Altimimi v Twinomugisha (Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2000) [2000] UGCA 49 (19 January 2000)

Full Case Text

### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

### IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

#### $CORAM:$ HON. LADY JUSTICE L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO, DCJ HON. JUSTICE A. TWINOMUJUNI, J. A HON. LADY JUSTICE C. N. B. KITUMBA, J. A.

### **CIVIL APPEAL NO.22 OF 2000**

### UGANDA ALUMINIUM LTD....................................

### **VERSUS**

### <table> RESTETUTA TWINOMUGISHA....................................

# (Appeal from the judgment of the High Court (Ntabgoba, P. J) dated 19 January 2000 in H. C. C. S. No.1031 of 1998)

### **JUDGMENT OF TWINOMUJUNI, J. A:**

This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court in which the appellant was ordered to pay shs.15,000,000/ $=$ (Fifteen million shillings) to the respondent as compensation for "harassment, defamation and mental as well as physical anguish."

### THE FACTS.

The background to this suit as found by the learned trial judge are is follows:

"The facts of the case, which do not seem to be contested by either side, are that the plaintiffs late husband, Tony Twinomugisha was employed by the defendant as Chief Accountant prior to his death. I will hereinafter refer to him as the deceased. He had opened a bank account jointly to be in the name of his rvife and his. He was obtaining goods from the defendant and, apparently, without the knowledge of the plaintiff he was paying for those goods by issuing cheques drawn on the joint account. He had asked the plaintiff to sign several blank cheques. Whenever he rvanted to pay for the goods he would ask the defendant's Cashier, Ms. Florencc Tiko to fill in the blanks of the relevant cheques. Tiko was witness DW3 and testified that her duties as a Cashier was receiving and banking Cash and Cheques and maintaining Customers 'ledge accounts'. The deceased was her boss. He used to bring cheques signcd by the plaintiff and instruct Ms. Tiko to till in thc details that he would give her, including the amount of money and the date. She filled in three cheques of shs.4,000,000/= (Cheque No.075339 u'hich was exhibited in Court as D3), of shs.4,000,000/: (Chcque No.075338 exhibited :rs D5 and Cheque No.07534,1 for shs.6,000,000/=). She testifiecl that these cheques wcre issued in respect of goods taken by Tyresland. With regard to the cheque for shs.4,000,000/- (Ex D.5) she dated it 319197 after deccasetl had died. He died on 217197.

)

,'.

After the deceased's demise, Ms. Tiko opened the deceased's desk drarver in his Office (i.e. deceased's Office) in the presence of other Staff members and found several documents' including several cheques lvhich borc the signature of the plaintiff as aforementioned.

Most cheques were dated by her after the deccased's death and presented to the bank for paymcnt. Those and some which had been credited on the ledge account of Tyresland were dishonoured and the debit on that account grew to shs.40, 831,849/:. But because some of the old cheques could not be recovered, the debit balance in the account showed a sum ofshs.30,631,849/=.

Mr. A. M-Jha the Executive Director of thc defcndant testified that when the deceased died he was in lndia and on rcturn he was informed that the deceased had misappropriated a sum of shs.47,731,000/:. It is then that he started demanding from the plaintiff payment of the mone)'. He reported the plaintiff to the Police and the plaintiff was charged rvith the offence of issuing false cheques because she was the signatory to the dishonou red cheques contrary to S.36,1(l)(b) of the Pcnal Code Act. She was released on Police Bond but kept on reporting to the Police subscquent to her release.

While the plaintiff was charged with the offence in September 1997, in October 1997, the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant's lawyers, M/s. Mulenga & Kalemera Advocates informing her that goods purchased by her Company from the defendant had not been paid for 'as a result of the fraudulent concealment of your Company's indebtedness by your late husband Mr. Tony who also our client's Twinomugisha was Chief Accountant...'

The advocate's letter continues: -

'Our client further discovered a series of cheques issued by your Company in purported settlement of your dues which had been receipted but were never banked and instead were kept aside by your late husband. When our client discovered and presented them for payment they were all dishonoured. According to our instructions you were the signatory to all the Cheques. Upon full investigation our client found that your Company was indebted in the sum of shs.40,631,849/ $=$ and demanded repayment of the same. On $18^{th}$ August, 1997 the Administrator of the estate of your late husband paid to our client Ug.shs. $10,000,000/=$ . To date, however, the outstanding balance of sh s.3 0,63 I ,849/: remains unpuitl despite severul reminrlers und demtn s bl'our clienl.'

The advocate's letter warned the plaintiff that unless within 7 days she paid the debt together with their legal fees she would be reported to the Police for having issued a bouncing cheques and for conspiracy t<l defraud and/or theft/obtaining goods by false pretences.

The plaintiff, in her plaint complains of harassment and intimidation which were calculated to extort from her the amount of indebtedness. She denies having had a Company that obtained goods from the defendant shc must be right actually. The defendant, during the trial could not identify Tyresland nor that it at all belonged to the plaintiff. Some of the tax invoices/receipts pleaded by the defendant indicate that the goods werc supplied to 'Tyresland' while others showed that the supply was made to Tyresland Ltd. The Executive Director of the defendant said that there was no such Conrpany or business name. He claims that the goods rvere supplied to a shop which he claims belongcd to the plaintiff. But he concedes that the goods were supplied on the orders of the deceased. The plaintiff denies having operated a shop or Tyresland Company. She claims she u:rs n Teacher of a School,"

# llrE rssJrFis

At the beginning of the trial, counsel framed the fbllowing seven issues for determination which the learned Principal Judge accepted: -

l. Whether the facts quoted in paragraph 8 of the plaint are correct.

- 2. If they are corect, whether they justihed the defendant's conduct of reporting plaintiff to Police. - 3. Whether defendant conducted a campaign and crusade against plaintiff for purposes stated in paragraph 9 ofthe plaint. - 4. Whether defendant's actions or conduct have caused loss or damage to plaintiff. - 5. Whether plaintiff purchased any goods from the defendant. - 6. Whether plaintiff issued the cheques to defendant in payment fbr the goods. - 7, Whether plaintiff owes the sums claimed in the counter claim to defendant.

The learned Principal Judge found on the facts proved that she had suff-ered 'harassment, defamation and mental and physical anguish' at the hands of the appellant and awarded her combined general and exemplary damages of shs.15,000,000/: with interest and costs of the suit.

## THE APPEAL

The appellant's appeals against the decree. It filed the following grounds of appeal:-

- l. The learned Principal Judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the respondent did not issue the cheques in question to the appellant. - 2. That the leamed Principal Judge ened in law and fact in finding that the respondent was not legally responsible to make good the dishonoured Cheque No.075339 which she signed. - 3. That the leamed Principal Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the facts quoted in paragraph 8 ofthe plaint were entirely false. - 4. That the leamed Principal Judge ened in fact and in law in finding that the appellant was notjustified to report the respondent to the police. - 5. That the learned Principal Judge erred in fact and in law in finding that the appellant conducted a campaign and crusade against the respondent. - 6. That the learned Principal Judge erred in fact and in law ir.r finding that the appellant's actions or conduct caused loss or damage to the respondent. - 7. That the leamed Principal Judge ened in fact and in law in awarding the respondent damages of shs. 15,000,000/= (fifteen million) without any basis or substantiation whatsoever.

I have found considerable difliculty in dealing with these grounds of appeal. There are two reasons for this. The first difficulty one is caused by the pleadings in this case. The plaint contains mostly generalities without any specifics. The plaint states vaguely that she had been harassed and defamed

as a result of a false and malicious report made against her to the police. She also stated that her constitutional rights were violated but she did not specifo which ones and whether she was seeking a constitutional rernedy under Article 50 of the Constitution or not. The law requires arnong other things that a plaint should state facts constituting the cause of action and specify particulars. Looking at the plaint in the instant case, it is difficult to tell what the cause of action is. The Written Statement of Defence did not challenge the averrernents in the plaint as a result of which it never became an issue at the trial whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action or not.

Secondly, it appears to me that many of the issues rvhich were frarned at the trial were either wrongly tiamed or none issues. The learned trial judge attempted to deal with all of them in his judgment as a result of which counsel for the appellant mounted a lot of irrelevant attacks on the judgment which are the subject ofthe grounds ofappeal.

It is therefbre, necessary for this court to re-appraise all the evidence, including the pleadings and submissions, and to corne to its own conclusion as to whether the decision of the trial couft can be supported. See !e ndp vs. R. (1957) EA.336 and Peters vs. Sundav Post (1958) EA ,t2,1.

In dealing with this appeal I do not intend to follow the traditional method of dealing individually with each ground of appeal since this is likely to lead me to deal with a lot of irrelevant materials that I do not consider necessary for the determination of this appeal. I will re-appraise all relevant material on record and pronounce whether in my j udgrnent, the clairn and the

counter-claim were proved or not. I propose to focus on two broad issues, namely: -

- (a)Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintifflrespondent disclosed and proved a cause ofaction against the defendant/appellant. - (b) Whether the counter-claim was proved to the required standard.

(

#### HE PI-EADINGS t'

In order to decipher what the respondent pleaded as her cause of action, it is necessary to reproduce those paragraphs of the plaint in which the cause of action is alluded to. The relevant allegations are in paragraph 7, 8, 9 and I I as follows:

"7. There are other cheques of the said joint account whose particulars the plaintiff does not have and which were not filled in by either the deceased husband or the plaintiff rvhich, together with originals of annextures 'A' and 'B' the defendant falsely and maliciously on or before 4/911998 used to report to the police CID Jinja Road that the plaintiff had issued to the defendant false cheques and as a result of the said false and malicious report by the defendant, plaintiff was arrested by the police and charged with the offence of issuing a false cheque contrary to section 364(lxb) of the Penal Codc Act. A photocopy of plaintiffs release on bond issued to her on 41911997

') and indicating the many times she has been put to inconvenience and expense reporting to police CID headquarters in Kampala for bond extension is annexed hereto and marked 'E'.

$\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{S}}$

8. By a letter dated $24/10/97$ addressed to her by Mulenga & Kalemera advocates for the defendant, plaintiff learnt that the actual complaint to the police which led to plaintiff's arrest was this:-

'In or about July 1997 our client discovered that goods purchased by your company from our client had not been paid concealment of your company's (sic) indebtedness by your late husband Mr. Tony Twinomugisha who was also clients (sic) Chief Accountant. Our client further discovered a series of cheques issued by your company in purported settlement of your dues, which had been receipted but were never banked and instead were kept aside by your late husband. When our client discovered and presented them for payment they were all dishonoured. According to our instructions you *were signatory to all the cheques.*

Upon full investigations our client found that your company was indebted in the sum of Ug.

Shs. 40,631,849/ $=$ and demanded repayment of On $18^{th}$ August, 1997 the the same. Administrator of the estate of your late husband paid to our client Ug. Shs. 10,000,000/ $=$ . To date the outstanding however. balance $of$ shs.30,631,849/ $=$ remains unpaid despite several reminders and demands by our client.'

The said words were falsely and maliciously reported and stated of the plaintiff by the defendant and are in their natural meaning defamatory of the plaintiff. $\mathbf{A}$ photocopy of the said letter is annexed hereto and marked "F".

9. The plaintiff does not and has never owned or been a member of a company called Tyresland (U) Ltd, the said company has never issued cheques to the defendant nor indeed has the plaintiff ever issued the cheques to the defendant for the consideration of any goods or her late husband's indebtedness or at all and the defendant's campaign and crusade against the plaintiff is for the purposes of extorting money against her and/or by use of the police and/or the police report and/or the threat of criminal arrest and prosecution and other similar unlawful means obtaining the sum of shs.30,631,848/= from her."

$\overline{11}$

In these paragraphs the plaintilfalleged that:

- (a)The defendant falsely reported her to the police on or belbre 41911998 that she issued to it false cheques. [The date of the police report is not correct. The correct date seems to be 41911997 .l - (b) As a result of this report she was arrested and made to suffer a lot of tnconvenlences - (c)On 24110197 the appellant's advocates wrote to her a letter which was false, malicious and defamatory of her. - (d)As a result of the foregoing her constitutional rights were curtailed and/or interfered with. - (e) She has been exposed to public humiliation, odium and contempt, loss and damage and anguish and distress.

It should be noted that she did not make any effort to give particulars of the alleged arrest, defamation or any other loss or damage nor does she indicate which of her constitutional rights were curtailed or interfered with.

#### l)ll) l'l ll: IrVIl)tr\('l: l)lS('l. OSIr ;\ ( ,.\t;Sl: Ol .,\( llON'.'}

The phrase "cause of action" is defined in Volume I of WORDS AND PHRASES LEGALLY DEFINED to mean:

"All those things necessary to give a right of action,, whether they are to be done try the plaintiff or a third person. Hernaman vs. Sntith (I855) l0 Exh 659 at 666, rrer Parke B.

The same book further states that :-

"cause of action has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse. Cook vs. Gill (1873) LR 8 CP107 at 116, per Brett J." [Emphasis mine].

It has been held and is now well established in Uganda that there are three essential elements to support a cause of action. They are:

- 1. the plaintiff enjoyed a right; - 2. the right has been violated; - 3. the defendant is liable.

#### See Auto Garage vs. Motokov (1971) EA.514 at 519 and 523.

In order for the respondent to succeed, she had to produce sufficient evidence to prove these elements.

### THAT THE RESPONDENT ENJOYED A RIGHT OR RIGHTS AND WHETHER THEY WERE VIOLATED

From the pleadings it can be inferred that, the alleged arrest, defamation and harassment violated her rights. She also talks of other constitution rights that she does not disclose. However, in her evidence, she never claimed that she was arrested by the police. She stated that she was called to the police

station on 2419197 to explain the presence of her signature on a number of cheques which had been reported forged. On the same day she was released on police bond which contained a holding charge of issuing false cheques contrary to section 364(lXb) ofthe Penal Code Act. She was never detained or charged in courl and consequently, has never been prosecuted. The Executive Director of the appellant (DW4) himself testified that: -

"I do not remember when she vacated the house. May be in September 1997, I reported the matter of the bounced cheques to the police because it lvas cash taken away and the goods were supplied. We wanted to recover the money against the bounced cheques. And I had to report to the shareholders. But rve did not report thc \*'idorv. But over and above insurance company threatened they would not entertain the insurance claim unless we reported to the police. The insurance visited on reporting the case of fraud or theft; that it rvould entertain thc claim in respcct thereof if we deposited the cheques and reported to the police. The Insurance company has paid us the sum of shs.6.l m/=. ln my report to the police I did not specifically name the widow because we were not sure and because she was a widow of our colleague. I did not follow up my report to the police."

According to this testirnony, the appellant only reporled the rratter of fbrged cheques for purposes of fulfilling insurance forrnalities. They did not repoft the respondent as such but since the cheques had the respondent's

signatures, she had to be called upon to explain. The report, which DW4 made on 419197, was not produced in evidence and no police officer was called to tell the courl the exact report that was made. The evidence of DW4 is unchallenged and unless the report is produced it is impossible to tell how the report was t-alse or malicious and whether it was defamatory of the respondent or capable causing her anguish and distress. The respondent failed to prove the contents of the report made to the police by the appellant on 2419197 and therefore it was not proved that it caused violation of her rights. The respondent did not name any single right that was violated by the report and how it was violated, But then, the respondent claims that on 24110197, fifty days after the respondent was called to the police and released on police bond, the appellants lawyers, Mulenga & Kalemera & Co Advocates wrote a defamatory letter (relevant parts reproduced in the part of the plaint quoted above). According to her the contents of the letter harassed her and caused her anguish and distress.

As I have noted above, this letter was written fifty days afier the appellant reported the matter of forged cheques to the police. By that time the respondent had been on police bond for as many days and had in fact reported herself, as required by the terms of the police bond, to the police four times. The letter was not copied to the police and there is no evidence that the police ever leamt of its contents or acted on them to the detriment of the respondent or at all.

The letter cannot be said to have contributed to her alleged arrest or any inconvenience she may have gone through as a result of having to continually report to the police.

Even assuming that the lawyers wrote the letter on the instructions of the appellant, it would only have given rise to a cause of-action if-: -

(a) it had been published and,

- (b)the reputation of the respondent was impaired, - (c) caused any other actionable damage to the respondent.

In the instant case, the letter was addressed to the respondent and copied to the Executive Director of the appellant (who was their client and allegedly who had given them instructions) and to the Executor and Adrninistrator of her late husband's will. We are not otherwise told how the letter could be defamatory of her when it was not published. It was not atleged in the pleadings or in evidence how the contents of this letter could have delamed her or caused her any other loss or damage.

In conclusion, I would hold that in rny judgment, the respondent's evidence never proved the cause of action she set out to establish, namely that she enjoyed rights which had been violated by the actions or omissions of the appellant as a result of which she sufl'ered damage. She therefbre, failed to prove her case and her suit should have been dismissed with costs.

## .f I]F OUNTER. CLAIM

In my judgment the issues that arose on the counter-clairn were the following: -

( l)Did the respondent own a colnpany called Tyresland or Tyresland Ltd?

(2)lf so did the appellant supply it with goods?

- (3)What was the value of the goods supplied? - (4)Did the respondent issue any cheques in payrnent of the goods? - (5/ Is the respondent indebted to the appellant to the tune of shs.30,631.,849?

I think the first three issues above can be answered in a few sentences. It was common ground that at all rnaterial times no company existed by the names Tyresland or Tyresland Ltd. There is therefore, no way the respondent could conceivably own such a company. In the same vain, there is no way a non-existent company could order or receive goods from the appellant or anyone else. The value of the goods supplied to the cornpany does not arise.

It is also common ground that the respondent signed blank cheques on a bank account owned jointly by her and her late husband. She did not know what the husband used the cheques for and she did not operate the account. She never signed the cheques in contemplation of payment of any goods supplied by the appellant or anyone else. Despite nurlerous authorities which were cited to us, it is not possible for me to hold that a person who signs an otherwise completely blank cheque can be said to have "issued" it to anyone within the meaning of the definition of that word in S.2 of The Bills of Exchange Act. The word issue:

# "means the first delive of a bill or note, cornlrlcte in lirrrn. to n person who takes it as a holder". [Emphasis minel

"deliveryt' rneans transfer of possession, actual or constructive fiom one person to another

o and "holder" means: -

t >7

> "the payee or endorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bea rer thereof."

It was the evidence of the appellants own witness (DW3) that the cheque book in question was always kept by her boss, the late Chief Accountant of the appellant. The respondent never possessed or kept any cheques and was not capable of delivering them to anyone let alone the appellant. The appellant could not be said to be a "holder" since it was not a payee or endorsee known to the appellant. It is common knowledge that many of the cheques in question were filled by ernployees or agents of the appellant without reference to or knowledge of the respondent and many of them were filled after the death of her husband. By signing blank cheques, some of them many rnonths before they were "issued" to the appellant by its own agents, the respondent did not bind herself to be liable to any person to whorn such a cheque could be fraudulently issued. I find no rnerits in the counter-claim and I would dismiss it with costs to the respondent.

In the result, I would allow the appeal in part and dismiss the suit and the counter-claim. Each party should be ordered to bear its own costs here and in the High Couft.

Dated at Karrpala this 3 rd day ol ......200r Arno II . I PPEAL t ### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO.22 OF 2000

HON. JUSTICE L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO,DCJ CORAM: HON. JUSTICE A. TWINOMUJUNI, JA HON. LADY JUSTICE C. N. B. KITUMBA, JA

UGANDA ALUMINIUM LTD....................................

#### **VERSUS**

RESTATUTA TWINOMUGISHA ........................ RESPONDENT

(Appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Uganda at Kampala before The Hon. Principal Judge Mr. Justice J. H. Ntabgoba Dated the 19th day of January, 2000 in Civil case No. No.1031/1998)

$10$

#### JUDGMENT OF L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO, DCJ

I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by Twinomujuni J. A. and I agree with the conclusion he reached that the appellant's appeal must succeed.

I do not have much to add except to briefly comment on some aspects of the cause of action raised in the lead judgment of Twinomujuni J. A. I entirely agree with him that as the evidence stands on record it is difficult to see the respondent's cause of action in this case.

It appears part of her complaint stems from the letter dated 24 October 1997 addressed to her by Mulenga and Karemera Advocates Counsel for the defendant which led to her arrest by the Police.

It reads as follows:-

"In or about July 1992 our client discovered that goods purchased by $10$ your Company from our client had not been paid for as a result of the fraudulent concealment of your company(sic) Chief Accountant. Our client further discovered a series of cheques issued by your company in purported settlement of your dues which had been receipted but were never banked and instead were kept aside by your late husband, when our client discovered and presented them for payment they were all dishonoured. According to our instructions you were signatory to all the cheques. Upon full investigations our client found that your company was indebted to the sum of Shs.40.631.849 and demanded repayment of the same. On 18th August, 1997 the Administrator of the estate of your 20 late husband paid to our client Shs. 10 million. To date however the outstanding balance of Shs.30,631,849 remains unpaid despite several reminders and demands by our client"

It was the contention of the respondent that the aforesaid words were falsely and maliciously reported and are in the natural meaning defamatory of the plaintiff. I do not agree. The respondent had to show in what way the words complained of were defamatory.

Further in paragraph 11 of the plaint it was claimed by the respondent that

"The plaintiff has had her constitutional rights curtailed and/or interfered with and has been exposed to public humiliation/odium and contempt by the defendant's false and malicious report and she has suffered loss and damage and much anguish and distress"

I agree that the appellant had probable cause to report the matter to the Police because the respondent had signed the cheques in question. The circumstances in which the respondent later explained had signed the said cheques had not been known yet. Investigations had to be carried out by the Police.

It)

Be that as it may I Iind that there was no justification for the appellant's Counsel to use such strong language which in my view bordered on harassment, intimidation and which was capable of causing much anguish and distress.

However in agreement with the lead judgment the respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove the above mentioned allegations. As far as I am concerned the words used in the advocate's letter were not in their natural meaning defamatory. She had to prove her allegations. The respondent did not show how she was affected. There is no evidence on record to prove that she suffered from anxiety or stress. I am unable to find evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the advocate's letter \*dtd harass ar.d ilntlmldc;te the platnttff'to justify the award of any damages to the respondent let alone the exemplarlr damages of Shs. 15 million.

On the counter claim I also concur that it must fail, too. It cannot be sustained on the evidence on the record and especially in view of the finding that the respondent did not issue the cheques within the meaning of the Bill of exchange Act and that the respondent never owned a Company called lzresland as a-lleged by the appellant.

Since TWinomujuni J. A. and Kittumba J. A. came to a similar conclusion the appellants appeal is hereby allowed but the counterclaim is dismissed. The award of 15,OO0,000/= to the respondent is set aside. It is ordered that each party bears its costs in this court and the High Court.

.-fl A.quit-Dated at Kampala this .. J.... day of gu+h ZOO1

I L. E. M. MUKASA-KIK ONYOGO DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE

### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT II

### CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE L. E. M. MUI(ASA-KIKON\ HON. JUSTICE A. TWINOMUJUNI, JA HON. LADY JUSTICE C. N. B. KITUMBA, JA

## CIVIL APPEAL NO.22 OF 2OOO

# UGANDA ALUMINIIIM LTD........... .............. APPELLANT

#### VERSUS

# RESTETUTA TWINOMUGISHA......... ........ RESPONDENT

#### (Appeal from the judgment of the High Court (Ntabgoba, P. J) dated 19 January 2OOO in H. C. C. S No. 1O31 of 1998f

### JUDGMENT OF KITUMBA JA

I have had the opportunity to read the Judgment of Twinomujuni, JA in draft and I agree with him.

However, I would like to observe that in this case the respondent's fundamental rights might have been violated. For example freedom of movement which is guaranteed by article 29(2lr(al(bl of the constitution. The respondent was unfairly reported to the police as suspect. She was charged with issuing bouncing cheques contrary to section 364(1) (b) of the Penal Code Act. The police imposed restrictions on her movement as she was required to report to the police at scheduled times. She reported to the police a total of twenty eight times.

The contents of the report to the police are not known but the Executive Director of the appellant, Mr. A. M. Jha, PW4, testified that they had reported to police because of insurance purposes only and they did not report the respondent. I cannot invisage why the police required her to execute a bond if she was not a suspect in a criminal offence. The report must have imputed improper conduct on her part.

The fact that the respondent who was a respectable lady, and a school teacher was required to report at the police, must have somewhat lowered her esteem in the eyes of right thinking members of the communit5r.

The lawyer's letter was a harassment and an intimidation to the respondent. It was an attempt to extort money from her. The lawyers who are supposed to know the law, visited the liability of the deceased's estate to pay the debts incurred by her late husband on the respondent. Their letter is as follows:-

"On 18th August, L997 tlne Administrator of the estate of your late husband paid to our client Ushs. 1O,OOO,OOO/=. To date however, the outstanding balance of Shs. 30,631,849/= remains unpaid despite several reminders and demands by our client"

She was informed in no uncertain terms that unless she paid within seven days they would report her to the police for having issued bouncing cheques and for conspiracy to defraud and or theft/obtaining goods by false pretences.

The Executive Director of the appellant testified that there was no company known as 'I\zresland of \$resland Ltd. The goods were supplied to a shop of the respondent known as 'Ilrresland Company. Given that evidence, one wonders who instructed the lawyers that the respondent had a company.

The crimes for which the respondent was threatened to be reported to the police and prosecuted were of a grave nature, that would have injured her reputation. The lawyers was an abuse of process. The letter must have been published at least, to the lawyer's secretary who typed it and that would in law be sufficient publication.

It is my considered view that there was abuse of legal process by counsel for the appellant. The respondent's constitutional rights were violated. She must have been defamed, harassed and suffered physical and mental anguish. However, the respondent failed to plead those violations and to adduce evidence to prove the same. Therefore, I would allow the appeal and dismiss the counter claim.

Dated at Kampala this c day of . A"JftL"J '1 200t.

> ?ftS ffiso, JUSTICE OF APPEAL