Bespoke Insurance Brokers Ltd v County Secretary, County Government Of Nairobi & anothers [2016] KEHC 232 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.  252 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW  UNDER  SECTION 8 AND  9 OF THE LAW REFORM ACT, CAP  26, SECTION 2(J) OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015  AND  ORDER 53 OF THE  CIVIL PROCEDURE  RULES, 2010 LAWS OF KENYA.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF MANDAMUS, COMPELLING THE RESPONDENTS TO SETTLE A DECREE

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 21(4) OF THE GOVERNMENT  PROCEEDING  ACT AND  SECTION 7 AND  SECTION   33  OF THE SIXTH  SCHEDULE   OF THE CONSTITUTION, OF KENYA   2010.

BETWEEN

BESPOKE  INSURANCE  BROKERS LTD......................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

COUNTY SECRETARY, COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI.......................1ST RESPONDENT

COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI...............................................................2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. On  25th July 2016  the applicant  obtained  leave of this court to apply for  Judicial Review  orders of mandamus  to compel  the respondents   City County  of Nairobi and the County Secretary        of the said  County Government, to settle decretal sum  due in  HCC 590 of 2005.  The  court  ordered  the exparte  applicant  to  file the substantive  motion and  serve  within  21 days  from the date of issue  of leave  thereof.

2. On 9th August 20116  the exparte  applicant  filed notice of motion dated 7thAugust 2016  seeking for an order of mandamus  to  issue to compel  the 1st  respondent, the  County Secretary  of Nairobi City County  Government  to implement  the decree  emanating  from the judgment  of the  High Court  dated  27th October, 2008 in Milimani HCC 590 of  2005  and  without delay (sic) cause to be paid  the amount of kshs  25,286,910. 14  together  with interest accrued  from the  date of filing  the suit; and that costs  of the application  is supported by  grounds on the face of the notice of motion, the statutory  statement  verifying  affidavit  together  with annexed   exhibits.

3. The exparte  applicant’s  case is that  it instituted  proceedings   vide Nairobi HCC 590 of  2005- Bespoke  Insurance  Brokers Ltd  vs City Council  of Nairobi with judgment being entered  in favour of  the applicant  for  shs  27,914,768. 10  with costs  and  interest  at court rates  of  12% per annum from the date  of filing suit.

4. Thereafter, that the applicant  extracted  a  decree  dated  21st  October   2008   and issued  by the court on  27th  October 2008.   It  was alleged that since then, efforts  to have the entire decretal amount  settled have been  futile  as the 2nd  respondent has been making sporadic payments  here and  there and  failing   to settle  the decretal  amount in its  entirety.

5. That as  at  6th June  2016  the  outstanding  amount  was  kshs  24,557,677. 14 together with costs taxed at kshs 729,233 bringing  the total to kshs  25,286,910. 14.  It  was  averred and  deposed by the exparte applicant’s director Mr Geoffrey Wahome Muotia  that the decretal sum continues  to accrue   interest since the date of filing of the suit  and that despite  numerous demands, the respondent has not issued  any plausible   reason  for its  no-compliance  with the  decree in that suit.

6. As a result, it  was  contended that  the respondent   continues to  frustrate the  applicant’s  efforts  to have the sum settled as they  continue to purposefully delay and or evade  settling  the interest  and  costs,  and that the applicant  continues to  suffer loss  and  prejudice as a result of the respondent’s nonpayment  as they are denied an opportunity to enjoy what is rightly  theirs.

7. In the  verifying  affidavit, a part from the grounds  set out   above, the applicant disclosed at paragraph 5 that although it had  previously instituted JR 295 of 2011 – Bespoke Insurance  Brokers Ltd Vs  Phillip Kisia, The  Town Clerk of the City Council  of Nairobi  and  City Council of Nairobi, in pursuit  of the decretal amount  herein, which  matter  was dismissed as  shown by  annexed copy of  the judgment, but that  the doctrine of  Resjudicata does not  apply to judicial  Review proceedings.

8. Further, that the cause of action  continues to accrue as the  decretal  sum has  never been  fully  settled; and  that the applicant  has no other remedy  of seeking  against the decretal   sum other  than through these Judicial Review  proceedings.

9. The applicant also annexed  copy of  tabulation  of the payments made by  the respondents  and the outstanding  amount todate  and  urged the court  to grant it  Judicial Review orders of Mandamus.

10. As at   21st November  2016 after the applicant  served the notice of motion  upon the respondents  who entered an appearance  through the firm of  Kithi & Company Advocates  on 15th August  2016, the respondents had not filed any replying  affidavit   or grounds of opposition  therefore   the court ordered   the matter to  proceed to  hearing  as scheduled  which order  was not taken kindly by Mr Mutua of Kithi & Company  Advocates, who  wrote a letter to  the  Judge ( not the court through Deputy Registrar as is usually the case ) furiously protesting the hearing   and   reservation  of the matter  for  a decision  yet, according to Mr Mutua, they  needed more  time to file  a response.

11. The court  took the braved the accusations but noted that what  Mr Mutua  was doing  by writing  to the judge  personally and not the court, was an intimidation  through commands  that the court had no mandate  to proceed with  the hearing  in the  absence of reply  by the respondents  yet the latter  had a preliminary point of law to raise, to wit, resjudicata; but that which they  had nonetheless refused to urge  in court  that morning.

12. The court  vide a brief  ruling addressed  the issues raised d by Mr Mutua in his letter   to court  and directed that as Mr Mutua’s conduct   in this matter  may not be on his client’s instructions  anyway, and that  in order to do justice to his client, the ruling  which was scheduled for that afternoon of  21st November 2016 was recalled and  I directed that the Preliminary objection   by Mr Mutua  be raised on 23rd November 2016  and  both parties advocates agreed  on that directive   and  date.

13. This judgment  therefore determines  the notice of motion  dated  7th August   2016  and the preliminary  objection argued on 23rd November   2016   seeking   to dismiss  the notice of motion  in limine for being resjudicata JR 696/2009  which   was dismissed  by R. Wendo J on  29th September  2010.

14. In her oral submissions  in support of the notice of motion dated 7th August 2016, Miss Maitai counsel for the applicant  submitted  reiterating the grounds  and  statutory  statement    as  well as the depositions in her client’s director’s verifying   affidavit.  She  also relied  on the exhibits  annexed  to the verifying affidavit which included the decree  in HCC 590/2005, copy of certificate  of taxation; copy of  judgment  in the said  suit  and  a schedule of payments  and alleged  outstanding  sums  due and   urged the  court to allow the notice of motion as prayed.

15. In response the notice  of motion as  argued on 23rd November  206, Mr Mutua  for the respondents   argued that the  notice of motion  dated  5th August  2016   is resjudicata  and  an abuse of the  court process.  That the same matter  had twice  been filed  in court vide JR  696/2009  over the same  subject  matter and  between  the same parties  and vide  a judgment   delivered  on 29th  September  2010,  Honourable  Wendo J  dismissed  the claim for Judicial Review orders of Mandamus. That  subsequently, the same  matter  was filed  vide JR  295/2011 and  Honourable  Korir  J dismissed it vide  his  judgment of  8th March   2013.

16. That this  notice of motion  is the same  as what   was previously dismissed in the two Judicial Reviews  as it the same  cause  of action and between  the same parties.

17. In addition, Mr Mutua  submitted  that the same  matter  was  adjudicated  upon vide Court of  Appeal Civil  Appeal No. 87/2010  following   the decision  by J Khaminwa  dated   16th March  2009  in HCC 590/2005  between  the same parties, with the Court of Appeal remarking at page 5 of the judgment  that the amount in  dispute  had been  settled  save for interest on  the principal sum.

18. Mr Mutua  further submitted that the  amount  which is  sought is different from the attached decree and  that the annexed schedule  of interest  due is in  excess of the decretal  sum which  was paid totaling shs 37,914,768 from a decree of shs  27,914,768 which is over  and  above by shs  10 million.

19. Further, that the applicant is seeking  shs  67 million  from  a decree of shs  27 million which is clearly  an abuse  of the court  process  and  an attempt  to steal from  public  coffers.  Mr   Mutua  urged the court to dismiss  the notice of motion  with costs.

20. In a rejoinder, Miss Maitai  submitted  that based  on the case of  Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing  Company Ltd vs  West End Distributors  Ltd[1969] EA, the preliminary objection  is not well founded.  That a preliminary objection  cannot be  raised as  a matter  of  discretion.  That a preliminary  objection  cannot arise based on the prayers of mandamus which are  discretionary.

21. Further, that in this case, interest  has to be   ascertained  and the   total amount  is also disputed so the preliminary  objection is not well  founded.

22. Miss Maitai  further submitted  that the applicant  has no other   remedy  other than   Judicial Review  and that therefore if this  application is  dismissed the applicant  will be left   with no remedy; yet the amount has never been paid in full.  She relied  on JR  44/2012  James Alfred  Kasoro  vs Attorney General where the court held that  where there  is no other legal  remedy  the court will grant mandamus.  That in this case, the respondents  have no  intention of settling   the decree   which will  leave the applicant   without  a  remedy.

23. In response, Mr Mutua  submitted  with regard  to the preliminary   objection, that   a point of law   stands  on a certain   set of  facts upon   which the court ascertains.

24. Further, that the court in determining  the issue of resjudicata   must look at the facts since  points of law do not  stand  alone.   Mr Mutua  further submitted that   the applicants   had admitted that  the decretal  sum had been paid  and that the Judicial Review  court only  enforces  what is illegal  and  what   was   granted yet in  this case, the applicant    was bringing   a  decree    and claiming different sums of money  which are not   supported by a decree.

25. Mr Mutua  maintained that this matter  was settled by  the judgment  of Korir   J in  JR  295/2011 where Korir  J at page  4  was clear that  the  claim cannot be to compel payment based on no evidence   of how the  figures   were arrived at. Mr Mutua prayed  for dismissal  of the applicant’s application and that the preliminary obje tion be upheld.

Determination

26. I have  carefully  considered  the applicant’s  application as  supported by the grounds, statutory statement, verifying   affidavit   and  exhibits.  I have also considered the parties’ advocates submissions  on the  preliminary objection  argued  to the effect  that this notice of  motion is resjudicata JR 696/2009 and JR 295/2011 and that  it is therefore  an abuse of  court process  and should be dismissed.

27. In my  humble view, the issues  for determination are:

1. Whether these Judicial Review proceedings  are resjudicata  JR 696/2009 and  JR  295/2011 which  are over the  same subject matter and between the same parties; and or whether  it is an abuse  of the court process.

2. If the answer in (1) is in the negative, whether the application  for mandamus  is merited.

3. What  orders  should  this court  make.

4. Who should bear the costs  of the proceedings.

28. On the  first  issue as to  whether these  proceedings  are resjudicata  JR 696/2009 and JR  295/2011  and  or whether  they are   an abuse  of court  process, the applicant  in its  pleadings  averred  that although there  were previous proceedings  in JR  295/2011, over the  same  subject   matter which  was   dismissed, but that   resjudicata  does  not apply  to Judicial Review proceedings.

29. Therefore, the first  question  that  I must  dispose of  is whether  resjudicata is applicable to Judicial  Review  matters, before going into whether   resjudicata  can be   raised as  a preliminary  objection   on a point   of law.

30. On whether the  doctrine  of resjudicata is applicable  in Judicial  Review  proceedings  or matters, it is  important  to understand  the origin of this legal  principle  which is  embodied   in Section 7  of the Civil Procedure  Act.

31. The doctrine  originates  from the policy  “that  parties  to a judicial  decision should  not afterwards  be allowed  to relitigate the same question”, as per Miller J in Crown Estate Commissioners  Vs Dorset  County Council  [1990]1ALL ER  19 at  23.

32. In other  words, the principle   of resjudicata  applies  to bar subsequent  proceedings  when there has been  adjudication by the court  of competent or concurrent  jurisdiction  which conclusively  determined  the rights of  the parties with regard to all or any  matters in controversy  as was  held in Mandaria V Ratten Singh [1965] EA 118.

33. For one  to succeed in the plea of resjudicata, he must  show that:

a) The matter in  issue is  identical  in both suits

b) That  the parties in the   suit are  substantially  the same

c) That  there is concurrent  jurisdiction  of the court.

d) That the subject   matter is  the same  and finally

e)  That there is  a  final determination  as far as the  previous  decision  is concerned.

34. Section  7 of the Civil Procedure  Act Cap  21  Laws of  Kenya provides that:

“ 7  No court  shall try any  suit or issue  in which the matter directly  and  substantially  in issue  has been directly   and  substantially  in issue  in any former suit  between the same  parties, or  between  parties under  whom they or any  of them  claim, litigating  under the same  title, in  a court of competent   to try such  subsequent  suit or  the suit in which such issue  has been subsequently  raised, and has been heard and  finally  decided  by such court.

Explanation (4) – Any  matter which  might and  ought to have been  made ground  of defence  of attack in such  a former  suit shall be deemed  to have been  a matter directly  and   substantially  in issue  in such suit.”

35. It has been argued that  Judicial  Review proceedings  do not  fall under the Civil Procedure Act as they  are not suits as defined  in Section  2 of the Act and  that  pursuant  to Section  8 and  9  of the Law Reform  Act Cap  26  Laws of Kenya, the  High Court  is expressly barred from exercising civil or criminal  jurisdiction  in  determining  Judicial  Review matters   which,  therefore,  are not suits.

36. Further argument  is that the long  title   to the Civil Procedure Act is clear  that it is “ An Act of Parliament  to make provisions  for  procedure  in civil court’s   and that since Judicial Review  applications  are neither   civil nor criminal, in nature, therefore, the doctrine  of  resjudicata   does not apply.

37. In Commissioner  of Lands  Vs Kunste  Hotel Ltd [1995]-1998]1 EA 1the Court of Appeal  held that  Judicial Review jurisdiction is a special  jurisdiction  which is neither  civil or criminal and the Civil  Procedure  Act  does not   apply since it  is governed  by Section 8  and 9 of the Law Reform Act  being the substantive law and  Order  53   of the Civil Procedure Rules  being the procedural  law.

38. Therefore, strictly  speaking, Section 7 of the  Civil Procedure Act does not apply to Judicial  Review proceedings.

39. The same   position  was upheld  by  the same Court  of Appeal in Republic Vs Judicial Service Commission exparte  Pareno[2004] 1KLR 203-209; Sanghani  Investments Ltd vs  Officer in Charge Nairobi Remand and Allocation  Prison[2007] 1 EA and Re National  Hospital Insurance  Fund Act and Central Organization of Trade Unions (K)  Nairobi HCMA 1747  of  2004[2006] I EA  47.

40. The above  position  notwithstanding, courts   have in the  recent  past held that it does not  mean that  the courts are  powerless  where it  is  clear that  by  bringing proceedings,  a party is clearly   abusing the court process.

41. Thus the courts have held that  whereas rejudicata may not be invoked in Judicial Review proceedings, the court retains the inherent jurisdiction to terminate  proceedings  where the proceeding amounts to an  abuse of   its process.  That is what the court inRepublic Vs City Council of Nairobi & 2 Others [2014] e KLRheld per Odunga J, inter alias that:

“ One of the cardinal  principles  of law is  that litigation  must come  to an end and  where a  court of competent  jurisdiction has  pronounced a final  decision on a  matter, to bring  fresh proceedings whether  as Judicial  Review  proceedings  or otherwise  would   amount   to an  abuse  of the process  of the court  and would  therefore not  be  entertained.  The court  in terminating the same would be invoking its inherent   jurisdiction  which is not jurisdiction conferred  by Section  3A of the Civil  Procedure  Act as  such  but merely  reserved  there under.”

41. In Kenya  Bus Services Ltd & Others  Vs Attorney General  &Others[2005]1EA 111the Court of Appeal stated, concerning   the inherent   powers of the court, inter alia:

“ …….whereas  ordinary  jurisdiction  stems  from the Act  of Parliament  or statutes, the  inherent powers  stem from the character   or the nature  of the court  itself……It is regarded  as sufficiently empowered  to do justice  in all  situations.  The jurisdiction  to exercise  these  powers  was derived, not  from statute  or rule of law, but  from the very nature of  the court as supervision  court of law, and for  this reason  such jurisdiction  has been called “inherent”.  For the  essential  character of a superior court of law  necessarily involves  that it   should be  invested  with a  power to maintain  its authority  and to prevent  the process  being obstructed  and abused.  Such a power is intrinsic  in a superior  court, its  very  life blood , its  very essence, its immanent  attribute without such   a power, the court  would have form but would lack substance.  The  jurisdiction, which is  inherent in a superior  court of law, is that  which enables  it to  fulfill itself   as a court of  law.   The judicial  basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the  judicial function of administering  justice  according   to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.  The need  to administer justice in accordance with the constitution occupies  an even higher  level due to the supremacy of the Constitution and the need to prevent the abuse of the constitutional provisions and  procedure  does occupy the  apex  of the judicial  hierarchy of  values.  Therefore, the court does have inherent  powers  to prevent  abuse of  its process  in declaring, securing and enforcing   constitutional rights and freedoms…….”

43. In Karuri & Others Vs Dawa Pharmaceuticals Company Ltd & Others[2007] 2 EA 235 the court emphasized  that nothing can  take away  the court’s  inherent power to  prevent  the abuse of its  process by striking  out  pleadings  or striking  out  a frivolous and vexatious   application and that  baptizing – such  matters  constitutional  cannot  make them  so if they  are  in fact  plainly  an abuse of  the court process.

44. However, a three  judge  bench sitting  in Silas Make  Otuke  Vs Attorney General & 3 Others[2014]eKLR a Constitutional Petition  observed, inter alia, that:

“ Although  the constitutional  principles  of fair hearing   under Article 50(1), access  to justice  under Article  48, promotion  and  protection of the Bill of Rights under Articles 22, and enforcement  of  the Constitution under  258  would  generally call for  full inquiry  into disputes  that may  be resolved by operation  of law, consistency with the rule  of law, the principle   of resjudicata as a cardinal principle for the finality  of  litigation  and for the  prevention  of abuse  of the court  process  must be inbuilt  in any constitutional litigation that may be preferred for that purpose.  We agree with  the privy  council decision  in Thomas   vs the Attorney General  of Trinidad  and  Tobago [1991] LRC  (Const) 1001, cited in E.T. Vs Attorney General & Another [2012] e KLR, where the  Board   was   satisfied  that the existence   of the constitutional remedy as that  upon  which the  appellant   relies  does not  affect  the application for  the principle of  resjudicata, and  referred  to a decision  of the Supreme  Court of  India  Daryao  and  Others  V The  State of UP and Others [1961] 1scr 574,582-2  where   Gajendragkar  J held that the  principle   of resjudicata  was  applicable in cases under Article   32 of the Constitution of India:-

“ But  us the rule of resjudicata  merely a technical   rule or it is  based  on high public  policy” if the rule  of resjudicata itself  embodies a principle of  public policy  which in turn  is an essential  part of the rule of law  then the objection  that the rule cannot  be invoked  where fundamental  rights  are in question  may lose  much of its  validity.  Now the rule  of  resjudicata as indicated  in S.11 of the  code of Civil  Procedure   has no doubt  some  technical aspects, for instance  the rule of  constructive resjudicata  may be  said to be  technical, but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded  on consideration of public   policy.  It is  in the interest of   the public at large   that a  finality  should  attach to be binding  decisions pronounced by the courts of competent   jurisdiction, and it is   also in  the public   interest  that individuals  should not be   vexed  twice over  with  the same   principles  form the  foundation  of the general  rule of  resjudicata they cannot be treated  as irrelevant   or  inadmissible  even in dealing  with fundamental  rights  in Petitions  filed under  Article   32”  See   also Charo Kazungu Matsere & 273 Others v Kencent Holdings Ltd & another Mombasa HC (CP) 136/2011; [2012]e KLR and Booth Irrigation v Mombasa Water Products Ltd (Booth Irrigation No.1)Nairobi HC Miscellaneous  Application  No. 1952  of   2004.

Accordingly, we  unhesitatingly find that the  principles  of resjudicata  is applicable  to constitutional  litigation  and its  relevance   is not  affected by  the substantial  justice principle  of Article 159 of the Constitution which overrides  technicalities  of procedure “

45. From the above decision, I have  no doubt in my mind  that the  principle  of resjudicata being  a public policy principle, it applies to judicial review proceedings  as it bars  re-litigation  over the same issue  and over the same  subject matter   and  even if   the  doctrine  of   resjudicata  would strictly  not be applied  as such  in Judicial Review  or constitutional  matters, the court  may in proper cases invoke its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss  proceedings which are instituted  by way of Judicial Review  and which  would  otherwise  be an abuse of the court process   in similar  circumstances  as where the  doctrine  of resjudicata  would be  applicable.

46. It  therefore  follows that    abuse of court  process   in Judicial Review  proceedings  takes   the  place of resjudicata.

47. On whether Resjudicata can be taken as a preliminary point of law, a preliminary objection on a point of law as correctly  submitted by Miss   Maitai, cannot be raised  if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.

48. That is the  principle  enunciated  in the Mukisa  Biscuits  Manufacturing  Ltd  Vs West  End   Distributors  Ltd.Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1969 [1969] EA 696.

49. In Arnold Vs West Minister Bark [1991]AC 93 HC the House of Lords  held that  cause of action estoppel  “ is an  absolute   bar in relation to all points  decided  unless  fraud  or collusion  is alleged, such as to justify setting aside the  earlier  judgment.”

50. In Mulla Code of Civil Procedure, 18th  Edition  2012  page  293, it is observed  that the principle  of resjudicata  as a judicial  device  for finality of court decisions   is subject  to the special circumstances  of fraud, mistake  or lack of  jurisdiction. The authors state:

“ The principle  of finality or  resjudicata  is a matter  of public policy and  is  one of the pillars   on which a  judicial system  is founded.  Once  a judgment  becomes  conclusive the  matters  in issue  covered   thereby  cannot be   reopened  unless   fraud  or mistake  or lack of  jurisdiction  is cited to  challenge  it directly  at a later stage. The principle is routed to the rationale  that  issues   decided may  not be reopened  and has  little   to do with the  merit   of the decision.”

51. From the above  decisions  in their spirit  and  tenor, it is clear that resjudicata  is a pure point of law  and when  taken  as preliminary  point  of law so as to  avoid  abuse  of the process of  court would   determine  proceedings in limine.

52. It should  be noted that in the Mukisa  Biscuits  case (supra) the court  was dealing with the  issue of dismissal  of a suit  for want of   prosecution.  In  that case, the defendant, instead of applying  for dismissal  of the  suit  for want  of prosecution, by way of a  motion, it  raised  a preliminary  objection  and that  is  when the court   made it   clear that  a preliminary  objection   consists  of a point of which   has been   pleaded, or   which  arises by clear  implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a  preliminary  point may  dispose  of the suit.

53. The same  Mukisa Biscuits case gave  examples  of what would  constitute a preliminary objection at  page  700 paragraph D of the  judgment  as “ an  objection to the jurisdiction  of the court, or a  plea of limitation, or  a submission  that the parties  are bound by the contract giving   rise  to the suit   to refer  the suit to arbitration.

54. In this  case, the  applicant  by its  own pleadings  admits that  there  was previously  JR 696/2009  but that  resjudicata does not lie in Judicial Review proceedings/matters since the principal sum claimed with costs  and interest  have never  been settled by the respondent and that if these proceedings are  dismissed, then the applicant  will  not be left   with any remedy.

55. Further, that  Judicial Review  is  a discretionary  remedy  hence resjudicata would not apply  where  facts have  to be ascertained  or if  what is sought  is  the  exercise  of judicial discretion.

56. In my  humble view, the applicant in this case is admitting  that  this matter  is resjudicata  JR 696/2009  but that  resjudicata   does not   apply to  Judicial Review  matters  hence it is safe with these proceedings.  I disagree.

57. I further  disagree  that   in the circumstances of this case, the respondent is seeking    judicial discretion  of the court.  The applicant is seeking  to have the matter herein  determined in limine since it is the same  proceedings   were  adjudicated  upon and  determined  finally  by way  of a judgment.

58. In my  humble view, the applicant  has misapprehended the remedy of judicial review being a discretionary one, and  a preliminary  objection  seeking   judicial  discretion   of the court like  in the Mukisa  Biscuits case where the  appellant  defendant had sought  the judicial  discretion of the court to dismiss  the suit for  want of prosecution, by way  of a preliminary  objection  to the  suit as  opposed  to filing  a motion to dismiss  the suit for  want of prosecution.

59. That being  the case,  I find that  the preliminary  objection  was well  taken, that a matter amounts to  an abuse  of court process  if it has been adjudicated  upon and determined  fully  by a  court of competent   jurisdiction if the issues and   subject  matter are the same as those determined in a previous  proceeding.

60. This  then leads  me to answer the  overall  question of whether  this judicial Review Application is resjudicata  JR 696/2009 and  JR 295/2011  or whether  it is an abuse of  the court process.

61. In paragraph  5 and  7  of the exparte  applicant’s  verifying  affidavit  it  was deposed  that:

5. That  the applicant had  previously  instituted JR  No. 295  of  2011  Bespoke   Insurance  Brokers  Vs Phillis  Kisia, The Town Clerk of the City  Council of Nairobi and City Council of Nairobi, in pursuit  of the decretal  amount herein  but the same   was dismissed  ( annexed  herein marked  as “GW3” is a copy of the judgment.

7. That I am  informed  by my  advocates on  record, Messrs Maina  & Maina   Advocates  and which  information I verily  believe to be true that: i.  The  principle  of resjudicata  does not apply to  Judicial Review  matters: ii. The cause  of action continues   to accrue  as the decretal amount  has never  been  fully settled. Iii. That the applicant herein is barred from instituting   execution proceedings against the  1st and  2nd respondents  and therefore   has no other way of compelling the respondents to settle  the decretal sum.”

62. However, annexture “GMW3”  is not the judgment  in JR  295/2011 but is the judgment  by J. Khaminwa  J ( as  she then  was )  dated  28th October, 2008 wherein  she  entered  judgment  for the plaintiff/applicant herein against the  defendant/respondents herein for a sum of kshs 27,914,768. 10 plus  interest at  court rates  from date  of filing suit  until payment  in full,  and  costs of the suit.

63. However, the respondents  filed before this court  judgments  in JR  295/2011 and  JR 696/2009 between the same  parties.  In JR  696/2009, the applicant   herein  sought the  following orders:-

“That the court do issue   Judicial Review   by way of an order of mandamus compelling  the Town Clerk, City Council  of Nairobi, to pay the decretal sum outstanding at kshs   36,276,431/30 as at  the date of filing  thereof together  with interest  therein  till payment  in full  pursuant  to the decree issued  in Milimani  HCC No. 590/2005 on  27th October  2008. ”

64. The applicant  in  the JR  295/2011  between the same  parties  hereto sought   for the  following orders:

“ 1.  Judicial  Review  by way of an order  for mandamus   compelling the Town Clerk , City Council of Nairobi, to pay the  decretal sum outstanding  at kshs  20,872,392. 12  as at the date of  filing thereof  together with interest  thereon  till payment  in full pursuant  to the decree  issued in  Milimani  High Court   Civil Case  No. 590 of  2008  on 27th  day of  October, 2008”

65. And in this application the following  orders are  sought:

“That an order of mandamus do issue to compel the  1st  respondent  to implement  the decree  emanating from  the judgment of the High Court dated 27th October, 2008 in Milimani  HCC No.  590  of  2005  and  without   delay cause   to be  paid  the amount of  kshs  25,286,910. 12  together  with  interest accrued  from the date of filing the suit.”

66. I have perused Republic Vs  P. Wendo  J in JR  696/2009, wherein the learned  judge stated  as follows  at page 4 of  8 of her  judgment  dated  29th September  2010:

“ I do note that  whereas  in the statement  there  was no prayer for interest  on the sum claimed, in the notice of   motion, there is a prayer for  the  substantive  sums  and for interest  thereon  from the date of  filing.  The decree  issued on  27th October   2008   was for kshs  27,914,768/10  plus interest   at court rates. So by the  applicant  seeking  interest on kshs  36,287,431/30  from the date of filing,  was  claiming a different  sum  of money  all together.  This is because   kshs  36,276,432/- sought  in the statement   must be  inclusive of interests.  I do agree  that the prayers set out in the statement and  notice of motion  are at  variance  and the notice  of motion therefore  offends order  53  Rule  4(1)  of  Civil Procedure  Rule.”

67. The learned  judge went  further to  state a follows:

“Utmost good faith is required of an applicant who approached   the court for  Judicial Review  orders  and  failure to  disclose  material facts to his case would disentitle one to the  discretionary  orders of  Judicial Review. Michael  Fardham in  his Book Judicial Review Handbook 5th Edition says as  follows:

“ Claimant’s duty of candour” Judicial Review claimants  have always  been under  an important  duty  to make full  and  frank disclosure to the court of material facts, and known  impediments  to Judicial Review. (eg alternative remedy, delay, adverse  authority statutory ouster)….”

68. The court in JR 696/2009 concluded that the order of mandamus  could not  issue at that stage even if  deserved  because  not all  facts  were disclosed  to  the court for  consideration and to enable  it arrive at  a fair decision.  She  further  found that the notice  of  motion  was incompetent   and that that was a case where  the parties   should  have tried  to pursue  the appeal  first before seeking   an order  of mandamus  and she  struck  out the  notice  of  motion  dated  21st January  2009  with no orders  as to costs.

69. No doubt, the above  JR  696/2009  was  struck  out for   being incompetent.  It was not dismissed.  The law is  clear  that where  a matter is struck  out for  being incompetent, then that order of striking out  is not conclusive  of all the issues  raised  and therefore the aggrieved party can institute fresh  proceedings.

70. Perhaps, it is for  that reason   that the  exparte  applicant herein  instituted  JR 295/2011 seeking the same prayers  as those  contained  in JR 696/2009.

71. However, in JR 295/2011,Honourable Korir J had this to say in conclusion:

“ The  respondents  have disputed the sum of kshs  20,872,392  claimed by  the applicant.  I have gone through  the papers  filed by the applicant  and  it is clear that the applicant  was  awarded  kshs  27,914,768. 10 on 21st  October 2007  in High Court civil case No. 590 of  2005.  A decree for this amount was later  issued.  It is also clear  from the ruling  delivered  by the Court  of Appeal on 21st October 2011 in Civil Application No. Nairobi 87 of 2010 (unreported 63/2010) that the principal  amount  was  paid in full and  what remains  is the  interest.   The applicant  did not  place  any documents   before the court  to  explain how the interest  was arrived  at.  This court  can only  compel the  respondents  to perform   that which is  legal.

The court cannot compel the respondents to pay money  without  any documentation to support  such payment.   It is not  to say  that the  applicant’s  claim is illegal.  What the court requires  is evidence  as to how  the figure was arrived at.  For the reason  alone, the applicant’s application fails and the same  is dismissed  with costs  to the respondent’s.”

72. The above  judgment   was rendered  on 8th March  2013. There is   no appeal filed challenging the  above  Judgment  of Korir J and on  8th June  2016   three  and  half years   later, the exparte  applicant was back  into the same  court seeking   for the same orders, with an enhanced amount of “ shs  25,286,910. 14   together  with interest   accrued    from the date of filing suit.”

73. Examining   the above  prayer for mandamus and the judgment  in CA 63/2010  in the Court of Appeal vide  Civil Application  Nairobi 87/2010[2011]eKLRbetweenCity Council of Nairobi  and Bespoke Insurance Brokers, wherein  the Court of Appeal was dealing  with an application for stay  of execution  pending hearing   and  determination of the  appeal from the ruling  of Khaminwa  J dated  16th March  2009, the Court of Appeal as at  21st  October  2011 stated:

“ …we  are of the  new that this  application  was brought  without  merit   as the  amount  in dispute  had been  settled save  interest  on the principal  sum and  also more   so for the fact  that there  is nothing  to stay as s a result  of the learned  judge’s  order of  6th March  2009.  That being  our view  of the matter, we order that this application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”

74. The decree  in HCC 590/2005 as per  the judgment  delivered  on 21st  October   2008   was kshs  27,914,768. 10.  According  to the  ruling  by the  Court of Appeal  on 21st October   2011, the principal   sum  had been  settled save for  interest   on the principal.

75. Annexture  GWM4 is a schedule  of interest  allegedly due as prepared  by the exparte  applicant and  not by the court.   That schedule   is not part of the decree of the court which still reads shs  27,914,768. 10  together  with interest  at court rates  from the date of filing suit until payment in full, and there is no indication that the costs   as  taxed  on 30th March  2016  and  a certificate  of taxed costs issued by the  taxing officer on  3rd June 2016 were ever  included  in the claimed  sums of  money.

76. In my humble view, GWM4  which  is a schedule  of interest  due  is not a court document. Interest due can  only be calculated  by the court and not by  a party  on its own accord since the interest  awarded on the principal sum does not  form a  separate  or independent  cause of action  as it is part of a decree.

77. From GWM4, the applicant is no doubt  establishing   a separate and independent cause of action against the  respondent, which claim  would be  legally  untenable.

78. In addition, the said  schedule  does not  even mention  the principal  sum as awarded   by the Honourable   Khaminwa  J.

79. Further, whereas  the schedule  claims that the  total outstanding  amount as  at  6th June  2016 is  kshs  24,557,677,14, the amount  claimed in the application for leave  and  in the substantive  notice of  motion is shs   25,286,910. 14 together with  interest  accrued  from the date  of filing   of the suit.”

80. The judgment  by Honourable Wendo J  in JR  696/2009  and  Honourable  Korir J  in JR  295/2011  battled  with the issue  of the applicant herein claiming  for the sums together  with interest   accrued  from the date  of filing the  suit.”

81. An order of mandamus  is issued to  compel  a public body  or authority or an administrator to do that which the law  requires it to do. For such  an order  to issue, the applicant  must state  with certainty  and  specifity  that which the  public authority  or body or administrator is  required  to perform  and  which it has  failed  to perform.

82. The amount sought by the applicant to be paid by the  respondents   can only  be as per the  decree  of the  court  or certificate  of order against the government pursuant to Section 21 of the Government  Proceedings  Act.

83. In this case, the decree reads  a  different  sum from that which is sought  in the notice of motion.  What  the applicant  has done, after Honourable Korir dismissed its application in JR  295/2011 on the ground that  the court cannot  compel   the respondent’s to pay money without any documentation  to support  such payment, was to  prepare  a schedule, instead  of reverting  back to the court  to calculate  interest  if any, since  the principal  sum had  already been settled as per  the ruling of the Court  of Appeal in CA 63/2010.

84. In my  humble view, the conduct  of the exparte  applicant in seeking  for mandamus  orders against  a public  authority is  unacceptable.  That  conduct of  litigating  over the  same subject  matter by  installments  and only  changing  the figures   is a sign  of dishonesty on the part of the applicant.

85. That  dishonesty  is further reflected in  the fact that  despite the principal judgment sum having  been  settled  many years ago, as  per the ruling of the Court of Appeal in CA  63/2010, the exparte  applicant’s  “ schedule  of interest” which I have dismissed  does not  even reflect  when that  principal sum was  paid and  how much  interest  had been  earned  on it  from date  of filing suit.

86. Further, the sum of money  disclosed  in that “ schedule  of  interest” is  not the same  sum of  money  claimed  in the prayer  for mandamus.

87. In addition, the  sum of money sought to be compelled  to be paid as  per the prayer for  mandamus  is not  disclosed  to be interest on the principal sum butdecretal sum in HCC 590/2005, together  with interest  accrued  from the date  of filing the suit.

88. With utmost  respect to the  exparte  applicant, it cannot  claim interest  on 25,286,910. 14  from the date of filing  the suit since shs  25,286,910. 14 is not  the sum  which  was  claimed  as the principal  sum in HCC 590/2005 and neither was it the  sum that  Honourable Khaminwa J awarded on 27th October 2008.

89. Although paragraph  4 of the grounds  in support of the notice of motion  and paragraph C of the statutory  statement   dated  7th June 2016 claims  that the debt  now stands at shs  24,557, 677. 14  together  with costs  of shs  729,233, the question, how is this fresh debt  being incurred if the principal  sum  was  settled  and  even if it  was interest, then  the notice  of motion  is claiming for  decretal  sum and not just interest. Further, it is  not clear  how that  interest  was  arrived  at in the  absence  of a uniform  interest rate  and or  calculations by the   court on  the settled   principal sum.

90. Furthermore, although the schedule of interest   uses  the interest rate of  12%  in  compounding   the sums due, paragraph   C(ii) in the statutory  statement  on the  facts relied  upon claims that:

“ The said judgment  required  the  respondent    to pay  a sum of shs  27,914,768 together with  costs  and  interest  at  14%  from dated of filing  the suit  until full payment.”

1. One wonders  what the court rate of interest  was at the time of  judgment  in HCC 590 of 2005 and  when that  interest rate  started  fluctuating.

2. There is so much conflicting information supplied by the exparte  applicant to this  court that  no court  of law can grant  the orders being  sought  which orders   are discretionary.

3. For example, ground 1 on the face of  the notice of  motion provides  another rate of interest at  12%  from the  date of filing  suit. Ground  5 thereof  claims that the  decretal  sum  continues  to accrue interest  since the date   of filing  of the suit.

4. Surely, the decretal sum having  been settled, it  cannot under any  circumstances  be found to be in existence to be accruing  any interest   at whatever  rate.  What would be owing if any is the balnce of interest due on the principal sum since there is no order in the judgment of Hom Khaminwa J that interest would also earn interest as if it was the principal sum.

5. The exparte  applicant  is not  being candid  with the court and as such, I cannot help but agree with the  respondent’s counsel’s submissions that the applicant’s  application after application is intended  to steal  from the public coffers  since for this court  to compel  the payment  of the conflicting  sums of money, which  all  come nearly  67 million from a  judgment  sum  of shs  27  million, it must   be shown, clearly, how  that sum of money was arrived at.

6. Further, the applicant cannot bring into this court a decree and claim different sums  which are  not supported by a decree.  I find that  the interest  which is being  claimed  is at  large as  it is not  supported by a decree or certificate  of order against  a  County Government  as stipulated  by  Section  21(1)-(5)  of the Government Proceedings Act, which echoes the repealed   Section  263  A( 1) of the Local  Government  Act Cap  265  Laws of Kenya on satisfaction of orders against the Government.  It therefore   follows that  in this case,  whether or not  these Judicial  Review proceedings  are resjudicata JR  295/2011, the applicant  has  miserably  failed to  satisfy  the court that  it is entitled  to  Judicial Review  orders of Mandamus  to  compel the respondents to settle  any decretal  sums as the sums  allegedly  due are not  ascertainable   from the conflicting   material   claims  and  documents  placed before  this court.

7. What this court has been treated to  from the commencement  of the hearing  of this matter is nothing but conflicting  issues of  fact and although this court  was unfairly  accused by  Mr Mutua  of bias  for ordering the matter  to proceed, this  court, not being  a mechanical court that acts  robotically  has managed  to sift through the available evidence  on record, even without  the plea of  resjudicata  and found that the notice of  motion filed   by the applicant and which  is dated  5th August is  a grave  abuse of  the process of this court.

8. Furthermore, Honourable Korir J  having  dealt  with the same  issues that  I have been  confronted  with, it is expected  that if the exparte applicant was dissatisfied with that judgment of  Honourable Korir J, it should have lodged an appeal  challenging  that decision  since  the judgment dismissed the notice of motion by  the applicant, based  on the merits  of the matter and   not on the point of incompetence as was  the case in JR 696/2009.

9. is not an appellate  court that would consider  the  judgment of a court of concurrent  jurisdiction and  which court  determined  the same issues  as the ones before   me and  between the same  parties  on merits.

10. Accordingly, I find that not only  is the notice of motion dated  5th August  2016  an abuse of the court  process   but that it is devoid  of any merit and  is vexatious  and  the order  that  commends itself in those circumstances  is to dismiss the exparte  applicant’s  notice  of motion  dated  5th August  2016.

11.  Each  party shall bear their own costs of the Judicial Review  proceedings.

Dated, signed  and  delivered at Nairobi  this  7th day of December  2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss MAITAI for the exparte applicant

N/A for Respondent (pupil Miss Lynn Ngira attending court)

CA: Lorna