapacitation. The 4th Defendant therefore made a counterclaim against the Plaintiff for the following reliefs: a) A declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Sowutuom in the Ga District in the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana and containing an approximate area of 0.16 acre or 0.06 hectare and bounded on the North-East by proposed road measuring 100 feet more or less, on the South-East by proposed road measuring 70 feet more or less on the South- West by lessor’s land measuring 100 feet more or less, on the North-West by proposed road measuring 70 feet more or less which is more particularly delineated on a plan attached to 4th Defendant’s document thereto shewn edged pink and registered with certificate No. GA 31773. b) An order for perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiff, his workmen, assigns, any and or all others claiming through Plaintiff, from dealing with the property being disputed. c) An order for recovery of possession. d) An order directed at the Plaintiff to remove forthwith all building materials placed on the disputed land by the Plaintiff e) An order for the cancellation of Land Title Certificate No. GA 28469 issued in the name of Augustine Konadu as having been obtained by fraud. f) General Damages for trespass. g) Costs. h) Any other order or orders as to this honourable court may seem just. The issues set down for trial were: 1. Whether or not the Plaintiff validly acquired the disputed land from the late Samuel Mensah Ablordeppey? 2. Whether or not the Plaintiff’s acquisition was obtained by fraud? 3. Whether or not the late Maxwell Ablordeppey made a gift of the disputed land to his son Elvis Awuku Ablordeppey during his life time? 4. Whether or not the 4th Defendant put up a structure on the disputed land? 5. Whether or not the disputed land forms part of the estate of late Maxwell Samuel Ablordeppey? 6. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to his claims? 7. Whether or not the Defendants are entitled to their counter-claim? 8. Any other issues raised by the pleadings. The trial court found on the evidence adduced that the late Maxwell Ablordeppey had not divested himself of the land either by sale to the Plaintiff or by gift to the 4th Defendant. The Court concluded that he had died possessed of the land in dispute which therefore formed part of his estate. The Court therefore held that both parties had failed in their claims for declaration of title, recovery of possession and damages for trespass and dismissed both claims. The Court also ordered the cancellation of Land Certificates No. GA 31773 and GA 28469 issued in favour of the 4th Defendant and the Plaintiff respectively. Aggrieved by this decision, the Plaintiff/Appellant has filed a Notice of Appeal which contains the following grounds of Appeal: a. That the High Court Judge did not consider the doctrine of ademption thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice. b. That the late Samuel Maxwell Ablordeppey did not himself have documents covering the land in dispute as the land documents tendered by the Defendants/Respondents is not executed and therefore asked that the Plaintiff/Appellant be sent to the palace of Kwashiman for land documents. His Lordship did not consider this hence miscarriage of justice occurred. c. His Lordship did not consider the fact that money for the rental of the land in dispute became part of the purchase money and by holding that the Plaintiff/Appellant did not commit fraud meant that Plaintiff properly and validly acquired the land in dispute. d. That Doctor Dollar’s evidence as to the state of health of the late Samuel Maxwell Ablordeppey in carrying out the transactions was not conclusive as he did not physically examine the late Samuel Mensah Ablordeppey nor did he see his hospital folder. e. The receipts issued to the Plaintiff/Appellant under the instructions of the late Samuel Maxwell Ablordeppey on his sick bed are valid and that satisfy the provisions for writing under the Conveyancing Act and the persons that saw to the sale are relations of the late Samuel Maxwell Ablordeppey and are as well known to the Defendants/Respondents. f. The land in dispute is located at Kwashieman and the witness from the Abola Piam family of Sowutuom could not describe fixtures on the land established on the land by the late Samuel Maxwell Ablordeppey himself not knowing the land. An appeal as indicated by Rule 8(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules CI 19, is by way of rehearing. What this provision seeks to say is that the appellate court will deal with the matter as if it was hearing the matter at first instance. See the cases of Mamudu Wangara v. Gyato Wangara (1982-83) GLR 639 @ 655 CA; Ansu-Agyei v. Fimah (1993- 94) 1 GLR 299 at 305-306 SC and Praka v. Ketewa (1964) GLR 423 @ 426, SC. In rehearing the matter, the appellate court is required to examine the whole record of appeal, taking into account all the evidence, oral and documentary, to satisfy itself that the judgment is amply supported by the evidence on record, upon the preponderance of the probabilities. See Koglex Ltd (No. 2) v. Field (2000) SCGLR 175 @ 184; Tuakwa v. Bosom (2001-2002) SCGLR 61 @ 65 and Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd (2010) SCGLR 729. In this regard, the appellate court is enjoined to put itself in place of the trial court and evaluate the evidence. In so doing, it could make inferences from the facts on record and either affirm the judgment or interfere with the judgment where it deems fit. The parties in this Appeal shall be referred to simply as the Appellant and the Respondent respectively. The Appellant whose evidence can be found at p. 490-501 of the ROA told the court that he first acquired the disputed land when the late Maxwell Ablordeppey gave him land at Santa Maria as a tenant. While he was renting the land, he travelled to Kumasi when he got a phone call from his wife informing him of Maxwell’s intention to sell the land. He said he negotiated the selling price of the land with Maxwell Ablordeppey at GH¢21,000.00 out of which he made an initial payment of GH¢8,000.00. He told the court that he made subsequent payments of GH¢5,000.00 and GH¢3,400.00. PW1 who gave evidence on behalf of the Appellant told the court that his late cousin, Maxwell Ablordeppey while on admission at the 37 Military Hospital sent for him. It was when he went to the hospital in response to the invitation that he met the Appellant at the hospital. His cousin then informed him that he had sold the land in dispute to the Appellant and instructed him to see the Kwashiman chief to prepare land documents for the Appellant. It was his testimony (see pages 345-357 of the ROA) that the land was sold sometime in 2008 and that Maxwell Ablordeppey had received an initial payment of the purchase price of GH¢21,000.00 and that the outstanding balance of the purchase price was paid to him (PW1). He denied the contention that his cousin was unable to speak due to the stroke he had suffered from. He contended that he could speak and had even relayed instructions about what was to be done with the money received which included paying for medicines and for performing customary rites in respect of one Victoria Ahorlu. PW2 who described himself as Maxwell Ablordeppey’s brother testified that he knew the Appellant as a person who had purchased land from his brother, Maxwell Ablordeppey. It was his testimony that he was present when his brother informed the Appellant’s wife about his intention to sell the land in dispute. It was at that point that the said wife informed them that her husband was out of Accra and that she would relay the message about the intended sale of land to him. The Appellant’s wife eventually returned and said her husband was interested in purchasing the land. He said the purchase price of the land was negotiated as being GH¢21,000.00 out of which GH¢1,800.00 was made as a down payment. He told the court that the Appellant was a tenant on the land and that the amount he had paid as rent, was also deducted from the purchase price thus reducing further, the balance outstanding. He denied the contention that the Appellant took advantage of his brother’s illness and incapacity to induce him into parting with the land. The Respondents’ case on the other hand is that the land in dispute was given to the 4th Defendant as a gift. (See pp 10-21 of Volume 2 of the ROA). DW2 tendered in evidence a land certificate prepared in 2009. DW2 said she and her brother Ebenezer Ablordeppey were the administrators of their late father’s estate and that they vested the land in 4th Respondent after obtaining letters of administration. DW3 also told the court she was 4th Respondent’s mother and that the land in dispute belonged to the 4th Respondent. From the proceedings, the Appellant’s evidence that he had purchased the land in dispute has been corroborated by PW1 (Professor Ablordeppey) and PW2 (William Ablordeppy. It was his case that he was informed about the availability of the land for sale from his wife and this has been corroborated by PW2 who testified that his brother had evinced a desire to sell the land in dispute. This had been conveyed to the Appellant’s wife who informed her husband of the intended sale. Exhibit D and D2 are receipts numbered 5294 and are found at pages 278 and 280 of the ROA. They show that an amount of ¢14 million (currently GH¢1,400.00) had been paid by the Appellant in respect of 2 years rent in advance. Exhibit D1 is a receipt numbered 5299 and dated 2nd August, 2008 for GH¢3,400.00 issued for final payment for land for sale at Santa Maria. (see p. 279 of the ROA). Exhibit D3 dated 17th May, 2008 is a receipt numbered 5296 for GH¢3,000.00 being second payment for Land Sale at Santa Maria. (see p. 281 of the ROA). Exhibit D4 dated 2nd May, 2008 is a receipt numbered 5295 issued for the payment of GH¢8,000.00 being part payment of land purchase at Santa Maria property of Mr. Maxwell Ablordeppey. (see p. 282 of the ROA). Thereafter, Exhibits D5 and D6 which are receipts numbered 5298 which evidence the payment of GH¢5,000.00 and described as third payment for Land Sale at Santa Maria. (see pp. 283- 284 of the ROA). The total sums paid add up to GH¢20,800.00. There is corroborative evidence both oral and documentary that there was a sale of land between Maxwell Ablordeppey acting per PW1 and the Appellant. Section 7(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323 provides as follows: Corroboration consists of evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn which confirms in a material particular the evidence to be corroborated and connects the relevant person with the crime, claim or defence. However, the Respondents have said that the said Maxwell Ablordeppey was incapable of entering any negotiations on the sale of land as he was incapacitated having suffered from a stroke. Could he in spite of suffering a stroke have been capable of what the Appellant asserts? The Respondents called a medical practitioner whose evidence has been captured at pp. 186-188 of Volume 2 of the ROA. He gave the cause of Maxwell Ablordeppey’s death as Cerebro-Vascular Accident (CVA) known in layman terms as stroke. He also stated as follows: CT Scan – this clearly shows the right cerebra infarct. So, it goes to confirm what is on the cause of death. Our brain controls every activity of the human body. And therefore, if the right side of the brain is dead, every activity on the left side of the body will be affected and therefore even without seeing the patient, I will know that he will have paralysis of the left side of the body – the left upper and lower limbs may not work properly. In that there would be weakness on one side of the face, so the face would be shifted to the left of the weakness. The tongue too will be weakened so the person cannot speak properly. Either he may not speak at all depending on the level of spread of the infarction………. It would be 75/25 – when I said speech. I can break it into two – receptive or expressive speech. We would have been better of if we can get the folder to know what actually is the problem. Receptive is that when you talk to him, he would understand and expressive is that he should also be able to respond appropriately. Obviously, the CT Scan says that the speech area was affected so how he expresses that cannot be deduced from the CT scan unless we get the folder. 75% of the time, he may not be able to have any meaningful transaction or converse intelligently with somebody and the 25% means that he may be able to do that. The evidence given by the expert in this regard confirmed that the Maxwell Ablordeppey did have a stroke. Judging from the Medical Certificate of the Cause of Death, he said this was not the first time the stroke had occurred. It was recurrent. He also stated that the CT scan had indicated that there was an extensive infarction of the right cerebrum. However, he did say that he would not be able to say without the patient’s folder whether or not the patient would be able to converse intelligently with someone. The witness therefore was not conclusive on whether or not Mr. Maxwell Ablordeppey was capable of negotiating with the Appellant or anyone else in respect of the sale of the land. We cannot therefore say with certainty that Maxwell Ablordeppey was so incapacitated that he was disabled from negotiating and selling the disputed land. What indeed is evident that it is Professor Ablordeppey who gave out receipts for the land. And he explained that he did so on the authority of his brother, Maxwell Ablordeppey. The questions that arise are: how did PW1 know that there was land indeed to be sold? How would he know the purchase price of the land? How would he have known that the previous amount paid by the Appellant as rent for the land in question was to be factored into the purchase price and how would he have known who the owners of the land were for him to have made arrangements for documents to be made in the Appellant’s name? His evidence that he was acting on Maxwell Ablordeppey’s instructions are more probable than not. We can only infer from the evidence presented that PW1 got to know of Maxwell Ablordeppey’s wishes in connection with the land from Maxwell himself. There is a distinction between pure conjecture and reasonable inference. A conjecture may be plausible but it is of no legal value for its essence is that it is a mere guess. An inference in the legal sense on the other hand, is a deduction from the evidence and if it is a reasonable deduction, it may have the validity of legal proof. The attribution is always a matter of inference. (See the case of Nyame v. Tarzan Transport (1973) 1 GLR 8 CA. See also Section 18(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323 which states: An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. The Appellant and PW1’s evidence has also been corroborated by PW2 who said the Appellant was not in Accra and that initial discussions for the sale of the land were first held with his wife who said she would convey the contents of these discussions to her husband. This court finds that there was indeed a sale of land at a named price of GH¢21,000.00 and that the Appellant indeed did pay the purchase price in instalments less the amount he had paid as rent. The court also finds that the Appellant’s evidence was corroborated by both PW1 and PW2. PW1 contended that he was instructed to see the owners of the land for documents to be made in the Appellant’s name. Exhibit 10 is a copy of the original documents made between the Ahiaku Family of Kwashiman and Maxwell Ablordeppey which appear to bear no date and which have not been executed between the original parties (see pp. 344-352). Exhibit 1 found at pp. 318-324 are documents made between the Ahiaku Family and the Appellant and dated 1st July, 2007. The Respondents’ version of events is that the land sold to the Appellant had already prior to the sale, been given as a gift to the 4th Respondent. Since they had made a counterclaim, they had the same burden as the Appellant of proving their case. See the cases of Birimpong v. Bawuah (1994-95) GBR 837, Malm v. Lutterodt (1963) 1 GLR 1 and Appiah v. Asamoah (2003/2004) SCGLR 226 as well as Section 11 of the Evidence Act. The 1st Respondent told the Court that the land in question belonged to the 4th Respondent and that it had been given to him by her deceased father, Maxwell Ablordeppey when he was about 20 years old. At the time she was giving evidence on 18th July, 2012, he was about 36 years old. It was her evidence that the 4th Respondent exercised possession by walling the land and by operating a mechanic shop on the land. He also erected a washing bay and a wooden structure which housed a corn mill. (see Vol. 2 p. 11 of the ROA). In cross-examination found at pp. 17-19 of Volume 2 of the ROA the following was elicited from her: Q: …. Can you tell this honourable court how the late Maxwell Ablordeppey gifted this land in dispute to your brother Elvis or haw did your daddy, the late Maxwell Ablordeppey give the said land to Elvis? A: Yes. My Lord it was a gift to him. When our father was alive, he provided for all of us. At this moment where we live belongs to the ladies. One of our brothers was also given a place. Q: Madam Cynthia Ablordeppey, I believe per your custom when a gift is given something or a rite is performed. Is that not so, something substantial? A: My Lord, I personally don’t think that it should be so when your father gives you something substantial you must also do something in return Q: So how many people witnessed this gifting ceremony of this land in dispute to your brother Elvis Ablordeppey? A: We the siblings we were there, our grandmother was also present. Q: Does it mean that there was a ceremony then? A: Not really nothing of the sort. We were holding family meetings and often and it was during one of these meetings that the incident took place, the gifting of the land took place. Q: So aside your siblings and your grand mum can you tell or any other family member also witness this? A: No. My Lord. Q: … are you award the land in dispute as at the time no document covering same. Are you aware the land in dispute for which reason we are in court has no document, land document covering the land? Are you aware? A: My Lord there were documents covering the land. Q: … I suggest to you that when your daddy, according to you, gifted the said land in dispute to your brother, there were no documents covering the land. A: My Lord that is not true because my father will never go into any transaction without a document. The 1st Defendant’s evidence of a gift was corroborated by DW2 at pp. 23-32 of Volume 2 of the ROA. In cross-examination at p. 32 this was elicited from her: Q: … I believe that when a gift of substance is given to someone, certain rites are performed? A: No, my Lord. Q: Per your custom, you do not perform any rites? A: No. My Lord. Q: You don’t do something like aseda to thank your daddy? A: No. we were living together. We do things for our father and he also does things for us. Elvis is not the only son he has given a property to. It was now for the Respondents who had said there was a gift to prove it. The Respondents and their witnesses only said verbally that the late Maxwell Ablordeppey had told the 4th Respondent that he had made a gift of the land to him. They did not lead any evidence to show the essentials of a valid gift intervivos. The late Maxwell Ablordeppey never executed a Deed of Gift in 4th Respondent’s favour. The authorities are replete with the elements that make up a valid customary gift intervivos. The gift must be offered and accepted and these actions must be in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, just to say simply that a gift had been made was not enough. There had to be evidence to show the occasion on which the gift was made, the date, the venue and the people who were present and witnessed the gift. The Respondents had failed to prove all the essential ingredients of a valid gift of the land to 4th Respondent which were: a) Ceremony where the land was transferred to the 4th Respondent. b) Publication to the living and the dead that ownership in the land had moved from Maxwell Ablordeppey to the 4th Respondent. c) Pouring of libation. d) Aseda from 4th Respondent indication acceptance of a gift of land. (See Yoguo & Anor v. Agyekum & Others (1966) GLR 482 The requirement that the acceptance of a gift, especially of land, must be made by the presentation to the donor of some token of acknowledgement and gratitude in the presence of witnesses serves many purposes, and solves many problems relating to gifts. In the first place, a proffered gift which the donee does not accept is thereby prevented from becoming a gift. Secondly, where no gift was intended by a putative donor, a purported acceptance in the presence of witnesses affords an opportunity for express denial of a donative intent. Thirdly, the requirement of acceptance in the presence of witnesses ensures publicity and makes the gift not only impossible or difficult to deny afterwards, but operates as a double check preventing the donor from making a gift of what is not his own, namely, family property, and preventing fraud. See Mahama Hausa v. Baako Hausa (1972) 2 GLR 469, Asare v. Kumoji (2000) SCGLR 298 and Akunsah v. Botchway & Jei River Farms Ltd (2011) SCGLR 288. The evidence is not in support of the land having been made as a gift to the 4th Respondent as none of the elements of a customary gift has been proven to this court’s satisfaction. Moreover, if as the Respondents would like the court to believe, a perfect gift had been made, why would the Administrators of the Estate of the Maxwell Samuel Ablordeppey have executed a Vesting Assent in the 4th Respondent’s name? The Vesting Assent would be reproduced in full for its significance: VESTING ASSENT THIS ASSENT is made this 14th day of August in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Nine by MAVIS MAA NAKO DZIFA ABLORDEPPEY and EBENEZER KOFI ABLORDEPPEY of Accra in the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana (hereinafter referred to as the Administrators) WHEREAS the plot of land as shown by the site plan and described in the schedule was acquired by Mr. Maxwell S. Ablordeppey. And WHEREAS MR. MAXWELL SAMUEL ABLORDEPPEY died intestate and the property in issue devolved on his son ELVIS AWUKU ABLORDEPPEY. 0.1 MR. MAXWELL SAMUEL ABLORDEPPEY (deceased) herein died intestate on the 5th May, 2008, having at the time of his death his fixed place of abode at House No. SM Block 10 Santa Maria, Accra. 0.2 By Letters of Administration (not with will annexed) granted on the 28th day of October, 2008, MAVIS MAA NAKO DZIFA ABLORDEPPEY and EBENEZER KOFI ABLORDEPPEY were appointed administrators of the estate of the late MAXWELL SAMUEL ABLORDEPPEY. 0.3 During his life time Maxwell S. Ablordeppey permitted his son Elvis Awuku Ablordeppey to exercise acts of ownership and possession over the property in issue. 0.4 Elvis Awuku Ablordeppey until his sojourning to the United Kingdom partly developed the land in issue and operated a garage on it. 0.5 Elvis Awuku has now approached us the administrators herein and requested us to execute this assent and we as administrators of the estate of Mr. Maxwell S. Ablordeppey (deceased) have agreed to assent to the vesting in him of property referred to in the schedule. NOW, we MAVIS MAA NAKO DZIFA ABLORDEPPEY and EBENEZER KOFI ABLORDEPPEY all of H/No. SM Block 10, Santa Maria a) ASSENT to the vesting in ELVIS AWUKU ABLORDEPPEY the said property, being land plot at Kwashiman (Santa Maria) in the Ga West district of the Greater Accra Region measuring 0.16 acre, or 0.06 hectares b) WE DECLARE that the Administrators have not previously without the knowledge and consent of the said ELVIS AWUKU ABLORDEPPEY given or made an assent or conveyance in respect of any legal estate in or affecting the said property or any part thereof. AND WE ACKNOWLEDGE the right of the said beneficiary to the production of the letters of administration and to the delivery of copies of it. The Vesting Assent did not state that a gift had been made to the 4th Respondent. It only stated: “that the deceased had permitted his son Elvis Awuku Ablordeppey to exercise acts of ownership and possession over the property in issue” Surely, if a valid gift over the property had been made to 4th Respondent, that property would no longer form part of the deceased’s estate to be vested in anybody. The Administrators would have had no control over it as it would not have been part of the deceased’s estate to lend itself to be administered. In rehearing the matter, the appellate court is required to examine the whole record of appeal, taking into account all the evidence, oral and documentary, to satisfy itself that the judgment is amply supported by the evidence on record, upon the preponderance of the probabilities. See Koglex Ltd (No. 2) v. Field (2000) SCGLR 175 @ 184; Tuakwa v. Bosom (2001-2002) SCGLR 61 @ 65 and Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd (2010) SCGLR 729. In this regard, an appellate court is in the same position of the trial court and can make up its own mind on the facts and also draw its own inferences from the facts as found. Based on its evaluation of the evidence on record, the appellate court may interfere with the findings of facts made by the trial court, where good reasons exist for such interference. The authorities are however clear that findings of fact made by a trial Court can only be interfered with where such findings are not supported by the evidence on record; are perverse, or are based on wrong inferences drawn from established facts. These principles have been established in cases such as Simmonds v. Trassaco Estate Development Company (2010-2012) 1 GLR 393 CA; at holding 7 in the headnotes; Bonney v. Bonney (1992-93) Part 2 GBR 779 @781 SC and Jass Company Ltd & Anor v. Appau & Anor (2009) SCGLR 265 @275. In Amoah v. Lokko & Alfred Quartey (substituted) Gloria Quartey & Others (2011) 1 SCGLR 505, the court speaking through Aryeetey JSC whilst conceding that it was the exclusive duty of a trial judge to make primary findings of facts which will constitute the means by which the final outcome of the case would be arrived at, however held that, this notwithstanding, an appellate court was obliged to evaluate the evidence in coming to a decision whether the conclusions and findings of the trial court, which are being assailed, are supported by the evidence on record. It is in our view that the Appellant’s case is more probable than the Respondent’s. As a result, we find that the trial judge in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Appellant had paid for the land ought to have upheld his case. In view of this we set aside the order cancelling the Appellant’s Land Title Certificate issued on 13th January, 2009 (No. GA 28469). We however, re-iterate the trial court’s order of cancellation in respect of Land Certificate No. GA31773 dated 18th January 2010 in favour of the 4th Respondent. Since the property did not form part of the estate of the late Maxwell Ablordeppey, the administrators of his estate did not have any jurisdiction to deal with it and their purported vesting of the property in 4th Respondent was wrongful. The Appeal against the Judgment of the trial court is hereby allowed. I AGREE sgd JENNIFER DODOO (MRS) (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) sgd SENYO DZAMEFE (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) sgd I ALSO AGREE JANAPARE A. BARTELS-KODWO (MRS) (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) COUNSEL ISAAC AIDOO FOR PLAINITFF/APPELLANT ELIZABETH ANDERSON YEBOAH FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 20