Blackwell Bwanda and 20 Ors v First Quantum Mining and Operations Limited (COMP. NO. IRCLK/558/21) [2022] ZMHC 117 (18 August 2022)

Rl IN THE HIGH COURT FOR ZAMBIA COMP. NO. IRCLK/558/21 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION HOLDEN AT LUS. Al<A (Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: n J a I, _ (' ' .- ' ~-- ' r,- ' J BLACKWELL BWANGA & 20 OTHERS COMPLAINANTS AND FIRST QUANTUM MINING AND OPERATIONS RESPONDENTS LIMITED Before the Hon. Mrs. Justice T. S. Musonda For the Complainants Major J. H. Mwaaba Rtd. of Messrs. Mwansa, Phiri , Shilimi & Theu Legal Practitioner For the Respondents Mr. M. Chilufya from Messrs. Mulenga Mundashi Legal Practitioners RULING Legislation referred to: 1. The Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Cap 2. The Rules of the Supreme Court (White Book), 1999 Edition 3. The High Court Act, Cap 27 Cases referred to: 1. Mwale V Njolomole Mtonga (Sued as Administrator of the Estate of the Late Gabriel SiwonamutenJe Kapuam Mtonga) and the Attorney General, Selected Judgment No.25 of 2015 2. Silwamba V Kitwe City Council, S. C. Z Appeal No.86 of 2000 R2 3. Aristogerasimos Vangelatos and Another V Metro Investments Limited and Others, S. C. Z Appeal No.35 of 2016 4. JCN Holdings Limited V Development Bank of Zambia, S. C. Z Appeal No. 87 of 2012 5. owners of the Motor Vessel" Lillian S" V Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited, 1989 KLR 13 6. Antonio Ventriglia and Manuels Ventriglia v Finsbury Investment Limited, s.c.z Appeal No.2 of 2019 7. Louise Kakoma V Investrust Bank PLC, APP/IRCLK/191 of 2018 8. Ackson Mark Kanduza V Trinity University, APP/IRCLK/274 of 9. African Bank Corporation V Mubende Country Lodge Limited, s.c.z Appeal No.116 of 2016 10. Genesis Finance Limited V Longreach Commodities Limited and Others, 2012/HPC/0144 11. 12. Henry Kapoko V The People, Access Bank (2016) ZMCC 6 (Zambia) Limited V The Attorney General, (2019) ZMCC 21 13. Augustine Tembo V First Quantum Minerals Limited-Mining Division, (2017} ZMHC 169 14. Hakainde Hichelema and Geoffrey Bwalya Mwambo V Edgar Chagwa Lungu and Others, (2016) ZMCC 4 15. Sun Country Limited V Charles Kearny and Roslyn Kearny, s.c.z Appeal No.7 of 2017 16. Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc V Martin Musonda & 58 Others, (2018) ZMCC 12 17. Rajagoplan Khotanda Raman V Jenala Ngwira, S. C. Z Appeal No. 163 of 2015 18. Enoch Kavindele and Dorothy Kavindele V Bologna Properties Limited and Diego Casili, C. O. A Appeal No.136 of INTRODUCTION 1. This is a rull.ny u11 c1. µ..t.elltuluo...t.y lssu~ 1.a.i.sed by the Respondent by way of Notice dated 24 th January, 2022 filed pursuant to Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act, Chapter 269 of the Laws of Zambia as read together with Rule 33 and 38 of the Industrial and Labour Relations Rules, Chapter 269 of the Laws of Zambia. R3 2. The Notice was premised on the following grounds: i. Whether the c1aims fil.ed by the CoJ!!Pl.ainants' l.isted in the schedul.e exhibited to this Notice as ••schedu.le l rr (the Comp1ainants) against the Respondent on 12~ October, 2021, before this Honourab.le Court are statute barred in te.rms of section 85 (3) 0£ the Industria1 and Labour Re1ations Act, Chapter 269 0£ the Laws of Zambia. i i . Whether the c1aims by the Comp.lainan ts against the Respondent are competent.ly before this Honourabl.e Court and whether this Honourabl.e Court has the power and jurisdiction to entertain or consider the CoJ!!Pl.ainants' c1aims against the Respondent £il.ed on 12th October, 2021. 3. The Notice was supported by an affidavit in support and skeleton arguments dated 24th January, 2022 and skeleton arguments in reply dated 8 th April, 2022. 4. The Notice was opposed by way of an affidavit in opposition and skeleton arguments in opposition both dated 17th March, 2022. 5. On the date set for the hearing of the application the parties through Counsel indicated that they would rely on the documents filed in support and in opposition to the Notice to raise preliminary issue. This Court was requested to proceeded to render a Ruling on the basis of the aforesaid documents. THE RESPONDENT'S CASE IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE TO RAISE PRELIMINARY ISSUE 6. It was argued in respect to the first question for determination- 1whether the COJtlPiainants case was statute barred' as follows: - 7. Pursuant to Section BS (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, the Complainants in the instant case were required to bring their claims before this Court at least within 90 days from the date of receiving the Respondent's letter R4 discharging them from employment on medical grounds, i f aggrieved. 8. Further that, the analysis of the dates upon which the Complainants were discharged, disclosed that the Complainants filed their claims outside the prescribed 90 days period and as such, the Respondent's claims were statute barred in terms of Section 85 (3). The Complainants did not obtain leave to file their claims outside the prescribed 90 days statutory period and as such, their claims were liable to dismissed in contravention of the provisions of Section BS (3). 9. With regard to Complainants namely, Mr. Tommy Mungundi and Michael Mundia, their contracts of employment were terminated in 2015, well over 6 years ago and their claims could not be entertained in whatever case or form and ought to be dismissed in light of the Section 2 (a) of the Statute of Limitations Act, which proscribed that cases founded in simple contract must be brought before the expiration of six years from the date the cause of action arose. Reliance on this position was made to the cases of Mwale V Njolomole Mtonga (Sued as Administrator of the Estate of the Late Gabriel Siwonamuteenye Kapuam Mtonga) and the Attorney General (1) and Silwamba V Kitwe City Council ~ 10. With regard to the second question, 1whether the Compl.ainants cl.aims £il.ed against the Respondent on 12th October, 2021, were competentl.y be£ore this Court and whether this Court had the requisite power to entertain and determine the Respondent's cl.aims', it was argued as follows: - 11. This Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and determine the Complainants' complaints as the same were filed outside the prescribed 90-day period as demonstrated in the affidavit in support of this application. Further, no leave RS was obtained to file the said Complaint within the mandatory 90-day period. 12. It was argued that where a Court had no jurisdiction, it could not grant a relief and where it proceeded, what it granted was a nullity. Reliance on this position was made on the cases of Aristogerasimos Vangelatos and Another V Metro Investments Limited and Others (3), JCN Holdings Limited V Development Bank of Zambia (4), Owners of the Motor Vessel" Lillian S" V Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (5) ,and Antonio Ventriglia and Manuela Ventriglia V Finsbury Investment Limited (6). 13. The net result was that the Complainants' Complaint was to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. THE COMPLAIN. ANTS' CASE IN OPPOSITION TO NOTICE TO RAISE PRELIMINARY ISSUE 14. The Complainants preliminary point in oppositi on was that Article 118 (e) of the Constitution (Amendment} Act No.2 of 2016 clearly provided that justice was to be adminis t ered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Therefore, the administration of justice was a priority as compared to disposing of the matter based on technicalities. 15 . Reliance was made on the cases of Louise Kakoma V Investrust Bank PLC (7) and Ackson Mark Kanduza V Trinity University (8) where the Courts respectively held that Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act on which this application is anchored, was no longer applicable in light of the Constitution (Amendment) Act, No.2 of 2016. The Complainant in the luttcr case was accordingly allowed to file the substantive complaint without applying for leave. 16. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid law and cases cited, t he assertion that the Complaint was statute barred was misplaced and a misdirection of justice. The Complaint was thus properly R6 before this Court and this Court had jurisdiction to determine the issues that had arisen in the said Complaint. 17. Further, the Respondent had not filed an Answer to the Complaint herein, which would entitle him to raise a preliminary issue for the disposal of a matter on a point of law. Reliance on this argument was placed on the explanatory notes, 0 14A/2/3 under Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court, to the effect that an Applicant would only be entitled to invoke the said provision where a Defendant had had notice of an intention to defend. Further reliance was made on the case of African Bank Corporation V Mubende Country Lodge (9) which restated the aforementioned position and additionally outlined that a Defendant was also required to state in that defence, the point of law the Defendant wished to rely on and specifically plead that aspect in that defence. The Respondent in this case, was not entitled to raise the preliminary issue on the basis of failure to specifically plead the issue in the Answer. THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO THE COMPLAINANTS ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO NOTICE TO RAISE PRELIMINARY ISSUE 18. The first issue raised in reply was that the Complainants' affidavit in opposition contravened Order 5 Rule 20 of the High Court Rules which set out mandatory requirements to be complied with in the preparation of affidavits to be filed before this Court. The affidavit in issue in particular contravened Order 5 Rule 20 (g) of the High Court Rules, which in mandatory terms required all affidavits to state the date of the swearing and pl~cc where it wa □ □ worn. 19. The jurat in the affidavit in issue did not state the date when the deponent, Derrick Ndanduia was purported to have deposed to the affidavit. The said affidavit was incurably defective and R7 was to be disregarded as having no evidential value and was to be expunged from the record. 20. My attention was drawn to the case of Genesis Finance Limited V Longreach Commodities Limited and Others (10), a High Court decision in which a jurat in an affidavit was not dated, was expunged from the record for offending the mandatory provisions of Order 5 Rule 20 (g) of the High Court Rules and Section 6 of The Commissioner for Oaths Act and was therefore held to be incurably defective. 21. Turning to the substantive arguments, it was argued that the Constitutional Court whose decision is binding on this Court guided that the Industrial and Labour Relations Division of the High Court would continue to use the existing processes and procedures and enjoy the same jurisdiction until new legislation was enacted to provide for the said processes and procedures. Further that, Article 133 (2) of the Constitution as amended did not affect wholesale the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act and its Rules, to the extent that they did not conflict with any provision of the Constitution as amended. 22. Therefore, the cases relied on by the Complainants, namely Louise Kakoma V Investrust Bank PLC and Ackson Mark Kanduza V Trinity University where of no aid to the Complainants case in opposition. Further, that the Louise Kakoma case was decided by the Registrar of the Industrial Relations Court who had no jurisdiction to declare provisions of an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional. The Ackson Mark Kanduza case was not binding on this Court, there was no pronouncement to the effect that Section 85 (3) of the industrial Relations Act was inapplicable to the Industrial Relations Court by virtue of the Constitution . 23. It was further argued that it was clear from the judicial pronouncements in cases such as Henry Kapoko V The People (11) and Access Bank (Zambia) Limited V The Attorney General (12), RB that parties could not hide behind Article 118 (e) of the Constitution, to flout rules of Procedure, even when where the same constituted technicalities. 'l'he aim of the subject Article was to avoid a situation where injustice would be done to litigants through paying unjustifiable regard to a technicality. 24. Adherence to Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act did not in any way result in manifest inj u stice as parties were given 90 days from the date of exhausting the administrative channels available to them and also given latitude to apply to this Court for extension of time in t h e event of their failure to file their Complaints within the prescribed time limit as demonstrated in the case of Augustine Tembo V First Quantum Minerals Limited-Mining Division (13). 25. It was reiterated that the Complainants should have cured the defect of not adhering to Section 85 (3) by making the requisite application to file their Complaint out of time which they had clearly not done and not rely on Article 118 (e) of the Constitution to aid their case. 26. In line, the with the case of Hakainde Hichelema and Geoffrey Bwalya Mwarnbo V Edgar Chagwa Lungu and Others (14) , t his Court had been robbed with its jurisdiction to hear the Complaint as the same had been presented outside the 90 days prescribed period, without leave of Court. 27. In response to the argument that the Respondent had not complied with the provisions of Order 14A of the Supreme Court Rules, it was argued that the said provision could only be invoked where there was a lacuna in our law. 28. The Respondent in this case had moved this case pursuant to Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act and not Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Even if the Respondent had moved this Court pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Respondent by filing an Answer R9 and Affidavit in Support thereof, would have still satisfied the condition precedent required to be satisfied before a party could employ Order 14A. The Re8pond1:ant' s appl ication was thus properly before this Court having been brought pursuant to Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act. The Complaint in issue was to be dismissed for being incompetently before this Court. THE LAW, ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION 29. Before proceeding any further, I will first determine whether the Notice to raise preliminary issue is competently before this Court for non-compliance with Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court as argued by the Complainants. 30. It is very clear from the holding of the Supreme Court in African Banking Corporation Zambia V Mubende County Lodge Limited pursuant to Order 14/1-2/2/2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court one requirement for the disposal of a matter on a point of law, is the giving of notice of intention to defend. In the context of the High Court Rules, i t is the filing of a memorandum of appearance which is accompanied by a defence. Under the context of the Industrial Relations Rules, there is no provision for the filing of a memorandum of appearance. A respondent is required to file an Answer pursuant to Rule 11 (2) of the Ind\lstrial Relations Court Rules. Although this application action was not f i led pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Respondent in this case filed an Answer in compliance with Rule 11 (2) Industrial Relations Court Rules and thereafter, filed this application action pursuant to Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act. The Complainants argument that the Respondent's present application is improperly before this Court for non-compliance with Order 14A is devoid of any RlO merit. I therefore, need not belabor the point any further. The application before this Court having been premised on Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act is properly before this Court. 31. It was also contended on behalf of the Respondent, that the affidavit sworn by Derrick Ndadula on behalf of the Complainants should be expunged from the record for contravening the mandatory requirements of Order 5 Rule 20 (g) of the High Court Rules. This was with the background that the deponent did not state in jurat the date on which the affidavit was sworn before a Commissioner of Oaths. 32. Indeed, an examination of the jurat reveals that the date on which the subject affidavit was sworn is not indi cated in the jurat. 33. I am required to also make a determination this issue before proceeding any further. 34. The Supreme Court in Sun Country Limited V Charles Kearny and Roslyn Kearny (15) had occasioned to pronounce itself on the effect of a deponent's omission to indicate the date on which an was sworn . 35. It was observed that the requirements under Order 5 Rule 20 of the High Court Rules and Section 6 of the Commissioner for Oaths Act are in respect of the form of the document as opposed to the substance. Further that, Section 47 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia sheds light on the practical consequences of defects in form and substance on t.he nt.hP..r hand. The import of the above section is that if a defect in an instrument or document is in form, it is not a fundamental defect or irregularity and is thus curable. Rll 36. Further, an affidavit that is afflicted by a defect in form is rcccivQblc in proceedings under Order 5 Rule 13 of the High court Rules which provides as follows: 11The Court or a Judge may permit an a££idavi t to be used notwithstanding it is de£ective in £orm according to the Ru1es, i£ the Court is satis£ied that i t has been sworn be£ore a person du1y authorized." 37. The Supreme Court further guided that even if Order 5 Rule 13 was to be discounted on the basis that it seemed to contravene a statutory provision, namely Section 6 of the Commissioner for Oaths Act, Section 47 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act would still be sufficient to save the affidavit in question. 38. The Supreme Court further guided that an omission of a date does not go to the jurisdiction of a Court, nor does it prejudice the adverse party in any fundamenta l respect. As such, such an omission ought not to be treated as nullifying an affidavit. 39. Turning to the present case, I note that in the Respondent's arguments, no issue was raised as to the authority of the Commissioner of Oaths before whom the affidavit in was sworn. The affidavit in this case is thus merely defective in form and receivable by this Court pursuant to Section 47 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act as guided by the Supreme Court in the Sunny Country Limited case. 40. The net ef feet is that the affidavit in issue shall be received by this court in the intcrcot of juaticc. 41. I shall now proceed to determine the issues raised for determination namely: (i) Whether the claims £il.ed by the Comp1ainants' 1isted in the schedul.e exhibited to this Notice as 11sc:hedul.e 1" (the Comp.lainants) against the R12 Respondent on 12th October, 2021, be£ore this Honourab1e Court are statute barred in terms of Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Chapter 269 of the Laws of Zambia. (ii) Whether the claims by the Con;;,lainants against the Respondent are competently before this Honourable Court and whether this Honourable Court has the power and jurisdiction to entertain or consider the CoJ¥1lainants' claims against the Respondent filed on 12th October, 2021. 42. The preliminary issues are interrelated thus I shall deal with them as a whole. 43. I shall in this regard begin by addressing the argument advanced by the Complainants regarding Article 118 (e) of the Constitution. 44. It was contended that this Court had jurisdiction to proceed to determine the Complaint, on the basis of Article 118 (e) which prescribes that justice is to be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Therefore, this Court was bound to determine the Complaint pursuant to the Court's duty to administer justice. The Court could thus not dismiss this matter on the basis of technicalities raised by the Respondent. 45. It is was also contended that Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act, was no longer applicable in the Industrial Relations Division by virtue of the Constitutional Amendment that created the court into a Division of the High Court. This argument is not tenable by virtue of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc V Martin Musonda & 58 Others (16) which acknowledged that whereas the Industrial Relations Division was now a Division of the High Court, the Constitution provided for the procedure R13 for specialised Courts as was prescribed in specialised Acts of Parliament. In relation to the Industrial Relations Division, the Industrial Relations Rules would continue to govern processes and procedures including commencement of actions before the Industrial Relations Division, until new legislation was drafted. 46. Section 85 (3) of the Industrial Relations Act provides as follows: 11The Court shall not consider a conplaint or an application unless the Complainant or Applicant present the conplaint or application to the Court- (a) Within ninety days 0£ exhausting the administrative channels available to the COJ!i'laint or Applicant; or, (b) Where there are no administrative channel.s available to the COll!Plainant or Applicant, within ninety days 0£ the occurrence 0£ the event which gave rise to the complaint or application Provided that- {i) [pon application by the Applicant, the Court may extend the period within which the co.nplaint or application may be presented before it. 47. As correctly argued by the Respondent, the Industrial Relations Division of the High Court can only hear a dispute under the following circumstances: (i) Where i t is brought within 90 days 0£ exhausting 0£ exhausting all administrative channels; or (ii) where there are no such channels, i t is brought within 90 days £rom the date when the dispute or event occurred. R14 48. The provisions of Section 85 (3) are clearly, couched in mandatory terms. 49. The Supreme Court in a matter that involved, Section 85 (3), Rajagoplan Khotanda Raman V Jenala Ngwira (17) guided that rules of the court must be observed. They serve a purpose, namely to ensure orderly conduct of court proceedings, fair play between all the parties involved in the litigation and control by the Court of the whole process, without which real justice would be elusive. Further that in the absence of rules as a guiding factor, confusion and anarchy would reign as litigants would do their own thing, at their own time and in their own way. 50. The cases referred to by the Respondent namely, Henry Kapoko V The People and Access Bank (Zambia) Limited V The Attorney General, are instructive that parties cannot hide behind Article 118 (e) of the Constitution to flout rules of procedure, even when where the same constitute technicalities. The subject Article aims to prevent a situation where injustice would be done to litigants by paying attention unjustifiable regard to technicalities. 51. The Complainants are thus bound by the provisions of Section 85 (3) which are couched in mandatory terms. As noted above, the Industrial Relations Division continues to be governe~ by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act and Rules, in the absence of new legislation to guide practice and procedure in the Division. 52. Tnrn.i.ng to the gist of the Notice to raise preliminary issue, it is not in dispute that the present Complaint was filed on 12 th October, 2021. The table below highlights the dates when the Complainants were respectively terminated from employment and the period that lapsed and from the date of termination of employment to the filing of the Complaint. RlS 53. It sho1,1ld be noted that a demand letter in this case was S/N NAME 2 4 6 Blackwell Bwanga Linda Mapoma Derrick Ndandula Emmanuel Sekeletu 9th February, 2021 9 th April, 2 021 Loveson Soneka Chiwahisha Justin 14th May, 2018 9 th February, 2021 16th March, 2021 7 th January, 2021 DATE OF TERMINATION OF NUMBER OF YEARS /DAYS LAPSED AS EMPLOYMENT OF FILING AT COMPLAINT ON 12T11 OCTOBER, 2021 245 DAYS 210 DAYS 278 DAYS 245 DAYS 186 DAYS 3 YEARS DAYS 1 YEAR & 229 DAYS 6 YEARS & 20 DAYS 245 DAYS 1 YEAR & 84 DAYS 6 YEARS DAYS 1 YEAR & 208 DAYS 25th February, 2020 22nd September, 2015 9 th February, 2021 20th July, 2020 14th May, 2015 18th March, 2020 151 & & 16th March, 2020 3 rd March, 2020 11th May, 2020 15th January,2021 28th July, 2020 25th July, 2021 2Qth July, 2021 21st February, 2018 l YEAR & 210 DAYS 1 YEAR & 223 DAYS 1 YEAR & 154 DAYS 270 DAYS 1 YEAR & 76 DAYS 79 DAYS 84 DAYS 3 YEARS & 239 DAYS Happy Kaonga Tommy Mungidi Vincent Chinyama 8 10 Mwansa Ngoma 11 Michael Mundia 12 Thompson Chimbimbi 13 Gideon Mwamba 14 Cornwell Sakanya 15 Hobson Kasongo 16 Victor Konde 17 Samuel Kalembe 18 Castor Habeenzu 19 Ananias Mumba 20 Dorothy Bulaya written to the Respondent on 11th June,2021. The Respondent was required to respond to the said letter within 14 days from the date of tho letter. I note however that the letter was received on 23 rd June, 2021. If I were to take the v i ew that the 14 days started to run from the date of the letter, namely 11th June,2021, then by 12 th October, 2021, 123 days had lapsed. On the other hand, if I were to consider that the R16 14 days started to run from the date of receipt of the letter, namely, 23rd June, 2021, then by 12 th October, 2021, 97 days had lapsed. 54. Therefore, in the event that the Complainants who were subject of the letter sought to rely on the argument that the letter was a demonstration of their effort to exhaust administrative channels, the Complaint would be out of time following the lapse of the prescribed 90 days within which to file a Complaint following the exhaustion of administrative channels. 55. It is evident from the analysis of the table above that the Complaint is deemed to have been filed within time with respect to only two Complainants, namely Castor Habeenzu and Ananias Mumba. 56. According to exhibit, \\DN 3" in the affidavit in support of Complaint, Castor Habeenzu's effective date of termination of employment was 25th July, 2021 and whilst Ananias Mumba effective date of termination was 20 th July, 2021. 57. With respect to the rest of the Complainants, Section 85 (3) of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, is instructive in mandatory terms that a Complaint not filed with 90 days of the occurrence of the event or 90 days of exhausting administrative channels is barred by limitation and those affected Complaints were mandated to proceed pursuant to the proviso under section 85 (3) (b) (i) to apply for leave to extend time within which to file their Complaint. It is evident from the Complainants admission that no such leave was sought to file the Complaint out of time and consequently, there is no an order of the Court granting the requisite leave. 58. For the above reasons stated, the Notice succeeds to the extent that the Complainant is statute barred with respect to R17 the following Complainants; Blackwell Bwanga, Linda Mapoma, Derrick Ndandula, Emmanuel Sekeletu, Loveson Soneka, Justin Chiwahisha, Happy Kaonga, Tommy Mungidi, Vincent Chinyama, Mwansa Ngoma, Michael Mundia, Thompson Chimbimbi, Gideon Mwamba, Cornwell Sakanya, Hobson Kasongo, Victor Konde, Samuel Kalembe and Dorothy. M. Bulaya. 59. It follows that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain to entertain the claims of the aforementioned individuals in an absence of an Order granting them leave to file the Complaint out of time. It is trite that jurisdiction is everything and once statutory time expires, the court has no jurisdiction to deal with a matter; and where there is no jurisdiction, the court's hands are tied. Without jurisdiction, a court has no power to take one more step and must down its tools in the matter before it. (See Enoch Kavindele and Dorothy Kavindele V Bologna Properties Limited and Diego Casili (18), Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S V Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited and Rajagoplan Khotanda Raman V Jenala Ngwira ) 60. The claims in respect to the named affected Complainants are hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. 61. For avoidance of doubt, with regard to Castor Habeenzu and Ananias Mumba, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain their Complaint having been filed within 90 days of the date of termination of their employment. 62. This Court thus ORDERS the two Complainants to file an amended Complaint within !4 days from the date of this ~uling which shall reflect only the reliefs sought by the said Complainants. The Respondent shall in like manner file an amended Answer within 14 days of receipt of the amended Complaint. 63. Each party shall bear their own costs. 64 . Leave to appe al is h e reby granted. R18 DATED THIS 18TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2022 T. S . MOSONDA JUDGE