Beauty Simakomo Mukanda v Siayula and Anor (Appeal 168 of 2016) [2019] ZMSC 319 (23 July 2019)

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR ZAMBIA APPEAL NO. 168/2016 JI HOLDEN AT LUSAKA BETWEEN: BEAUTY S MAKOMO MUKA AND KEN SIAYULA (CHIEF SINGANI) BAKISHA SIAMULYA 1st RESPONDENT 2nd RESPONDENT Coram Musonda DCJ, Kabuka and Mutuna JJS On 9th of July 2019 and 23rd July 2019 For the Appellant : N/A For the First Respondent : For the Second Respondent : Mr. A. Shilimi and Mr. M. Phiri of Messrs Mwansa Phiri Shilimi and Theu Mr. D. Chakoleka of Messrs Mulenga Mundashi Kasonde, Legal Practitioners JUDGMENT MUTUNA JS, delivered the judgment of the court. Cases referred to: \ 1) Zambia Railways Limited v Pauline S. Mundia (2008) volume 1 ZR 2) The Attorney General v Marcus Kampumba Achiume (1983) ZR 1 3) Nyambe Mukelabai v Gunther Widmaier SCZ judgment No. 116 of 4) Clementina Banda and Emmanuel Njanje v Boniface Mudimba 2010/HP/A39 J2 5) Henry Mpafiwa Siwale, Reverend Ewen Siwale, Kelvin Siwale, Stephen Siwale, Dr. Sichilindi Siwale, Peat Siwale, Musenga Siwale v Ntapalila Siwale (1999) ZR 84 6) Samson Katende and Crosby Bernard v NCF Mining Plc (2012) volume 2 ZR 128 7) Ison Sichimata v Amonson Siame and others Appeal No. 168/2016 8) Mususu Kalenga Building Limited v Winnie Kalenga v Richmans Money Lendors Enterprise SCZ judgment No. 4 of 1999 Legislation referred to: 1) Lands and Deeds Registry Act Introduction 1) This appeal challenges findings of fact by a Learned High Court Judge, Mulongoti J, (as she then was), in respect of ownership of a property which was in dispute. The Judge found that the Appellant had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the property belongs to her. 2) The basis of the findings by the Judge were a number of inconsistencies she found in the Appellant's evidence and her failure to call a crucial witness to testify on her behalf. 3) The appeal also addresses the issue of alienation of customary land, which issue has, in the recent past, been the subject of contest in a number of appeals that have come before us. Background 4) The property which is at the center of this dispute appears to be a twenty five hectares piece of land situate in an area popularly known as Madenja, in Hachizibe village where land is superintended over by traditional leaders. For this reason, the property is not on title as it is part of customary land. 5) The Appellant in her quest to prove that the property was hers, contended that it had been allocated to her late grandmother, Marie Munsaka, in 1964 by Headman Mwambwa. She lived on the property with her mother until her grandmother passed away. 6) Following the passing of her grandmother, the Appellant and her mother relocated to another place leaving a caretaker in charge of the property. Sometime in June 2012, the Appellant received a phone call from the caretaker informing her that the Second J4 Respondent was encroaching upon her property and had, by that time, dug a foundation for an intended structure. Her efforts to halt the construction by the Second Respondent were in vain, prompting her to approach the First Respondent (in his capacity as Chief) with a request to intervene in the dispute between her and the Second Respondent. 8) Efforts were made to reconcile the two disputing parties which resulted in visits to the property, its demarcation and the issuance of permits to the two, for occupation of the portions allocated to them and obtaining title deeds to their portions. This did not please the Appellant, she, therefore, took out an action in the High Court. The Appellant's claim and Respondents' defences in the Court below 9) In her pleadings in the Court below, the Appellant contended that she is a family member of the Simakomo family who hailed from Madenja village, in Batoka area of the Southern Province of the Republic of Zambia. J5 10) On the other hand, the Second Respondent was an individual whom, she contended, had been allocated a portion of her twenty five hectares property by the First Respondent acting in his capacity as Chief Singani, overseeing Madenja village. 11) The Appellant traced her occupation of the property to her late grandmother and set out the facts leading to her dispute with the Second Respondent. 12) In an effort to resolve the dispute between the two parties, the Appellant contended that the First Respondent urged her to allow the Second Respondent occupy a portion of her property. Despite her refusal, the Second Respondent has continued to be in occupation of her property resulting in her suffering loss in that she does not enjoy quiet possession of her property nor has she been able to implement her development plans. 13) As a consequence of the foregoing contentions she claimed the following: 13.1 a declaration that she and all members of her family have a vested interest in the land comprised of approximately J6 twenty five hectares known as Madenja village and situate in Batoka and, consequently, should be consulted before the grant of any portion of her property by the First Respondent to the Second Respondent or any other person; 13,2 an order nullifying the grant of the permit to acquire the certificate of title given to the Second Respondent; 13.3 an injunction restraining the First and Second Respondents, and their servants or agents in any way from trespassing on any portion of the Appellant's family property or village homeland; 13.4 an order for demolition of any structure built on the property. 14) In his defence, the First Respondent contended that the property was originally allocated to a Siamalambo in the 1950s who sold it to George Chazangwe from whom the Second Respondent purchased the property in 2012. 15) Following consultation with the Headman in the area and interested parties, a permit was issued to the Second Respondent on 17th July 2012 to which was attached a map indicating the boundary of the property. Subsequently, the Appellant, in the company of Headman Hachizibe, approached the First Respondent in respect of another property. He issued the Appellant with a permit J7 in respect of this other property on 25th July 2012 on which she intended constructing a filing station and bank. 16) In conclusion, the First Respondent denied the Appellant's claim in its entirety and contended that she was not entitled to the relief sought. 17) In his defence, the Second Respondent denied ever trespassing on the Appellant's property or that the disputed property was ever allocated to the Appellant's grandmother. He contended that the property on which he was constructing a house is customary land, legitimately allocated to him by the First Respondent as Chief Singani. 18) The Second Respondent also denied that the Appellant ever approached him in an attempt to stop him from constructing on his property. Further, that he was given a permit to build on the property by the First Respondent on 17th July 2012. He denied the Appellant's claim in its entirety and the relief sought. a J8 19) After the Appellant commenced the action, she was granted an injunction restraining the Second Respondent from constructing on the property. Consideration by the Learned High Court Judge and decision 20) The Learned High Court Judge heard the evidence by the Appellant and First Respondent and considered it in light of the pleadings and submissions by counsel. She set out the facts which were not in contention which we have explained in the earlier part of this judgment and identified the issue for determination as being whether the Appellant owned the property on which the Second Respondent was building. 21) In determining the issue, the Learned High Court Judge considered the contention by the Respondents that the Appellant had failed to prove that the property in issue belonged to her and her family. She also noted that the property is customary land which is subject to alienation by the village Headman on behalf of the Chief. Further, that the Appellant had for this reason involved Headman J ' a J9 Hachizibe in trying to resolve her dispute with the Second Respondent. 22) The Learned High Court Judge then posed the question, had the Appellant proved that the property was hers? In answer to the question, she noted that the Appellant and her witnesses conceded that they did not know the size of the property; and that the Appellant confirmed that the property was not given to her, but rather her grandmother many years ago. She also observed the inconsistencies in the evidence tendered on behalf of the Appellant as to the location of the property. That is, is it in Madenja village or Hachizibe village and whether it was alienated to her grandmother by Headman Mwambwa or Headman Hachizibe? The Learned High Court Judge also expressed her concern at the failure by the Appellant to call Headman Hachizibe to testify on her behalf in view of the role he played in the resolution of the dispute. 23) In effect the Judge found that the evidence given by the Appellant and her witnesses was not sufficient to prove J10 her claim to the property through her late grandmother. To this end, she acknowledged the meetings held by the parties, Headman and Chief, mapping of the properties allocated to the Appellant and Second Respondent and the issuance of the permits thereafter. This, according to the Judge, resulted in the alienation of two separate portions of land to the Appellant and the Second Respondent. Given these facts, she concluded that if indeed the property in dispute initially belonged to the Appellant, it would not have been necessary for it to go through the process of alienation again. As a result, she held that the Appellant had failed to prove her case on a balance of probabilities and dismissed it with costs. She also discharged the injunction granted restraining the Second Respondent from cariying out some developments on his property. Grounds of appeal to this Court and arguments by the parties Jll 24) The Appellant is unhappy with the decision of the Learned High Court Judge and brings this appeal on five grounds as follows: 24.1 The Court below erred both in law and fact when it held that the Appellant failed to prove that the land given to the Second Respondent belonged to her family, when in actual fact senior Headman Munganjo who oversees Headman Hachizibe gave evidence to and confirmed to the Court that the land in question belonged to the Appellant's family; 24.2 The Court below fell in grave error both at law and in fact when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the Appellant's land is unsurveyed customary land which has no cadastral map to show the exact extent and therefore, the boundaries of the land in dispute could only be established by the Court viewing the property, and further that the Appellant did not fail to provide the exact size of the farm as in her statement of claim she pleaded that the land was approximately twenty five hectares; 24.3 It was a grave error both in law and fact for the Judge to find that the Appellant was consulted by the First Respondent before giving land to the Second Respondent when the First Respondent himself gave evidence before Court that he did not consult the appellant and her family before giving the land to the Second Respondent; J12 24.4 The Court erred both in law and fact when it held that the Appellant was not sure of the location of her family land because she referred to it as Madenja village instead of Hachizibe, when in fact the Appellant and all her four witnesses informed the Court that the Appellant’s family land was called Madenja as it was named after the Appellant's late grandmother who had been given the land in 1964; 24.5 The Court fell in grave error both at law and in fact when it concluded that the Second Respondent bought the Appellant's land from a Mr. Hamalambo in the absence of evidence showing that the Second Respondent ever bought the piece of land from Mr. Hamalambo. 25) The parties to this appeal filed heads of argument in support of their respective positions. The Appellant also filed heads of argument in reply to the heads of argument filed by the two Respondents. Counsel for the Second Respondent, Mr. D. Chakoleka, applied to expunge these latter heads of arguments from the record on the ground that they are not reply submissions but rather introduce issues that had not been presented in the two Respondents' heads of argument. He did not specify the portions of the argument which he considered unacceptable. The Appellant did not respond because she J13 was not represented at the hearing as she had caused to be filed a notice of non-attendance in accordance with the rules of our Court. 26) The thrust of the Appellant's argument under ground 1 of the appeal was that in determining her claim, the * ’ ■ Learned High Court Judge considered a standard of proof higher than balance of probabilities. She argued that there was sufficient evidence led by her to show the location of the property as forming part of the Madenja family land situate in Hachizibe village. 27) Further, the said evidence was led by Senior Headman Munganjo, testifying as PW3, who was the overseer of Hachizibe village and thirteen other villages. This, witness, the Appellant argued, also confirmed that the Second Respondent had trespassed on her family property prompting the witness and other Headman in the area to convene a meeting to resolve the dispute. The meeting resolved, among other things, that the Second Respondent should halt the construction. J14 28) In addition, the Appellant contended that PW3 and other witnesses did attest to the exact location of her property and its extent. Further, the property in dispute not only fell under the jurisdiction of PW3 as Senior Headman Munganjo, but he had also been to the property with the Appellant and First Respondent when the Appellant was attempting to obtain a permit. He was also present at the meeting convened to resolve the dispute between the Appellant and Second Respondent. 29) We were also invited to revisit the evidence of PW5 in the Court below which, the Appellant contended, shows that PW5 witnessed the handover of the property to the Appellant's grandmother, by his father, who at the time happened to be the headman. This evidence, it was contended, is supported by the evidence of PW4 who confirmed being Headman of Hachizibe village between 1980 and 1993 and was, thus aware of the area called Madenja. 30) The position taken by the Appellant was that the foregoing evidence shows that she proved her case on a J15 balance of probabilities especially that the competing evidence by the Second Respondent merely revealed that he bought the property from a third party rather than it being allocated to him. To this end, the Appellant referred us to our decision in the case of Zambia Railways Limited v Pauline S. Mundia and Brian Sialumba1 in which we restated that the standard of proof in civil matters is not as high as the one in criminal matters. 31) The Appellant concluded that the decision made by the Learned High Court Judge that she failed to prove her case on a balance of probabilities was arrived at due to a misapprehension of the facts, and is consequently, amenable to setting aside in accordance with our decision in the case of the Attorney General v Marcus Kampumba Achiume2. 32) The thrust of the arguments under ground 2 of the appeal was that since the property in dispute was part of customary land there are no diagrams or plans to show its extent or exact location. Therefore, the Learned High Court Judge could only ascertain its extent from the J16 evidence tendered by the witnesses or by moving to the site to view the property. That the Appellant's witnesses would have shown the Court the boundaries if it had taken the trouble to visit the site. 33) The Appellant argued further that the evidence by PW5 was of utmost importance because he was present at the time the property was being alienated to the Appellant's grandmother. She drew an analogy of the facts in this case with those in our decision in the case of Nyambe Mukelabai v Gunther Widmair3 in which we upheld the approach taken by the trial court of relying on the evidence of an induna who was present at the time of alienation of the property in dispute in that case in determining ownership. 34) In conclusion, we were reminded that in considering this appeal we are at large to consider the evidence tendered in the Court below and make findings of fact as it is a rehearing on the record. The Appellant urged us to adopt this approach taken by the High Court, quoting from a J17 decision of this Court in the case of Clementina Banda and Emmanuel Njanje v Boniface Mudimba4. 35) Arguing ground 3 of the appeal, the emphasis was that the First Respondent did not seek the Appellant's prior consent before allocating the property to the Second Respondent. The finding by the Learned High Court Judge that there was consultation was flawed especially in view of the evidence tendered to the contrary. The Appellant argued that she ought to have been consulted prior to alienation of the property to the Second Respondent because she was affected by the alienation. In support of this argument she referred us to our decision in the case of Henry Mpafiwa Siwale, Reverend Ewen Siwale, Kelvin Siwale, Stephen Siwale, Dr. Sichilindi Siwale, Peat Siwale, Musenga Siwale v Ntapalila Siwale5 and Sections 3 and 7 of the Lands Act which we have discussed in the latter part of this judgment. 36) Turning to ground 4 of the appeal, the arguments by the Appellant mirrored the arguments under ground 4 of the J18 appeal in relation to the evidence tendered as to the location of the property in dispute. Following a review of this evidence, the Appellant concluded that the Learned High Court Judge made an unbalanced evaluation of the evidence and her findings of fact were thus amenable to setting aside in accordance with the principle we laid down in the Achiume case referred to earlier. 37) In ground 5 of the appeal, the Appellant challenged the finding of fact by the Learned High Court Judge that the Second Respondent purchased the property in dispute from one Chazangwe. According to the Appellant, the evidence on record shows that the Second Respondent testified that the property was allocated to him by the First Respondent in his capacity as Chief Singani. That there was no evidence to support the alleged sale of the property to the Second Respondent and that the location of the shop initially owned by Hamalambo, which is alleged to have been on a properly other than the property in dispute, is different from the location where J19 the Second Respondent commenced construction of his house. 38) We were urged to allow the appeal. 39) In response to ground 1 of the appeal, counsel for the First Respondent, Mr. A Shilimi and Mr. M. Phiri argued that the Learned High Court Judge was on firm ground when she dismissed the Appellant's claim because she failed to discharge the duty placed upon her to prove her claim on a balance of probabilities. Counsel emphasized the fact that we have on a number of occasions reminded litigants that it is their duty to prove the allegations they make. In doing so we were referred to our decision in the case of Samson Katende and Crosby Bernard v NCF Mining Plc6. 40) In conclusion counsel reviewed the evidence tendered by the Appellant in the Court below and contended that her claim to ownership of the property emanated from what they termed "ancestral inheritance" because she traced her claim from an allocation of the property to her J20 grandmother. There was, in counsel’s view, no direct allocation of the property made to the Appellant, 41) They argued further that the evidence by the Appellant and her second witness lent credence to the contention made by the Second Respondent that he purchased the property from one Chazangwe. 42) Under ground 2 of the appeal counsel argued that the finding by the Court below that the Appellant had given conflicting evidence as to the location and size of the property was on firm ground. Their position was that, whilst the Appellant testified that the property was located in Hachizibe village, her pleadings revealed that it was situate in Madenja village. 43) In relation to the size of the property, counsel stated that the Appellant's witnesses all testified that they did not know the extent of the property. Summing up arguments on this ground, counsel stated that the Appellant ought to have moved the Court to the site to ascertain both the size and location of the property. They also noted that the Appellant omitted to call Headman Hachizibe in whose J21 village the property is located to testify on her behalf as to the extent and location of the property. These two omissions, they contended, were part of what led to the Court below concluding that the Appellant failed to prove her case to its satisfaction. 44) In responding to ground 3 of the appeal, counsel once again reviewed the evidence tendered by the Appellant in the Court below. They concluded as in ground 2 of the appeal, that it failed to show that the property in dispute belonged to the Appellant or her family. As a result, the Chief had no option when allocating it to follow the usual consultative steps involving the village Headman and committee. Following from this consultation, two permits were issued to the Appellant and Second Respondent in respect of two separate pieces of land. 45) Lastly, that this process was in line with the procedure set out in the case of Siwale and others5, referred to earlier, and Ison Sichimata v Amonson Siarne and others7. J22 46) In response to ground 4 of the appeal, counsel repeated the arguments advanced in relation to ground 3 of the appeal. We, as a result, do not feel compelled to summarize the arguments. 47) Finally, responding to ground 5 of the appeal counsel once again reviewed the evidence as they did under ground 1 in relation to the genesis of the Second Respondent's claim to the property. They argued that the evidence tendered by the Appellant in the Court below supported the Second Respondent's claim to the property. We were thus, urged not to interfere with the findings of fact made by the Learned High Court Judge as to ownership of the property because they did not satisfy the test of perverseness, misapprehension of facts or absence of any relevant evidence. 48) We were urged to dismiss the appeal. 49) In his response to the arguments advanced by the Appellant under ground 1 of the appeal, counsel for the Second Respondent, Mr. D. Chakoleka argued that the Appellant had not demonstrated how the Learned High J23 Court Judge applied a standard higher than the prescribed balance of probabilities. That the fate of her case in the Court below was determined by her failure to justify her claim that the property in dispute had been in the possession of her family. Mr. Chakoleka then reviewed the evidence led by the Appellant in the Court below in regard to the extent of the property in dispute and concluded that, it showed that the witnesses did not know the extent of the property and as such, there is no way the Court could hold that the Appellant had proved her case. 50) Counsel also reviewed the findings by the Learned High Court Judge on the need for the Appellant to have summoned Headman Hachizibe to testify on her behalf in view of the role he played in resolving the dispute. He concluded chat she was on firm ground in finding that this omission worked against the Appellant. 51) The responses in relation to the arguments under ground 2 of the appeal were a repetition of the arguments advanced in relation to the onus of proof having been on J24 the Appellant to prove the extent of the property. Counsel also urged us to ignore the argument suggesting that the Learned High Court Judge was under an obligation to conduct a site visit to ascertain the extent of the property because it was not raised in the Court below. Our attention, in this regard, was drawn to our decision in the case of Mususu Kalenga Building Limited and Winnie Kalenga v Richmans Money Lendors Enterprises8 in which we reiterated the position articulated by Mr. Chakoleka. 52) Concluding arguments in respect of this ground of appeal, counsel pointed out that the principle in our decision in the case of Nyambe Mukelabai v Gunther Widmaier3 does not aid the Appellant's claim. We have not found it necessary to make a detailed analysis of the arguments here because they have no bearing on the decision we have reached in the latter part of this judgment. 53) The response to the arguments under ground 3 of the appeal was simply that the case of Siwale and others5 J25 does not aid the Appellant's case because its facts are distinguishable from the facts of this case. Counsel argued that the consultation of affected persons alluded to in that case arise from the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Lands Act, which refer to a situation where the President is alienating land. On the other hand, the Learned High Court Judge referred to consultations at the local level involving the Headman and village committee. 54) Finally, the responses to the arguments under grounds four and five of the appeal were a repetition of the arguments in respect of ground 1 of the appeal. They reiterated the Appellant's failure to prove her case on a balance of probabilities arising from contradictions in the evidence. 55) We were urged to dismiss the appeal. 56) The relevant portions of the Appellant's reply to the Respondents' responses are a repetition of the arguments advanced in support of the five grounds of appeal. It is not necessary for us to restate them. Consideration and decision by this Court J26 57) Our consideration of the record of appeal and arguments by the Appellant and counsel for the two Respondents leads us to conclude that all five grounds of appeal question findings of fact made by the Learned High Court Judge, which resulted in her decision that the Appellant had failed to prove her case on a balance of probabilities. The findings of fact which are contested are as follows: 57.1 that the Appellant did not know the extent of the property in dispute; 57.2 that there were contradictions in the Appellant's evidence as to the location of the property, that is to say is it located in Madenja village or Hachizibe village; 57.3 there was contradiction in the Appellant’s evidence as to whether the property was allocated to the Appellant's grandmother by Headman Mwambwa or Hachizibe; and 57.4 that the Appellant was consulted prior to the allocation of the property to the Second Respondent. 58) The contention by the Appellant is that these findings of fact are perverse, made from a misapprehension of facts and an unbalanced evaluation of the evidence and thus, \U amenable to setting aside. The position we have taken is that these findings of fact are peripheral to the main issue upon which the determination of this appeal revolves. 59) The view we have expressed in the preceding paragraph becomes evident if we begin our consideration by showing the context in which the Learned High Court Judge made the findings of fact. Firstly and of paramount importance is the observation she made that the property in dispute being customary land is superintended over by a chief with the aid of a headman. She observed further that as customary land, the property had no title deeds issued. 60) The Learned High Court Judge also acknowledged the fact that when the dispute arose both the Appellant and Second Respondent met, not only with the Chief, but other members of his committee. Following from these meetings the two parties were issued with permits over two properties. The findings of fact in this and the preceding paragraph are not challenged in this appeal. J28 61) The significance of what we have stated in the two preceding paragraphs is that the Judge took the view that the property in dispute, being customary land, was being alienated for the first time and as such, the Appellant having participated in the alienation process, could not later complain that she was not consulted. 62) The view taken by the High Court Judge ties in well with the evidence given by the Appellant which shows that she participated freely, in this process. This is evident from her evidence in chief at page 261 of the record of appeal which states in part as follows: "... the chief told me to provide money for stationary to give me permit. I gave him KI,500.00 then I got a paper written permit and asked everyone present to sign. Myself, Hachizibe, my Aunt and I think the chief signed the permit. The Chief had said I will give you permit now because I want to make a map after meeting headmen. I was not given permit. After second meeting of going round the issue of permit was not discussed because I refused to leave foundation out. Later I was told the 2nd [Respondent] continued building. I went to see Hachizibe and his committee but he said he had no power because the Chief demarcated the land and J29 gave that portion to [the Second Respondent]. That is why I decided to come to Court." 63) The passage we have reproduced in the preceding paragraph (though admittedly contains a number of typographical errors) shows that the disputed property under went demarcation by the chief who later allocated pieces of it to both the Appellant and Second Respondent. The two participated in the process but the former refused to accept the permit for her portion of the property unless the portion on which the Second Respondent was constructing was included. 64) The significance of this is that the property in dispute underwent alienation in accordance with the tenets of customary law applied by persons authorized to alienate the property. We hold the view that land alienation involving land under customary tenure at the local level, should be left at that level, especially where the laid down rules for alienation have been followed. 65) Indeed, at no stage in the Court below or this Court did the Appellant question the authority of the Chief and J30 Headman to alienate the property in dispute or the procedure they applied in doing so. She has also not denied the fact that she freely participated in the process and her only grievance is that a section or portion of the property which she felt was hers was given to the Second Respondent. Therefore, if the property had been allocated to her initially as she alleged, she ought not to have participated in the process. The fact that she did and that it underwent alienation, in 2012, attests to the fact, as found by the Judge, that it did not belong to the Appellant. 66) The decision we have reached is following our consideration of our earlier decision in the case of Situate and others5. In that case the Appellants sought to be included on the title deeds in respect of a property which had previously been customary land then alienated to the Respondent without being consulted. We held that they should be included on the certificate of title as they ought to have been consulted as beneficiaries to the estate of the initial settler on the land. 67) - o: the Siwale and others5 case are clearly - tt from the facts of this case because, as the Learned High Court Judge found, the Appellant in this case was consulted and participated in the alienation process which was not the case with the Appellants in the Siwale and others5 case. Further, we hold the view that the provisions of Sections 3 and 7 of the Lands Act are of no relevance to this appeal because they relate to alienation of State land by the President as opposed to customary land. Conclusion 68) As a consequence of our determination in the preceding paragraphs, all five grounds of appeal must fail and we so order. The appeal is, as a result, dismissed with costs, to be taxed in the absence of agreement. M. MUSONDA ' DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE J. K. KABUKA SUPREME COURT JUDGE N. K. MUTUNA SUPREME COURT JUDGE