Associated Automobile Distributors (K) Ltd v Town Clerk, Municipal Council of Mombasa [2017] KEHC 2674 (KLR) | Judicial Review Enforcement | Esheria

Associated Automobile Distributors (K) Ltd v Town Clerk, Municipal Council of Mombasa [2017] KEHC 2674 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  53 OF 2006

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ASSOCIATED AUTOMOBILE  DISTRIBUTORS(k)  LTD  FOR LEAVE  TO APPLY  FOR ORDERS  FOR MANDAMUS  DIRECTED  AT THE TOWN CLERK, MUNICIPAL  COUNCIL OF MOMBASA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE TOWN CLERK  OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL  OF  MOMBASA  AND  SECTION  263   OF THE LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  ACT( CAP  265), LAWS OF KENYA.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE SATISFACTION OF A DECREE IN THE HIGH COURT CIVIL SUIT NO.  1311 OF 2000  AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI ( HON. JUSTICE  AZANGALALAL) AND THE  SATISFACTION  OF A CERTIFICATE  OF COSTS IN  THE ABOVE  MATTER CERTIFIED  BY THE DEPUTY  REGISTRAR  OF THE HIGH COURT  AT NAIROBI ON  THE  30TH  DAY OF  JULY,2004.

ASSOCIATED AUTOMOBILE

DISTRIBUTORS (K) LTD.......................……….APPLICANT

VERSUS

TOWN CLERK, MUNICIPAL

COUNCIL OF MOMBASA…….....................RESPONDENT

RULING

1. On  25th January 2017,  the applicant  Associated Automobile  Distributors (K) Ltd  filed a notice of  motion  under Section   5(1) of the Judicature  Act, and   Article  159  of the Constitution  seeking for orders that:

a. ……..

b. The court be pleased to issue  a notice against the county  executive  committee  member for Finance, Mombasa  County  to  show  cause  why he  should not  be committed  to serve  6 months  imprisonment  for failing to  pay the applicant  the sum of kshs 17,751,529. 10 plus interest, by way of monthly  installments  of kshs  1,000,000 as ordered  by the High Court in Civil suit  No. 1311  of  2000 on 4th  April 2008  which amount  now stands at kshs  37,574,282.

c. That the Honourable  court be pleased  to issue  a  warrant  of arrest against the County Executive  Committee member  for Finance, Mombasa County  to be committed  to civil  jail  for failing  to pay the  applicant the sum  of kshs 17,751,529. 10 plus interest, by way of monthly  installments  of kshs  1,000,000 as  ordered by the High Court  in CC NO.  1311  of  2000 on 4th April  2008  which amount  now stands  at  kshs  37,574,282.

d. That the court be pleased  to order  and  or direct  the  County Executive Committee Member of Finance, Mombasa  County to pay the  applicant  the  sum of kshs  37,574,282 ( plus interest until payment in full) being the  decretal amount (inclusive  of accrued  interest  to 31st  December  2016  in High Court  Civil suit No. 1311 of 20oo ( Associated  Automobile  Distributors  (K)  Ltd Vs  Municipal  Council of Mombasa).

e. That costs of the application   be provided for.

2. The application is premised on  21  grounds  on the face  thereof and supported by an affidavit sworn by Bejul Gudka, the applicant’s Director  and  annexed thereto are several  exhibits   which include  a  plaint in  HCC 1311  of   2000; decree issued on 23rd  April  2004  dated  10th March  2004; certificate   of  taxation dated  30th July  2004; warrant of arrest  given on  21st March  2010; a supplementary  affidavit sworn by  J.N. Mwangi, legal officer, Mombasa  County on 17th June  2013.

3. In response  to the notice of motion,  the  respondent  filed a notice of  preliminary  objection  dated  20th  March 2017  and  a replying  affidavit  sworn by Hazel  Koitaba  on 20th March  2017.

4. According  to the respondent, the court  herein lacks  jurisdiction  to enforce  the judgment/decree and that the  proceedings  herein are statute  barred pursuant  to the provisions of  Section 34  of the Contempt  of Court  Act No.  46 of 2016. herein pursuant  to Section  4(4) of the  Limitation of Actions  Act, Cap  22  Laws of Kenya.

5. That the applicant’s claim for interest on judgment is barred pursuant to the provisions of Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act which states that

“ No arrears  of interest  in respect of  a judgment  debt  may be  recovered after the  expiration of six  years  from the  dated on which   the  interest  because  due.”

6. That the notice to show cause issued herein is contrary to the mandatory provisions of Section 30 (2) and (5) of the Contempt of Court Act No.  46 of 2016;

7. That the  execution  proceedings  herein  are contrary  to the  express provisions  of Section  12(b)  of the  Inter-Governmental  Relations  Act No. 2  of  2012   as  read with  Clause  2(1)  and  (2) of the Kenya   Gazette  Notice No.  858 of 2017; and that therefore the  suit is  misconceived  and an abuse of the due  court process.

8. The parties  advocates  argued  the  preliminary  objection by way of  oral arguments  on  22nd March  2017  hence this  ruling  which  could not  be  delivered  immediately as  the  court  was engaged in  urgent  matters  related to pre election  disputes.

9. According to the respondent as argued   by Mr Otieno advocate, the judgment sought to be enforced is statute barred.  Reliance  was  placed  on  Section  4(4)  of Limitations  of Actions  Act and  Civil Appeal  No. 124  of 2003  Sebastian  Nyamu vs Gilbert  Kabeere  M’ mbijiwe ( Nyeri CA).

10. It  was argued that judgment  having been  entered on 10th March  2004, the  subsequent  steps  taken by  the applicant  to enforce  the  judgment  including  mandamus to compel the then Town Clerk of the respondent, was  on  15th March  2012   when  warrants   of arrest  were  issued but later  no action  was taken to move the court.

11. That therefore  12 years  having lapsed  from 10th April 2004  to  10th March  2016, the Notice to show cause  proceedings  taken on  27th January 2017  were taken well after  12  years  hence this  court cannot  entertain  Notice to show cause which is  premised on an application made after  12  years of the judgment.

12. It  was  further submitted that the  interest on  judgment    is also  statute  barred  under Section  4(4)  of the Limitation of Actions Act   as it has been  calculated  until after a period of  12  years  yet the  limitation  period is  6  years.  Reliance was placed on Patrick Kimani Nganga vs Kenya Power & Lighting   Company Limited [2016] e KLR.

13. The respondent’s  counsel narrated  that the application  herein violates Sections  30 and  34 of the Contempt of  Court Act, 2016;  that the application  for contempt   of court   was   never served  upon the Attorney General  and  or personally  upon the  individual to be  summoned  to appear  before the court, which  omission  is  not  a mere  technicality.

14. It  was  also submitted  that despite the notice  to show cause having  been issued  on  22nd  February  2017,  the  same   was not  served in  accordance with  Section 30(2)  of the Contempt  of Court Act  hence  the court should   allow  this preliminary  objection.

15. In response,  Mr  Murage   counsel for  the applicant  submitted  that the  preliminary  objection   was filed  late when the  notice  to show  cause   was slated for  hearing. He relied on the case of Amin Mohamed   Hassan v Zahra Mohamed [2009] e KLR.

16. That the application having been granted, the respondent had come too late in the day with a preliminary objection.  That the  Notice to show  cause  had already been  argued  and  orders  granted  hence the preliminary objection  could not  hold  any substance.  It was further argued that what was before the court was not execution proceedings.  That  the  action to action or enforce the judgment  was  taken in  2006  while  contempt  of the court  law  came  into  effect  in  January  2017  hence  the law  does  not act  retrospectively.

17. Reliance  was placed  on the  Council  of Governors  v Kenya Medical Practitioners  and  Dentists  Union and 10 others [2017] e KLR  where the  court  held that  the  new Act  could not  act  retrospectively.

18. It  was   argued that  in this  case,  the respondents  were already  found to be  in contempt of  court and  warrants  of arrest  issued  upon which they applied  for  stay of those  warrants  and  hence they  cannot claim that the  court lacks  jurisdiction.  Further, that twelve years would run from 2008 to 2020.

19. On the procedure  for recovery  of decretal  sum against  the  respondent  reliance  was placed  on Republic  v  County Chief  Officer, Finance & Economic Planning, Nairobi  City County.

20. It was  submitted  that the  last action  in this matter  was taken  on 11th January 2013 after a warrant of arrest hence the preliminary  objection  was  without  any substance.

21. In a brief rejoinder, Mr Otieno submitted on behalf of the  respondent that they  were  properly  on record; that the  order to  commit  the  applicant  to prison   was made  before 12th January 2017, before  the commencement  of the Contempt  of Court  Act and  that this  application  was made  after commencement  of the Contempt  of Court.

22. It was further submitted that the Notice to show cause is pursuant to the judgment hence it is the enforcement of that   judgment that was the subject of these proceedings.

DETERMINATION

23. I have  considered  the  preliminary  objection by the respondent as argued  by  Mr Otieno  advocate  supported  by the  statutory  and  case law  cited.  I have  given  equal consideration to the  applicant’s  opposition and  both  parties advocates’  submissions  and  authorities  relied on.

24. The issues for determination are:

1) Whether  the preliminary objection  raised has any  merit;

2) What orders should the court make.

3) Who should bear costs of the preliminary objection?

25. On whether  the  preliminary  objection raised has any  merits, it is important to first determine whether the preliminary objection   as raised is a  pure point  of law as stipulated  in the Mukisa  Biscuit Manufacturing Company Ltd vs West End  Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696wherein  Sir Charles  Newbold  stated;

“A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurer.  It raised a pure point of law which is argues on the assumption that all the facts   pleaded by the other side are correct.  It cannot  be  raised if  any facts  have  to be  ascertained  or if what  is sought  is the   exercise of  judicial discretion.

The improper raising of points by way of preliminary objection does nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and, on occasion, confuse the issue.  This improper practice should stop.”

26. The grounds  raised  in the  preliminary objection  herein  is that the  proceedings  herein are  statute  barred  by Section  4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act; that the  notice to show cause  issued  herein is contrary to the mandatory  provisions  of Section  30(2)  and  (5)  of the Contempt  of Court Act;  that these  proceedings are  statute  barred  pursuant  to Section  34  of the  Contempt  of Court  Act; and  that the  execution  proceedings herein violate Section 12(b) of the intergovernmental  Relations Act No. 2  of  2012  as read with Clause 2(1) and (2) of the Kenya Gazette notice  No.  858/2017.

27. In the supporting  affidavit  sworn by Hazel Koitaba the  County Executive Committee member for Finance of the County Government  of Mombasa on  20th March  2017, paragraph  3 and 4 admit the existence of HCC 1311 of 2000 by the applicant  against  the  respondent and  at paragraph  5,  it is  conceded  that the  applicant  moved the  court by way of mandamus  to compel  the then Town Clerk  of the now  defunct  Municipal  Council  of Mombasa  to settle  the decree.

28. He also concedes that on  22nd  February  2017  this court  issued  a notice to  show cause  to the  County Executive  Committee  Finance to  attend  court  on  22nd  March  2017  to show  cause  why  they  should not  be committed  to civil jail for  failing  to pay the decretal sum.

29. The  deponent  then goes  on to claim  that he has never  been made aware  of the judgment  against the  respondent  to enable   it settle liabilities  of the former Municipal  Council of Mombasa  hence  the notice  to show  cause  which is time barred  should be  dismissed.

30. In my humble view, pleading a statute of limitation is a pure point of law which can be raised as a preliminary objection.  The only question is whether these proceedings are statute barred or in violation of any statute as cited by the respondent’s counsel.

31. The court notes  that on record  is a  decree  made on 10th March  2004 in HCC 1311/2000 and  on 2nd February 2006.  Judicial Review   proceedings   were commenced  before  this court in this file  for mandamus  to compel respondent’s  predecessor  and  office  holder  to settle  the decree in HCC 1311 of 2000.  The applicant  also sought  for a warrant  of  arrest  against the  then  Town Clerk in default  of payment of  the  decretal sum with  interest.  Leave to apply was granted  by Wendoh J on  2nd  February  2006 and the applicant was granted 21 days  from 2nd  February   2006  to lodge  the  substantive  notice of motion.

32. The  substantive  notice of motion  was   filed on  22nd February  2006   and annexed  to the supporting affidavit  is an  order  made on  12th November 2004 by the Honourable Justice  Festus Azangalala  (as he then was)  for payment  of  the decretal  sum  by the  then  Town Clerk, and  in default, enforcement  to be effected.

33. On  22nd September  2006   Honourable Nyamu J  ( as he  then  was ) issued  the Judicial Review  orders of mandamus  directed  at the  then Town Clerk  of Mombasa  Municipal  Council  to settle  the  decretal sum  in HCC 1311/2000 together  with  interest at  12% per annum  from 1st August  2004  until payment  in full.

34. The order of mandamus which is   the substantive decree in this matter, as   made on 22nd September 2006   has never been set aside.

35. On  16th August 2007 the applicant   sought  by way of notice of motion  a warrant  of arrest to  issue against  the then  Town Clerk of the respondent council for nonpayment of shs 14,369,625/25 as decreed on 22nd September 2004 by  Azangalala J  pursuant  to decree  made on 10th March  2004   issued on  23rd April  2004 (annexed) and  certificate  of taxation dated  30th July  2004  for shs  331,227 ( annexed).

36. On 4th April  2008  an order by  consent of  the  parties  was  issued  by the court to the effect  that shs  2,000,000  was paid  vide the  4 named   cheques  of shs  250,000, 500,000 and  1,000,000 each and the balance  was  to be defrayed  in equal monthly installments  of kshs 1,000,000 from  15th May  2008  until  payment  in full, and  on the  15th day  of each succeeding  month  and in   default,  a warrant  of  arrest was to issue against the Town Clerk of Mombasa  Municipal Council.

37. Following  the  above consent  order,  there  was  default and  so the  warrant  of arrest   was issued  on  26th June  2008  against  the Town Clerk  and  reissued  on 21st, March 2010, 6th July 2010 and 14th July 2010.

38. On  11th January  2013  the  respondent  filed a  notice of motion seeking  for stay  of orders made  on 10th March  2010   and  all consequential  orders made  thereto in execution   of decree  in  Nairobi HCC  1131/2000. The orders in question directed for the arrest of the  defendant Town Clerk.

39. The applicant/respondent  also sought  for a free bond  and  review/variation  or discharge  of the orders of  10th March  2010.

40. In the supplementary  affidavit  sworn on  17th June  2013  by J. Mwangi, the legal  officer of f the  respondent,  he claimed  that the  respondent   never owed  any monies to the applicant  and  that the  applicant  was  out to  defraud  the  respondent hence, the reason  why they  abandoned  Nairobi HCC  1311/2000 to execute   the  decree using the current  suit where  nobody would   query  the validity of the entire process  and the manner  in which the  applicant  got   its orders to  execute.

41. Mr Mwangi also claimed that the execution of decree   was suspect because no notice to show cause why execution should not issue was served  on the defendant.

42. There was no allegation  that the decree or these  proceedings  are statute  barred.

43. On  11th January  2013   Majanja  J certified  the application  by the respondent   as urgent   but  noted that :-

“ In view of  the  length  of time  it has taken to settle the debt, I decline  to stay  any proceedings  or arrest.  The matter  shall be  heard interpartes  on 21st  January  2013.  The Town Clerk  to attend court  on that date.”

44. On 21st January  2013  Odunga J  mentioned  the matter  and  fixed it for  21st February  2013 for further orders.  On the latter  date the learned  judge  placed it for  9th May 2013  for further  orders.  The matter  kept being  mentioned  until 18th February 2015 when the learned Korir J  ordered  the application  dated 9th January  2013 to be  heard on  6th May  2015 and when there was no appearance by advocates  for the parties, the court  ordered the  Deputy Registrar  to issue  dismissal  notice for  17th June  2015.

45. There  is no record for  17th June  2015.  The next   action  was  25th January  2017  when  the notice of motion   seeking notice to show cause  and  warrant  of arrest against  County Executive  Committee member  for Finance was  sought.

46. The application  was  placed before   me on  1st February  2017 under certificate of urgency.  I certified  it as urgent and directed  service  upon   the respondent  for inter  partes  hearing  on 22nd  February   2017.

47. On 22nd February   2017 only the  applicant’s   counsel attended  court.  There is  an affidavit  of service  sworn by  Jane  Abwoga   Rodis on 9th February  2017  showing  service of  the application   upon  the respondent’s counsel  O.M.  Robinson & Company Advocates  on  7th February  2017.

48. The court was satisfied  as to the service of the  application upon the respondents and  after hearing  Mr Juma counsel for the applicant, I  granted prayer No. 2  that notice  to show  cause  do issue against  the respondent’s County Executive  Committee  for Finance to show cause  why he should not be committed to  serve 6 months  for failing to pay  to the  applicant  the decretal  sum plus interest  now standing at  shs   37,574,282.  I  declined  to grant  prayers  3 and  4   and  gave  reasons.

49. The above order  of notice to show cause  is still  on record  and  no application has been filed challenging  its issue.

50. It therefore   follows that with the earlier  orders of   10th March  2010, 21st March  2010;  6th July  2010 and  14th July  2010  being  validly  on record; and  as the application  of  9th January  2013   has never  been canvassed  to  overturn  the orders of  10th March  2010;  and  as the  orders of   22nd  February  2017  of notice to show  cause   are validly  on record, the  respondent  cannot  emerge  from  nowhere  and  claim that  the  proceedings  herein are statute  barred  or that  they  offend  certain   statutory  provisions  of the law  cited.

51. Furthermore, from the chronology of events detailed in this  ruling, as  per the clear  record, the respondent  has  all along    been aware  of the  judgment subject  of these  proceedings but in  some instances  pretended  not to be  aware  and  or being  liable  in any way to the  applicant.

52. The respondent   has not even  sought to set aside  the judgment  and  decree in HCC  1311/2000.  It cannot therefore claim that  these  proceedings  are an attempt  to defraud  it or that they  are statute  barred.

53. In addition, the respondent has not sought to set aside or challenge the orders of  22nd February  2017.  It follows that the preliminary objection is not only an afterthought but misconceived, frivolous and vexatious. The respondent wishes to rely on procedural technicalities to defeat the course of justice which attempt is thwarted by application of Article 159(2) (b) and (d) of the Constitution. Justice delayed is justice denied.

54. Under Article 262 of the Constitution and the  Sixth Schedule – Transitional and consequential provisions, Section 7 is clear  that: (1) all laws in force immediately  before the effective date continues in force and shall be  construed  with the alteration, adaptation, qualifications and   exceptions  necessary to bring it  into conformity with the  Constitution.

2)  If, with respect to any particular  matter-

a) A law that was  in effect  immediately  before the  effective dated  assigns responsibility  for that  matter to  a particular  stare  organ or  public officer; and

b) A provision of this Constitution that is in effect  assigns  responsibility  for that matter  to a different  state  organ  or public officer, the provisions  of this  Constitution prevail to the extent  of the conflict.

c) All Local Authorities  established  under the Local Government  Act Cap  265 Laws of Kenya  existing  immediately  before the  effective   date shall continue  to exist  subject  to any law  that might be enacted.

d) An office or institution established under this Constitution is the legal successor  of the corresponding   office or  institution or by an Act of Parliament  in force immediately before the effective  date, whether  known by the same  or a new  name.

55. From the above  transitional and  consequential provisions   of the Constitution, it is clear  that the County Government  of Mombasa  is the  successor  of the Municipal Council  of Mombasa  and therefore  all  existing  rights  and   liabilities immediately before the effective  date would  automatically be  assumed  by the  latter  which is the County Government.

56. There is  sufficient  evidence  that the respondent  was  aware  of the  liability  as demonstrated  by the consent  orders  made  in 2013  wherein  it undertook to settle  the decretal  sum of shs  1,000,000  in monthly installments after  paying the initial  2 million.

57. A decree  which is in the  process of being  executed  and  which has not been lying  idle  for the alleged 12  years  period  stipulated  in Section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions  Act cannot  be  statute  barred  and therefore  the respondent’s  preliminary  objection on this  aspect  is not only  absurd  but frivolous  and  vexatious.  It is also  raised  in bad faith  and intended  to abuse  the court  process and to deny justice to the applicant thereby rendering a decree of the court useless.

58. Furthermore, there was no contempt of court proceeding initiated in this case after the coming into force of the Contempt  of Court Act in  January  2017.  The notice  to show cause  issued on  22nd February  2017  was a follow up  of the orders earlier on issued  by the court  compelling  the settlement  of the decree and  as ordered  by  consent  on  4th April 2008 by Dulu J, which latter  orders  were clear  that a warrant  of arrest   would issue  if there  was  default.  Those orders have never been set aside.  It cannot  therefore  be said that  these proceedings  are generally violating  the  Contempt  of Court  Act as  there is no  application for contempt placed before  this court  for consideration.

59. A notice to show cause is not a contempt application.  The allegation that the execution  proceedings herein  offend  Section  12 (b) of Intergovernmental Relations  Act  as  read  with Clause  2 (1) and  (2)  of Gazette Notice No. 858 of 2017  is irrelevant for purposes of these proceedings and the  preliminary  objection raised  herein.

60. The County Government  is governed  by the Government  Proceedings Act  and therefore  no execution  by way  of attachment  and  sale of  its assets can be levied.  The only means  by which  a  decree  against  a County Government  can be  enforced  is Judicial Review  proceedings.  In this case, there is  on  record  a valid  order of mandamus  against the County Government  of Mombasa.

61. Enforcement  proceedings  for the order of  mandamus  were commenced  by way  of notice  to show  cause  and  a warrant  of arrest  issued  way back in  2010.  The respondent cannot feign ignorance of those orders which are on record and which have not been successfully challenged by it.

62. For all the above reasons, I find that the preliminary objection taken against these proceeding in misguided, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process. The same is dismissed with costs to the applicant.

63. The respondent’s Executive Committee Member responsible for finance to be given 30 days’ notice to appear before this court and show cause why the decree herein for mandamus cannot be enforced by way of committal to civil jail for contempt of court. The Deputy Registrar to issue Notice as stipulated in section 30(1) of the Contempt of Court Act. A date for notice to show cause to be fixed by the Deputy Registrar  before  a judge after service of the said Notice to show cause.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 16th day of October, 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE