Attorney General & Another v Byaruhanga & 2499 Others (Consolidated Appeals No. 246 & 375 of 2021) [2025] UGCA 19 (16 January 2025)

Full Case Text

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

[Coram: F. M. S Egonda-Ntende, Muzamtu M. Kbeedi, and Christopher Gashirabake, JJA]

## CONSOLIDATED CIVIL APPEALS No. 246 OF 2021 AND No. 375 OF 2021

(Arising from Forl PorlalHCT-01-CV-CS-020 OF 2003)

## 1. ATTORNEYGENERAL 2. KASESE DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENT:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPELLANTS

VERSUS

#### BYARUHANGA JOHN & 2499 OTHERS (surNG THROUGH THErR LAWFUL ATTORNEYS/REPRESENTATIVES) RESPONDENTS

[Appealfrom the Judgment of the High Courl of Uganda at Foil Poftal (Musene, J) delivered on the 2&h ttlay 2019 in Civil Suit No, 020 of 20031

## JUDGMENT OF MUZAMIRU MUTANGULA KIBEEDI. JA

## Backqround facts

I1l The Respondents' case before the trial Court was that around 1990, the servants and/or agents of the Appellants consisting of the Policemen of the Uganda Police Force, Local Administration Police, officials of Kasese District Local Defence Units, game and forest warders and security personnel armed with guns, pangas, axes and other dangerous weapons forcefully evicted the Respondents from their respective lands located in the present day Kyabatukura, Ruhero, Katachenga, Kamuhaho, Kabirizi and Rutooma Villages in Kichwamba Sub-County, Bugoye County, Kasese District. At the time of the eviction, the Respondents andior their parents had lived on the said lands for about 19 years, having been allocated and resettled there in 1971 on the orders of the then President of Uganda, General ldi Amin Daada, and by Kigezi

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District Administration in their bid to alleviate the problems of over population and land fragmentation in the then Kabale, Mbarara and Bushenyi Districts.

- l2l ln the process of the eviction, the Respondents' properties were destroyed and/or lost. The properties included permanent and semi-permanent houses, livestock and crops. The Respondents were also assaulted and battered, and forced to flee their homes bare handed. Others were forcefully transported by the Ministry of Local Government and the 2nd Appellant and dumped in lbiga Refugee Camp from where some of their children died of starvation and disease. As a result, the Respondents sought to recover compensation from the Appellants for the damages and injuries suffered. - t31 The Appellants admitted before the trial Court the fact of the eviction having taken place but denied liability. The l.tAppellant contended that the Respondents were encroachers on various pieces of Government lands and were lawfully evicted from there. As for the 2no Appellant, she contended that the eviction was bonafide and carried out after notice to the Respondents since they were encroaching and trespassing on Government land gazetted as a foresUNational Park. The 2no Appellant further averred that if any force was used, it was commensurate with the need to evict the Respondents from the National Park gazetted land.

#### Decision of the trial Court

- t4l After the Respondents' suit undergoing a checkered history spanning about nineteen years in the High Court system, and going through the hands of not less than seven Judges of the High Court without determination, on the 28m of May, 2019, the High Court of Uganda at Fort Portal finally rendered its ludgment in favour of the Respondents in the following terms: - a) A declaration that the Respondents were wrongfully evicted and were not encroachers on the various lands they were evicted from.

- b) An order for the Appellants to pay the Respondents special damages of UGX. 52,658,658,633/= (Fifty-Two Billion, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Million, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand, Six Hundred Thirty{hree Uganda Shillings). - c) An order for the Appellants to pay the Respondents general, exemplary and punitive damages of Ugx. 4,000,000,000 (Uganda Shillings Four Billion). - d) An order for the Appellants to pay the Respondents interest at the court rate from the date of judgment till payment in full. - e) Costs of the suit

#### The Appeals

- t51 The Appellants were dissatisfied with the above decision and orders of the High Court and each one of them filed a separate appeal. - t61 ln the Memorandum of Appealfiled by the 1't Appellant's in Civil Appeal No. COA-00-CV-CA-0246-2021 Attorney General Vs Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others,lhe 1rr Appellant set out four grounds of appeal, namely: - - 1) That the learned Tial Judge erred in law and fact when he ruled that the Plaintiffs had been lawfully allocated and seftled on lhe surt land by His Excellency ldi Amin Dada and that as such, they had both lawful and equrtabb lnleresls. - 2) The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he considered, admrtted and relied upon the Technicalassessment and Valuation Report of PW4, Mr. Mpamya Joseph (Former Kasese District Agricultural Officer) as a technical valuer of Government and thus anived at an erroneous decision. - 3) The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he awarded special damages to the tine of UGX. 52,658,658,633/-- (Uganda Sht//tngs Ftfty-Two ['age 3 of29

Billion, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Million, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Ihousand, Six Hundred Thirly-three Shr//rngs) that were not specifically pleaded nor proved.

- 4) The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he awarded general damages, of Ugx. 4,000,000,000(Uganda Sh//tngs Four Billion) without any legal Justification. - t7l On the other hand, the 2nd Respondent's grounds of appeal as set out in Civil Appeal No. COA-00-CV-CA-0375-2021 Kasese District Local Government Vs Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others, were in substance similar to those of the 1( Appellant save ground three where the 2nd Appellant claimed thus:

'The Leamed Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he held that the Respondenls'suit was not time barred by limitation.'

#### Consolidation of the Appeals

- t8l Hearing of Civil Appeal No. COA-00-CV-CA-0246-2021 Attorney General Vs Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others proceeded by way of the Written Submissions of the 1,t Appellant and the Written Reply of the Respondents. This was pursuant to the Consequential Orders made by this Court as part of its Ruling in Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others Vs Attomey General, Civil Application No. 322 of 2021. However, in their Written submissions, Counsel for the Respondents prayed for the consolidation of Civil Appeal No. 246 of 2021 and Civil Appeal No. 375 ol 2021 which were separately filed in this Court by the Attorney General and Kasese District Local Government respectively, on the ground that both appeals arose from the same High Cou( Judgmenl, High Cout Fol Poftal Civil Suit No. 020 of 2003. - tgl On 29th November 2024, this Court received a letter from the 2no Appellant's advocate, Mr. Samuel Kiriaghe of M/S MRK Advocates, communicating their no objection to the proposal of the Respondents for consolidation of the two appeals. ln the said letter,

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the 2.0 Appellant's advocates acknowledged that whereas Civil Appeal No, 375 of 2021had not yet been fixed for scheduling and hearing, they sought the indulgence of thisCourtlopermittheAppellantinCivilAppealNo.3T5of 202ltoassoctalelfself with the wriflen submlssions filed by the Attorney General in Civil Appeal No. 246 of 2021 since the grounds in the Memoranda of appeal are substantially the same and the likely outcome in Civil Appeal No. 246 of 2021 would effectively dispose of Civil AppealNo. 375of 2021.'

- [10] Consolidation of appeals is provided for by rule 101 of the Rules of this Court. Under the said rule, this Court may, for sufficient reason, order any two or more appeals to be consolidated on such terms as it thinks just, or may order them to be heard at the same time or one immediately after the other, or may order any of them to be stayed until after the determination of any other of them. - [11] I reviewed the Records of the two appeals sought to be consolidated and the Memoranda of Appeal filed therein. Both appeals arise from the same suit and judgment in which the Respondents were the Plaintiffs, the 1.t Appellant was the 1't Defendant, and the 2nd Appellant was the 2no Defendant. The substance of the grounds of appeal in both appeals is similar, save that the 2nt Respondent's Memorandum of appeal had an additional ground on time limit. The Respondents likewise prayed for the same order of consolidation. Lastly, no further delay in the disposal of the appeals will be occasioned through the consolidation since the 2nd Appellant simply opted to adopt the written submissions of the 1't Appellant which were already on the file. - [12] ln the circumstances, I was satisfied that Civil Appeal No. 246 ot 2021 and Civil Appeal No. 375 o'f 2021 meet the criteria for consolidation. I would accordingly consolidate them and resolve both appeals in one judgment.

### Duty of the court

- [13] As a lstAppellate court, it is the duty of this Court to re-appraise all evidence that was adduced before the trial court and come to its own conclusions of fact and law while making allowance for the fact that the court neither saw nor heard the witnesses. (See Rule 30(1)(a) of the Judicature (Cout7 of Appeal Rules) Directions, S.l 13-10, Fredrick Zaabwe vs. Orient Bank Ltd Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2006) - [14] Similarly, in Kfamunte Henry vs. Uganda SCU Cr. Appeal no. 10 of 7997 the Supreme Court of Uganda held that:

'The first appellate couft has a duty to review the evidence of the case, to reconsider the materials before the trial judge and make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it."

[15] lt is with the above principles in mind that lwillproceed to resolve the consolidated appeal starting with the ground on limitation of time. Thereafter, I will resolve the grounds of appeal in the order in which they were set out in the Memorandum of Appeal in CivilAppeal No. 246 of 2021.

## Limitation of the oriqinal suit

[16] lngroundthreeoftheMemorandumofappealfiledin CivilAppeal375of2021,the 2no Respondent set out his complaint faulting the trial Judge's resolution of the issue of limitation in the following terms:

'The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he held that the Respondents' suif was not time barred by limitation,"

[17] ln the Written submissions filed by the 1st Appellant which were also adopted by the 2no respondent has her legal arguments in this matter, the question of limitation of the original suit was neither addressed nor alluded to at all. The adoption of the said submissions by the lno Respondent as her legal arguments in support of her appeal in essence meant that the 2no Respondent did not address this Court on the issue of limitation. This Court has in a number of cases treated the grounds in respect of which no legal arguments or submissions have been made as having been abandoned by the concerned party. See: Centre for Health & Human Rights (CEHURD) Vs Aftorney General, CPC NO. 029 of 2018; Kabuuza v Mukeeze Muwanga (Civil Appeal No 87 of 2017) 2022 UGCA 142; and Olando Difasi Ors v Ono Zacharia (Civil Appeal No 08 of 2016) 2017 UGCA 133. I have not found any reason to depart from the above position. I would accordingly strike out ground three of Civil Appeal 375 of 2021.

## Ground one - lnterest of the Respondents in the suit land

[18] Ground one of appeal was couched as follows:

'The learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he ruled that the Plaintiffs had been lawfully allocated and settled on the suit land by His Excellency ldi Amin Dada and that as such, they had both lawful and equitable lnterests. "

#### The Appellants' submissions on ground one

[19] The Appellants faulted the learned trial Judge for finding, with no evidence on record, that the suit land belonged to the Respondents and that they had acquired both lawful and equitable interests by way of a Presidential directive allocating the land to them. The Appellants argued that the Respondents did not submit before the trial Court any documentation relating to the alleged Presidential Directive/Decree from the Government for them to settle on the suit land as claimed. The Appellants contended

that the suit land was a gazetted Central Forest Reserve and that the then President ldi Amin Dada did not have powers to allocate the same.

[20] Counsel for the Appellants opined that the Respondents were not only unlawful occupants but also encroachers on the suit land, as the suit land was a Central Forest Reserve, now a National Park, under the Uganda Wildlife (Declaration of Wildlife Conservation Area) (Kibale National Park) S.l No. 46 of 2003 which illustrates in the attached Schedule that Kibale National Park was formerly known as Kibale Central Forest Reserve as described in the Forest Reserve (Declaration) Order, 1968 and Queen Elizabeth National Park-Kibale Forest Corridor Game Reserve as declared by the Game Reserve Declaration (amendment) Notice 1965. Counselfor the Appellant submitted that the subsequent legislation (S.l 46/2003) declared the suit land as a Wildlife Conservation Area and changed its description to Kibale National Park. While relying on Section 56 (1) (b) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6, the Appellants urged this Court to take Judicial Notice of Uganda Wildlife (Declaration of Wildlife Conservation Area) (Kibale National Park) S.l No. 46 of 2003 and find that the suit land being a Gazetted Central Forest Reserve, now a National Park, belongs to the Government of Uganda which is holding the same in trust for the people and could not have been available for such allocation.

#### The Respondents' Reply to ground one

- [21] ln reply, the Respondents submitted that the learned Trial Judge rightly found that the Respondents had been allocated the suit land by President ldi Amin Dada and thus had an interest in the suit land. As such, the Respondents were not encroachers as claimed by the Appellants. - [22] Counsel argued that the Appellants having been in possession of the suit land at all the material times, the burden of proving that they were not owners was on the Appellants to prove. For this proposition, the Respondents relied on Section 1'10 of the

Page 8 of 29 Evidence Act, Cap, 6 which provides that when the question before the Court is whether any person is owner of anything of which he or she is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he or she is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he or she is not the owner.

- [23] As regards the Appellants submission that the suit land was a forest reserve or national park, the Respondents contended that the submission is an afterthought since the same was not canvassed al trial. That there was no map of the Forest reserve or national park as gazetted produced at the trial. And that the documents that were included on Pgs. 96 -145 of the Record of Appeal are not part of the exhibits that were admitted at the trial. - [24] The Respondents concluded by urging this Court to dismiss ground one for lack of merit.

#### Resolution of ground one

- [25] From the Amended Plaint, the Respondents' claim before the trial Court was for compensation for damages, loss and injuries suffered by them as a result of being wrongfully evicted from the suit lands on which they were settled in 1971 on the directives of the then President of Uganda, General ldi Amin Daada. They sought, among other things, a declaration that they were wrongfully evicted and were not encroachers on the various lands they were evicted from. - [26] ln the 1,r Appellant's Amended Written Statement of Defence, he denied that the Respondents were settled on the suit land by Government or any Local Government. The 1sr Appellant contended that the Respondents on their own and without the permission, consent or knowledge of the Government of Uganda, migrated from various places in Kabale, Rukungiri, Bushenyi and other districts and temporarily settled on the suit land.

- [27] lt was the 1't Appellant's case that the suit land was at all material times government land and occupied by and in the hands of different government institutions. Further, that the Respondents were encroachers on various pieces of government land who were evicted laMully from the suit land after being notified of the intended eviction. - [28] As for the 2no Appellant, she contended in her Amended Written Statement of Defence that the Respondents were encroachers and trespassers on Government land/ gazetted a foresU National Park and that the acts of the Government, the District Council and their agents in evicting the Respondents were bona fide and with notice to them. - [29] The trial Court resolved the issue of the interests of the Respondents on the suit land as follows:

"l find and hold that the plaintiffs [now Respondents], having been allocated the land in question by ldi Amin Dada, who was the Head of state and Fountain of Honour at the time, then they could not be taken as mere sguafters.

Fuihermore, that fact the plaintiffs were allocated and settled on the suit land by his Excellency ldi Amin Dad was not challenged by the defendants. ln the circumstances, I find and hold that the plaintiffs became lawful owners of the suit land as they acquied such lawful and equitable interest in the suit land."

- [30] The first line of attack of the findings of the trial Judge by the Appellants was that the Respondents did not present any documentation before the trial Court to prove the Presidential allocation. The second reason for the Appellants faulting the findings of the trial Judge was that the suit land was a gazetted Central Forest Reserve and President ldi Amin Dada did not have powers to allocate the same. - [31] With regard to the absence of documentation, the Appellants have not cited any legal provision to the effect that proof of the allocation had to be done exclusively by documentation. Sections 58 and 59 of the Evidence Act, Cap.8 (formerly Cap. 6) Page l0 of 29

provide that all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence which is direct.

[32] The oral evidence of allocation of the suit land was given by PW1, PW2 and PW3. The trial Judge properly summarised their evidence thus:

"lt was the evidence of PWl, PW2 and Pw3 that they had initially settled in the South Western districfs of Uganda namely, Kisoro, Kabale, Rukungiri, Mbarara, Bushenyi and Kasese and that in 1971, his Excellency ldi Amin Dada allocated them the suit land that was under national seruice. That the idea behind thrs reseltlement was to alleviate over population in the said dlstricts. Ihat the allocation of the land took place at Hima Cement Factory in Kasese Drstrict when his Excellency had come to inaugurate Hima Cement Factory. That the said President diected local administrators and leaders to comply and distribute the land. That the allocation was prompted by the [Respondents'] petition to His Excellency. Afrer the said allocation, the [Respondents/ setf/ed on their respective lands, burlt houses, cultivated seasonal crops and reared animals thereon.

The [Appellants] on the other hand provided the [Respondents] with the necexary rural seryices ranging from local administration, security, roads, schoo/s, health seruices and agricultural services among others. The [Respondents] paid graduated taxes to the local administration among other taxes and by 1990 they had lived on the suit land for over 21 years. The said wrtnesses testified that in the course of eviction, the [Appellants] burnt thet houses and crops, cut down and destroyed banana plantations, coffee plantations, cotton, cassava and other crops, beat up, assaulted, battered the [Respondents] and forced them to flee their homes bare handed. Later the [Respondents] were forcefully provided with transport by Kasese District Local Government Administration and the Ministry of Local Government and were dumped in lbuga refugee camp without any assistance and many of thei children died of dlseases and starvation .. ."

[33] The above evidence was not rebutted by the Appellants at all. None of the Appellants' witnesses who testified before the trial Court had knowledge of the Respondents or the suit land. DW1 Kawalya Ronald admitted that he did not have information and Page I I of29 details pertaining to the alleged temporary period of settlement of the Respondents on the suit land. Neither did he know how the respondents came to be settled on the suit land.

[34] As for the other witnesses of the Appellants, their evidence was evaluated by the trial Court thus:

'DW2 did not know and has never visited the villages comprising the suit land. DW3 who testified for the 2nd defendant conceded that at the time the cause of action arose in 1990 he was stl// at Makerere University pursuing a degree in Bachelors of Science in Forestry. DW3 admitted that he did not know how the plaintiffs came to settle on the suit land; that he does not know and has never visited the sutt /ands in which the villages are located. DW3 did not have a list of those plaintiffs who were found inside the boundaries of Ksangi Forest Reserve. DW3 did not have a lrst of those plaintiffs who were found inside the boundaries of Kisangi Forest Reserve. DW3 admitted that he was not around when the alleged boundary opening of the said forest reserve was done nor did he know the paliculars of lhose persons he claims opened the boundaries of the forest rese rve. DW3 claimed that his evidence was based on records from office afthough he produced none to support his claims.'

- [35] ln the premises, I find that the Appellant's complaints about the trial Court's findings that the Appellants were not encroachers of the suit land having been allocated the same by the then President of Uganda, ldi Amin Dada are without basis. - [36] From the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 as accepted by the trial Court, by the time the Respondents were evicted in 1990, they had spent about 19 years of continuous and unchallenged physical occupation of the suit land. This ipso facto confened upon the Respondents an interest in the suit land legally termed as title by adverse possession. See Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, th Edition, Stuart Bridge, Elizabeth Cooke and Martin Dixon, Srveet & Maxwell, London, 2019 at paragraphs, T-001;7-004;7-084). Whether the original entry was unlawful is

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inelevant. Whether, as claimed by the Appellants, the President had no power to allocate the land which formed the basis for the Respondent's original entry into the suit land became irrelevant after the passage of twelve years of continuous and unchallenged occupation. Whether the land occupied was a gazetted forest or National Park does not negate the title acquired by the Respondents by adverse possession.

[37] While elaborating on the law of title by adverse possession, the learned authors of the legal treatise, Megarry & Wade (supra) at paragraphs 7-007; 7-014; 7-029 to 7 f10), state thus:

> "... Possession is a legal concept which depends on the peformance of overl acts, and not on intention. lt requires an appropriate degree of physical control of the land and it must be a single and exclusive possession...lt is in the public interest that a person who has long been in undisputed possesslon should be able to deal with the land as owner. lt is more important that an established and peaceful possession should be protected than that Page 20 of 29 the law should assist the agitation of old claims. A statute which effects lhis purpose is "an act of peace." Long dornant claims have often more cruelty than of justice in them... Adverse possesslon runs counter to the principle of the indefeasibihty of a registered title and can only be justified in limited circumstances... fo estab/tsh adverse possesslon, a squafter must prove both factual possesslon of the land and the requisite intention to possess (anlmus possldendi)... The principles which determine whether conduct amounts to adverse possesslon were affirmed by the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30; [2003] 1 AC 419...the House held that where /rcensees remained in possesslon of grazing land for more than 12 years after the expiry of the licence, they had acquied title to the land by adverse possession, because they were in factual possesslon and shown the requisite intention."

[38] ln the premises, I find no basis for faulting the Trial Judge for having found that the Respondents had an interest in the suit land. I would accordingly reject ground one of the appeal.

# Ground Two - Valuation bv an expert other than a Reqistered Valuation Survevor

[39] The second ground of appeal was couched as follows:

"The Learned Trial Judge ened in law and fact when he considered, admitted and relied upon the Technical assessmenf and Valuation Reporl of PW4, Mr, Mpamya Joseph (Former Kasese District Agricultural Officer) as a technical valuer of Government and thus arrived at an erroneous decision.'

## The Appellants submissions on ground two

- [40] The Appellants' complaint in ground two was that the trial Court in arriving at its decision, squarely relied on lhe "Technical Assessment and Valuation Report dated 24h October 2015" authored by a one Mr. Joseph Mpamya, a Retired Agricultural Officer of Kasese District, who was not only incompetent but also not qualified to carry out the purported valuation exercise as he was neither registered nor accredited by the Board under Section 4 and 15 of the Surveyors Registration Act. The Appellants submitted that for the trial Court to have relied on the valuation as credible evidence, the same ought to have been done by a Valuation Surveyor registered under Section 1(h) and 26 of the Surveyors Registration Act, Cap. 275. - [41] Additionally, Counsel for the Appellants submitted the above notwithstanding, the trial Court made a finding that PW 4 Joseph Mpamya, in making PE3 was guided by compensation rates which had values attached and approved by the Government Valuer before they are effected by the District Land Board. Counsel argued that PW4 Joseph Mpamya, was not a certified and qualified valuer for purposes of any property valuation and that the value of the affected land in issue that was presented before the Trial Court is highly questionable, speculative and not based on actual evidence. As such, Counsel called on Court to consider PW 4 Joseph Mpamya an incompetent

expert procured by the Respondents who, in the circumstances, could not be able to produce an objective, unbiased and competent valuation opinion or report.

- [42] Furthermore, Counsel submitted that there is no evidence on Court record to show that the land in issue and property was ever valued given the fact that the Technical Valuation Report was made over 20 years after the eviction of the Respondents had been done. The Appellant relied on the case of Omito Luka and 5 others Vs. Aftorney General HCCS IVo. 0073 of 2004[2014 where Hon. Justice Stephen Mubiru questioned the valuation Report of an Agricultural Officer and found that it was inherently incredible and possibly untrue in so far as there was no indication as to when the actual valuation was done and whether it was still possible at the time to determine the acreage of crops each of the plaintiffs had, the crop varieties grown by each of the Plaintiffs, the productivity of each of their parcels of land or information relating to other material loss suffered by any of the Plaintiffs. Counsel invited this Court to be persuaded by the above decision given that the valuation was also conducted by PW4 who was, in the opinion of the Appellants Counsel, "an incompetent person" twenty-five years after the alleged eviction. - [43] The Appellants concluded that as a result of the failure of the trial Court to intenogate the competence and expertise of PW4 Joseph Mpamya, it erroneously relied on Technical Assessment Report in the determination of the case.

#### The Respondents' Reply on ground two

- [44] ln reply, the Respondents submitted that PW4 did not testify as the technical Valuer of Government as claimed by the Appellants. His testimony was as an expert which he acquired from his long service as an Agricultural Officer in the area and was knowledgeable about the property which he valued. - [45] The Respondents distinguished the case of Omito Luka and 5 Ors Vs. the Attornev General lsupra) as ina pplicable to the instant case. The Respondents submitted that Page l5 of 29

the Agricultural Officer in the case of Omito luka (supra), was not called to testify, did not sign or othenvise execute the Valuation Report in the matter. As such, the Court in that case rightly relected the plea to rely on the Valuation Report in question. ln contrast, PW4 signed the Report, testified in Court and tendered the Report in evidence. The Trial Court was satisfied with his competence and expertise and admitted his evidence, subjected it to proper evaluation and discounted the values assessed by 50% and rightfully awarded the sum of UGX. 52,658,658,633/= as special damages.

[46] The Respondents urged this Court to reject ground two

## Resolution of ground two

- [47] A review of the trial Record and judgment shows that the trial Court relied on the impugned "Technical Assessment and Valuation Repor( dated the 24th October 2015 when assessing the quantum of special damages to compensate the Respondents for the property they lost during the eviction exercise. The said Report was made, signed and tendered into evidence by PW4. The Appellants' first complaint in ground two is that that the "Trial Judge ened in law and fact when he considered, admrtted and relied upon the Technicalassessmenf and Valuation Repol of PW4, Mr. Mpamya loseph (Former Kasese District Agricultural Officer) as a technical valuer of Government'. - [48] I have carefully reviewed the evidence before the trial Court. Nowhere did PW4 purport to be a "technical valuer of Government' as claimed by the Appellants. And neither was he taken as such by the trial Court. PW4 signed the impugned "Technical Assessment and Valuation Reporl' dated the 24th October 2015 thus:

# "JOSEPH MPAMYA

# RTD DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL OFFICER, KASESE DISTRICT'

Page 16 of 29 - [49] Even in his oral testimony, PW4 maintained the same reference titles. Accordingly, I find the first leg of the Appellants' complaint without any factual basis. - t50l The Appellants' second complaint in ground two is about the competence of PW4 to carry out the valuation exercise when he was neither registered nor accredited by the Surveyors' Registration Board under section 4 and 15 of the Surveyors Registration Act, - [51] When resolving the claim by the Respondents for the value of the property they lost and/or damaged while being evicted, the trial Court was entitled make use of the opinion of "experts". This is by virtue of Section 43 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 8 of the 2023 Revised Edition of the Laws of Uganda (formerly the Evidence Act, Cap. 6) which is couched as follows:

## "Opinions of experts

When the court has to form an opinion upon a point of ... sclence or aft, ... the opinions upon that point of persons specla//y skl//ed in that ... science or aft, ... are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts." [Emphasis added]

[52] From the above provision of the law, the material criteria when Court is considering whether a particular person qualifies to give it expert opinion is whether he/she is 'specially skilled" in the relevant area or subject matter. There is no doubt that practising as registered Valuation Surveyor is one of the modes through which the special skills can be acquired. However, it is NOT the only and exclusive mode of acquisition of the expertise in the area of valuation. And neither does the Evidence Act restrict expertise in the area of valuation to only Valuation Surveyors registered under the Surveyors Registration Act as argued by the Appellants nor exclude persons who are not registered under the Surveyors Registration Act from giving the Courts of law expert opinions in the areas they are specially skilled in on the sole the

ground of the non-registration. lf the legislature had intended it to be so, it would have expressly stated so.

[53] The restriction of persons who are not registered and licensed is found in section 19(3) of the Surveyors Registration Act, Cap. 303 of the 2023 Revised Edition and is couched as follows

> " SubTect to this Act, no person shall engage in or carry out the practice of surveying, by whatever name called, unless he or she ls the holder of a valid practising ceftificate granted to him or her in that behaff under fhrs Act. " [Empasis added]

- [54] The operative clause from the above provision of the law is "carry out the practice of surueying'. As far as is relevant to the resolution of the matter before this Court, the Webster online dictionary defines the verb "practice" to mean 'to do or perform often, customarily, or habituallf','fo be professlonally engaged in","to peform or wo\* at repeatedly so as to become proficient', or "to train by repeated exerclses". See: https : i/www. meniam-webster. com/d iction arvlpraoliee - [55] ln my understanding, "practice" as a verb in the current context implies doing the barred act repeatedly or more than once or being professionally engaged in doing the barred acts. And this ultimately boils down to evidence to be adduced by the one alleging the fact. lt is not simply a question of legal interpretation. There was no such evidence adduced by the Appellants before the trial Court in this regard. - [56] Therefore, the relevant question to be used by this Court in determining whether the impugned Report was erroneously relied upon by the trial Cou( is: Was PW4 specially skilled in the subject matter of the Report, namely: valuation of the crops, properties, dwellings and agricultural holdings which he valued?

- [57] PW4's evidence before the trial Court was that at the time he made the contested Valuation Report, he was a retired Agricultural Officer holding a Bachelor of Science (Agriculture) degree of Makerere University obtained in 1971. Upon graduation, in 1971 he joined the Civil Service as a Deputy District Agricultural Officer, and his first posting was in the then Bunyoro District. He worked in diverse places in Uganda. ln 1983 he was elevated to the post of District Agricultural Officer. At the time of the eviction of the Respondents from the suit land PW4 was the District Agricultural Officer. He was also a member of the District Planning Committee who offered various services to the Respondents ranging from agricultural extension services, field visits and other related crop husbandry practices. ln November 1990 he was transferred to Kabarole as a Regional Agricultural Officer. At the time of his retirement PW4 was a Principal Agricultural Offi cer. - [58] I am satisfied that on account of his formal educational qualifications and work experience, PW4 possessed the necessary skills to give the Court expert opinion in respect of the values of the property lost by the Respondents as detailed in the impugned technical Valuation Report. Accordingly, ground two fails.

# Ground three - Court award of Special damaqes

[59] Ground three was couched as follows:

"The Leamed Trial Judge ened in law and fact when he awarded special damages to the tune of UGX. 52,658,658,6338 (Uganda Shl//rngs Fifty-Two Billion, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Million, Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand, Six Hundred Thitylhree Shl//lngs) that were not specifically pleaded nor proved.'

#### The Parties' submissions on ground three

[60] ln their submissions, the Appellants argued that the Respondents did not at any material time, during the trial, present proof of special damages as required by law.

Page l9 ol'29

The Appellants contended that discharging the burden of proof necessitated presenting actual physical evidence. But in the instant matter, the Respondents presented only their personal declarations as opposed to actual physical evidence.

- [61] The Appellants further argued that considering that PW 4 made his assessment more than 20 years after the eviction of the Respondents from the suit land was completed, there was nothing to value at that time, for purposes of ascertaining the alleged claim. As such, opined the Appellants, the learned trial Judge should have disregarded the Valuation Report ln tolo in assessing the award of special damages. - [62] The Respondents disagreed and supported the findings of the trial Court as having been arrived at after a proper evaluation of the evidence before the Court and all the concerns raised by the Appellants in this ground.

## Resolution of ground three

[63] I have examined the Amended Plaint filed by the Respondents in the trial Court. They pleaded their claim for special damages in paragraph 14 thus:

#### "PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES, IOSS, AAJD DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY LOST BY EACH PLAINTIFF

Monetary value assessed and valued at Shs. 105,317,317,266/= inclusive ot disturbance allowance at 30% as per valuation and assessment report by Joseph Mpamya dated 24th October 2015 as per ertract annexure A5"

[64] Pleading by way of reference to a document annexed to the Plaint which contains the more fine details or more specific particulars of a claim has long been recognised as an acceptable style of pleading by the Courts. ln Jeraj Shariff & Co. Vs Chotai Fancy Stores [1960] EA 374 (CA-U), it was held that facts appearing in an annexture to a Plaint are to be regarded as appearing in the Plaint.

- [65] Accordingly, it is my finding that the claim by the Appellants that the Respondents did not specifically plead special damages is without any basis. - [66] As regards the proof of the special damages claimed, it was done principally through the admission of the impugned Valuation Report in evidence as Exhibit PE3. I have examined the methodology used by PW4 when assessing the values of the Respondent's claim for special damages. lt is reflected in the Report itself and the oral testimony of PW4. ln the report, PW4 stated that the villages from which the Respondents were evicted were known to him since he was the District Agricultural Officer at the time of the eviction. Further, when the eviction occurred, he had the opportunity to visit the affected areas together with the District Executive Committee and Planning Committee and various Ministry representatives, Consequently at the time he was instructed by the Respondents'Advocates to make the Valuation report in 2015, he did not start from scratch. He still had memories which he termed as being 'still fresh in [his] mind given the magnitude of the incident." The Respondents were also largely known to him as commercial and subsistence farmers in the categories which were set out in the appendix to the Valuation Report. - [67] The oral testimony of PW4 was properly summarised by the trial Court. PW4 stated in his examination in Chief that he was the District Agricultural Ofiicer at the time of the Plaintifls eviction from the suit land. He was also a member of the District Planning Committee who offered various services to the Respondents ranging from agricultural extension services, field visits and other related crop husbandry practices. He had interacted with the Plaintiffs for a period of over 7 years. He kept a register of crop activities. After their eviction, PW4 visited the Respondents in their various areas where they had re-settled and interviewed them about the quantities of the properties lost. PW4 maintained that he knew the acreage of the land as well as the nature of the crops each of the Respondents had owned as he had seen them before the Respondents were evicted, and that he vividly remembered what the Respondents

Page 2l of29

owned having been the Agricultural Officer for over 7 years, having lived in Kasese for 12 years, and also based on his knowledge on the information from the District Planning Committee, Veterinary Officers and engineers. PW4 also pointed out that at the District level there used to be extension workers who worked under the Principal Agriculture Officer up to the Village level and that they would make monthly reports on the crop activities in the District.

- [68] On top of relying on the information availed to him by the Respondents, and his own previous knowledge of what the claimants owned, PW4 stated that he also employed the method ol "random sampling' which is one of the acceptable scientific methods. He also used the Compensation Rates for the year 201412015 as set out and approved by Kasese District Local Government under Minute KDLB/09/2014 of the Board meeting sitting on the 3,0 and 4th September 2014. The total outcome of all the above considered factors was the conclusion he arrived at, to the effect that the appropriate compensation due to the Respondents was Ugx 105,317,317,2661=. - [69] When dealing with the issue of special damages, the learned trial Judge considered the qualification and experience of PW4, the methods he used to establish the particulars of the propefl claimed by the Respondents, the compensation rates applicable at the time, the fact of passage of time of about 15 years between the occurrence of the eviction and the compilation of the Report, and the applicable legal principles, and reduced the Respondents' claim by 50% from Ugx 105, 317,317,2661= to Ugx 52,658,658,633/=. The detailed evaluation and decision of the Trial Court on the subject is reproduced below: -

"This Couft has considered the submlssions on both sides on issue 4 and 5. .. None of the defence wifnesses challenged the evidence of PW4. Whereas the eviction took place in 1990, PW4 relied on the compensation rates for the year 2014/2015. Ihis is because the law provides that the Land Board of every district shall review every year the list of rates for compensation, lhus the valuation must be based on the prevailing rates at the trme of assessm ent and not the previous rates. See: Section 59(1)(l) ofthe Land Act as amended.

Page 22 of 29

This Courl finds that PW4 in making PE3 was guided by compensation rates which have values attached and approved by the Government Valuer before they are effected by the District Land Board. ln doing so, PW4 was only computing and therefore his registration and license with the Board of Surveyors and Valuers was not necessary. Whereas the Coul accorded the [Appellants] ample time to produce the repoi of the Government Valuer, none was done and exhibited in Cout. They cannot therefore turn round and say there was no Government Valuer's report when they kept on seeking adjournments to call a Government Vauer but in the end, they failed. Who was to blame?

Special damages as c/armed in PE3 are on a balance of probabilities. The compensation rates relied upon are in line with Section 59 Sub Sections (1) (e) and (t) and 5 of the Land Act as amended, Cap. 227. Any estimate expeftly arrived at cannot be said to be an act of guesswork as long as lhe wlness experlise is nol denied. See: Mparo Limited versus Attorney General, HCCS 726/1992 repoded at P. 557 [1996] KALR. The knowledge, experience and expeftise of PW4 was not challenged in cross examination. Courts have held that an elenent of variation of actual in valuation repods is possible and not an exaggeration and held that there is no valuation repoft that can be 100% accurate since it always contains some measurc of speculation and such do not render the valuation reporl irelevant or unreliable. See: Dr. James Ssekalugo versus Woodstock Enterpnses, HCCS No.396 of 1992 reported a P.642 [19981KALR.

PW4 provided a scientific base for his conc/uslons and computations rn the valuation repoft earlier on pointed out. The Courl's criticism against PE3 and PW4 is that there was no consideration that the majority of the destroyed properlies were agricultural products subject to economic price fluctuations and vulnerable to the vagaries of nature, and the immovable properlies were aged structures and the fact that the Plaintiffs have not suffered for eternity. ln view of these factors and considering the plight of the Plaintiffs in thet large numbers, I decline to award he full quantum of UGX 105,317,317,226h as specla/ damages but rather discount special damages by 50%. The Court therefore awards Shs. 52,658,658,6331= (Fifty two billion and six hundred fitg eight million, six hundred tifry eight thousand six hundred thity three shillings only) as special damages."

[70] For this Court, as a first appellate Court, to interfere with an award of damages of the trial Court, it must be satisfied that the trial Judge acted on some wrong principle of law or that the amount awarded was extremely high or so small as to make it, in the judgment of the appellate Court, an entirely enoneous estimate of the damages which the litigant is entitled to. See: Sembuya Francis Vs Allports Servrces (U) Limited, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1999 (Unreported); Bank of Uganda Vs Masaba & Others 1t9991 I EA 2; Uganda Breweries Ltd Vs Uganda Railways

Page 23 of 29

Corporation, Supreme Court Civil Appeal I{o. 6 of 2001; and Ahmed lbrahim Bholm Vs. Car and General Ltd, SCCA No.12 OF 2002,\_

[71] I am satisfied that the Appellants have not made out a case to warrant the interference with the damages awarded by the High Court. Ground three would accordingly fail.

## Ground 4 - Award of oeneral damaqes

[72] Ground four was couched as follows:

"The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and fact when he awarded general damages of Ugx. 4,000,000,000 (Uganda Sh//rngs Four Billion) without any legal Justification."

#### The Appellants' submissions on ground four

- [73] Counsel for the Appellants submitted lhat the Respondents prayed for general, exemplary and punitive damages of UGX. 5,000,000i= as per the Amended Plaint yet the learned trial Judge surprisingly stated that the Respondents had pleaded for a sum of UGX. 10,000,000,000/= for the same. That the trial Judge then awarded 4,000,000,000/= as general and exemplary damages contrary to the principles governing the exercise of discretionary powers of the Court, namely, that it must be used reasonably and judiciously depending on the different circumstances of each case and in accordance with the well-established principles when dispensing justice. - [74] Counsel argued that general damages are compensatory in nature and are not meant to enrich the Plaintiff as they must be in the reasonable contemplation of parties to arise from the breach as per the case of Godfrey Opus Vs. Harvest Farm Seeds Ltd SCCA l{o. 02 of 2012. lt was the Appellants' submission that from the evidence presented by the Appellants before the trial Court, the Respondents did not suffer any economic inconvenience or injury as they were transported by train and resettled in the present districts of Kagadi and Kibale. That while at Nalweyo Reception Center, they were given food items, tools of work such as hoes, pangas and settled in the Page 24 of 29 villages of Muhinga, Mpasana, Busita and Kyangota, among others where each family was given 10 (ten) acres of land and a monthly food ratio, and the Government also built a school at Kasambya as per the testimony of DW2 Mugenyi David.

[5] The Appellants contended that the learned trial Judge ignored the Appellants' evidence and relied on allegations that were not based on any strong evidence as alleged by the Respondents which greatly influenced his decision at that time when awarding an exorbitant amount of general, punitive and exemplary damages. The Appellants urged this Court to find that the award of general, punitive and exemplary damages to a tune of UGX. 4,000,000,000/= was exorbitant and set it aside accordingly.

# Respondent's reply to ground four

- [76] ln reply to ground four, the Respondents submitted that the learned trial Judge rightly exercised his discretion and awarded UGX. 4,000,000,000i= as general, exemplary and punitive damages to atone for the inconvenience, pain, suffering and misery occasioned to the Respondents and not to enrich them as alleged by the Appellants since each Respondent was to receive a paltry Shs. 1,600,000/=. - [77] Counsel prayed that this ground of appeal be relected.

# Resolution of ground four

[78] I note that the submissions of the Appellants in respect of ground four are not only at variance with what they pleaded in their Memorandum of Appeal, but also the order of the trial Court complained about. ln ground four, the Appellants' faulted the trial Judge for awarding the Respondenls 'general damages of UGX 4,000,000,000/= (Four Billion Uganda Sh/irngs) without any legal justification." This is factually untrue. The trial Court's award of Ugx 4,000,000,000/= was NOT for general damages only as pleaded by the Appellants. The award of Ugx 4,000,000,000/= catered for general,

l)ag,e 25 ol'29

exemplary and punitive damages. Nonetheless, as no injustice has been occasioned, I would not censured the Appellants for making submissions which are contrary to their pleaded ground of appeal without the leave of Court as required by Rule 102(a) of the Rules of this Court.

[79] The second factual enor raised by the Appellants in their submissions is the claim that the learned trial Judge stated in his judgment that the Respondents had pleaded for a sum of UGX. 10,000,000,000/= for the general, exemplary and punitive damages. A review of the Amended Plaint shows that the Respondents prayed for general, exemplary and punitive damages of Ugx 5,000,000,000/= in the following terms:

'c. General, exemplary and punitive damages for wrongful violent eviction, inhuman treatment, starvation, psychological torture, pain and suffering, /oss of /lves due to staruation and lack of daily necesslties, inconveniences, /oss of income and livelihood, displacement, forged refuge, denial of right to property, /oss of homesleads and dlspossess ing them of land, homes and property to a lune of Shs. 5 billion."

- [80] From the above, it is quite clear that the trial Judge's statement complained about by the Appellants was not borne out of the pleadings of the Respondent. Nonetheless, the error on the part of the trial Court has not occasioned any inlustice in the circumstances of the case. - [81] Before awarding the Respondents the sum of Ugx 4,000,000,000/= as general, exemplary and punitive damages, the learned trial Judge set out the law, analysed the evidence and arrived at his conclusion thus:-

"For general, exemplary and punitive damages, the law is sett/ed See; lhe cases of Muyingo John Paul yersus Abbas Rugemwa and 2 Others, High Court Civil Suif IVo. 229 of 2011Rookes versus Benard and Others (1964) A. C. 1129. Such damages are awarded at Courts discretion considering the nature of the suffering

Pase 26 of 29

encountered. They are compensatory in nature and are intended to put the victim in the position they were in before the cause of action arose.

Exemplary and punitive damages are awarded especially where citizens' ights are arbitrarily abused. PWl-PW3 explained the misery, suffering, torture and inhumane treatment they were subjected to by the agents of the Defendants and how they have lived as destrtufes and as internally displaced people in their own country. Majority of the Plaintiffs that braved to appear before Court during the hearings notwithstandingthatthey had represenfatlves really looked destltute and miserable. The Plaintiffs pleaded for a consolidated sum of Shs. 10 billion for general, punitive and exemplary damages and given the long period of suffering that the Plaintiffs have endured.

Counsel for the Defendanls submitted that this case of the Plaintiffs does nol warrant general damage since the plaintiffs were evacuated to Kbale District, now Kagadi district and compensated by Govemment. However, I have earlier on disregarded the claim of resettlement in Kagadi District due to lack of suppotable evidence. And whereas counsel for the defendants fufiher submitted that the clain for general and exemplary damages is notTusfifed, lhis court's finds to the contrary. The evidence on record reveals the suffering of the plaintiffs at the hands of government functionaries, parlicularly the police and army. They acted in a high handed manner towards the plaintiffs. They are therefore entitled to exemplary damages. Neverthe/ess I find the sum of UGX 10 Billion requested by counsel for plaintiff for general, Punitive and exemplary damages on a higher scale.

ln the circumstances, I shall award a sum of UGX 4 billion as qeneral and exemplary damaqes, to atone for the inconvenience, pain sufferinq and misery occasioned to the plaintiffs.' IEmphasis added]

[82] The claim by the Appellants that the Respondents did not suffer any economic inconvenience or injury as they were transported by train and resettled in the present districts of Kagadi and Kibale was raised by the Appellants before the trial Court. lt was considered by the trial Court. The Appellants have simply repeated the same complaint before this Court without demonstrating how the trial Court erred in resolving the same complaint. Neither have the Appellants demonstrated any of the exceptional circumstances which entitle the Appellate Court to interfere with the award of damages by the trial Court as set out in the numerous judicial pronouncements of this court which I have already quoted hereinbefore including Sembuya Francis Vs Allports Services (U) Limited (Supra). The sum of Ugx 4 billion when shared equally between the 2500 Respondents in this matter means, in simple arithmetic, that Page 27 of 29 each Respondent was awarded Ugx 1,600,000/=. Can this amount be stated, by any inch of imagination, to be so extremely high as amount to an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages which the Respondents were entitled to be compensated for the pain and misery which they experienced? I think NOT.

- [83] On the contrary, I note that by the trial Court lumping together the award for general damages with the award for exemplary damages, it acted in breach of the general practice of the Courts to make distinct awards for general damages and exemplary damages. The reason underlying the practice is not hard to decipher. Each head of damages serves a different purpose: Whereas general damages are principally compensatory in nature, exemplary damages seek to demonstrate the disdain of the Court for the reprehensible conduct of the defendant, in acting in such a high-handed and outrageous manner in the abuse of the authority entrusted to him or her or it by the law. - [84] ln light of the amount awarded and the share of each Respondent I would, in befitting circumstances have treated such an award as simply general damages. Shs1.4 million is a paltry sum to be treated as exemplary damages to atone for the pain and suffering inflicted on each individual Respondent. But as there was no cross appeal, I will not comment beyond that. - [85] Acmrdingly, I would reject ground four of the appeal.

# t86l Conclusion

- 1) I would dismiss the consolidated appeals - 2) I would award the Respondents the costs before this Court. - 3) As a consequential Order, I would strike out the application filed by the Respondents against the 2nd Appellant seeking to strike out its appeal, namely: Civil Application No. 397 of 2021 Byaruhanga Moses & 2499 Others Vs Page 28 of29

Kasese District Local Government, on the ground that it has been overtaken by events following the resolution of the appeal on its merits.

Delivered and dated at Kampala this $16.1$ day of January....................................

ucileas

**MUZAMIRU MUTANGULA KIBEEDI** Justice of Appeal

#### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

[Coram: F. M. S Egonda-Ntende, Muzamiru M. Kibeedi and Christopher *Gashirabake JJA)*

CONSOLIDATED CIVIL APPEALS NO. 246 OF 2021 and No. 375 of 2021

#### 1. ATTORNEY GENERAL

2. KASESE DISTRIT LOCAL GOVERNMENT:::::: ......................................

#### **VERSUS**

#### **BYARUHANGA JOHN & 2499 OTHERS SUING THROUGH THEIR LAWFUL** ATTORNEYS/REPRESENTATIVES) J ....................................

### JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER GASHIRABAKE, JA.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Hon. Justice Muzamiru M. Kibeedi, JA.

I concur with the judgment and the orders proposed and I have nothing useful to add.

Dated at Kampala the $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day of $\frac{1}{2}$ day

Christopher Gashirabake **JUSTICE OF APPEAL.**

## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

lCoram: Egonda-Ntende, Kibeedi, and Gashirabake, JJAI

# CONSOLIDATED CIVILAPPEALS No. 246 OF 2021 AND No. 375 OF 2021

(Arisingfrom Fort Portal HCT-01-CV-CS-020 OF 2003)

#### BETWEEN

| Attorney General | Appellant No.l | |--------------------------------|----------------| | Kasese District Local Govemmcn | Appellant No.2 |

#### ANI)

Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others Respondents

lAppealfrom the Judgment of the High Court of Uganda at Fort Portal (Musene, . I) delivered on the 28th May 20191

#### JUDGMENT OF FREDRICK EGONDA-NTENDE . IA

- Ilt Ihave had the opportunity to read in draft the judgmcnt of my brother, Kibeedi, JA. I agree that these appeals have no merit, and I have nothing useful to add. - t2t As Gashirabake, JA, also agrees, these appeals are dismissed with costs to the respondents. - t3l Civil Application No. 397 of 2021 , Byaruhanga John & 2499 Others v Kasese District Local Govemment is also dismissed.

Signed, dated and delivcred at Kampala this lbfror j,,,\* \ 2025

I:redrick onda-Ntenclc

.l ustice of Appeal