Maurel v Maurel (SCA 1 of 1997) [1998] SCCA 5 (11 August 1998)

IN THE SEYCHELLES COURT OF APPEAL ANGELIKA MAUREL APPELLANT V/S MAX MAUREL RESPONDEFf Before Goburdhun P, Venchard and Adam JJA Judgment In this appeal the Appellant declares that she is dissatisfied with the decision of the Learned Trial Judge on the 3 following issues:- the award of a lump sum of R 360,000.- to the Respondent for alimony. a monetary contribution paid towards the purchase of the shares of Islette Island by the Appellant was a gift to the Respondent. 3. the house at PortGlaud is to be given to the Respondent. By a cross appeal the Respondent contends that the lump sum of R 360,000.- awarded to him on maintenance is insufficient to maintain him in the lifestyle to which he had been accustomed. I shall deal with these 3 issues, seriatim. 1. LUMP SUM OF R360,000 The Learned Trial Judge reached that figure by awarding him the equivalent of six months' expenditure pattern, at a rate of R 60,000.- per month - that is - he should be paid by the Appellant the sum of R 360,000., payable as a lump sum. Essentially, the maximum period during which the Respondent would be entitled to any form of maintenance would lapse at the time of his I .marriage which apparently took place some six months after the divorce. The Learned Trial Judge awarded him the monthly sum claimed by him for the period ending to that time. The question which arises is whether the Respondent is entitled to any amount whatsoever under that heading. It must be remembered that in the divorce proceedings, he was held to be the guilty party. As such he would not be entitled to any form of maintenance (aliment) at all from the innocent party. I therefore hold that on that issue the award of any amount whatsoever for maintenance is wrong in principle. But there is more. The Respondent is essentially claiming arrears in alimony accumulated up to some time i0eptember 1995 when he remarried. The Seychelles Law relating to maintenance was initially governed by the French Civil Code. There have been various legislative amendments — 1. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1992, 2 Maintenance Orders (Attachment of Earnings) Act, Cap 118 3 Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Cap 119 4 Summary Jurisdiction (Wives & Children) Act, Cap 223. However, the principles regulating alimony have remained the same. It is therefore appropriate for guidance to turn to French doctrine and case law to construe the nature and extent of the rules relating to the award of alimony I read the following in Encyclopedic Dalloz, Civil V° Aliments. 1. Le code civil, en etablissant entre parents et allie proches une obligation dont l'objet consiste en des "aliments'', entend par la tout ce qui est necessaire a la vie du creancier alimentaire: nourriture, vetements, chauffage, eclairage, logement, sante, etc. pour des frais medicaux exceptionnels occassionnes par un accident, Trib. Grande inst. Seine, 19 fevr. 1966, D. 1966.428). L'objet de la dette alimentaire ainsi concue progresse en meme temps que le niveau de vie general de noire époque. Il .faut, aujourd'hui, y comprendre des prestations que le code civil ne considerait pas comme necessaires. A un moindre degre, la necessite des prestations alimentaires varie d'apres les habitudes de vie du milieu auquel appartient le creancier alimentaire. Les "aliments" etant ainsi compris, la loi leur substitue normalement, pour simplifier les rapports des parties, une pension forfaitaire en argent, calculee d'apres l'importance des sommes besoins necessaires a la satisfaction des besoins alimentaires: c'est la "pension alimentaire" (V. infra, N '214). Dans certains cas, si la consistance des biens du debiteur s'y /vete, la pension alimentaire peut etre convertie en capital (C.civ., art. 285 et 294) (V infra, n °s 38 et s., 139). Et la constitution d'un capital n'a pas alors un caractere subsidiaire par rapport a l'octroi d'une pension alimentaire (Civ 2e, 21 juill. 1986, Bull. Civ II, n °123). M. si ce capital devient insuffisant pour couvrir les besoins du creancier, 1117 complement peut etre attribue sous forme de pension alimentaire (C. civ., art. 285, al. 2 et 294-1). 2. A MONETARY CONTRIBUTION PAID TOWARDS THE PURCHASE OF THE SHARE OF ISLETTE ISLAND BY THE APPELLANT WAS A GIFT TO THE RESPONDENT. The learned Trial Judge held that the admitted contribution made by the Appellant was a gift, against the assertion of the Appellant that they were a loan or an advance as a "préte nom" in order to circumvent the prohibition by law under which she was to acquire a land in Seychelles. The Learned Trial Judge quite rightly held that she could not invoke her own turpitude in attempting to defeat a prohibition of public order in order to derive a benefit therefrom. This however fails to consider what in my view is the essential part of the claim, i.e was the money, admittedly remitted by the Appellant to the other co-owners of Islette Island, a gift or not to the Respondent? It is incumbent upon the Respondent to prove that the money was a gift. As in every other case, a donation between spouses rests essentially on the intention to, in fact, make a donation. In that respect I read the following from Encyclopedic Dalloz, Civile V° Donation entre Epoux, 119 121 Toutes les donations entre epoux pendant le mariage sont soumises aux regles de forme des donations ordinaires, c'est-a-dire celles etablies par l'article 931 du code civil. Elles doivent etre revues, a peine de nullite, par acte notarie et en minute. Ces donations doivent contenir les mentions ordinaires des actes authentiques ainsi que cello exigees par les lois fiscales (donations precedentes....) Lorsque les donations entre epoux pendant le mariage portent sur des droits reels immobiliers, elles doivent mentionner les indications prevues pour leur publication a la conservation des hypotheques par le decret n° 55-22 du 4 janvier 1955 (D.1955.44, Rect.73;VDonation) pour qu'elles soient opposables aux tiers (V. A. RAISON, op.cit., n° 53) Ces liberalites peuvent revetir la forme d'une donation indirecte, d'un don manuel (Civ 1 re, 18 oct.1966, Bull.civ.1, n°472; 27 dec. 1949, J. C. P., ed. not., 1950.11.5679, note Voirin; Paris, 20 Mars 1858, et sur pourvoi, Req. 25 janv. 1859, D. P.59. I.411), mais non d'une donation deguisee ou par personne interposee formellement prohibees par I 'article 1099 du code civil - mais encore .faut-il qu'on en demande l'annulation (V.infra, n°s 300 et s.). Si la donation porte sur des meubles, it slaw y annexer l'etat estimatif exige par l'article 948 du code civil (V. Donation), afin que l'egalite dans le partage, la masse de calcul et les regles imperatives sun la reserve soient observees, le cas echeant. Souvent, neanmoins, le don manuel est rebelle a la comptabilite juridique. 122 Les donations entre epoux pendant le mariage doivent etre expressement acceptees par le donataire, a l'inverse de ce que l'article 1087 du code 3. La notion d'aliment, telle que le code civil l'avait reglementee dans les rapports familiaux, a tendu a s'elargir. On reconnait aujourd'hui un caractere alimentaire, hors des rapports familiaux, aux creances payables par des prestations successives et viageres tendant a assurer des moyens d'existence a une personne (V infra,n Os 6 et s.). Mais, meme elargies dans leur conception, les obligations alimentaires ont toujours des traits communs correspondent a leur but. Visant a assurer l'existence d'une personne dans le besoin, elles sont moderees, quant a leur chiffre, et essentiellement personnelles a leurs beneficiaire, qui ne pent les ceder, et entre les mains duquel elles ne sont pas saissisahles. (Emphasis added) CAS OU L'OBLIGATION ALIMENTAIRE AURAIT UNE SOURCE DELICTUELLE OU QUASI DÈLICTUELLE. 11. 170 C'etait le cas, avant la loi n° 75-617 du 11 juillet 1975 (D. 1975 .247), de l'obligation alimentaire de l'ex-conjoint divorce coupable envers l'ex-conjoint innocent. La pension alimentaire cesse d'être due si le conjoint creancier se remarie ou vit en concubinage notoire (C.civ., art.283). Selon un arra de la cour de Paris, c'est au juge aux affaires matrimoniales d'apprecier s'il y a etat de concubinage,' cause legale de cessation du versement de la pension alimentaire (12 mai 1978, D. 1978, 1. R. 437, obs. A. Benabent, et 1979, I. R. 164, obs. J. C. Grosliere). L'existence d'1,111 concubinage notoire peut etre etablie par tout moyen, mais c'est au juge d'apprecier la valeur de cette preuve et, dans l'exercice de ce pouvoir souverain, it peut rejeter des debats "un proces verbal de concubinage" etabli par un huissier de facon irreguliere. D'ailleur, un coastal huissier, du mains lorsqu'il a pour objet d'etablir de facon directe les relations sexuelles de l'un des anciens epoux avec un tiers, ce qui suppose l'acces a l'interieur du domicile et la visite de ses parties les plus intimes, constiturerait une immixtion intolerable dans la vie privee de cet ancien epoux degage de son devoir de fidelite; un tel acte ne peut etre justifie, en raison de sa gravite, par le seul souci pour le requerant de preserver ses interets patrimoniaux. Aux termes de l'article 208, alinea ler, du code civil les aliments sont accordes "dans la proportion du besoin de celui qui les reclame et de la fortune de celui les doit". C'est a la date out ils statuent que les juges du fond doivent se placer pour apprecier les besoins du creancier et les ressources du debiteur d'aliments. tiennent compte de toutes les circonstances caracterisant la situation des parties:age, charges familiales, etas de sante, situation sociale, notamment. Les droits alimentaires sont inseparable,s de la personne du creancier et consideres comme lui etant indispensable pour assurer son existence. La survie des individus interessant l'ordre public, de ce caractere personnel de l'obligation alimentaire decoule son caractere d'ordre public, qui interdit au creancier de civil admet pour les donations par contra! de mariage: la seule presence a l'acte du donataire n'est pas suffisante (Rennes, 20 mars 1941, journ.not. et ay.1941, art. 11072, p.146; Amiens, 24 nov. 1843, S.47.2.343). In the present case, the alleged donation has not been made in one of the recognised forms which would have established conclusively the "intention liberale". The Appellant's intention as alleged by her and as adumbrated by the Learned Trial Judge was to circumvent the law and not to make an outright donation to her husband. No cogent evidence has been led to rebut that fact. That very fact itself defeats the "intention liberale" so that the Respondent cannot claim to be the full beneficiary of the proceeds of the use of the funds remitted to the co-owners for their share in the island. I would therefore hold that the finding of the Learned Trial Judge that the monetary contribution paid towards the purchase of the shares of Islette Island by the Appellant was a gift to the Respondent, was wrong in principle and not borne out by the evidence. I would also find that the Respondent is accountable to the Appellant for the use of those funds and cannot appropriate for himself either the funds or the proceeds of the use of those funds. 3. THE HOUSE AT PORT CLAUD IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE RESPONDENT The fate of the house at the Port Glaud is intimately linked with the fate of the house at Mare Anglaise. The Learned Trial Judges' order on that issue is as follows:— There is documentary evidence proving that parcel J .351 belongs to the respondent. Its value has been given as being about half the value of the Matrimonial home at Mare Anglaise. However, as submitted by Mr. Derjacques , the respondent appears to accept a fair deal by giving the Mare Anglaise house to the petitioner, while he retains the one at Port Glaud, where he is currently residing, the fact that it is worth less than the former, notwithstanding. I do approve this deal and direct the respondent to transfer the remaining undivided half share of parcel 1-1.648 to the petitioner. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner's claims over parcel J351 are dismissed in turn, the respondent is given ownership of same. For the same reasons, as those elaborated above, the order of the Learned Judge cannot be upheld. I would therefore quash the order in respect of the house, ordering that the house at Port Glaud be given to the Respondent. It is at this stage apposite to draw attention to the fact that we are here dealing with limited companies incorporated under the Companies Act. They have corporate identity and existence independent of the personality of their shareholders and promoters - principle in the Solomon's case. In the present case as well, there is no warrant to lift the corporate veil and to assimilate properties belonging to a company as being owned by shareholders or any one shareholder or as matrimonial property. The proper course is to seek a liquidation of the assets of the company in accordance with the Companies Act. For all those reasons, I would allow the appeal of the Appellant and dismiss the cross appeal of the Respondent. I order the Respondent to pay the costs of the appeal and cross appeal. 0v- L. E. VENCHARD JUSTICE OF SEYCHELLES