Attorney General (for and on behalf of the Judiciary) v Vincent Makando (sued in the Capacity as General Secretary of the Judicial and Allied Workers Union) [2015] ZMIC 12 (7 December 2015) | Collective disputes | Esheria

Attorney General (for and on behalf of the Judiciary) v Vincent Makando (sued in the Capacity as General Secretary of the Judicial and Allied Workers Union) [2015] ZMIC 12 (7 December 2015)

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ZAMBIA LAW REPORTS ATTORNEY GENERAL (for and on behalf of the Judiciary) V VINCENT MAKANDO (sued in the Capacity as General Secretary of the Judicial and Allied Workers Union) 5. 10. I DUSTRTAL RELATIONS COURT CHISUNKAJ DECEMBER, 2015 15. REFERENCE. NO.06/2015 Employment Law - Failure of Conciliation Board to settle dispute - Three options: reference to court, strike ballot or arbitration - Applicant referring disp~te to court - Respondent could not then opt for strike ballot - Public interest relevant - Strike would cause anarchy and disruption - Ex parte injunction preventing strike ballot upheld interlocutory The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent from taking strike action pending the detennination of the dispute between the parties. The application arose from the application by the applicant under section 78(1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act (the Act), and Rule 33 of the Act for a declaration that the package offered to the employees was fair and reasonable. The applicant was the Government and employer of the respondent's members through the judiciary, and the respondent was a mother b.ody union to which the applicant's e1nployees belonged. The applicant believed that the respondent would be taking a ballot on strike action which would not be in the public interest; ao<l that it was in the interest of justice that the court should settle the dispute between the parties that had been referred to it. The court granted an ex parte interim order restraining the respondent, frolll taking any strike action pending this inter partes hearing. 20. 25. 30. 35. 40. CamScanner ATTr JRN EY <i l~NEHAI. v MAK ANDO Th· main th e co urt should grant the inl •rloc1tf~lr~ r ·:itr: 111111111 onl ·r soupht without delving into the merits of lh • llHllll 1s:; 11 --:L iHs ~i •. wa s whclh ·r I telfl : I. Th · int ·ntion of' the statute was the peacefu l resoluti on of di sput s b ·twccn cmplc ycrs and their workers and the promotion of industrial harmony. This meant that, in maki ng nn award in respect of a trade di spute, the court was to have rega rd to the public interest. The court was not bound by the f evidence in doing substantial justice between ► tri ct rules the parties. 2. Where a Conciliator or Board of Conciliation failed to settle a collective dispute, either party had three options: to refer it to the court; to conduct a ballot to settle the dispute by strike or lockout; or to refer it to arbitration. 3. A party intending to invoke section 78(1) of the Act could not exercise two options provided thereunder concurrent! . Once one option was selected, then the other two were not available. The appJicant invoked the first option and came to court before the respondent exercised the option to conduct a strike ba]]ot. This action was in order and in accord , ith the provisions of section 78(1) of the Act. 4. Once the applicant had lodged a notice of reference referring the collective dispute to the court, the re pondent ould no longer conduct a ballot. Any strike aft r the lodgment of the notice of reference would be illegal. 5. The purpose of granting an interlocutory injunction was to avoid or minimise loss lo an applicant while the substanti, e case proceeded to final determination by the preservation of the status quo. 5. 10. 15. 20. 30. 35. 40. CamScanner ' · A n,, till, ,· , 1lw r·:pnt1l . ·I ,y' \\ 1,111 to r o11d11cl II lmllot h:,d lh · pot .,,1•1. 1 ,, . ihil-h , 011 1d 1101 h · 111 Ill· p11hli · inl •r '.' l . ' ll) l' :l\\Sl lllltll Th, applicntin11 w:1s ulln, ·d. l. l 0. :tsl'S n•krrrd to: , . . , . lnrnke. Prop ,11 s v and Ors ( \ l ~4) Z. R. 85 L 'V) B • USttl 'S. : • T ntcnne:, out ,sm " Rcf--r nee No. I of 2015 \. 1 wnka W •sl I ev ·lopmcnt Co. I .iniik d , . ' P·,rl· Hotel T/a , lay l~asy I usaka v I lotcl ' ,..,lei Allied Workers Union o _,am 1a IR · , · z h' • I Legislntion referred to: 1. lndustTial and Labour Rclalions /\cl Cap. 269 s. 78( I )(2)(5)(6), Rule 33 Mr. Francis K. Mwale Acting Senior Slate Advocate with Ms. M. 20. Kapamba, Ass. Senior State Advocate for the applicant. L. Zulu of Messrs. Tembo Ngulubc and Associates for respondent. the : 25. 30. 35. 40. CHISUNKA, J, delivered the following ruling. Introduction 1. This ruling decides an interlocutory application for an order to restrain the respondent from taking strike action pending determination of the dispute between the applicant and the respondent. ' ' 2. The application, filed on ?1h December 2015 arises from reference No. 6 of 2015, which was filed on the same day under section 78( 1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Chapter. 269 ()LRA) and Rule 33 of the ILRA, where the applicant seeks, among other relief, a declaration that the whole ?ac~age o~fercd to the employees belonging to the respond~nt ~s, 10 all _circu~stanccs, fair and reasonable particularly tak•~g mto con~tderation the general prevailing conditions of service 10 the Public Service. CamScanner ------------__:_..::...:._.::.::.:_~~~v ~A~K~AN~D~O~ - - - - - - ATTORNEY GENERAL M 3. The application was accompanied by: (a) An affidavit in support sw . b registrar or the ' 11i) 0111 , Y one Mathews Likuba gli ourl for Zambia in the Zulu • d. • JU 1crnry· (b) A notice of rekrcncc of 78(l)(a) of the lLRA· ' ( ) Notification of isSues . section 78(l)(a) of the lLRA· ' ( d) Staten1ent of clain1. . I I . . a co ecl1vc cl1spulc under sect ion in a collective di spute under . I O. , 4. The applicant is the Government and employer of the respondent's me1nbers through the judiciary, a branch of the Govenu11ent and the respondent is a mother body union to 15. which the applicant's e1nployees belong. Background ,. The brief background is that, prior to the matter being referred to this court for determination; the parties had been engaged in a 20. collective agree1nent negotiation for improved salaries which resulted in a collective dispute being declared after the parties failed to agree. 6. The dispute was referred to a conciliator and it was duly conciliated upon, between the period 4th and 51h December, 2015, but could not be resolved. As a result, the conciliator filed a report of non-resolution. 7. On ?1h December, 2015 the applicant filed a notice of reference of a collective dispute pursuant to section 78(l)(a) of the ILRA under which this court for determination and, at the same time applied for an ex parte restraining order against the respondent on the ground that: the dispute was referred to 25. 30. (a) the applicant verily believed that the _respon~ent would _be 35. taking a ballot on the taking of a stnke actwn and which strike action would not be in the public interest, as business at the judiciary would come to a standstill; (b) that it was in the interest of justice that the court should settle the dispute between the parties that had been referred 40· CamScanner ZAMBIA LAW REPORTS to it and that allowing the respondent to go on strike . render the court process an aca cm,c exercise and I d I. have adverse effects on t 1e c 1vcry o Justice in Zambia. . f . Would Would , d . . 8_ On the basis of the foregoin g, this court granted an ex Part interim order restraining the respondent, whether by h'e k. IS 111 mb 'rs or nget:ts from ta mg any s n e action pending the inter partes heanng on 14th December, 2015 or until further ord r. t .k . 9. The respondent filed an affidavit in opposition to the applicatio n ili on 11 December, 2015. 1 0. The court heard the inter partes app 1cahon on 14 December ' 1. · th 2015. The parties' respective cases 11. The applicant's case 11.1 The applicant's application, as it is apparent from the supporting documents filed on ih December, 2015 as well as the submissions by counsel, is as follows: to the court its honest belief that The applicant was compelled to refer the collective the parties dispute between for the to determination due respondent was about to take a ballot on whether to take strike action and which strike action would not be in the public interest as business at the judiciary would come to a standstill. 11.2 That since the matter was properly before the court, in terms of section 78(1) of the ILRA, there could not, at the same time, be a strike action before the matter was determined by the court. That allowing the respondent to go on strike after reference to the court, would rend~r the court process, between the parties, a mere academic exercise and will have adverse effects on the delivery of justice in Zambia. 11 -3 That the main reason for the restraining order granted by this court on 7th December 2015 is to preserVe thC ' CamScanner 5. 10. 15. 20. 25. 30. 35. 40. ~ -- - - - -- I I ' ' :\I \ 1·\ hi\ Nl ll l ,\ I l'UI~ 1: \ · l l 'N t • . 11 I ' l •fl'l'llllll :l ll (lll tl l 11\l' ll' l't· l l'll< '. IH' li1 1 . st l ~IIS -'"" \llll il Iii until lu rt lwr nrdtT 1'11 11 dt' lt• 111 1i1 111 111 11 ,,r ll ll' lll lll h' r 01' tl, 11 1·11 1111·. 111 11 . 1 . . t t• :~ 1':11 1111 1/ 1, , I ':t .' '.1L'l' _-ss1 11 \ ' _in pn·s1·1 ' l' tit,· ~ i111:11iu 11 1w11d i11g l r I r ' till' t:otll l \Il l .' I r ·l'. d ) II the 1\ llhol'i li ' /l or '/'11rnl,c·1 · l'l'fJ/WJ'lif·.~ ~ ,. I us 1k 1 II <'SI 'o, /,i111 i11·rl u11d ( )//l('l'S, 111 ht· rc ii w; 1; held th:1t an inl L·r lon tln r I ill.i1111 clio11 is ;1pprnpr1 :i1 · f'()r thL' r ·stnratiun nl' a pnrli ·ulm sil11al io11 p ·1Hli111: l ri:d . lll t· l ' I 1/ ·ri11g. 1'011ris111 and ;/ /lied 11.4 Th' appli ·ant ~1lso r ·Ii · I 011 th · rnl i11g cl ·liv ·r ·d by tlii : lrnirma11 or lh · II~(' in Ill: c:i:c of' - urt , thr HI 1h th' L ,,:,· f:>11si11ess I ark I /ote/ '/1/r, St<~I ,~·n.\) /,usolw \ / lo tf'I, IVorker.,· Union of . I 1 · ~ Z the l 11s 0 111 1w. r ~ trnining order given 011 7' 11 I cccmber, 20 15. That though the said ea c was not binding, it was on all fours with the present application and was, therefore of great persuasive value. to conl 1rm I . t-) urge( ·cllrrt an d I O. I S. 20. L The respondent's case 12.1 Opposing the application for the interim injuncti n counsel for the respondent informed the court that he would rely on the affidavit in opposition fil ed on I I th 25. December, 2015 and would supplement it with hi · ra l submi ssions. 12.2 12.3 12.4 the affidavit in opposition sworn by From respondent, Vincent Makondo, and coun el's ml submissions, the res pondent's case can b summari d as follow s: th for an order restraining That th e appli cati on th e respond ent from taking strik act ion was premature, lacked legal support and was highl y irr ' gular: th at there was al so no publi ~ interes t in maint·ti11in g the sa id order. That the ruling or the Industrial and Labour Relations Court referred to hy the appli cant was not binding on the court and the said ruling clenlt with the interpretation 35. 40. ·-.~.........._ CamScanner Z1\MHl1' Lt\ W REPORTS . . · 78( 1) before it was amended by Act No 8 f of s ·tton · o ( ,,s thcr fore not rel evant for the purpos es 008, nm -v , , , of s , ·tion 78 ns it stnnds todc1y. , ' l .5 12.6 12.7 12.8 1 o. 20. 25. 30. 35. 40. l Thnt sc lion 78 as c1111c1~dcd, gives options to either the collective di spute to refer the matter to . 1 pdt y O ·ourt conduct a ballot to settle a ( 1sp_utc . y strike acti on or lock out or refer the matter to arbitration. That, most importantly, it docs provide safeguards rela~ing to the conduct of a ballot on whether to settle the di spute by a strike or lockout. b 1· . That there was no provision under section 78 where a party to a dispute could stop another from exercising the options granted under section 78(1 ). That the options under that section were granted to the parties by Parliament and the applicant could not lawfully curtail the respondent from legally exercising an option given to it by section 78(1 ). That the safeguards implanted in section 78(1) were provided by Parliament to take care of the concerns that the applicant has in the matter; that additionally, the Minister of Labour has been given power under section 78(5) to intervene either before the commencement of a strike or after the strike action had commenced and there was nowhere in the Act, apart from section 78(6) where the court was empowered to stop a strike as was sought to be done in this case (sic). That the only ground upon which the applicant has relied for seeking the restraining order was "public interest". That public interest was only relevant for purposes of determining whether the strike should for purposes of longer and not continue much commencing or conducting the ballot: That it was not in the public interest to stop employees who have been ~ranted a right which must be exercised within a rigorous confine to exercise the right to strike within CamScanner \2.9 . that onfin . That th 't°l w ,s t\l) mplo ' ' .. --an bl' stn1 lK' \ j,. suppnrl 111 lhl l11w whnl' · . ,·ct' l 10111 l'X n·i:ing th ·ir rip,hl ~: . ' That it \\r\S a rinht ror L'lllplny 'l" t . count1 · de m1tn 'C " .. nr ,.lhntnstrikewnso11l , ·11I• 1·1·· . , not upp01t rush d to court. ' l) !'() Oil .' ll'lh· Ill lhi : · ,l\\l : lu utld I lil· y . . II \\Ill ~: ) In". 1 hat tn this ·ns, th. nppli '!1111 Ii I ' · 1 th1:v lnllowtd 11 , I· . ct b . pt , 1 l I'll I . . ' ., . • • , • • ' ' l u - . • • , , :::-c- tlt'lt g ,11 ,1.,11 ase of Turnke\' / ,.01,<.,.ti .,, (1) ··t I · . That th I '( Ill s11ppnrl • 1. b)' the applicant sunocst . 1 pr111 ·1p 'S o • mJm~ch~ns n1ust apply. That if that b, th, ·ns '. lh ·n lh, apph_c~tlon was ill-fated bccau:e in that •as , whil, prov1dm~ for preservation of status quo, does go further to hold that ii cannot be used by to obtain new conditions only favourable to itself which is what the applicant intends to achieve in this case. i1tjunct ion was nc • . snry the applicant that an 12.11 That an injunction could only be granted if an applicant has a good arguable case, and also that he has a good prospect of success and that his right to relief i clear. That these conditions have not been satisfied. 12.12 That this was not a proper case for the grant of a restraining order in the manner sought by the applicant; more so that the applicants were pushing it against the general principles for granting an injunction. That thi interim injunction should not have been granted in the first place, because it did not have an undertaking to pay damages and this made it prejudicial to the respondents to claim damages in the event that the restraining order was discharged. 12.13 It was counsel's submission that the ex parte order granted in this matter be discharged on the groun?s that it had been demonstrated to the court that 1t was premature because there was no strike; that it was irregular because the Minister had not applied to court to intervene and that it was not supported by law. 10. I. S. 20. 25. 30. 35. 40. CamScanner :, -~ ' 5. ' I I ,' l I 1., 10. ' I •o subtnl c 1 . HJcrtn ,111g •tt ·d that notwithstanding the absen ce r0 ,- damages by the apphcant th It wn. n s . e ol an ui O order that all damages sustamed by the ·ourl shoul, . , result or this order be enforceabi e r -:ponclcnt ,1s :' agninsl the nppl ,cant. . • , Rcpl) by the :ipplicant . ,1 .c: • tl c 't•Jplicant subm1tted as follows . . . ' t ln reply. counsc iot 1 13. l Thnt. the issue of an undertaking for damages ~as unnecessary in this case as what the co~rt w_as dealing with was a mere reference of a c~11ectlve d1s~ute and not, in the strictest sense, a complaint before thts court; that, in any case, since counsel had already prayed for costs if the court felt that this was a proper case where costs can be awarded the respondent would not be averse to that. ' 20. 13.2 13.3 13.4 25. 30. 35. 40. That contrary to the position taken by the respondent that this court had no power to intervene because the power lay with the Minister, section 78 was quite clear with regard to the power of the court in that when a reference is made to the court under that section the court was supposed to determine the issue that the reference brings about. ' That when such a determination is made under refe~ence, the determination is for the benefit of both parti.es to the collective agree1nent, and not only to the applicant. Such determination, in tenns of section 78(2) was finaJ but subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. • h That the Minister O J "or a 11 Y con1es into play where a dec1s10n t ·'k s r I c or I k ~~ out ad been 1nade. If he tries to intervene an Minister the (6) That clearly · beca~se no d~ . ~at stage had not yet been reached r l . een made for strike act10n o ockout by any of tl then le court using section 78 d fails under section 78(5) , can apply to tl c1s1on had b .. tl · ' 1e parties. CamScanner --------------..:.::..:.:...:~~~----- An 'ORNEY C. ENERAL v MAKANDO l 3.5 tJ.6 13.7 13.8 . , ~ . That had this court not gr·mt d ' c an mtcnm restrammg ·d ,. • or er m th I trst 11la. u c no 1ave een · "" . . s11111~g _today be ·aw;c of strike action and that is the puhlt mtcr 'SI sought to be prolcclccJ. this ''<lu1·t wo 11 . . b t I . , That in this case the respondent has conceded that the matt r was properly before the court and hence the npplicnnt's submission that since there is a reference b fore the court, the parties should not be seen to be engaged in activities inimical to the application before the court. That the facts in the ruling of the Industrial Relations Court earlier referred to was on all fours with the present application and, though not binding on this court was of serious persuasive value to the present application, and this court should have good reasons to depart from the said ruling. Counsel concluded his arguments in reply by submitting that there was no application before the court that was completely stopping the respondents from exercising their legal rights; that this was a proper case in which this court should exercise its discretionary power to confirm the ex parte restraining order that was granted so that this court can properly exercise its powers under reference. Issue for determination 14. From the pleadings, documents and oral submissions, the main issue arising for determination is whether or not the court should grant the interlocutory restraining order sought without delving into the merits of the main issues that have yet to be detennined in the reference. 15. Analysing and determining the foregoing issue will, in my view, entail dealing with the fol lowing: (i) Having recourse to the relevant law relating to the resolution of a collective dispute; 5. JO. 15. 20. 25 . 30. 35. 4o. CamScanner ZAMBIA LAW REPORTS .. g whether the applicant has prov·d (ii) Oeterrntnin 'bl exJJlanation to JUst1 fy the confinnation plaust c . . 1ntent111c . sti·atnmg orde1 granle . d h · eretn. ' . . . . c 1 ed f a 0 the · . The 1:n, 16. The starting point is the _Industna.l and Lab_our Relati ons Act hl.ch this court 1s establJshed. It 1s clear from 1.h d e un er w . . preamble and the general prov1s1o~s under 1t t~at the main underlying intention of the statute 1s the prevention (sic) and peaceful resolution of disputes betwe~n employers and their workers and the promotion of industnal hannony in order to attain industrial peace. Which means that, when makjng a award in respect of a trade dispute, the court is to have regard to the public interest, among other factors. . 17. The Act provides that the court shall not be bound by the rules of evidence in civil or criminal proceedings, but the main object of the court shall be to do substantial justice between the parties before it. What this means is that the Industrial Relations Coun is not subject to rigid rules of evidence and procedure but adop · a flexible approach. 18. Section 78 of the ILRA as amended by Act No. 8 of 200 (quoting the relevant part) reads: "78 (]) Where a Conciliator or Board of Conciliator fails to set/le a Collective Dispute either party to a Collective Dispute may- (a) refer it to the court (b) conduct a ballot to settle the dispute by a strike or lockout; or (c) refer it to arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration Act shall apply accordingly;" Evaluation 18· It is plain from the section quoted above that where a conciliator or board of conciliation fails to settle a collective dispute either party to the collect· d' . ispute has three opt10ns: . ( 1) (ii) conduct a b 11 t to refer it to the court· ' tve or k ut· a O to settle the dispute by strike or Ioc O ' (ii) refer it to arbitration. CamScanner 5. 10. 15. 20. 25. 30. 35. 40. ----------~~~--- ATTORNEY ENERAL v MAKANDO . It is quite clear to m~ that a party intcndin 1 two optio 19 ?S(l) cannot exercise . g t.o invoke section . th crcundcr concurrently or consccut1vcly. The effect t 1cn the other two arc c one option is sc ectc words option (ii) can only be conductcSob ~vailabhlc. Jn other c ore t c matter is rc1e11e ns prov1c.lcd f th' t . c. .. d to court · is 1s that one . , : d I l O • • 5. 20 Jn the present case, the applicant invoked the fi . . . • t t· 1rs op 10n and came ~o com t before the respondent exercised any option and 10. when it became appar~nt that the respondent was intending to conduct a ballot to decide on whether to go on strike. This action was, in my view, in order and in accord with the provisions of section 78(1). The applicant referred this court to the Levy Business Park Hotez,<2) case, being Reference No. I of 2015 at 15· page 4 where the court said: "We have considered the application and the arguments. We have read the provision of section 78(1) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act (}). It is quite clear from the section that where a conciliator or board of conciliator fails to settle a collective dispute, the parties to the dispute have one of two options (1) to refer it to the court (Industrial Relations Court); or (2) to conduct a ballot to settle the dispute by a strike or lockout. Where the dispute is referred to the court, it is our position that a ballot to settle the dispute by strike or lockout cannot be conducted and if it is done, it would be illegal. Jn other words a ballot can only be conducted before the matter is referred to the court. 20. 25. · . •t ·1 seem,; to us as soon as it 30. In the present case the applicant came to cow , 1 ' if the respondent to conduct learnt about the intended meetmg by mem ers O a ballot. The applicant lodged a notice of reference referring the tollecll~; dispute for determination by the court. At that point the r~spo,ne, ent ~011 if Id nl deal wrth t 1e otrce o ·t to que tion Reference and the issue of the Minister applymg _to t.: ~or I dgment of 35. no longer lawfully conduct a ballot an cou ~ ) j d b • . any feared strike could not arise. Jn fact, any Sfl'lke c1;te, 11e 0 the notice of reference would illegal." respectfully adopt all that passage an sa1 passage as correct wit re I the scope of section 78(1 ), where one party to referred the matter to court. • d accept the reasoning m h re effect and the dispute has spect to t 1e na 1 · h ·d . , 40. - - ----- CamScanner ZAMl31A LA W REl'OllTS - -- - - - - 21. I k ta e 1 d It s 10 •t as correct, he t t even l a_ so 8(1 ). I note tha interpretation placed on tl·ie court was ref erring to fore the 2008 amendments, the sect~on 778(1) in its form be I uld be noted that the only · section 78()) was the su slttul1on of the . t f 011 was soun · . . , rt " mterpre a I " . dment effcctc o . either pa y . n this th t amen . . d "the parties . portant thmg m a section is wor s . . spect I wish to a ti·ve dispute invokes or elects to I e that when one party O h options under 78(1) are then not exercise one option, available to any party. dd that the 1111 t the co ec the ot er d t sectton . " with t 1e l words b · I · ' . . · 113· unct10n 1s 0 11 d that the purpose of granting an 22. It should also be r~ca ~ t avoid or mini1nise loss to an ·ie the substantive case proceeds to final aided or minimised by ordering the h h • . t t stop a controversial activity so t at t e d d while the substantive case procee s to . mter ocutory. I . applicant/plamttff wlhI . determination The oss IS av respondent/de1en an ° . status quo IS preserve finality. ~ d · · Conclusion 23. In the instant application, the applicant seeks an interlocutory injunction order restraining and prohibiting the respondent from undertaking actions whether by strike action or any action that would undermine the reference presently before this court. I take the view that given what I have said above, the matter is properly before this court, and this being the case, the other options under section 78(1) are not available to the respondent. 24. Accordingly, I dismiss·· the respondent's arg~~ents that the action by ~he respondent to refer the collective dispute to court under section 78(1) was premature, irregular and not supported h~ law. 1 confirm my position that the matter is properly before this court. I accept the submission by the applicant that allowing the respondent to undertake or conduct a ballot after the matter has been referred to the court, would not be in 'accordance with the law and has the pot r 1 td not e m the pubhc mterest. . . en ia to cause anarchy and as such wou b . 14& CamScanner I ' ' :., .: 1 10. ' •' I . 15. 20. : I I I 25. ' ~: r, '1 ,; .. ' ' '· i' I 30. 35. 40. ----- - - - - - - - - - - . :~ :_ v~~A~KA~N~IJ~O'.._ _____ _ ATTORNEY GENERAL M Given the foregoing, and bearing in mind tl , t 25. ·nterlocutory injunction is an exercise of ll ,ld . the! gra_nt of_an . · l e court 8 d1scrct1on which must e exercised Judiciously 'tl .,11 t' 1. tines, I am of the t' view that t _e app ican s_ app 1cat1on has merit and it wil l be . . Just and convenient to allow 1t. r h b . . · c. '- -- . orders 26_ The foregoing. analysis an? determination leads me to make . . specific orders _in_ the following terms: (a) The restra1~i~g order granted by this court on ih December, 2015 restra1n1ng the respondent, whether by his members or agents, from conducting a ballot or taking any strike action or steps in that direction is hereby confirmed as an 15. interlocutory order pending reference. the determination of the 1 O. (b) The hearing of the Reference will be on 21 5tJanuary, 2016 at 09:30 hours. ( c) Any party wishing to file any skeleton arguments or 20. submissions, should do so on or before 15th January, 2016. ( d) Each party to bear its own costs. Order accordingly. CamScanner