Akim Azed Wakoli, Edwin Wafula Kilima & Joseph Stephen Juma v Republlc [2014] KECA 51 (KLR)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT KISUMU

CORAM: ONYANGO OTIENO, AZANGALALA & M'INOTI, JJ.A)

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.  49 OF 2009

BETWEEN

AKIM AZED WAKOLI...................................................... 1ST APPELLANT

EDWIN WAFULA KILIMA................................................2ND APPELLANT

JOSEPH STEPHEN JUMA..............................................3RD APPELLANT

VERSUS

REPUBLlC.............................................................................RESPONDENT

(Appeal  from  the judgment of the High  Court of Kenya

(Mwera & Karanja, JJ.) dated 24th February, 2009

in

H.C. CR. APP. NOS. 17, 18 & 19 of 2008)

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The three  appellants, Akim Azed Wakoli,  Edwin Wafula Kilima and Joseph  Stephen Juma  were  charged  on 14th November, 2006  before the Principal Magistrate's Court at Siaya with robbery  with violence contrary to section 296(2)   of the Penal Code. The particulars of the  offence  were  that on 22nd  October,  2006, at  Ligega Village,  Siaya District, within  Nyanza  Province, jointly  with  others  not before  the  court,  and  while  armed  with  dangerous  weapons, namely firearms, rungus  and pangas, they  robbed  George Ochieng  Kadega of  an  Ahuja  amplifier, a pocket  radio,  a Yashika camera  and  a  wrist watch  all  valued   Kshs  28,000/=,  and  at  or  immediately  before   or immediately  after   the  time   of  the  said  robbery,   they   used  actual violence  on the said George Kadega.

The third appellant was separately charged with handling stolen goods contrary  to section 322  (2) of the  Penal  Code; the particulars of  that  offence  being  that  on 1st November, 2006  at  Kitale  Town in Trans Nzoia District within  Rift  Valley  Province,  otherwise than  in  the course  of  stealing,  he dishonestly  received   or   retained  an  Ahuja amplifier Serial No. 555913  knowing  or having  reason  to  believe  that the same was stolen or unlawfully obtained.

Broadly,  the  facts  of the  case against  the  three  appellants were that on 27th  October,   2006,  at  about   7. 30  pm,   George  Ochieng Kadega (PW1)  and  his  wife Sarah Ochieng alias Hilda Anyango Oluoch(PW2),  returned to  their  home  at  Ligega  Village.  While  PW1 was in the  bedroom, PW2 rushed  in and informed him  that  their  home had been invaded by robbers, after she had espied a stranger struggling    with their house-help,  Roselyn  Auma, (PW3), in  the kitchen. Terrified  and  in despair,  PW1 and PW2 locked  themselves in their  bedroom  and managed  to  alert,  by cell  phone,  a neighbour and the  police  of  their  predicament. Soon thereafter, one of  the  robbers broke the  bedroom  window,  pointed  a gun  at them  and ordered  them to  open  the  door. Three  other  robbers  shortly  succeeded in breaking down  the  bedroom  door, after  which  they  assaulted  PW1, tied  him  up and demanded  money  from  him. The robbers took Kshs 3,000/= from PW1 as well as the properties particularized in the charge sheet.

To make their getaway, the robbers forced PW1 to start for them his Motor Vehicle Registration No. KAP 938 R, but at the gate, they were confronted by the arriving police, upon which they abandoned the vehicle and made their escape on foot. The police directed PW1 and his family to stay away from the vehicle pending investigations.

Acting on information, the police arrested the three appellants on 1st November,   2006 at Kitale. None of the stolen property was recovered from them, save the Ahuja amplifier which the police alleged to have recovered   from   the   third   appellant.  The appellants were subsequently charged  with the offence as particularised above.

In  the  meantime, the  day  after  the  robbery,  Corporal David Ongwenyi, (PW5),  of  the  Provincial  CID scenes  of  crime   support services  office  visited  the  locus in  quo  and  lifted  finger  impressions from  among  other  places, the  rear door of the  house, the  door  of the store,  window  panes  and the  inside  and outside  of the  Motor  Vehicle No. KAP  938 R. Those impressions together with the finger prints of the three appellants were analysed  by  Barrack  Odero,  (PW 1O), a gazetted   fingerprints   expert    working   at  Criminal Investigations  Department (CID) Headquarters, Nairobi.  He prepared  a report  which showed  that  each  of  the  appellants'  fingerprints  matched some  of those  that  had been lifted  from  various  places  at the  locus  in quo. In total the  prosecution   called  11 witnesses, including Peter Amoth, (PW8) who testified to the injuries  sustained  by PW 1.

In their defence, in which they gave sworn evidence and called no witnesses, the appellants denied commission of the offence. The 1st appellant's defence  was, in  the  main,  that  the  charges  against  him were fabricated because  of a land boundary  dispute  between  him  and a senior  police  officer;  that  of the  2nd  appellant was that  he had been framed  by his brother- in- law, a police officer  after he, the  2nd appellant, had quarrelled with  his wife (the sister of the police  officer); while that of  the  3rd  appellant  was  that   he  was  in  Nairobi  at  the  time  of  the robbery  and  that  was  never  found  in  possession  of  the amplifier as alleged by the police.

On 14th March 2008, the trial magistrate convicted the appellants of the main charge and sentenced them to death.  The third appellant was acquitted of the charge of handling stolen property. The conviction of  the  appellants  was  based  solely  on  identification  by  fingerprint evidence, after the trial  magistrate rejected  the evidence  of their identification in identification parades.

Aggrieved  by the decision  of the trial court, the appellants lodged separate  appeals in the High Court, contending that  the evidence  upon which  they  were  convicted  was  contradictory  and  insufficient.  The three  appeals  were consolidated and heard  together by Mwera, J. (as he then  was) and Karanja, J., who, on 24th  February,  2009  dismissed the  appeals  and upheld  the  conviction, thus  precipitating the  present appeal.

Before us, Mr  Lore,  learned  counsel  appeared  for the appellants while  Mr  Abele  the  learned  Assistant  Director of Public Prosecutions appeared for the  respondent. The appellants' memorandum of appeal raised four  grounds  of appeal, but  upon closer scrutiny, it really  raised only  one  issue, namely  the  identification of the  appellants, although the  issue  had  two  limbs  to  it. The  first limb  is  identification of  the appellants by the witnesses at the locus in quo and the second is identification of the appellant's through the fingerprint evidence.

We  need   not   spend   time   on  the   first   limb   of  identification, because  the  trial  court  rejected all the  evidence  of purported identification of  the  appellants  at  the  locus  in  quo  as  well  as  the evidence of  the  purported identification  in  subsequent identification parades.  The first appellate court   similarly concluded that that evidence   was unsafe   and   unreliable and that the   trial   court   had properly rejected the  same.  The first appellate court expressed  itself thus, on the issue:

"Regarding the crucial issue of identification, the  learned trial magistrate found that the  complainant's wife  (PW2) and his house-help  (PW3)  who incidentally  were  the  identifying  witnesses for  the  prosecution were  unable to identify  the  robbers at  the  scene of  the  offence. The learned trial magistrate was of the view that the evidence of identification by   the aforesaid witnesses was   not reliable thereby rendering the identification parades useless. He therefore found no   need to analyse the evidence of the officers who carried out the parades (i.e. PW9 and PW 11).   We   cannot agree more with the foregoing   findings   of    the   learned trial   magistrate regarding the identification of the offenders at the scene. The evidence of PW2 and PW3 regarding the same was inconsistent and contradictory to  be   relied upon.  In effect, the entire evidence of identification at the scene of the offence during the robbery was such that the prosecution failed to establish that favourable conditions and adequate opportunity for the identification of the offenders existed at the time."

We do  not  intend  to  say  more  on  that  limb  of  the  ground   of appeal. That leaves the issue of identification of the appellants through the fingerprint evidence.

Mr Lore submitted that the trial court and the first appellate court had erred in convicting the appellants on the basis of the fingerprint evidence which was inconclusive and   unreliable.  Learned counsel further contended that it was not clear who had lifted the fingerprint impressions at PW1’S home and what the result of that exercise  was. Counsel urged that the Scenes of Crime Report (C.I.D Form No. C. 46), was not properly filled, and in his view, that suggested that it was a concocted report.

Mr Lore criticised the  prosecution   for  failure  to  lift  fingerprint impressions   from  the  bedroom   door,  doubting   the  veracity   of  the explanation that  it was  not  possible  to  do so from  a  wooden  door. Counsel concluded by submitting that the fingerprint evidence was incomplete because there was no report relating to the fingerprints of PW1, PW2 and PW3 which were taken for purposes of elimination as persons who were legitimately at the locus in quo.

Mr Abele,  on  his  part  opposed  the  appeal  and  supported the conviction and  the  sentence.  Counsel  submitted that both the  trial court  and  the  first  appellate court  had  arrived at  correct  concurrent findings of fact  which,  on the  facts  of this  appeal,  this  Court  could  not interfere with.   Mr Abele  invoked  section 48(1) of the  Evidence Act regarding opinions  of experts, and submitted that  the provision renders admissible opinions  of persons  specially  skilled  in, for example, finger or other  impressions, when  the court  is required to form an opinion  on such matters. Counsel concluded by submitting that the fingerprint evidence was not challenged by any other expert evidence and that the same remained cogent  and consistent.

We have perused the record of the  proceedings before  the  trial court  and  the  first  appellate court,  as well  as the  exhibits that  were produced by  the  police  regarding the  fingerprint  evidence. We have also considered the submissions by learned counsel.

Fingerprint impressions have  been  accepted  for  a long  time  as reliable means  of  personal identification; some  people  would  assert, may establish conclusively the presence or absence of a suspect at the scene of crime or the identity of the person  whose finger or palm prints have  been  found  at  the  scene  of  crime.  Once  that  is  done,  all  that remains  is primarily the  determination of whether  the  suspect  was at the scene for an innocent  purpose or otherwise.

In this appeal, contrary  to the submissions  of learned  counsel for the   appellants,  PW5 testified that   he  was  the  one  who  took   the fingerprint impressions  at  the  locus in quo  from  the  rear door  of the house, the door of the store, window  panes and the inside and outside of  the  Motor  Vehicle  No. KAP 938 R. His evidence was particularly detailed  and he produced  those impressions  as Exhibits  9, 13  and 15. Those impressions, together with the finger and palm prints were despatched  to  PW 10,  a gazetted  fingerprints expert  with  two  years  experience  in identification of people through fingerprints impressions, who,   after    analysing    and   comparing   the    impressions    and   the appellant's prints  found as follows:

i) The 1st appellant's left thumb prints were identical to the impressions taken from window pane;

ii)    The 2nd appellant's   left forefinger prints were identical to the impressions taken from the door of the store and several other places  at the scene; and

iii)    The   3rd appellant's right forefinger prints were identical to impressions taken   from the    motor vehicle.

From the evidence  of PW 10, he was able to identify, in respect  of each appellant sixteen  (16) matching marks  or characteristics between the  fingerprints of  each  appellant and  the  corresponding impressions collected from the  scene of crime.  We do not think from that evidence and  the exhibits that PW 10's   report  was   a  concocted  report  as submitted by Mr Lore.

The evidence on the identification of the appellants was circumstantial.   In   ABANGA ALIAS ONYANGO  VS  REPUBLIC, Criminal  Appeal  No   32  of  1990, this   Court   stated   as  follows regarding circumstantial evidence:

“ ”lt  is settled law that when a  case rests entirely  on circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests: (i)  the circumstances from which an  inference of guilt is sought to be  drawn, must be  cogently and firmly established,;  (ii) those  circumstances should  be   of  a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;   (iii)  the   circumstances  taken   cumulatively, should form a chain so  complete that there is no  escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was  committed by  the accused and none else."

In  our  opinion, the  evidence of  identification of  the  appellants through their  fingerprints was safe evidence upon  which  to found  their conviction. Their fingerprints were found at the locus in quo, only hours after the robbery.  Those fingerprints were found  at  the  very  places where,  according to  the  evidence  of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the  robbers had  visited   or  on  property  they   had come   into   contact  with. The indeed, an infallible method of identification. The small ridge formations or patterns on fingertips or palms of the hand are said to be personal to each person, so that no two persons have exactly the same arrangement of the ridge patterns. In addition those patterns remain unchanged for life.  Those  are  scientifically undisputed facts  which  a court  can  take  judicial  notice  of  under  section 60 of  the  Evidence Act.

Way  back  in  1911,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois in  the USA, delivered its  landmark decision  in the  PEOPLE  VS.  JENNINGS,252 III. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911),  in  which           it ac epted  fingerprint evidence  as a means  of legally  identifying individuals, in the following words:

"We are disposed  to hold  from the evidence  of the four witnesses who testified, and from  the  writings  we have referred to on  this subject,    that   there   is   a  scientific  basis   for   the   system  of fingerprint identification, and  that  the  courts  cannot   refuse  to take judicial cognizance of it... "Here   in   Kenya,   in   NAZIR  AHMED  S/O   REHAMAT ALl   & ANOTHER VS R, (1962) EA 345, the former  Court of Appeal for East Africa upheld  the  conviction of an appellant for theft  of motor  vehicle on the basis of his finger  and palm prints  that  were found on the stolen motor  vehicles  soon after the theft.

By comparing the  fingerprints found  at the  scene  of crime  with those  of  a suspect  therefore, an  expert,  whose  evidence   is properly admitted by  the  court  under  section 48 one  of the  Evidence  Act,evidence  irresistibly placed  the  appellants at the  scene  of the  robbery and their  presence  there  had no innocent explanation as they  did not give any explanation of the same presence  as would be required under section 111 of  the   Evidence Act. We  do  not  see  any  basis  for concluding that  those  fingerprints were  at the  scene  of crime accidentally.

In NAZIR  AHMED S/O REHAMAT ALl  &  ANOTHER VS  R, (supra) the Court reasoned as follows:

"The possibility of accidental contact by the same person (being a person unconnected with the owners) with the three cars stolen on  different occasions does not warrant serious, or indeed any, consideration. It is plain then that the first appellant had deliberate contact with cars mentioned in counts 4 and 5 either at the time of the thefts or within a matter of hours...We therefore think that the magistrate was fully justified in convicting the first appellant on the evidence before him."

We would adopt the same reasoning in this case and find that the appellants were properly identified through their fingerprints.

We do not think much turns on the complaint on lack of a report relating to the fingerprints of PW 1, PW2 and PW3.   In   our understanding, the purpose of taking the fingerprints of PW1, PW2 and PW3 was purely for eliminating or excluding their presence at the locus in quo, which was undoubtedly legitimate or innocent. That  there  was no report  on the  analysis  of  the  places  where  their  fingerprints  were found cannot  form the basis for impeaching a report  on the presence  of the fingerprints of the appellants  at the locus in quo. The real issue was not whether   PW1, PW2  and  PW3  were  at  the  locus  in  quo;  it  was whether  the appellants  were there.

We have ultimately come to the conclusion that we have no basis for interfering with the concurrent findings by the two courts below. The identification of the   appellants through their fingerprints was sound and safe. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Dated and delivered at Kisumu this 13th June 2014.

ONYANGO OTIENO

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

F.AZANGALALA

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

K. M'INOTI

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is a true copy

of the original.

DEPUTY REGISTRAR