Akim Azed Wakoli, Edwin Wafula Kilima & Joseph Stephen Juma v Republic [2014] KECA 27 (KLR)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT KISUMU

CORAM: ONYANGO  OTIENO, AZANGALALA & M'INOTI, JJ.A)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 49  OF 2009

BETWEEN

AKIM AZED WAKOLI......................................................1ST  APPELLANT

EDWIN WAFULA KILIMA.................................................2ND   APPELANT

JOSEPH STEPHEN JUMA.............................................3RD   APPELLANT

VERSUS

REPUBLIC.............................................................................RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Kenya

(Mwera & Karanja, JJ) dated 24th February, 2009

in

H.C.CR. APP. NOS. 17, 18 & 19 of 2008)

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The three appellants,  Akim Azed Wakoli, Edwin ,Wafula Kilima and Joseph  Stephen Juma  were charged  on 14th November, 2006  before the Principal Magistrate's Court at Siaya with robbery  with violence contrary  to section 296(2)  of the Penal Code.  The particulars of the  offence  were that  on 22nd October,  2006,  at Ligega Village,  Siaya District, within  Nyanza  Province, jointly  with  others  not before  the  court,  and  while  armed  with  dangerous  weapons,  namely firearms,  rungus  and pangas, they  robbed  George Ochieng Kadega of  an  Ahuja  amplifier, a pocket  radio,  a Yashika camera  and  a wrist watch  all  valued   Kshs  28,000/=, and  at  or  immediately before  or immediately  after   the  time   of  the  said  robbery,   they   used  actual violence  on the said George Kadega.

The third  appellant was separately  charged  with  handling  stolen goods contrary  to section 322  (2)  of the  Penal  Code; the particulars of  that  offence  being  that  on 1st   November, 2006  at  Kitale  Town in Trans Nzoia District within  Rift  Valley Province,  otherwise than  in  the course   of  stealing,  he  dishonestly   received  or   retained   an  Ahuja amplifier Serial No. 555913  knowing  or having  reason  to believe  that the same was stolen or unlawfully obtained.

Broadly,  the  facts  of the  case against  the  three  appellants  were that   on  27th  October,   2006,   at  about   7. 30   pm,  George  Ochieng Kadega (PW1)  and  his  wife  Sarah  Ochieng alias  Hilda Anyango Oluoch  (PW2),  returned to  their  home  at  Ligega  Village.  While  PW1 was in the bedroom, PW2 rushed  in and informed him that  their  home had   been invaded by robbers,   after she had   espied a stranger struggling  with their house-help,   Roselyn   Auma,(PW3),  in  the kitchen.  Terrified  and in  despair,  PW1 and PW2 locked  themselves in their  bedroom  and  managed  to  alert,  by cell phone,  a neighbour and the  police  of  their  predicament. Soon thereafter, one  of the  robbers broke the  bedroom  window,  pointed  a gun at them  and ordered  them to  open the  door. Three other  robbers  shortly  succeeded  in breaking down  the  bedroom  door, after  which they  assaulted  PW1, tied  him  up and demanded  money  from  him. The robbers took  Kshs 3,000/= from PW1 as  well as the properties particularized in the charge sheet.

To make their getaway, the robbers forced PW1 to start for them his Motor Vehicle Registration  No. KAP 938 R, but at the  gate,  they were confronted by the arriving  police, upon which they abandoned  the vehicle and made their escape on foot. The police directed PW1 and his family to stay away from the vehicle pending  investigations.

Acting on information, the police arrested the three appellants on 1st November,   2006   at   Kitale. None of  the  stolen   property  was recovered from them, save the Ahuja amplifier which the police alleged to have  recovered   from   the   third   appellant.  The  appellants  were subsequently charged  with the offence as particularized above.

In  the  meantime, the  day  after  the  robbery, Corporal David Ongwenyi, (PW5),  of  the  Provincial  CID  scenes  of  crime   support services  office  visited  the  locus in  quo  and  lifted  finger  impressions from  among  other  places, the rear door of the house, the  door  of the store,  window  panes  and the  inside  and outside  of the  Motor  Vehicle No. KAP 938 R. Those impressions together with the finger prints of the three appellants were analysed by Barrack Odero, (PW 10), a gazetted fingerprints expert working at Criminal Investigations Department (CID) Headquarters, Nairobi. He prepared  a report  which showed  that  each  of  the  appellants'  fingerprints  matched some  of those  that  had been lifted  from  various  places  at the  locus  in quo. In total the prosecution   called  11 witnesses,  including Peter  Amoth, (PW 8)who testified to the injuries  sustained by PW1.

In their defence, in which they gave sworn evidence and called no witnesses, the appellants denied commission of the offence. The 1st appellant's defence  was,  in  the  main,  that  the  charges  against  him were fabricated because  of a land  boundary  dispute  between  him  and a senior  police  officer;  that  of the 2nd appellant was that  he had been framed  by his brother-in-law, a police officer  after he, the 2nd appellant, had quarrelled with  his wife (the  sister of the police  officer); while that of  the 3rd appellant was  that   he  was  in  Nairobi  at  the  time   of  the robbery  and  that was  never  found  in  possession  of  the  amplifier  as alleged by the police.

On 14th March 2008, the trial magistrate convicted the appellants of the  main  charge  and sentenced  them  to death. The third  appellant was acquitted of the charge of handling  stolen property. The conviction of  the appellants was  based   solely  on  identification by  fingerprint evidence,  after the trial  magistrate rejected  the evidence  of their identification in identification parades.

Aggrieved  by the decision  of the trial court, the appellants  lodged separate  appeals in the High Court, contending that  the evidence  upon which  they   were  convicted  was  contradictory  and  insufficient.  The three  appeals  were consolidated and heard  together by Mwera, J. (as he then  was) and Karanja, J., who, on 24th February,  2009 dismissed the  appeals  and upheld  the  conviction, thus  precipitating the  present appeal.

Before us, Mr Lore,  learned  counsel  appeared  for the  appellants while  Mr  Abele  the  learned  Assistant  Director of Public  Prosecutions appeared for the  respondent. The appellants' memorandum of appeal raised four  grounds  of appeal, but  upon closer  scrutiny, it really  raised only  one  issue, namely  the  identification of the  appellants, although the  issue  had  two  limbs  to  it. The first  limb  is  identification of  the appellants by the witnesses at the locus in quo and the second is identification of the appellant's through the fingerprint evidence.

We  need   not   spend   time   on  the  first   limb   of  identification, because  the  trial  court  rejected  all  the  evidence  of purported identification of  the  appellants  at  the  locus  in  quo  as  well  as  the evidence of the  purported identification in  subsequent identification parades.  The first appellate court similarly concluded that that evidence   was unsafe  and   unreliable  and  that   the   trial court   had properly rejected  the  same.  The first appellate court  expressed  itself thus, on the issue:

"Regarding the crucial issue of identification, the learned trial magistrate found  that the  complainant's wife  (PW2) and  his house-help (PW3) who incidentally were  the identifying  witnesses for  the  prosecution were  unable to identify  the  robbers at  the  scene of  the  offence. The learned trial magistrate was of the view that the evidence of   identification  by   the  aforesaid  witnesses  was   not reliable thereby rendering the identification parades useless. He therefore found no   need to analyse the evidence of the officers who  carried out the parades (i.e. PW9  and PW 11). We cannot agree more with the foregoing   findings of the   learned trial   magistrate regarding the identification of the offenders at the scene. The evidence of PW2 and PW3  regarding the same was inconsistent and  contradictory to be  relied -  upon. In effect, the entire evidence of identification at the scene of the  offence during  the robbery was such that the prosecution failed to establish that favourable conditions and adequate opportunity for the identification of the offenders existed at the time."

We do  not  intend  to  say  more  on  that  limb  of  the  ground  of appeal. That leaves the issue of identification .of the appellants  through the fingerprint evidence.

Mr Lore submitted that the trial court and the first appellate  court had erred  in convicting  the  appellants  on the basis of the  fingerprint evidence   which   was  inconclusive   and   unreliable. Learned  counsel further  contended  that  it was not  clear  who had lifted the  fingerprint impressions  at PW1's  home and what the  result  of that  exercise  was. Counsel urged that  the Scenes of Crime Report (C.I.D Form No. C. 46), was not  properly  filled,  and in his view,  that  suggested  that  it was a concocted report.

Mr Lore criticised  the prosecution for failure to lift fingerprint impressions   from  the  bedroom  door,  doubting   the  veracity   of  the explanation that  it was  not  possible  to  do  so from  a  wooden  door. Counsel concluded by submitting that the fingerprint evidence was incomplete because  there  was no report  relating  to the fingerprints  of PW1, PW2 and  PW3 which  were  taken  for  purposes  of elimination  as person who were legitimately at the locus in quo.

Mr  Abele,  on  his  part  opposed  the  appeal  and  supported the conviction and  the  sentence.  Counsel  submitted that  both  the  trial court  and  the  first  appellate court  had  arrived at  correct  concurrent findings of fact  which, on the  facts  of this  appeal, this  Court  could  not interfere with.   Mr Abele invoked  section 48(1) of the  Evidence Act regarding opinions  of experts, and submitted that  the provision  renders admissible opinions  of persons  specially  skilled  in, for example, finger or other  impressions, when the court  is required to form an opinion  on such matters. Counsel concluded by submitting that  the fingerprint evidence was not  challenged by  any  other  expert evidence  and  that the same remained cogent  and consistent.

We have perused the  record  of the  proceedings before  the  trial court  and  the  first  appellate court,  as well  as the  exhibits that  were produced by  the  police  regarding the  fingerprint  evidence. We have also considered the submissions by learned  counsel.

Fingerprint impressions have  been  accepted  for  a long  time  as reliable   means  of  personal  identification; some  people  would  assert, indeed,            an infallible method of  identification. The small ridge formations or patterns on fingertips or palms of the hand are said to be personal to each person, so that no two persons have exactly the same arrangement of the ridge  patterns. In addition those patterns remain unchanged for life.  Those  are  scientifically undisputed facts  which  a court  can  take  judicial  notice  of  under  section 60  of  the  Evidence Act.

Way  back  in  1911,  the  Supreme  Court  of  lllinois  in  the  USA, delivered its  landmark decision  in  the  PEOPLE  VS.  JENNINGS,  252 Ill.  534, 96   N.E.   1077 (1911), in  which   it accepted   fingerprint evidence  as a means  of legally  identifying individuals, in the following words:

"We are disposed  to hold  from the evidence  of the four witnesses who testified, and from the  writings we have referred  to on  this subject,    that   there   is   a   scientific  basis   for   the   system    of fingerprint identification, and  that  the  courts  cannot  refuse  to take judicial cognizance of it ...  "

Here in Kenya,  in   NAZIR  AHMED S/O  REHAMAT ALl  & ANOTHER VS R, (1962) EA 345, the former  Court of Appeal for East Africa  upheld  the  conviction of an appellant for theft of motor  vehicle on the basis of his finger  and palm prints  that  were found on the stolen motor  vehicles  soon after  the theft.

By comparing the  fingerprints found  at the  scene  of crime  with those  of  a suspect  therefore, an  expert,  whose  evidence  is  properly admitted by  the  court  under  section 48  one  of  the  Evidence Act, may establish conclusively the presence or absence of a suspect at the scene of crime or the identity of the person whose finger or palm prints have  been  found  at  the  scene  of  crime.  Once  that  is done,  all  that remains is primarily the  determination of whether  the  suspect  was at the scene for an innocent purpose  or otherwise.

In this appeal, contrary  to the submissions  of learned  counsel for the   appellants,  PW5 testified  that   he  was  the   one  who  took   the fingerprint impressions  at  the  locus  in quo  from  the  rear door  of the house, the door of the store, window  panes and the inside and outside of  the  Motor  Vehicle  No.  KAP 938  R. His  evidence   was  particularly detailed  and he produced  those  impressions  as Exhibits  9, 13  and 15. Those  impressions,   together  with  the  finger   and  palm   prints   were despatched  to  PW 10,  a gazetted  fingerprints expert  with  two  years experience in identification of people through  fingerprints impressions, who,    after    analysing    and   comparing  the    impressions    and   the appellant's prints  found as follows:

i) The 1st appellant's left thumb prints were  identical to the  impressions taken from  window pane;

ii) The 2nd appellant's left forefinger prints were identical to the impressions taken from the door  of the  store  and several other places at the scene; and

iii) The 3rd appellant's right forefinger prints  were identical to impressions taken from the motor vehicle.

From the evidence of PW10, he was able to identify, in respect  of each appellant sixteen  matching marks  or characteristics between the  fingerprints of  each appellant and  the  corresponding impressions collected from the  scene of crime.  We do not think  from  that  evidence and   the   exhibits   that   PW 10's   report   was  a  concocted   report   as submitted by Mr Lore.

The evidence on the identification of the appellants was circumstantial.   In   ABANGA  ALIAS  ONYANGO VS  REPUBLIC, Criminal  Appeal No 32  of  1990, this   Court   stated   as  follows regarding circumstantial evidence:

“ lt  is settled law that when a  case rests entirely  on circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests: (i)  the circumstances from which an   inference of guilt is sought to be  drawn, must be  cogently and firmly established,;  (ii) those  circumstances should  be   of  a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (iii)   the  circumstances taken  cumulatively, should form a chain so  complete that there is no  escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was  committed by  the accused and none else."

In our  opinion, the  evidence   of  identification of  the  appellants through their  fingerprints was safe evidence  upon which to found  their conviction. Their fingerprints were found at the locus in quo, only hours after the robbery.  Those fingerprints were  found  at  the  very  places . where,  according to  the  evidence  of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the  robbers had  visited or  on  property  they   had  come  into   contact  with.  The evidence irresistibly placed  the  appellants at the  scene  of the  robbery and their  presence  there  had no innocent explanation as they  did  not give any explanation of the same presence  as would be required under section 111 of  the  Evidence  Act.   We  do  not  see  any  basis  for concluding that  those  fingerprints were  at the  scene  of crime accidentally.

In NAZIR   AHMED S/0  REHAMAT ALl   &  ANOTHER VS  R, (supra) the Court reasoned  as follows:

"The possibility of  accidental contact by  the same person (being a person unconnected with the owners) with the three cars  stolen on  different  occasions does not warrant serious, or  indeed any,  consideration. It is plain then that the first appellant had deliberate contact with cars mentioned in  counts 4  and 5 either at the time of  the thefts or within a matter of hours...We therefore think that the magistrate was  fully justified in  convicting the first appellant on the evidence before him."

We would adopt the same reasoning in this case and find that the appellants were properly identified through their fingerprints.

We do not think much turns  on the  complaint on lack of a report relating to the fingerprints of PW1,  PW2and PW3.  In our understanding, the purpose of taking the fingerprints of PW1, PW2 and PW3 was purely for eliminating or excluding their presence  at the locus in quo, which  was undoubtedly legitimate or innocent. That  there  was no report on the  analysis  of the  places  where  their  fingerprints  were found cannot  form the basis for impeaching a report on the presence  of the fingerprints of the appellants  at the locus in quo. The real issue was not  whether   PW1,   PW2 and  PW3  were  at  the  locus  in  quo;  it was whether  the appellants were there.

We have ultimately come to the conclusion  that  we have no basis for  interfering with  the  concurrent findings  by  the  two  courts  below. The identification of  the   appellants  through   their   fingerprints  was sound and safe. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Dated and delivered at Kisumu this 13th day of June 2014

ONYANGO OTIENO

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

F. AZANGALALA

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

K. M'INOTI

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is a true copy of the original

DEPUTY REGISTAR