Alvi Auto Village Limited v Shumuk Investment Limited & Another (Civil Suit 710 of 2022) [2025] UGCommC 41 (28 March 2025)
Full Case Text
#### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
# IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)
## **CIVIL SUIT NO. 0710 OF 2022**
1. ALVI AUTO VILLAGE LTD
## **PLAINTIFFS VERSUS**
#### 1. SHUMUK INVESTMENTS LTD
2. MUKESH SHUKLA
**.....................................**
### (Before: Hon. Lady Justice Patricia Mutesi)
### **JUDGMENT**
## **Background**
- $1.$ The Plaintiff brought this suit against the Defendants for a declaration that the Defendants breached the two tenancy agreements and the subsequent memorandum of understanding between the parties, a declaration that the Defendants misrepresented facts to the Plaintiff prior to those agreements and memorandum, recovery of special damages of UGX 225,000,000, recovery of general damages, interest on the damages and costs of the suit. - $2.$ The Plaintiff's case is that, on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020, the Defendants executed a tenancy agreement with the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Plaintiffs for Plot 148/152 Mukabva Road, Kampala). It was agreed that the Defendants were to complete some works on the rented Plot before the Plaintiffs could take possession of it. The Plaintiff paid UGX 195,000,000 in advance rent to the Defendants between November 2020 and August 2021, but to their disappointment, the works were not carried out by the Defendants as agreed. - On 30<sup>th</sup> October 2021, the parties agreed to execute another tenancy 3. agreement in which the Plaintiff agreed to, instead, take Plot 1509 Banda in place of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road. On 10<sup>th</sup> November 2021, the Defendants signed a memorandum of understanding with the Plaintiff. Therein, the Defendants agreed that they would develop a small portion of Plot 1509/232 Banda before it could be handed over to the Plaintiff. An additional UGX
50,000,000 in advance rent was to be paid for the said development by the Plaintiffs.
- Following the memorandum, the Plaintiff paid UGX 30,000,000 but, by 26<sup>th</sup> $4.$ November 2021, the Defendants had not commenced the agreed works on Plot 1509 Banda and these works were never carried out. The Plaintiff later discovered that there were ownership disputes/issues over the 2 plots which the Defendants had kept hidden from them. They demanded for a refund of their monies paid to the Defendants but all in vain, hence this suit. - The Defendants acknowledge that on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020, the Plaintiff and the 5. 1st Defendant entered into a tenancy agreement for the lease of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road to the Plaintiff. The Defendants, however, aver that the tenancy was to commence upon the Plaintiff securing a license from Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and upon completion of construction works by the 1st Defendant. The Defendants also admit that the Plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant later signed a 2<sup>nd</sup> tenancy agreement superseding and replacing the earlier tenancy agreement. That new tenancy agreement was in respect of Plot 1509 at Banda Industrial Area. - The Defendants further admit the memorandum of understanding of 10<sup>th</sup> 6. November 2021 between the Plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. They assert that, thereunder, the Plaintiff was to pay an additional UGX 50,000,000 as consideration and to also obtain a license from URA to operate an ICD before commencement of the tenancy. They assert that the 1<sup>st</sup> Plaintiff only paid a sum of UGX 30,000,000 and failed to obtain the ICD license and that this, effectively, frustrated the entire arrangement. The Defendants also assert that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant is not indebted to the Plaintiffs in the sums claimed or at all.
### **Representation and hearing**
At the hearing, the Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Jude Byamukama and Mr. $7.$ Phillip Mwesiga of JByamukama & Co. Advocates while the Defendants were represented by Mr. Alex Timothy Akena of SF Ssekitto Co. Advocates. The Plaintiffs adduced the oral testimony of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendant who testified as PW1. They also adduced 13 documents that were admitted into evidence and exhibited consecutively as P. Ex.1 – P. Ex.13. On their part, the Defendants did not adduce any evidence in support of their case.
In his testimony, PW1 stated that he has been doing business in Uganda for the 8. last 21 years through different entities, including the Plaintiff. He said that in October 2020, the 1st Defendant's employees, Judith Ayebare (operations manager) and Dharamdip Kadikar (finance manager) walked into his office and interested him in a business proposal. They told him that the Defendants were the owners of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road (opposite Spear Motors, Kampala) and that they were willing to offer the plot to the Plaintiffs for rent/lease for purposes of creating a new car bonded warehouse there.
- PW1 said that consequently, on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020, the Plaintiff executed a 9. tenancy agreement with the $1^{\ensuremath{\text{st}}}$ Defendant for a 5-year tenancy over Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road. The tenancy was to commence upon completion of some works which were to be carried out on the Plot by the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. The Plaintiff paid a total of UGX 195,000,000 to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant as advance rental fees for the Plot. However, after some time, PW1 noticed that there was no progress in terms of the construction works on the Plot yet the 1st Defendant had promised to handover the plot within two months. He made visits to the $1^{\rm st}$ Defendant's offices and made many calls to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant about this concern but received no positive response. - PW1 further testified that the Plaintiffs became increasingly frustrated with the 10. Defendants' failure to complete the works. On 13<sup>th</sup> September 2021, they requested a meeting with the Defendants to discuss a refund of their money but the Defendants ignored that request. On 30<sup>th</sup> October 2021, following several calls and meetings in protest over the Defendants' failure to perform their obligations, the Defendants convinced the Plaintiff to execute a new tenancy agreement for Plot 1509 Banda as a substitute for Plot 148/152. On 10<sup>th</sup> November 2021, the Defendants again convinced the Plaintiff to sign a memorandum of understanding wherein the Defendants were to develop a small portion of Plot 1509 before the Plaintiff could take possession. The Plaintiffs also agreed to pay UGX 50,000,000 to the 1st Defendant as advance rent to cater for the said development.
- Finally, PW1 testified that, on the 12<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> November 2021, the Plaintiff 11. made payments of UGX 30,000,000 to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant as part of the agreed UGX 50,000,000. However, to the Plaintiff's surprise, by 26<sup>th</sup> November 2021, the Defendants had not started on the works. This prompted the Plaintiff to withhold the balance of UGX 20,000,000. PW1 also later discovered that the ownership of Plot 1509 Banda was contested and that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant was not even the registered proprietor of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road. - 12. After the hearing, counsel for the Plaintiff filed written submissions to argue the Plaintiff's case. I have carefully considered the submissions, the laws and authorities cited and all the other materials on record in making this decision.
## **Issues arising**
- 13. The following issues have arisen for the Court's determination: - 1. Whether the suit discloses a cause of action against the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant. - 2. Whether the $1^{st}$ Defendant is in breach of the tenancy agreements and / or the memorandum of understanding. - 3. Whether there was misrepresentation and / or deceit by any of the Defendants. - 4. What remedies are available to the parties.
## Resolution of the issues
- Section 101(1) of the Evidence Act Cap 8 states that whoever desires a court to 14. give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he/she asserts must prove that those facts exist. Additionally, Section 103 of the Evidence Act Cap 8 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. - It is trite law that, in civil cases of this nature, the burden lies on the plaintiff to 15. prove the existence of his/her rights and the liability of the defendant for breach thereof on a balance of probabilities. That standard will, typically, be achieved if Court is convinced, on the basis of the evidence adduced before it, that it is more probable than not that the breaches occurred. (See Miller v Minister of
Pensions [1947]2 All ER 372.) I will be guided by these principles on burden and standard of proof in evaluating the evidence adduced.
Issue 1: Whether the suit discloses a cause of action against the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant.
- As already defined in Issue 1, a cause of action is a set of facts giving rise to a 16. claim enforceable in court. It is a legally-recognised wrong that creates the right to sue. It has also been established in Issue 1 that the agreements and memorandum in issue in this case were executed between the Plaintiff as tenant and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant as landlord. Since the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant was not a party to the agreements and memorandum, he cannot personally suffer any liabilities flowing therefrom. The Plaintiffs cannot seek to hold him liable for breaches of agreements and a memorandum that he was never party to. - The 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant cannot also be held personally accountable for the alleged 17. misrepresentation and deceit during the negotiation and performance of the agreements and memorandum. This is because, even if the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant is the one who actually misrepresented and, or, deceived Plaintiffs before, and in the course of, performance of those agreements and memorandum, he would have done so on behalf, and for the benefit of, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant who was the actual party to the agreements and memorandum. - 18. In the end, Court finds that, at all material times, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant acted as an agent of a known principal (the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant) and that it is that principal who ought to be held accountable for its agent's actions. It is trite law that a disclosed agent of a known principle cannot be held liable for any actions or omissions he/she took within the scope of his/her apparent authority. (See Obuntu Consulting Ltd v Plan Build Technical Services Ltd, HCCS No. 173 of **2014.**) For these reasons, this issue is also answered in the negative.
Issue 2: Whether the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant is in breach of the tenancy agreement and, or, the memorandum of understanding.
19. Once a contract is valid, it automatically creates reciprocal rights and duties for the parties to it. Those obligations must be performed to the letter. When a party fails to perform his/her promise in a contract as agreed, that party is said
to be in breach of the contract. Accordingly, breach of contract occurs if one party to that contract fails, neglects or refuses to perform the contract, without a legal excuse. (See William Kasozi v DFCU Bank Ltd, HCCS No. 1326 of 2000.)
- 20. This dispute arises from 3 contractual documents executed between the Plaintiff and the $1^{st}$ Defendant. The first document is the tenancy agreement of $1^{st}$ November 2020 in which the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant leased the land comprised in Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road (opposite Spear Motors) to the Plaintiff for 6 years at a monthly rate of USD 5,500. Clause 6 of that agreement required the Plaintiff to pay the rent for the first 10 months upfront. The agreement was to commence upon completion of some agreed works on the Plot by the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant and upon the Plaintiff securing a license from URA to for the business it wanted to set up thereon (a car bonded warehouse). - PW1 testified that the Plaintiff paid UGX 195,000,000 to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant $21.$ between November 2020 and August 2021 as advance rent but that it did not secure the license from URA. This was corroborated by P. Ex.9 – P. Ex.11 (receipts confirming the payment). PW1 revealed that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant did not carry out any of the agreed works on the Plot. - 22. In cross examination, PW1 admitted that the Plaintiff did not secure the license from URA. PW1 went on to explain that one of the requirements for obtaining that license was the land where one was going operate the bonded warehouse. He clarified that, without receiving actual possession of the Plot, the Plaintiff was unable to meet a critical requirement for the license and could not even dare to commence the license application process. It is thus evident that, in failing carry out the agreed construction works and handover actual possession of the Plot to the Plaintiff, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant breached the tenancy agreement of 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020. - 23. The second of the 3 contractual documents in issue is the tenancy agreement of 1<sup>st</sup> November 2021 in which the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant leased the land comprised in Plot 1509 Banda Industrial Area to the Plaintiff for 6 years at a monthly rent of USD 5,500. Again, some construction works were agreed to be carried out on that Plot by the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant before it could be handed over to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was further required to obtain a license from URA before the
tenancy could commence. However, this time around, the parties expressly agreed that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant would complete all the works within 2 months from the date of the agreement and hand over the entire Plot.
- The last contractual document in issue is the memorandum of understanding 24. of 10<sup>th</sup> November 2021. Therein, the Plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant agreed that the UGX 195,000,000 earlier paid by the Plaintiff for Plot 148/152 was to be transferred to cater for the lease over Plot 1509 Banda and that the Plaintiff would pay an additional 50,000,000 to fund the agreed construction works on the Plot before the lease could commence. They also agreed that the Plaintiff would occupy a small developed portion of Plot 1509 Banda and that it would only occupy the remainder after securing the URA license. - The Plaintiff, through PW1's testimony and P. Ex.11 (receipts for payment of 25. UGX 30,000,000) proved that it paid UGX 30,000,000 of the agreed UGX 50,000,000. In his cross examination, PW1 explained that, by 26<sup>th</sup> November 2021, none of the agreed works had commenced despite that part payment. He also said that this prompted the Plaintiff to repudiate the tenancy agreement and demand for a refund of its money from the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. - There is no doubt in my mind that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant failed to comply with its 26. contractual obligation to carry out the agreed works on Plot 1509 Banda and to hand over the demised premises within the agreed timeline. While it is true that the Plaintiff also failed to honour its promise to fully pay the UGX 50,000,000 as agreed in P. Ex.3, PW1 explained that this was because he saw no works going on at the Banda Plot even after a substantial partial payment of that sum had been paid. - I find PW1's explanation to be plausible and rational. Having received a total 27. sum of UGX 225,000,000 out of a potential UGX 245,000,000 as agreed in P. Ex.3, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant had more than enough money at its disposal to commence and complete the works and then demand for the balance. I am fortified in this view by the fact that the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant did not agree on a timeline within which the UGX 50,000,000 would be fully paid after P. Ex.3. Without a definite payment deadline for the UGX 50,000,000 and with over 91% of the total expected payment at its disposal, I cannot accept the 1st Defendant's claim that the Plaintiff's failure to pay the UGX 20,000,000 balance frustrated the entire transaction. At the very least, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant ought to have started on the works or refunded the Plaintiff's money.
In the end, this issue is answered in the affirmative with the finding that the $1<sup>st</sup>$ 28. Defendant breached the tenancy agreements and the memorandum of understanding by failing to carryout construction works and handover actual possession of the respective Plots as agreed.
## Issue 3: Whether there was misrepresentation and / or deceit by any of the Defendants.
- 29. The Plaintiffs adduced evidence proving that Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road is not owned by the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. This was through the testimony of PW1 and P. Ex.12 (a search statement on Plot 148/152 from the Lands registry). P. Ex.12 proved that the lease on Plot 148/152 had been owned by Shumuk Springs Development (SSL) Ltd and not by the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant company. P. Ex.12 also proved that lease had expired on 30<sup>th</sup> September 2020, a month before execution of the 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020 tenancy agreement. - This evidence was very damning. It meant that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant did not have 30. capacity to enter into the tenancy agreement of 1<sup>st</sup> November 2020 because it was not the owner of the lease on Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road. To make matters worse, even if the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant had been the owner of the lease, the lease had expired by the time the agreement was executed. All rights on and over that land had, thus, reverted to the lessor of the land by that time. - 31. Additionally, as P. Ex.13 (the search statement on Plot 1509 Banda from the Lands registry) revealed, there was a caveat lodged by one Mulondo Paul on Plot 1509 Banda on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2010. That caveat had not been removed by 1<sup>st</sup> November 2021 at the time when the 1<sup>st</sup> November 2021 agreement was executed. While the caveat would not have rendered the 1<sup>st</sup> November 2021 tenancy agreement and the subsequent memorandum invalid or illegal per se, it could have presented complications to the 1<sup>st</sup> Plaintiff in its attempts to utilise the land pursuant to the tenancy agreement. More importantly, PW1 testified that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant did not even relay any information about the caveat at the time when the $2<sup>nd</sup>$ agreement was executed.
It is on the basis of that evidence that the Plaintiffs insist that the Defendants 32. are liable for misrepresentation and deceit in the process leading up to the tenancy agreements and the memorandum of understanding. In Fredrick J. K. Zaabwe v Orient Bank Limited, SCCA No. 4 of 2006, the Supreme Court of Uganda defined the term "misrepresentation" to mean:
"... a false representation of a matter of fact whether by word or by conduct, by false misleading allegations, or by concealments of that which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he may act upon it to his legal injury." Emphasis mine.
Furthermore, in Esther Sempebwa v The Non-Performing Assets Recovery 33. Trust, HCCS No. 954 of 2004, which was relied on by counsel for the Plaintiffs, it was held that:
> "It is trite that a representation is not a term, but a statement of fact made by one party, to the other, during their preliminary negotiations, which was intended to induce the other party, to enter into the contract and which did so induce the other party, to enter into that contract. $A$ misrepresentation is therefore a representation which is false. Misrepresentation manifests itself in three shapes: it may be fraudulent, negligent or innocent." Emphasis mine.
I cite the above dicta with strong approval. Also see Lawrence Tumusiime v Patrick Idringi Salvado, HCCS No. 321 of 2018 in which false representations as to a person's capacity to enter into a tenancy contract were found to have amounted to misrepresentation in law.
The difference between misrepresentation and deceit was explained in the case 34. of Christine Hope Kanyima v Mercantile Credit Bank Ltd & Anor, HCMC No. 0085 of 2021 where this Court held that:
> "... While misrepresentation and deceit may be similar in nature, they are distinct legally. Deceit combines intentional misrepresentation and actual knowledge of the falsity. Only intentional or fraudulent misrepresentations would support a claim of deceit ... Deceit involves a false representation made by the defendant, who knows it to be untrue,
or who has no belief in its truth, or who is reckless as to its truth." *Emphasis mine.*
- In relation to the instant case, I am satisfied that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant's conduct of 35. executing the tenancy agreements and memorandum of understanding, well aware that it was not the owner of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road and that there was a caveat lodged on Plot 1509 Banda without disclosing the same to the Plaintiff was a misrepresentation which induced the Plaintiff into the impugned agreements and memorandum. - 36. It is also evident that this false representation amounted to deceit since the $1<sup>st</sup>$ Defendant and its agents ought to have known whether or not it had the legal capacity to execute the agreements and memorandum and whether or not there were any disputes over the respective Plots. If the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant had been forthright with this information, it is possible that the Plaintiff would have walked away from the contract negotiations altogether. - In my considered opinion, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant's representations were nothing but 37. a clever ploy orchestrated to deceive and cheat the $1^{\rm st}$ Plaintiff. The $1^{\rm st}$ Defendant's conduct was full of falsehoods and suppression or concealment of the truth. My conviction is also that the $1<sup>st</sup>$ Defendant was well aware of the untruthfulness of its representations because the land it claimed to lease out to the Plaintiff did not even belong to it. Failing to handover leased premises to a tenant is wrong, but purporting to lease out premises which one does not even own falls in a very special class of deceit and crookedness. - 38. As a result, this issue is answered in the affirmative.
## Issue 4: What remedies are available to the parties.
The Plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs in the plaint:
## i. Declarations
Following the above findings, the Court shall issue declarations to the effect 39. that the 1st Defendant breached the agreements and the memorandum it executed with the Plaintiff and that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant misrepresented and
deceived the Plaintiff about the true state of ownership of Plot 148/152 Mukabya Road and about the absence of any dispute over Plot 1509 Banda.
*ii. Recovery of special damages of UGX 225,000,000*
- Special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. However, that 40. strict proof need not always be documentary. (See Stanbic Bank (U) Ltd v Hajji Yahaya Sekalega t/a Sekalega Enterprises, HCCS No. 185 of 2009.) In the present case, the Plaintiff and the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant agreed in P. Ex.3 (the memorandum of understanding) that, as at 10<sup>th</sup> November 2021, a total sum of UGX 195,000,000 had been paid to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant. - The 1<sup>st</sup> Plaintiff further brought uncontroverted evidence through 2 receipts 41. (P. Ex.11) proving that UGX 30,000,000 had been paid by the Plaintiff to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant by 15<sup>th</sup> November 2021. This brings the total sum of money paid by the 1<sup>st</sup> Plaintiff to the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant to UGX 225,000,000. Since this sum was paid for no consideration at all, it is recoverable in special damages.
iii. General damages
- 42. General damages refer to the losses which flow naturally from a defendant's breach. They are what the law presumes to be the direct, natural or probable result of a defendant's breach (See Opia Moses v Chukia Lumago Roselyn & 5 Ors, HCCS No. 0022 of 2013). They are also said to be the immediate, direct and proximate result, or the necessary result, of the wrong complained of. - 43. The evidence adduced by the 1<sup>st</sup> Plaintiff proved that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant has held onto UGX 225,000,000 of its money without any consideration since 15<sup>th</sup> November 2021. The 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant has not made any effort to either refund this money or to carry out the construction works in order to hand over the demised premises to the Plaintiff. To the contrary, the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant is still crying foul over the non-payment of its UGX 20,000,000 balance in disregard of the $1^{st}$ Plaintiff's interests. - 44. Additionally, this Court has already found in the preceding issue that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant induced the Plaintiff to enter into the impugned agreements and memorandum through misrepresentation and deceit. It is truly shocking that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant would go ahead to rent out an expired lease which never even
belonged to it in the first place. Renting out land for 6 years when there is a caveat on the same without disclosing that information to one's tenant is equally appalling and deplorable. The natural and probable result of the 1st Defendant's said conduct is that it has caused financial loss and operational inconvenience to the Plaintiff who has been kept out of its money for all this time.
However, it is also undeniable that the Plaintiff's injury and loss has been partly 45. occasioned by its own laxity and inattention to relevant details at the time of negotiating the two agreements and the memorandum. The search reports which revealed the ownership issues over the two Plots could have been obtained by the Plaintiff during those negotiations. No contract document should have been signed before conducting a search at the Lands registry to confirm the true ownership of any of the 2 Plots. At page 26 of its landmark decision in the case of Sir John Bageire v Ausi Matovu CACA No. 7 of 1996, the Court of Appeal of Uganda emphasized the need for thorough investigations before dealing in land when it remarked that:
> "Lands are not vegetables that are bought from unknown sellers. Lands are valuable properties and buyers are expected to make thorough investigations not only of the land but of the sellers before purchase."
In the present case, the Plaintiff dismally failed in its duty to conduct all due diligence before entering into the tenancy agreements. The effect of the 1st Defendant's misrepresentation and deceit could have been avoided with such diligence $\quad\text{and}\quad$ the Plaintiff's loss and injury would not have accumulated/escalated to its current level.
46. In view of all these factors and evidence, Court shall award UGX 30,000,000 in general damages which sum is considered to be a fair, just and adequate compensation to the Plaintiff for all its non-quantifiable loss and injury.
iv. Interest of 25% p.a. from the date of default until full payment
47. Section 26(2) of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 71 gives the Court the power to award interest on damages awarded in a suit. Ordinarily, a successful plaintiff is entitled to interest at a rate which would not neglect the prevailing economic value of money but which would also insulate him or her against further economic vagaries, like inflation and depreciation of the currency, in the event that the money ordered to be recovered is not paid promptly when it falls due. (See Mohanlal Kakubhai Radia v Warid Telecom Uganda Ltd, HCCS No. 0224 of 2011.)
In view of these principles, the Court hereby awards interest to the Plaintiff on 48. the special damages at the rate of 19% p.a. from 15<sup>th</sup> November 2021 till full payment and on the general damages at the rate of 15% p.a. from the date of this judgment until full payment.
v. Costs
- Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act accords this Court the discretion to 49. award the costs in a suit before it. Nonetheless, the general rule is that costs follow the event. This means that an award of costs will generally flow with the result of litigation and that a successful party is entitled to costs, unless the Court, for good reason, orders otherwise (See Kwizera Eddie v Attorney General, SC Const. Appeal No. 01 of 2008). - 50. In the premises, I have not found any justification to deny costs to the $1^{st}$ Plaintiff. The costs of the suit are, therefore, awarded to the Plaintiff who is the successful party in the suit.
## **Reliefs**
- 51. Consequently, judgment is entered in favour of the Plaintiff against the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant on the following terms: - The Plaintiff's case against the 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant in this suit is dismissed for want $\mathbf{i}$ of cause of action. - A declaration that the $1<sup>st</sup>$ Defendant breached the 2 tenancy agreements ii. and the memorandum of understanding it executed with the Plaintiff doth issue. - iii. A declaration that the 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant misrepresented, and deceived the Plaintiff about, the existence and ownership of its lease on Plot 148/152
Mukabya Road and the absence of any dispute over Plot 1509 Banda doth issue.
- The 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant shall pay special damages of UGX 225,000,000 to the iv. Plaintiff. - The $1^{st}$ Defendant shall pay interest on the special damages in (v) above at $V$ . the rate of 19% p.a. from 15<sup>th</sup> November 2021 until full payment to the Plaintiff. - The 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant shall pay general damages of UGX 30,000,000 to the vi. Plaintiff for breach of contract, misrepresentation and deceit. - The 1<sup>st</sup> Defendant shall pay interest on the general damages in (vii) above at vii. the rate of 15% p.a. from the date of this judgment until full payment to the Plaintiff. - viii. Costs of the suit are awarded to the Plaintiff.
eadintes
**Patricia Mutesi JUDGE** $(28/03/2025)$
$14$