Bikumu v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 24 of 1989) [1991] UGSC 20 (30 August 1991)

Full Case Text

# IN THj, SUPRLML COURT OF UGANDA

#### *1* . AT MLNGO

CORAM MANYINDO, D. C. J., ODLR, J. S. C., AND SLATON, J. S. C.) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 24 OF 1989

### BLTWlLN

ISAYA BIKUMU APPELLANT AND

USANDA (Appeal from the Judgement of the High Court of at Kabale, (Mukanza, J) dated June 2, 1989) ^jiSPONDbNT • Uganda

# IN

### CRIMINAL SESSION CALL NO. 40 of 1988

### JUDGEMENT OF THF COUkT

The appellant Isaya Bikumu, was convicted of the murder of the' deceased, Yosia Tibanyana, and sente^^ed to death by the High court sitting at Kabale on June 2, 19\$9\* He k<s appealed the canvlx ction.

The evidence supporting the prosecution case was to the effect that the appellant and the deceased who were cousins, lived in the sain^ locality of ^unhandiiya. <» ^ub-ovunty4 KoAxale District\* They had had a land dispute between them which had been settled in favour of the deceased few months before the fateful incident.

On June 14th 1984 at about 4.00 p.m. the appellant and the deceased weare walking in the apposite directions along a footpath in Bweyo village when they met. 'rhey were returning to their respective homes., «After passing each other, the apoelant turned ba«k and struck the deceased, on the back of his. head^with a walking stick which was in the appellant's hand. No words were exchanged between the two men. On being struck the deceased fell down. The appellant then kicked and stumped on him with both his feet several times.

>./2

n'he formfe r was in what appeared to be military boots. e hud been a soldier in Lhe ^rmy up to 1979 • After assaulting the deceased the appellant ran away, leaving his victim bleeding profusely frog themouth nose and ears and what appeared'to be on the head\* Later villagers arrived at the scene, finding the deceased in They put and carried him pn a strecherfor a journey to Kis-isi Hospital but he died before reachj.ig there. a bad condition. a cut wound

*t*

A post mortem examination was performed on the body of the deceased on June 16th 1984 at Kabale Hospital. It reaveled a deep cut wound on the tempera! right region of the head, and a depressed fracture of tne temporaral bone. Cause of death was the head injury.

apparently destroyed by unknown people anc| he disappeared from the area for aoout lour years until his arrest in Kampala on June 21, 1987\* The appellant was absent at the burial oi' the deceased. Soon after the incident, tne house of the appellant was

*i*

At **hisj.** trial, the appellant gave swo?n tesitmony in which he denied responsibility for the death of the deceased, and put up an alibi. He said that he did not stay at home most of tne day in question. He went first to Kashambya sub-county Headquarters to pay his graduated tax. 11 e then ddparted from there at about 12.00 noon and went to Nyabuzana for a drink 3 returning home at about . 1.30 p. m. He was at his home when his wife returned from outside at 6.00 p.m and warned him to run away, because some people, intended **to kill himkc** He deeded the warning and ran away to Zaire from where he returned to had been overthrown. Uganda after the U. P. C. Government then in power >

*I*

- 2 -

He ran away because he felt threatened as he was being branded a bandit by U. P. C. supporters, of whim the deceased was a local chairman.

The appellant further oaid that after he had returned to Uganda, he was arrested in Kampala and detained at the Lubiri army barracks and Bassima House where he .vias beaten, tortured and forced by soldiers to make a statement. Subsequently he was transferred to the C. I. D. Headquarters, where he was further beaten and forced by the Police to sign .a statement <X»h which was produced and .admitted in evidence XX at his trial. e asserted that he had been falsely accused because of the land dispute he had with the deceased.

The learned trial Judtre'rejected the defence of the appellant, accepted the prosecution evidence and convicted him as charged in agreement with the unanimous opinions of both the assessors. there was no sufficient evidence to prove th.\*t the appellant caused the death of the deceased. and agu; ed by Mr. Lutakome, learned counsel for the appellant. 'We sh 11 consider them in the same order. Ground one is that ^'our grounds of appeal were set out in the Memorandum

In this regard the learned counsel attached firstlythe evidence of one of the eye witnesses to the incident, namely Binaleta Nyabanyangwa (PUS). Th.e learned counsel submitted that this witness claimed to have seen\*. the incident between the appellant and the deceased happen from a distancd of about 100 meters and yet did not raise to the learned counsel, she ought to. have done if she, infact, had seen what happened. She justified her failure te raise the alarm on account' of fear of the appellant but counsel ebaerved that she was apperantly protected from him by a stream which lay between her garden where she was collecting food and the scene of crime. an alarm as, according

We find PW5's explanation for not having faised an alarm reasonable. She had just seen the appellant strike the deceased in whht appeared a sava«e manner.

- 3 -

As a woman her fear of attracting an attack from aach was plausible. cross protection from a possible attack by the appellant. a man which'might have followed an alarm from her when she was alone, examined to establish whether it was deep enough to afford her rtith regard to the presence of a stream, she was not

Another point which, according to tie learned counsel raised doubt of PtfJ's claim that the appellant struck hhe deceased. as she claimed, was the failure by the deceased to raise an alarm or shout for heip. If, as claimed by PW5, the deceased raised his head and strethed his legs during the assault on him, it meant' that he had the strength and the opportunity to shout for help which he did not do. *Je* think that if PW5's evidence in this regard was true, he should have shouted for help. might have been in a condition or the other, matter of speculation. Consequently in our view the evidence of *P','J5* was not discredited simply because the deceased did not raise an alarm for assistance. ne it can only be a to do so or he might not have. In the absence of evidence on wqy it is not, without more, \*Ju^;ification for saying that

Secondly, the learned counsel's critieism of the medical report is the basis for his contention that the death of the deceased was not caused by th alleged attack on him by the appealant ne submitted that the evidence did not exclude th., possibility of other caus^ *01* death. was respect, we do«not accept this critieism about the medical evidence as the cause of death. The evidence of Dr. Mugerwa who ;perfoMhd an autopsy on the body of the deceased was admitted under section 64 of the Trial on Indictments Decree, 1971. onsequently he Has not called to testify the appell ants ' a d-°ubtthat the deceased died at the kauadsof appellftnt\* with In tae circumstances, therefore- there

1 5/

- 4 -

trial. Only if he gave evidence would he have been available to beyond what he admitted. He would have, for instance, explained whether other possible causes of the death could be ruled out. In the event, what was stated in his evidence as the cause of death of the deceased was admitted by defence and not challenged. The appellant's learned counsel, in our opinion, therefore, has no basis for critising that evidence with regard to prodf of cause of death. explain in cross examination or otherwise the cause of the death

- 5 -

In spite of what we have just said above, howevey we consider <'evidence concerning cause of deatn in this and many other cases. In the case of Aramanzani Kampayaniv. Uganda S. C. U. Cr. Appeal NO. 5of 1978 (unreported). this court criticised the admission in that case o'f a post mortem examinationr report under S. 64 of tne TID and said this: it appropriate to mention here once again, our unease regarding the \* o manner in which section 64 of\* the TID has been used to admit tne doctor's

> ''Whether an admitted or agreed evidence under section 64 should also be proved depends on the evidence or document and the case in question. Normally, the section should be applied only XX to formal or non-contentious evidence or documents. See Fatoiano v. Uganda CAU Judgements, Part 'i, page 86) But where witnesses are considered controversial or vital, they should give evidence to enable their evidence to be testified in cross examination."

In the instant case, however, though the medical evidence was admitted under section 64, no miscarriage of justice was occasioned to the appeallant thereby.

force was used. Considering therefore, all the evidence that was available before tne learned trial Judge we think, with respect that there is no merit in gound one of tne appeal and the learned counsel's submission theron. In our opinion, there wqs amole evidence to prove that the death of the deceased was caused by the appellant's assault on him. Such evidence came from tne eye witnesses and the post-mortem examination. The principal eye witness was Binaleta(P'J>) •her evidence was accepted by the learned trial 'Judge, justifiably we think. °he saw the appellant strike the deceased with a walking stick on tne head. The stick broke, suggesting that considerable he aeceased fell down and the appellant stumped on him with both feet, with military boots. i/hen PW5 subsquently reached the scene, sne saw the deceased bleeding from the mouth, nose, ears and-a cut wound on the head.

was There x'he Her evidence that tne ap eliant struck the deceased on the head corroborated by tne neud injury which was confirmed by the medical evidence. 'he deceased was lifted from the scene where he was assaulted ana died on the way to hospital, was no apparent intervening event between the time he was struck by the appellant and when he died. da, there can be no suggestion th^t .he could have sustained some other head injury before or subsequent to his encounter with the appellant.

- 6 -

Before he ana the appellant met, PW5 saw him walking normally from the school towards home. According to her evidence, the deceased was apparently in go\*d he .1th.

In the circumstances an inference would^i in our opinion, be safely drawn that tne deceased did not suffer the injury which caused his death before his encounter with the appellant.

For the above reasons, we think that grouna one of the appeal must fail\*

from Twesigye (PW6) which was circumstancial. ground two is that the appellant was not properly identified as the one who caused the aeutn of the deceased. »-e have already held, when considering ground one. of the appeal, tnat tne deceased died from the blow that was struck on his head bo the ap eliant. All that remains for us to consider under the present ground, therefore is.whether the appellant was properly identified as the person who struck th^t fatal blow <n the he.id of the deceased. The learned counsel submitted that both Hebert Tumucirah\* (PW4) and Bimaleta (PW5) \* could not be relied on as identifying witnesses. In the case of (Pflfr) it was doubtful that he reached the scene and witnessed^che incident even if he did he must have been overcome by fear, and therefore did not observe what went on. Equally, according to the leafned counsel, it was doutful whether ^inaleta (PW5) saw wXat happened, for the wife of the deceased, Joy Tibaganda (P./7) and Twesiftye Pafrah (p?;6) did not sue her at »tne scene. dor did Robert (PJ4) mentioned r.r£t he saw Binaleta (P'j5) the sc^ne. According to the learned counsel, the only important evidence of ' identification of the appellant was

In considering whether.tae appel.a t the person who struck the fatal blow on the head have in mind the principals. w xs or not properly identified as of the deceased, we

7/-

which have been laid down by this court and its predecessors in cases such as Roria vs. Republic (1967) ::583;- Tomasi Omukano^vs.. Uganda Cr.,App. No.. 4 of 1977 (unreported)) Nabulere vs. Uganda (1979) HCB 77 (CAU) and Emmanuel Nsubuga vs. Uganda Cr. Appeal No. 16 of 19-88 CAU ( unreported )

- 7\* -

Briefly stated, the principles are khat in a case resting entirely on evidence of identification, tne court has a duty to satisfy itself ttet in all the circumstances of the case, it is • safe to act on such evidence, which must be free from mistake or error on the part of the identifying witness or witnesses. The evidence of such witnesses must be tested as £o i£s truthfulness and any possibility of mistake or error excluded. Where conditions for correct identification are favourable such are difficult it would be unsafe to convict in the absence of some other evidence connecting the accused with tne offence. task will be easier, ^ut where conditions

In the instant case the incident took place in broad day light at 4.00 p.m. Robert (PW4) one of the identifying witnesses was walking home from school wnen he came across the appellant assaulting the deceased. The deceased was already lying down and and the appellant was kicking him with both feet. ,what was going on from a distance of four meters. very well. he appellant was, .infact, his relative.; the appellant's brother having been married to pv;4»s sister. di na leta (PV/5) wqtched tne incident from about 100 meteres. She also knew both the appellant and the deceased Very well. She even described how the appellant was dressed at tne material time. She said he was dressed in sportted trousers.' Twesigye (PV/6). another importatnt witness in this respect also knew the appellant well, e watched h .he knew both men

the latter being their neighbour. He met the appellant 20 meters from where the deceased was lying down\* The appellant was in army boots and carrying a piece of stick. ' The stick, the boots and his spotted trousers appered to be blood-stained. Soon thereafter PW6 came across the deceased lying down and bleeding from the mouth Judge accepted that they properly identified the appellant as the person who assaulted the deceased, causing his death. We think that that finding cannot be faulted. nil conditions which were favourable for proper identification were present. The three witnesses in question knew the appellant well, the incident occured in broad day light saw the appellant from very close quarters. regarding his evidence th^t he saw the appellant assaulting the deceased. He reported the incident to her, as a result of which she went to the scene. him that the appellant had Killed the deceased. Consequently he (PW8) rushed to the scene where he. found the deceased lying down unconscious. Hospital, which the deceased did not reach alive. In the circumstances PWS's consistency was also borne out by the evidence of his father Misakai Tushabemwe (Ptf8) to the effect that Ptf6 reported to we think ground two of the appeal must also fail\* PW8 was one of those who subsequently took the deceased to and two of them, pw4 and pW'jl ■^he evidence of tne widow jUy Tibanyanda (PW7) bore Ptf^'s consistency nose, ears and what PW6 called the 'whole face', jne learned trial

Ground three is that the learned trial Judge erred to convict the appellant on the uncorraborated evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

the learned counsel for txje appellant said that the evidence of Robert (PW4) required corroooration. With respect, we find no merit in this ground, In his submission

counsels» view,it was. /9 Such corroboration would have been provided by the evidence of Binaleta (PW5) were her evidence not doubtful as,

- 8 - the incident though she claimed to have done so. AS Robert (PW4), Twesigye (Pw6) and Joy (PW7) apparently did not see Binaleta (PW5) at the scene, it meant tnat she did not witness

In this regard all that. Hobeirt (PW4) s. id came during, cross examination, when he said that he did not see people cultivating This does not in our view exclude the possibility that Binaleta (PtfS) was collecting food from her garden at a distance, of 156 meters, from where according to her, she witnessed the incident. With and that he did not see any other person apart from the wife df .the deceased\* Joy (PW7)\* This would seem to suggest th t contrary to what several other prosecution witnesses said, only Joy (PW7) and Twesigye (PV/6) went to the scene and yet this, in our view was not so. In the absence of evidence about the time wen the various witnesses arrived at the scene such a conclusion would be contrary to the overwhelming evidence to the effect tnat several persons visited the scene. The evidence of Twesigye (PWb) referred to rule out the possibility that Binaleta (piV5) after watching the incident from a distance did afterwards reach the scene. As to Joy (PV/7) she said that after receiving a report of what had happened from . Robert (P7/4) she rushed to the scene where she found her husband the deceased, lying down and bleeding. There was no other person at the scene. Again, we think that as the possibility t^at Binaleta (P;V5) and Joy (PJ7) arrived at the scene at different times was not ruled out, the evidence of Joy (PW7) in this regard, does not mean that Binaleta (Pv'/J) lied gccepted the evidence of Binaleta (P.<5) as being true. when she said that she saw what happened and also went to the scene did not, we think, In the circumstances, we think that the learned trial Judge Properly near the scene, because he was in great fear. regard to Twesigye (Ptf/6), ne said th,.t he knew Binaleta (P'. V5)

10/.

The learned counsel .-Iso submitted that only the circumstantial evidence', of Twesigye (PW6) would have corroborated the e evidence of Robert (PW4) and «oy (PW7). But as both Twesigye nd Joy (PW7) did not report to tne authorities what they had seen, their evidence should have been treated as false and therefore, of no use for purposes of corroboration# With respect, we think that the learned counsel's criticism of these witnesses in this regard is unfair. (PV/6) a:

-10

*f*

Twesigye (PW6) said that at the request of Joy (PW7) he went and informed his father, Misaki Tushabamu (PW8) of what had happened. on receiving tne information Misaki (PW8) rushed to the scene• His own evidence confirms this. Having thus reported the incident to his father as he did, there would ap ?ear to be no compelling reason why Twesigye (PW6) should also have reported tne incident to the local authorities as veil. The evidence of the widow of the deceased, Joy (PW7), in this regard was that when hue^ki (P;V8) arrived it was decided that the deceased should be taken to the hospital Xhey started for the hospital, but the deceased died on tne way. hereafter tne body of the deceased was taken home, Charles Tugumisirize (PW9) then took the report to the police, who subsequently took the body to the hospital, The report to the Police was a report to the authorities and as Charles (PW9) appear to have made it on behalf of trie widow and all others who were present, we do not see any reason why the widow, Joy pw7 should have reported it separately.

As reported by Lord Reading, C. J., in X\* vs. Baskerville (1916) 2K3 658), evidence in corroboration must be independent connect him with the crime. In otnerwords, it must be ' evidence whicn implicated him, that is, which co\_nfirms in some material particular not only the evidence th«t tne crime has been commited but also that the defendant committed \_ut. The test ap-licable to determine the nature and extent of tne .corroboration is testiraony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to

11/

The test applicable to determine the nature and extent ox the corroboration is **the** same **wgether^tbcicase** falls within tne rule of practice at common law or within the class of ofiences for it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of the connection with the crime&lt; It is not a requirement that there should be independent evidence of everything which a witness relates. './ere it so, then his evidence 'would be unnecessary. Indeed if it were requited thext the witness should be confirmed in every detail of tne crime, his evidence would not be essential in the case; it would merely be rts to the purpose of defeient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible. Corroborative evidence will only fill its role if it is completely credible evidence. See also Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice ,39th edition, from paragraph 14149; CAU Cr. App. No 2 of 19771 Efurasi 8c Qrs vs. Uganda (1978) HCB 181; and CAU Nakemeya Tonga CAU (un reported) confirmatory of other independent evidence. corroborationm it is not to give validity or credence which is Cr App\* No<5 of 1982, which corroboration is required by Statute. The corroboration tkair •need not be direct evidence ttt^the defendant commited the offence;

properly found that the evidence of Twesigye PW6 fully corroborated that of Hobert(P//4)5 of Binaleta (PW5) and of Joy (PW7)\* \* was found at the scene. and was ip fact tendered in evidence ans as an exibit. Other evidence which also tendered to tonnect the appellant with the death of the deceased, w^s his absence from the burial of the deceateej and his disappearance from the area for a In the fail. In the instant case we are satisfied that the learned trial judge so did the evidence from the various witnesses th<\*t a broken stick period of about four years immediately after the incident. circumstances we thinx that ground three of the appeal shoul

/12

11 -

judge erred in regarding as he didiji th.t the apperent discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses were minor. The discrepancies **sere** indued xuinor and did notr.in ouiview point to deliberate lies on the part of prosecution witnesses Ground four of the appeal tnereSore also fails. In the instant case, therefore we do not think that the learned trial

Although it was not raised as ground of appeal, we feel extra^ judicial statement which we would not have wished to doq as evidence supporting the prosecution case and the manner in which it was received in evidence. The evidence regarding the extra judicial statement (PW12) , Lilian Balikya, AIP \*(£>713) and the api^ellant himself. According to d/aIP Esiagu (p,V12) the appellant was escorted and handed over to him at the C. I. D. ^eadquaters by an army Commander from Basiima House. iVhen he (PW12) wanted to record a statement from him the appellant chose to speak to someone who understood Rukiga Runyakole language. So PVJ13 undertook the task. assistant Inspector Balikya (pV/13; said that on receiving the appellant she interrogated and administered to him a caution. she then recorded a charge and caution statement from him. After the end ox' her testimony in exaidinution-in-chiel, the record of proceedings reads as follows against hhe appellant compelled to comment on an came from Esiagu George D/AIP custody at the CID. Headquarters. so but for tne reliance which the learned trial judge placed on it was recorded from the appellant by tne police when he was in their

> l,Exh.p.l. the charge and caution stcitement read by witness in open court original handed to court and marked as Exhiuit P.l. RSA: This is being put in under section 24(1) of the evidence Act. Evidence Amended Act. 2 of 198511

About the extra judicial statement, the appellants1 testimony was to the effect th~t while under azrrest in Lubiri army barracks and Basiima House, an array intelligence establishment, he was beared and

-13-

forced to sign certain documents. On being transferred to C. I. D. statement which was read at his trial. Headquarters, the beating continued and he was forced to sign the

Concerning the extra judicial statement, the learned trial judcre said this in. his judgement

''The accused gave a sworn statement in court but before that he had made a statement before Detective Assistant Inspector of Police PW1J. This statement was tendered in evidence as exaibit P. I. and it was dated 23rd June 1987, The fact that the accused was arrested by the army personnel and PJ3 and taken to CID headquarters in Kampala is not disputed by the accused. xhere was evidence of PW3, P. V12 and PW13 to that effect.

PV/12 took a charge and caution statement from the accused on the same d^y. In the Charge and Caution statement the accused talked of a protracted land dispute with the deceased and also conceded the dispute was settled and that big part of land was given to the deceased. He stated that when he was returning home on 14th June, 1984 he met tne deceased who had also got the stick and he also used it in return and assaulted the deceased. He gave him a kick and ran away in Zaire. He left him lying there but the stick was thrown away in the bush .... ne reiterated in his extra judicial statement to the police that he never intended to kill the deceased and requested for forgivawoss from the sons of the deceased and promised to take care of the family and the children and th-it he felt very sorry wnen he heard the death of the deceased.

/was Pwl2 however, informed tne court that tne staement was voluntarily made by the accused in Runyankole/pukiga in ner room No. 8. The army personnel were no longer there and infact when an army commander and Twmwebaze Ptf3 delivered the accused to the police station they had nothing to do with the accused ......... In his evidence tne accused testified that he made tne statement after torture and assaults by the army. However P;V12 who received the accused frqrn Hiltary personnel testified before this court tnat when the accused was brought to him, he took the accused to the central Police station but had the occassion to tulK to the accused and the accused informed him th^t he got the bruises during the arrest. I believe in the testimonies oi' both PW12 and PJ1> they impressed me as truthful witnesses. The accused w^s no assaulted before the statement was recorded from him. The accused therefore did voluntarily make the extra judicial statement to P;;/13. 1 reject his story that the statement was taken after torture and even if it were true that he was tqrtured by the army commander that threat was no longer there when he appeared before PW12 and PV/1j. My finding is that the extra judicial statement/voluntarily given by the accused t o ~ P 2" (the underlining is supplied).

We ara suprised that, according to tne record, the appellant's extra 'judicial atatement was adrmirted in evidence at the trial without even murmer from the defence counsel in view of the appellants/\* subsquent claim in his testimony that the statement was obtained from him under duress. We would have expected the defence counsel to have sought instructions from the appellant and the appraise the prosecution and trial court of his client's position on the matter\* If he did so the record does not show it. Equally the learned trial judge ought, in our opinion, to have been prudent enough, if the defence position was before the extra judicial statement was admitted in available in the summary of evidence th.-\*t is to say whether admission of the statement was o£ing objected to or not. evidence, especially as it was was silent on the matter, to have ascertained what the appellant \*-s

In the case of TUWAMOI V. Uganda (19o7) -QA 8^ at page 91 the Court of appeal for jjjast Africa stated what should be the duty of a trial court with regard to confession such as the one in the instant case. It said this;

> The legislatures in these countries has recognised the toery real danger that exists of confessions being improperly obtained barately falsefied, and nave laid down standard required and tne various safeguards applicable. The courts have also been aliveto this danger and have by numerous decisions over the ye<rs stressed the caution to be exercised by the trial courts, ana it is from tnese decisions that tho present rule does not more than stress the care or indeed of being deli-

with which a court should act in dealing with a confession.

We would summaries the position thus - a trial court should accept any confession which has been retracted or repudiated with caution, and must oefore founding a conviction on such a confession be fully satisfied in all the circumstances of tie case that the confession is true.... "

16/

We a^ree with what the court said in 'that case and reiterate In the instant case the learned trial judge in his judgement went at length in justfying his finding that the appellant's extra judicial statement had been properly and volui ntarily made. We think that his finding in that regard would have stood on firmer grounds had he satisfied himself at tne earliest possible opportunity that tne confession in that question was a voluntary one. me think that as he failed to do so, lie did not properly discharge the duty referod to in Tuiaamoi (supra). owever the conviction of the appellant did not depend on tne alleged conviction in his extra judicial statement since there was other independent evidence supporting the prosecution case. a failure of justice. that it is still the law in Uganda. We are, therefore, satisfied that the failure by the learned trial judge in this regard did not case

.-16 -

In the absence of the alleged confession in the extra judicial statement, the learned trial judge would still have come to the same •onclusion as to the guilt of the appellant.

In the circumstances and for the reasons no doubt that tne appellant was properly convicted. There was ample evidence to support the conviction. we have given, we have

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.

Dated at Mongo this JOth day of August 1991

(signed)

S. T. MANYINDO DEPUTY CHI\*F JUSTICE

A. H. O. ODER JUSTICE OF Tria SUPx<\*I4\* COURT

E.\*. SEATON JUSTICE OF Tri\* 3U?R\*M\* COURT

| certify I | that | this | is | the | true | copy, of-the original • ————— | |--------------|------|------|----|-----|------|-------------------------------------| | | | | | | | BA3IGUMIRA "B. F. B. | | | | | | | | REGISTRAR SUPR^i* COIL;? |