The Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others ((SCA MA 06/2025) [2025] (MA 14/2025 Arising in MC 35/2024) (18 August 2025)) [2025] SCCA 17 (18 August 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (18 August 2025) SCA MA 06/2025 (MA 14/2025 Arising in MC 35/2024) In the Matter Between Bar Association of Seychelles (rep. by Mr. Sabino) And The Honourable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (rep. by Mr. Elizabeth) Zeina Jabbi (rep. by Mr. Elizabeth) The Honourable Attorney General (rep. by Mr. Perera along with Mr. Afif) Applicant 1st Respondent 2nd Respondent 3rd Respondent Before: Summary: Neutral Citation: The Bar Association of Seychelles v The Honourable Chief Justice and Others (SCA MA 06/2025) [2025] (MA 14/2025 Arising in MC 35/2024) (18 August 2025) Twomey-Woods, Robinson, Andre, JJA Practice and Procedure — Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court — Qualifications for admission as an attorney-at-law — Ex parte leave — Refusal of leave to proceed with Judicial Review — Refusal of leave to appeal — Whether special leave is required to appeal — Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles [CAP 42], articles 120 (1) and 120 (2), 136 (2), 125 (1) (c); Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules 1995, rules 2, 5, 6, 8; The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, rule 17; Legal Practitioners Act [CAP 111], sections 5, 12; Courts Act [CAP 52], section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) Held: (i) Special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is not required under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules 1995 (ii) The Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for special leave under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 (iii) An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a refusal of the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules 1995 6 August 2025 18 August 2025 Heard: Delivered: ORDER (1) The application under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 for special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal stands dismissed. (2) With no order as to costs. ______________________________________________________________________________ RULING ON THE APPLICATION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE ______________________________________________________________________________ ROBINSON JA TWOMEY-WOODS, ANDRE JJA CONCURRING 1. Bar Association of Seychelles, the Applicant, is an association registered under the Registration of Association Act, Act 9 of 1959. The same Act has since been repealed. The Applicant continues as an association under the Associations Act 2022, Act 8 of 2022. 2. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Seychelles is the First Respondent, Zeina Jabbi, an attorney-at-law, is the Second Respondent, and the Attorney-General of Seychelles is the Third Respondent. 3. This is an application MA No. 6 of 2025 made by the Applicant on the 30 July 2025 under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, which stipulates — 17 (1) In every matter where special leave to appeal to the Court is required by law in a civil or criminal matter, an application therefor shall be made by way of a notice of motion supported by affidavit." Emphasis is mine 4. The application is made by way of motion rather than a notice of motion as required under the said rule 17 (1), dated 30 July 2025, and filed in the Registry of the Supreme Court of Seychelles on the same date. The motion sought an order for special leave to appeal an interlocutory ruling delivered by the Supreme Court on the 16 July 2025 in MA No. 14 of 2025, which arose from MC No. 35 of 2024. 5. Jean-Marc Lablache, the incumbent treasurer of the Applicant, claimed in the affidavit in support of the motion that he is authorised to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Applicant. He swore the affidavit in support of the motion together with seven exhibits on the 30 July 2025. 6. I begin by stating the background against which the issues for determination arise. The background 7. The Applicant, the petitioner then, filed an application by way of petition in MC No. 35 of 2024 supported by affidavit together with four exhibits, which were filed on the 3 July 2024 pursuant to the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995, for orders of declaration and certiorari, exhibit JM1. The Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals, and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995, are hereinafter referred to as the "the Rules 1995". 8. The Applicant argued in the petition that the admission of the Second Respondent as an attorney-at-law, under section 5 of the Legal Practitioners Act [Cap 111], by the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, on the 4 April 2024, was illegal. The Applicant argued that the Second Respondent did not meet the necessary criteria for admission under section 5 (1) (a) and/or section 12 of the Legal Practitioners' Act, and no exceptional circumstance was present to justify the admission of the Second Respondent as an attorney-at-law. 9. I rehearse the relevant parts of the petition, which stated the claims made by the Applicant against both the First and Second Respondents — "6 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. The Admission Order discloses that the 2nd Respondent holds a law degree from the Bayero University of Kano, Nigeria, had completed the Legal Practitioners Course in Nigeria in September 2023, and was called to the Nigerian Bar in October 2023, on which basis the 1st Respondent admitted her as an attorney-at-law under the LPA, with full rights of audience before all Courts of Seychelles. The Registrar of the Supreme Court, in a response dated 24th May to a letter of the Petitioner of 8th April 2024, enquiring into the circumstances of the admission of the 2nd Respondent, stated that the 2nd Respondent had served her pupillage in Nigeria, and has been admitted as an Attorney-at-Law in Seychelles under Section 5(1)(a) (i)(ii) and (iii) of the LPA. Section 5(1)(b) of the LPA requires that any person who seeks admission as an attorney-at-law under sub-section 5(1)(a) of the LPA, must have served a pupillage period, for an aggregate of 2 years, in an approved chambers or as the Registrar of the Supreme Court. Section 2 of the LPA defines the expression 'approved chambers' as a chamber of an attorney-at-law of at least 5 years' standing, practising in Seychelles, and explicitly approved by the Chief Justice for the purposes of the LPA or the Department of Legal Affairs. Section 12 of the LPA requires that admission to act as an attorney-at-law under this section must be for a specific matter or proceedings, or for a period not exceeding 6 months. In practice, admission under section 12 of the LPA was granted to experienced advocates or legal experts practicing in a Commonwealth jurisdiction, who would not otherwise be eligible to practice law in the Courts of Seychelles, and in all such instances, complying with the specificities of that section. 12. The Petitioner avers as follows: (i) (ii) The 2nd Respondent did not meet the criteria for admission under subsection 1(a) (i), (ii) or (iii) as she has not served a pupillage period in terms of Section 5(1) (b) of the LPA; The 2nd Respondent does not meet the criteria for admission under Section 12 of the LPA, which requires that an applicant be an experienced advocate or legal expert; (iii) (iv) There is no proof that subsequent to her call in October 2023, the 2nd Respondent maintained any licence and/or that she was practicing in Nigeria or in any other country; In the alternative to the above, following her call to the Nigerian Bar in October 2023, the 2nd Respondent would have, at most, only been able to practice for five (5) months. 13. In the circumstances, the 1st Respondent's decision to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney-at-law under sub-section 5(1)(a) and/or Section 12 of the LPA, where the 2nd Respondent has not met the criteria specified under those provisions and where no exceptional circumstances exist, is illegal inasmuch as it is an error of law, or alternatively, unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court, or in excess of the powers of the Supreme Court granted under the LPA." 10. In the petition, exhibit JM1, the Applicant prayed the Supreme Court to make the following orders in its favour — "(1) grant leave to the Petitioner to proceed with this Petition, in accordance with Rules 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules (the Rules) (2) direct the 1st Respondent to produce all relevant records, in accordance with rule 10 of the Rules; and (3) after hearing this Petition – (i) (ii) (iii) grant a declaration that the order of the 1st Respondent dated 4th April 2024 purporting to admit the 2nd Respondent as an attorney- at-law under sub-section 5(1)(a) and/or Section 12 of the LPA, is an error of law, or alternatively, an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the powers of the Supreme Court, or in excess of the powers of the Supreme Court granted under the LPA, and is therefore illegal. issue an order of certiorari quashing the aforementioned order of the 1st Respondent; grant such further orders or other relief as may seem just in the circumstances." 11. The learned Judge heard the petition ex parte to determine whether leave to proceed should be granted, as revealed by exhibit JM2, a ruling of the Supreme Court dated 13 January 2025 in MC No. 35 of 2024. The said ruling dismissed the application for leave to proceed on the basis that the Applicant did not demonstrate a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the petition and did not have the requisite standing to make it under rule 6 (1) and 6 (2) of the Rules 1995. The learned Judge reasoned that the Applicant "has not shown…how the decision of the Chief Justice directly affects it as an association that is neither the regulator of the legal profession, nor a compulsory association for attorneys, at paragraph [19] of the ruling. The learned Judge expressed the view that the Applicant should have "expressly pleaded sufficient interest in its petition and in the supporting affidavit", at paragraph [17] of the ruling. Additionally, the learned Judge stated in the ruling that the question of whether the petition was made in good faith under rule 6 (1) of the Rules 1995 did not need to be considered, as the Applicant did not demonstrate a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the petition based on the pleadings. 12. The Applicant filed a notice of motion supported by affidavit on the 27 January 2025, under rule 8 of the Rules 1995 for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Supreme Court's decision, which refused leave to proceed in MC No. 35 of 2024, delivered on the 13 January 2025, exhibit JM3. The notice of motion was titled as follows: "NOTICE OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST RULING (Rule 8 of the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules )". [Emphasis is mine] 13. On the 13 January 2025, the Applicant, the Appellant then, lodged a notice of appeal SCA No. 3 of 2025, arising from MC No. 35 of 2024, against the Supreme Court's decision, pending the learned Judge's order granting leave to appeal. The Applicant withdrew the same notice of appeal during the case management proceedings on the 24 July 2025. 14. On the 16 July 2025, the learned Judge delivered a ruling refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in MA No. 14 of 2025, which arose in MC No. 35 of 2024, exhibit JM6. The same ruling stated that the claim made by the Applicant at paragraphs [5] and [6] of the affidavit evidence – that the Supreme Court had determined the Applicant lacked sufficient interest or standing in the subject matter of the petition – was misleading. The learned Judge determined, "[12] …the question involved in the appeal is not one which ought to be the subject matter of an appeal given that the ruling of this court which the Petitioner seeks to appeal against, is that leave to proceed with judicial review was denied because the Petitioner had not pleaded sufficient interest and good faith". 15. Subsequently, on the 30 July 2025, the Applicant made the application under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 for special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 16. It is noted that the petition was heard ex parte to determine whether leave to proceed with judicial review should be granted, while the application for an order granting leave to appeal was heard inter partes. I will not comment on whether the approach of the learned Judge was correct. The Court made an exceptional decision to allow the Respondents, who were served with the application for special leave, to present arguments focusing solely on relevant legal issues with respect to that application. The application 17. It is noted that the Respondents did not submit any evidence addressing the merits of the application for special leave. The Respondent raised preliminary objections to that application. 18. With respect to the merits of the application for special leave, the Applicant presented three arguments in its affidavit evidence. First, the affidavit evidence claimed that the Supreme Court made an error by refusing to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the order of refusal, as the Supreme Court did not consider "the matters raised in the application nor the issues of public significance at stake", at paragraph [11] of the affidavit. 19. Secondly, the affidavit evidence claimed that the appeal is arguable and has a reasonable chance of success. The affidavit evidence claimed that — "12…an association with the legal profession at its core is found not to have sufficient interest in the admission of Attorneys-at-Law is difficult to comprehend. The decision is of paramount importance as it effectively closes the door on associations being able to judicially challenge issues and matters that are intrinsically part of the associations' objects and membership." 20. Thirdly, the affidavit in support claimed that the intended grounds of the appeal raise issues of fundamental legal importance and of public interest, and it would be beneficial for the jurisprudence of the Seychelles Court and the administration of justice for the grounds of the intended appeal to be determined by the Court of Appeal. The jurisdictional issues to be determined 21. On the 4 August 2025, during the roll call proceedings, the Court informed the parties that they would have to address the following issue at the hearing of the application: whether special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is required under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995 (the Rules 1995). 22. The Court relies on rule 18 (9) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, which stipulates — "(8) [n]otwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Court in deciding the appeal shall not be confined to the ground set forth by the appellant — Provided that the Court shall not, if it allows the appeal rest its decision on any ground not set forth by the appellant unless the respondent has had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground." 23. The jurisdictional issue to be determined, which is unaffected by the facts of the case, is important because should the Court determine that special leave is not required under the Rules 1995, it will not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 24. Should the Court determine that special leave is not required under the Rules 1995, the issue then arises: whether an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a learned Judge of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995 (the Rules 1995). 25. The First and Second Respondents filed an objection in point of law, which is in the following terms — "1. The Applicant's application is procedurally irregular and bad in law as the Applicant has an inherent constitutional right of appeal before the Court of Appeal under article 120 of the Constitution and does not require special leave from the Court of Appeal to file its appeal." 26. I interject to state that there is no inherent right of appeal; a statutory basis for a right of appeal must be demonstrated. This principle is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth Edition Reissue 1(1) Administrative Law Admiralty at para 57. Appeal and Review at page 84: "[a] right of appeal to a court or tribunal is a creature of statute: there is no inherent right of appeal" [Emphasis is mine]. The following authorities apply the aforesaid principle: Tony Lablache and Another v Josianne Vital SCA No. 26 of 2023, dated 3 May 2024, Adrienne v Shelly Beach Properties Ltd SCA No. 10 of 1999, dated 17 December 1999, Tresfle Finesse v The Republic Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1995, dated 19 October 1995 and Cono Cono and Co Ltd v. Veerasamy and Others [2017] UKPC 11, dated 8 May 2017, an appeal to the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of Mauritius, which was quoted with approval in Tony Lablache and Another, supra. 27. Although the First and Second Respondents had incorrectly framed their objection in point of law, during the hearing of the application, they argued through Counsel that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal against an order of refusal of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The submissions and analysis of the arguments of the Applicant and Respondents on the jurisdictional issues Submissions on behalf of the Applicant 28. The jurisdictional issues for determination are connected. I will state the main arguments made on behalf of the Applicant and Respondents. Submissions on behalf of the Applicant 29. Counsel for the Applicant submitted written arguments to the Court of Appeal on the 6 August 2025, addressing, inter alia, the jurisdictional issues raised. At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel for the Applicant elaborated on these arguments. 30. The main argument presented by Counsel for the Applicant was that an appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed concerning an application for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authorities, under the Rules 1995, does not lie as of right to the Court of Appeal. In support of that argument, Counsel for the Applicant argued that the order of the learned Judge refusing leave to appeal is considered an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act. Based on that argument, Counsel for the Applicant argued that the Applicant was correct to make an application for special leave under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023, as section 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act requires special leave to appeal. 31. For his submission that the order of the learned Judge refusing leave to appeal is an interlocutory order, Counsel for the Applicant relied on the authority of The Seychelles Human Rights Commission and others v The Speaker of the National Assembly of Seychelles and others SCA No. MA 21 of 2023, dated 18 December 2023. The Seychelles Human Rights Commission and others, supra, discussed at length the two tests used by Seychelles Courts to define the term "interlocutory order": the application approach test and the order approach test. The Courts Act does not define the term "interlocutory order". 32. I will consider whether section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act applies to the case, should I conclude that the Rules 1995 do not provide the practice and procedure concerning leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against an order refusing leave to proceed. Additionally, I will consider the merits of the application, should I conclude that Counsel for the Applicant is correct in his argument that leave and special leave is required under section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act, respectively. Submissions on behalf of the First and Second Respondents 33. Counsel for the First and Second Respondents argued that section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act did not apply to the case. He argued that the statutory basis for the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the order refusing leave to proceed is expressly provided in the Rules 1995, rather than under section 12 (2) (a) (i) of the Courts Act. Furthermore, Counsel for the First and Second Respondents argued that the Rules 1995 do not provide a statutory basis for special leave, which indicates that there is no requirement for special leave under the Rules 1995. 34. Additionally, Counsel for the First and Second Respondents argued that where leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed has been refused at a hearing of the Supreme Court, under the Rules 1995, an appeal lies as of right to the Court of Appeal under the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. 35. In light of these arguments, Counsel for the First and Second Respondents argued that the Court of Appeal does not have the jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for special leave under rule 17 of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023. Submissions on behalf of the Third Respondent 36. At the hearing of the application, Counsel for the Third Respondent presented oral submissions, the essence of which is reproduced below. 37. Counsel for the Third Respondent argued that the statutory basis for applying for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the order refusing leave to proceed is expressly provided in the Rules 1995, rather than under section 12 (2) (a) (i) of the Courts Act. He pointed out that, in any case, the Applicant did not file the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 12 (2) (a) (i) of the Courts Act; instead, it was filed under rule 8 of the Rules 1995. 38. On the question of whether special leave was required under the Rules 1995, Counsel for the Third Respondent argued that the Rules 1995 do not provide a statutory basis for special leave, clearly indicating that there is no requirement for special leave under the same Rules. In contrast, section 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act expressly states that there is a requirement for special leave, which he argued is not applicable in the case. 39. Based on his submission that section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act is not applicable in the case, Counsel for the Third Respondent argued that where leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed has been refused at a hearing of the Supreme Court, under the Rules 1995, an appeal lies as of right to the Court of Appeal pursuant to article 120 (1) and 120 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles and section 12 (1) of the Courts Act. 40. He argued that an application for special leave under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 is incompetent. Analysis of the contentions of the parties 41. I have considered the record and the submissions of Counsel for the Applicant and Respondents with care. 42. I turn to the two jurisdictional issues, which I will address together as they are connected. 43. The two jurisdictional issues are as follows — (i) whether special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a learned Judge of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is required under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995 (the Rules 1995). (ii) whether an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a learned Judge of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995 (the Rules 1995). 44. The case law from the Seychelles' Court has endorsed the following interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" contained in Halsbury's Laws of England (5th Edn) (2010) at para. 623, which is relevant to the case — ""jurisdiction" is the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction or limit is imposed, the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the claims and matters of which the particular court has cognisance, or as to the area over which jurisdiction extends, or it may partake of both these characteristics…". [Emphasis is mine] 45. Also material to the meaning of jurisdiction are the remarks made in the Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd 1926 37 CLR 393 at p. 408 per Isaacs; Braun v R 1997 112 NTR 31 at p. 39, per Kearney and Thomas JJ, quoted with approval in the case of Eric Njue v R SCA No. 15 of 2016, dated 6 December 2017 — "The "jurisdiction" of a court is its authority to take cognisance of, and to decide, proceedings brought before it; its jurisdiction delimits its area of competence and authority. The concept is one of authority or capacity; and the essence of an inquiry into "jurisdiction" in this sense is as to its limits — whether a court has power to hear and determine the particular case". [Emphasis is mine] 46. Before considering the arguments of the Applicant and Respondents, it is helpful to set out the written law relevant to the jurisdictional issues to be determined. 47. Article 120 (1) and 120 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles stipulates — "120(1) There shall be a Court of Appeal which shall, subject to this Constitution, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court and such other appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon the Court of Appeal by this Constitution and by or under an Act. (2) Except as this Constitution or an Act otherwise provides, there shall be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment, direction, decision, declaration, decree, writ or order of the Supreme Court. 48. The relevant provisions of section 12 of the Courts Act stipulate — "12 (1) Subject as otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law, the Court of Appeal shall, in civil matters, have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from any judgement or order of the Supreme Court given or made in its original or appellate jurisdiction. (2) (a) In civil matters no appeal shall lie as of right— from any interlocutory judgment or order of the Supreme Court; or (i) … (c) Should the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal under the preceding paragraph, the Court of Appeal may grant special leave to appeal… [Emphasis is mine] 49. Concerning the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, article 125 (1) (c) and 125 (7) stipulates — "125 (1) There shall be a Supreme Court which shall, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred by this Constitution, have — … supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authority and, in this connection, shall have power to issue injunctions, directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as may be appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory jurisdiction; (c) … (7) For the purposes of clause (1)(c) "adjudicating authority" includes a body or authority established by law which performs a judicial or quasi- judicial function. 50. The Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction over Subordinate Courts, Tribunals and Adjudicating Authorities) Rules, 1995, S. I. 40 of 1995, are enabled by article 136 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles. In the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is concerned with whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers, committed an error of law, committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached, or abused its powers. 51. The Applicant argued that section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act provides the statutory basis for both leave and special leave, respectively. On the other hand, the Respondents argued that the Rules 1995 provide the statutory basis for leave to appeal an order of refusal of leave to proceed. The Respondents further argued that Article 120 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles and section 12 (1) of the Courts Act provide the statutory basis to lodge an appeal to the Court of Appeal against an order refusing leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 52. The analysis of the two jurisdictional issues begins with rule 1 of the Rules 1995, which provides the citation and application of the same Rules. I am concerned with rule 1 (2) of the Rules 1995, which provides that the Rules 1995 provide the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court in respect of an application for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over subordinate courts, tribunals and adjudicating authorities. 53. The case-law from the Seychelles Court has underlined that the law governing judicial review is stipulated in the Rules 1995, and that judicial review is a two stage procedure, i.e before an applicant can proceed to the substantive hearing itself, the applicant must first have obtained leave to proceed with judicial review under the Rules 1995: see Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board SCA 14/2024, dated 18 December 2024, Airtel (Seychelles) Ltd v Review Panel of the National Tender Board and another SCA 70/2018, dated 13 August 2021, Registrar of the Supreme Court v Public Service Appeals Board and others SCA CL 6 of 2020, dated 30 April 2021, and Karunakaran v Constitutional Appointment Authority SCA No. 33 of 2016, dated 14 April 2017. In the Registrar of the Supreme Court v Public Service Appeals Board and others SCA CL 6 of 2020, dated 30 April 2021, the Court of Appeal explained the procedure at the leave stage as follows, at paragraphs 8 to 10 of the judgment — "8. 9. 10. jurisdiction over subordinate courts, Under Article 125 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has supervisory tribunals and adjudicating authorities. Judicial Review is governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court (Supervisory Jurisdiction Courts, Tribunals, Adjudicating Bodies) Rules 1995 (the "Rules"). Application for Judicial Review undergoes two stages: the leave stage and the merits stage. The Rules applicable to leave stage are Rules 2-6. Rule 5 provides that the petition made under Rule 2 shall be listed ex-parte for the granting of leave to proceed. Rule 6 provides two matters to be considered when deciding whether to allow or reject the application for judicial review: whether the petitioner has sufficient interest in the subject matter and whether the petition is being made in good faith. At the leave stage therefore, the petition is listed ex-parte and the Court considers matters referred to by Rule 6. The Respondent under Rule 7 may take notice of application being registered under Rule 5 at any time and object orally or in writing to the grant of leave to proceed, or if leave to proceed had been granted object to the application at any time before the time fixed by Rule 12 for filing objection. It was correctly stated in the case of Derrick Chitala v Attorney General (1995) ZR that the purpose of the leave stage is to eliminate claims that are frivolous, vexatious or hopeless. In R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex-parte Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 980 Lord Donalds explained that the process operates as a filter to eliminate unarguable cases and if an arguable issue emerges, the Courts grant the leave (Island Development Company v Marine Accident Investigation Board (MA90/2019, arising in MC19/2019) [2020] SCSC 37)." 54. Based on the Rules 1995 and the cases cited above, I determine that rule 8 of the Rules 1995 unambiguously provides the practice and procedure with respect to an appeal against the refusal of leave to proceed with judicial review. Rule 8 of the Rules 1995 provides that where leave to proceed with judicial review has been refused, the person seeking that leave to proceed may appeal to the Court of Appeal, but subject to leave of the Supreme Court "first had and received". An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to rule 8 of the Rules 1995 must be made within 14 days of the order of the Supreme Court refusing to give leave to proceed. 55. In light of my determination that the practice and procedure for appealing from the decision of the learned Judge, who refused to grant leave to proceed, are governed by rule 8 of the Rules 1995, I do not accept the argument presented by Counsel for the Applicant that section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act applies to the case. There is no compelling reason to invoke these provisions of the Courts Act, and the application approach test and order approach test. It is noted that the Applicant lodged a notice of appeal before the learned Judge had delivered his ruling on the application for leave to appeal. Subsequently, the Applicant withdrew the notice of appeal. I think the Applicant pursued an application for special leave under section 12 (2) (c) of the Courts Act in order to save the Applicant's appeal. 56. Additionally, I have examined the ruling of the learned Judge refusing leave to appeal and realised that confusion started with the learned Judge, who applied section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (b) of the Courts Act to the case, when the application was filed under rule 8 of the Rules 1995. Section 12 (2) (b) of the Courts Act stipulates: "12 (2) (b) [i]n any such cases as aforesaid the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant leave to appeal if, in its opinion, the question involved in the appeal is one which ought to be the subject matter of an appeal." The learned Judge did not explain why he overlooked the practice and procedure under the Rules 1995, instead relying on section 12 (2) (a) (i) and 12 (2) (b) of the Courts Act. 57. Rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 provides that "special leave to appeal to the Court is required by law". However, the Rules 1995 do not expressly provide any procedure for special leave should the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal. Upon review, I determine that special leave is not required under the Rules 1995. Therefore, the Applicant's application for special leave made under rule 17 (1) of The Court of Appeal of Seychelles Rules 2023 is fundamentally irregular. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for special leave. 58. It follows that the jurisdictional issue to be determined is whether an appeal against the decision of the learned Judge refusing leave to appeal lies to the Court of Appeal. In Treffle Finesse, supra, the Court of Appeal held that the words "except as this Constitution or an Act otherwise provides envisage provisions which are expressly exclusionary and which exclude a right of appeal", article 120 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles refers. The Court went on to hold: "[w]here the Constitution confers a right such right can only be taken away, where the Constitution so permits, by statutory provisions which are expressly and manifestly exclusionary". In the absence of an express provision in the Rules 1995, the same Rule 1995 cannot be interpreted as having taken away the right of appeal of an applicant to the Court of Appeal against the refusal of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 59. Airtel (Seychelles) Ltd, supra, dealt with an appeal to the Court of Appeal as of right against the decision of a learned Judge of the Supreme Court refusing leave to proceed with Judicial Review: see also Gemuenden, supra. 60. For the reasons stated above, I accept the submissions of both Counsel for the Respondents that a right of appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a learned Judge refusing leave to appeal under rule 8 of the Rules 1995. 61. In light of my conclusion that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for special leave, I cannot consider the merits of the application for special leave. Additionally, I cannot consider the issue which was argued at length at the hearing 18