Bonface Agomba v Republic [2014] KECA 26 (KLR)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT KISUMU

(CORAM: NAMBUYE, AZANGALALA & KANTAI, JJ.A)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 187 OF 2012

BETWEEN

BONFACE AGOMBA Alias  NANDWA CHENELWA….......APPELLANT

AND

REPUBLIC ………………..……………………..…..……RESPONDENT

(Appeal from a conviction and or Sentence, Judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Kakamega (Lenaola & Onyancha JJ) Dated 23rd February, 2012

in

Kakamega H.C.C.RA. No. 60 of 2009)

*********************

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1.  The   appellant  herein  Bonface  Agomba Alias   Nandwa  Chenelwa  was arraigned  before    the    Senior  Resident  Magistrates'  Court  at  Vihiga   in Criminal Case  No. 646 of  2005 with   the   offence   of  robbery with   violence contrary to Section 296 (2) of the  Penal Code.  The  particulars were  that, on the  25th day  of January,  2004 at Masigulu village  Centrol Maragoli location in  vihiga  District of the  Western Province, jointly with  others already before Court  while   armed  with   dangerous weapons namely pangas, axes and “rungus” robbed James Kabaka Likeya of cash (k) Sh 2,000. 00,  and one torch valued at Kshs. 80. 00 all to the  total value of Kshs. 2,080. 00 and at or immediately  before   or  immediately after  the   time   of  such  robbery used personal violence to the  said  James Kabaka Likeya"

2. The  appellant denied   the  charge. The  prosecution called  a total  of five (5) witnesses namely James  Kabaka Likeya (PWl), Zerephaya Musimbi Kabaka (PW2), Siddiq Mugasia Kadenge (PW3), Francis Wasike (PW4), and No. 67936 CPC Ezra Serem PW(5). The  appellant Bonface Agomba was   the   sole   witness  for   the   defence.  After  assessing,  evaluating and analising the  evidence tendered before  her,  the  learned trial  magistrate in a judgment dated the 3rd April, 2009  delivered  himself  thus:-

"PW1 stated that he had a torch with three batteries that night. When he came out of the toilet he  flushed the torch on  the faces of  six  people whom he  identified as Bonface Agolomba a.k.a. Nandwa, Kennedy Imbuga, Muihehe, Watu, Kevolwe and  another sixth person whose name he  later in his  testimony gave  as Mwambuki. He stated that  Nandwa was   the one   who   hit   him on  the head, Imbuga cut   him on  the hand while Kevolwe  took items  and money from him  (the   complainants) shirt pocket. PW2  stated that she  came out  of  the house with the optimus lamp on  when she  heard her  husband (the complainant/scream.  PW2   stated that  she   saw  many young   men whom she  could   not  count. She   stated  she identified  Mwambuki,  Imbuga,  Kevolwe and    a   person commonly known  as  Nandwa who   came  from behind raising a panga. PW1 and  PW2 testified that PW2 threw the lamp  she   had at  the  thugs.  The  person called Nandwa, from the  evidence on   record   is  the accused person herein. The accused, the complainant and   PW2 were   from the  same  village called Matsigulu.  That  is clear from the testimony of  PW1, PW2  and   the accused himself. I find   that  the accused person was   a  person known to the complainant and   PW2  even prior   to the time of  the incident. The  two recognized the accused on that material night. And, from the evidence of  PW3 the accused had   on  18th  January, 2004, sent PW3  to warn the complainant that he  would  cut  him after the accused asked PW3 why  the chief  PW1, and  the police used  to go to  his   home. According to  the  evidence of   PW5,   the complainant gave  the name of the accused to PW5 as one of the robbers who  attacked him on the material night. I find  PW1 and   PW2  credible witnesses. I have no  reason to doubt the veracity of  their testimonies. I am satisfied that there was  sufficient lighting at the material time that enabled PW1   and   PW2  to see  the thugs. And  each one  of  PW1  and  PW2  recognized the accused playing an active role  during the incident. There is clear evidence of recognition of the accused, and  the circumstances of this case with  regard to the  recognition and   lighting  well match, those in Anjononi  versus Republic [1980)  KLR59except that in this case it was  the complainant who  had the source of  light which was  a torch and  his  wife  (PW2) came out   with an optimus lamp. And   as the  Court of Appeal said  in the Anjononi case (Supra) at page 60, this was…………...a case of  recognition not  identification  of the  assailant;  recognition of   an  assaillant  is  more reliable than  identification  of   a   stranger  because  it depends on  the personal knowledge of the assaillant, in some form or other"

For  these  reasons  based  on   the  evidence outlined above, I find  that there is proof  beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused was  one  of  the people who  pobbed  the complainant on the material night. The evidence against the accused is clear, consistent, credible, and reliable and is not controverted. I find  the accused guilty of  the offence charged and  accordingly convict him of  the same under the provisions of  Section 215 of  the Criminal Procedure Code..."

3. The  appellant was  aggrieved by  that decision and he  appealed to  the  High Court  at Kakamega vide   Criminal  Appeal No. 60 of 2009.  After re- evaluating,  re-assessing  and  re-analizing  the evidence  in a  judgment delivered by S. Chitembwe, J. on  behalf of D.A. Onyanchaand I. Lenaola JJ on the  23rd day  of February, 2012, the  two learned Judges made findings inter  alia  that the   complainant  (PW1),   was   seriously injured during the incident; that these injuries had  been confirmed by (PW4), a medical officer; that when (PW5) visited the  complainant at Mukumu hospital, (PW1)  gave to (PW5) the   names of  the  appellant as one  of  the  robbers; that (PW1) and (PW2's)  evidence was  significant because PW1  and PW2 were  able  to  speak about the  identity of  the   attackers a few  hours after   the   attack; that the initial  report  is   always  critical  where recognition  is   alleged; that  the evidence presented to the  trial  Court was  not  in doubt.

4. On   recognition  the   learned  judges ruled  that,   the   appellant  had    been properly recognized by  PW1 when PW1 pointed a torch he  had  to the  group of people standing near his  pit latrine; that similarly PW2 with  her  pressure lamp  was  able  to recognize  the    appellant;  that  both  PW1   and   PW2 separately gave  the  names of the  appellant to  (PW5);  that PW1 as the  area chief  was  aware of his  subjects; that the  appellant in  his  defence admitted that he  was  well known to  PW1; that PW2 on  the  other hand said  that she had  known the  appellant since he  was  seven (7) years old.  On  that account the  learned Judges were  convinced that the  recognition of the  appellant in connection to the  omission of the  offence  was  proper and issues of mistaken identity arose.

5. Turning to the  appellants defence, the  learned Judges found that the  alleged grudge between appellant and PW1 had  only  been  raised at the  point when the  appellant tendered his  defence and not  in  PW1s'  cross examination and was  therefore a mere  afterthought. On the basis of the above reasoning, the Court dismissed the appellants’ appeal in its entirety.

6. The appellant was  aggrieved by that decision and has appealed to this Court firstly in  a home made memorandum of  appeal  lodged on  the  11th June, 2012 citing  three  grounds  of  appeal.  These were subsequently supplemented  by  a  supplementary memorandum of  appeal  filed on 9th June,  2012.  A  total  of   six    (6)   grounds   have  been  fronted  for   our interrogation. These can  be summarized into the  following:-

That the  High Court:-

l. Failed to exercise its jurisdiction as the first Appellate Court   to hold   that  the  evidence of   PW4 Francis Wasike was  in admissible.

2. Failed  to appreciate that the evidence of  recognition was not    sufficient   and  beyond   error given  the circumstances of this case, the modus Operandi of the attackers, the lighting at the scene, the period  of time of  the attack, the time the attack being   at night as well  as the status of mind of the victim.

3.  Failing to subject the entire evidence to a fresh and independent scrutiny as to efficacy of the evidence adduced in support of particulars of the charge which was wholly contradictory   and  as  a  result  has occasioned a failure of justice.

4. Failed to appreciate the totality of   the evidence adduced did not beyond reasonable doubt prove that the appellant was guilty of the offence.

5. Failed   to appreciate that the contradictory evidence adduced by crucial witnesses exonerated the appellant from the charge against him.

6. By  basing findings on  no  evidence, total misdirection on  record  of  law  which no reasonable tribunal could, on the  evidence  adduced  could have  made  such findings.

7. In his  oral  submissions to Court, Mr. Maranga Gichaba, for the  appellant argued  that  the medical  evidence  relied  upon  by  the  prosecution stood misplaced  as it  contradicted the  evidence of PW l, 2  and 5 with  regard to  the hospital where PW1  was  admitted after the  attack; that the  subordinate court after discrediting the  evidence of  PW4,  the  Appellate Judges  should not  have qualified that discrediting and then placed any  reliance on  it in  support of the appellants  conviction, in  the  absence of justification as to  why  they  found it credible.

8. On recognition of the appellant in connection with the commission offence Mr. Gichaba argued  that  the offence    took   place at  night,  after 10. 00 pm; the  only  lighting was  from  a torch light, which the  complainant does not  say  for  how  long  he  directed it  at the assailants, before  he  was  hit  with  a panga  and  started  bleeding; that  the attack  occurred  suddenly,  and  was therefore not  conclusive to  positive recognition sufficient enough  to  sustain a conviction. Lastly  that the  first  appellate Court failed  in  its duty in  failing to arrive at the conclusion that the  prosecutions' evidence was  not  conclusive as to the  appellants participation in the  commission of the  offence  charged.

9. In response to Mr. Gichaba's submission, Mr.  Abele,  the  Assistant Director of  Public Prosecutions agreed that  the   medical evidence of  PW4  was  indeed misplaced, but  that notwithstanding, there was  sufficient evidence to  support the  charge appellant faced. That witnesses saw  injuries on  PW1, and  blood  in the  complainants compound which PW2,  his  wife confirmed was  PW1s  blood;  PW1 and PW2  were  categorical, that the  attackers were  more  than one;  that though the  attack was  in  the  dark,  PW1 had  a torch which he flashed on  the  assailants before   he  was  attacked; that the  complainant and  the   assailants were  local  residents and therefore knew each other very well; that although the  intensity  of  the   light   and  the   distance  between the   complainant and  the  assailants were  not  given,  the  very  fact  that the  complainant described vividly what each assailant did  to  him  is  sufficient  proof  that both the  intensity and proximity of the  light  were  conclusive to positive identification of the  assailants. Lastly that when PW2  heard PW1s' screams, and came out with  an optimus lamp, whose light  is  more intense  than that from  a lantern or  chimney lamp, she was  close  enough to the assailants and that is why  she too (PW2) described what the   assailants did   to   her   husband  (PW1).  The  appellants  case  was therefore one  of recognition  and issue of mistaken identity did  not  arise.

10. Being  a second appeal, our   mandate is  as donated by  the   provision in Section 361 of the  Criminal Procedure Code  Cap  75  Laws  of Kenya  namely to deal  with  issues of law  only.  See  also   the  case of  Omboko versus Republic (1983[ KLR191 for  the  proposition that as a general rule, the  court of appeal sitting on a second appeal will not  disturb the  concurrent findings of fact  of the two courts below.

11.  The grievances that the appellant has fronted before us can be clustered into the following:-

(1) Whether the medical evidence adduced herein met the threshold.

(2) Whether the offence charged of robbery with   violence is sustainable if medical evidence is excluded.

(3) Whether the evidence of identification or recognition of the appellant in connection with the commission of the offence meets the threshold.

(4) Whether the first Appellete Court Judges exercised their mandate properly.

12.  With  regard to  medical evidence, PW1, PW2  and PW5  gave  concurrent testimony that PW1,  the  complainant was  injured during the  robbery; that he was  rushed to  Mukumu. mission hospital where he  was  admitted for.a total of five (5) to seven (7) days. PW4 Francis Wasike's evidence on  the  other hand ran inter alia thus:-

"The  patient came complaining that he was at his  home on  28th  January, 2004 at around 10. 00 pm  when he  was attacked by  thugs whom he  was able to identify when he came he  was very ill  and   was unconscious. I examined him and I established that he had swelling and had also been cut on the back and   both hands. The injury had taken about one and   half   hours before he would   reach hospital and   were  caused by  sharp objects. I admitted the patient in hospital for one week..."

13. The   learned  trial  magistrate  made  the   following observations  on   that evidence.

"One  disturbing aspect of PW4s  testimony was  that while all  the other four  prosecution witnesses were  consistent that the complainant after the incident was   rushed to Mukumu hospital,  PW4   stated that  he admitted the complainant at Vihiga district hospital - one  and   a  half  hours after  the  incident. How  could   the  complainant have been admitted at both Mukumu  hospital and  Vihiga  district  hospital at  the  same time.  The   witness  who testified as PW4  seems to  me  to have thought that his testimony  was   a  matter of  formality.  I  found  PW4s testimony lacking in credence. He did  not  even  state his qualifications so the court cannot tell whether he  was  a qualified -medical practitioner".

The learned Judges on the other hand had this to say:-

"We have perused the P3  form and   those injuries were authenticated by PW4 a medical officer".

14.  From    the    above, it   is   clear  that  while   the    leamed  trial    Magistrate discredited PW4's  evidence, the  learned Judges accepted it but failed  to resolve the  doubt created on  that evidence.

15. Realizing the  importance of medical evidence  to prove   the  offence  charged, the  leamed trial magistrate found a way around this thus:-

"But, all  the same the complainant testified that he was cut   during the incident. PW2  who  is his wife saw him bleeding. PW3  saw   blood   at the home of  the complainant,  and PW5    visited  the  complainant at Mukumu hospital where the complainant was admitted. It is my finding that the evidence of  PW1, PW2,  PW3  and PW5  shows that the complainant was assaulted as he was cut and wounded. Personal violence was used by  the thugs to the complainant I so find."

16. The learned Judges on the other hand observed thus:-

"Firstly from the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 a violent incident occurred at PW1s home on the night of 25th January 2004 and PW1s was seriously injured."  Both  Courts were  thus satisfied that medical evidence is crucial to prove  the  offence  of robbery with  violence, but that notwithstanding, where elements or  ingredients comprising the  offence  charged of robbery with violence are  proven, a conviction is  sustainable  notwithstanding absence of medical evidence proving the  extend of the  injuries suffered.

17. In the  case of  Ganzi and 2 others versus Republic [2005]1KLR 52, this court set  out  the  elements of the  offence  of  robbery with  violence as:-

(a) The offender is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument; or

(b) The offender is in the company with one or more other persons; or

(c) At   or   immediately before or immediately after the offender wounds, beats,   strikes, or uses   other personal violence to any other person.

In Ajode versus Republic [2004]2KLR81, this Court went   on to hold inter alia   that, "injury of the victim itself is not   the only ingredient of the offence under Section 296(2) of the penal code". In Opoya versus Uganda [1967] EA752as approved by this Court in the case of   Maneningu  Mbao Mangi versus Republic [20061 eKLR It was  held inter thus:-

"It will be noticed that the particulars of the indictment contain the word “robbed." That word  is a term of  art and  connotes not  simply a theft but  a theft preceeded, accompanied or  followed by  the  use  or  threats of use  of actual violence to any  person or property"

18.  Applying the  above  principles to  the  totality of the  evidence on  the  record and the  rival  arguments on  proof  or  otherwise of the  offence  charged, we find nothing to suggest that it is only  medical evidence which can prove  existence of injury on  the  body  of a victim  of robbery with  violence. To us, testimony of eye witnesses who  can  testify that they  either witnessed the  infliction of the  injury or  saw  the  injuries inflicted on  the  body  of the  victim  after their infliction or even  a mere threat of violence will surfice to satisfy the  element of infliction of violence or  threat of violence to  the  person a victim  of a robbery with  violence offence.

19.   The   uncontroverted  evidence of  PW1  and  PW2  demonstrates that  the assailants were  armed with  pangas, axes and  rungus. We  appreciate that in their  normal daily   usages, a panga, a rungu and or  an   axe   would   not   be classified as dangerous or  offensive weapons as they  are  domestic tools. It is their negative use as instruments of threat,  violence and infliction of injury to the   person  of  a victim   of  robbery  with   violence  or  any   other  offence   that converts such instruments  into dangerous and or  offensive weapons.  In  the circumstances of  this case, the   assailants were   so  armed  not   to  use such weapons as domestic tools  but as objects for  inflicting injury and pain  in  the execution of the  robbery subject of this appeal. This was  the  position taken by this Court in   the   case of   Kimemia and   another  versus  Republic [2005] 2K LR46, page  50 line  37  to 43-page  51 line 1-29.

"The  phrase: "dangerous  or  offensive weapon" is  not defined in Section 296 of the Penal  Code or in Section 4- the  interpretation Section of   the Penal   Code. Section 89(1) of the Penal  Code  creates the offence of  possession of a  firearm or other "offensive weapon" etc  and  Section 89(4) of  the Penal  Code  defines  "offensive  weapon" for purposes of Section 89 as meaning:

"Any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person or intended by the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use."

In Mwaura and  others versus Republic [1973] EA 373 the High  Court  in dealing with the question whether a panga, an iron bar, a wheel spanner, a king shaft, screw driver, a stone and  a chisel were "dangerous or offensive weapon" for the purposes of the offence of preparation to commit a  felony under Section 308(1) of  the Penal  Code held  at page  375 letter F:

"In   our   view  "dangerous or  offensive weapons" means any articles made or  adapted for  use  for  causing injury to the person such as a cosh knuckleduster or revolver or any article intended, by  the persons found with them for use in causing injury to the person."

The  High  Court followed that interpretation in Muthiori versus Republic [1981] KLR  46 at page  473 paragraphs 1-5.

In  our  view  the words "dangerous or  offensive weapon" in  Section 296(2)  of   the  Penal   Code   bear  the  same meaning as  Section  89(4) of   the  Penal   Code   and    as construed in  the  case  of   Mwaura &   others  versus Republic (supra)for the purpose of  Section 308(1) of  the Penal  Code.

There cannot be  any doubt that although a  knife is not   made or  adapted  for  use  for  causing injury to a person, it would  nevertheless be a dangerous or offensive weapon for  purposes of  Section 296(2) of  the penal Code if   the  robbers in  wielding it  in the  cause of   robbery intend to use  it for causing injury to any person."

20. As for  the  element of theft, the  uncontroverted  evidence of PW1  and  PW2 was  that the  assailants  roughed PWl up  and forcefully extracted the  named items from   him. This   satisfied  the   ingredient in  the   case of   Opoya   versus Uganda (supra) as approved by  this Court in  the  case of Maneningu Mbaomengi versus  Republic (supra).   On   the   basis of  the   above,  we  are satisfied that, from  the  totality of the  evidence adduced  on  the  record all  the elements of the  offence  of robbery with  violence as charged were  present.

21.  Turning to   the   identification and or   recognition of   the   appellant in connection with   the   commission of the   offence   charged, the   learned trial magistrate had this to say:

"PW1 stated that  he had   a torch- with three batteries­ that night. When he  came out  of  the toilet, he  flashed the torch on  the faces of  six, people whom he  identified as Boniface Agolombo A.K.A.  Nandwa, Kennedy Imbuga, Mulhehe, Watu, Kevolwe and  another sixth person whose name he  later ....in his  testimony - gave  as Mwambuki. He stated that Nandwa was  the one  who  cut  him on  the head, Imbuga cut  him on  the hand,  while Kevolwe took items and   money from him (the   complainants) shirt - pocket. PW2 stated that she  came out  of  the house with the optimus lamp on,  when she  heard her  husband (the complainant) scream.  PW2  stated that  she   saw   many young   men   whom she  could   not  count. She   stated that she  identified  Mwambuki, Imbuga, Kevolwe and  a person commonly known  as  Nandwa who   came  from behind raising a panga. PW1  and  PW2 testified that, PW2 threw the lamp she had  at  the  thugs.  The  person called Nandwa, from the  evidence on   record, is  the accused person herein. The accused, the complainant and   PW2 were   from   the  same village called Matsigulu. That  is clear from  the testimony of  PW1, PW2  and  the accused himself. I find  that the accused was  a person known to the complainant and  PW2,  even  prior  to the time of  the incident. The two  recognized the accused on the material night...'

22. The learned Judges on the other hand had  this to say:-

"4. According to PW1, he  recognized some of the men  as people he  had  previously known and  that the torch light assisted in the identification. He said   that the one  who cut  him  on   the  head    was   Boniface Akolomba alias Nandwa. The  one  who  cut  his  hand was Kevolwe and  the one  who  removed money  from his   pocket was   Kennedy Imbuga.

5. In any event, PW1 further stated that as he  screamed, his  wife  came out  and  she  was listed as PW2, Zeraphaya Musimbi Kabaka. Her evidence was  that when she  heard her husband  screaming,  she   came  out   of   the  house carrying a  lamp and   she  recognized the appellant and two  other robbers whom she  had  previously known"

6…….The   robbers that  she   allegedly  recognized  were named  Kevolwe, Mwambuki, Ananda, Bonface, Nandwa and lmbuga

7. During   cross-examination, PW2 stated that she had known the appellant since he  was  seven years old  and that he  lived  one  kilometer away from her  home.

8. According to PW1, when he  made his  initial statement to  the  police (which  he did  while  still  at  Mukumu Hospital he  named his  attackers and  Kevolwe and Mwambuki  were   the  first  to  be   arrested, while the appellant  who   had   been on  the  run, was   arrested at Mbale Township."

23. On case law, the learned trial Magistrate cited the case of Anjononi versus Republic [1980] KLR59. Wherein at page 60 paragraph G-H Madan JA (as he then was) made observation that:-

"Recognition of an assaillant is more satisfactory, more assuring and more reliable than identification of  a stranger because it depends upon the person and knowledge of the assaillant same form or other."

24. While  the   learned Judges  on   the   other hand  cited   the   case of Solomon Mungai and  others versus Republic [1965] EA 782,  for the   proposition that  where the  conviction of more than two  accused are  based on  a common design, the  acquittal of one  will not  affect  the convictions of  the   others if  the  evidence established that  the   others shared  a common design: and  the Republic versus Turnbull and others [1976]  3ALL ER549 for  the   proposition that, whenever the case of an  accused person depends wholly  or substantially on  the correctness of  one   or  more   identification  of  the   accused which the defence alleges to  be mistaken, the  Judge should warn the  jury  of the special need for caution  before   convicting   in    reliance   on    the correctness of the  identification.

25.  The  principle in  Republic versus Turnbull (supra) has been  followed  time and again in  numerous  decisions of both this Court and its predecessor, the Court of  Appeal for  Eastern Africa.  In  the   case of   Waithaka Chege versus Republic [1979]  KLR271 the  Court held  inter alia  that:-

"Although an issue of visual   identification   should always be approached with great caution where the  case against  an   accused  depended  entirely  on   visual identification at  night; by   torch  light;  his   conviction could be upheld where the trial Magistrate had  kept the matters in mind"

26.   In  Simiyu and another versus [2005] KLR192, the  Court emphasized that  evidence of  description of  the  attackers either by  appearance or  name given  to  police  or  any  other person at the  earliest opportunity is  a matter of great importance as failure to  do  so  may   give  rise   to  an inference that  the complainant or the  victim  either did  not  or  may  not  have  known who  their real attackers were.  Secondly that, where recognition is dependent on  the  nature of the  light, it is imperative on  the  Court to inquire as to the  nature of the  alleged light, its  brightness or  otherwise or  its intensity, as failure to  make such an inquiry may  render the  evidence of recognition to  be  held  not  to  be  free  from error. In  Sasi  versus Republic [2009]  KLR 353, this Court accepted evidence of identification by recognition of an  assailant whom the  appellant had known for over  twenty (20) years.

27. In the  circumstances of the  appeal before  us, the  two Courts below  reached concurrent findings that the  appellant, PW1  and PW2 were  local  residents and they   knew each other very  well;  that the  source of  light  was  a three battery torch whose light  was  described as very  bright; that this was  boosted by  the light  from  an  optimus lamp which gave out  superior light  until it was  hurled at the   attackers by  PW2  when the  attackers started charging at her, by  which time  PW1  and  PW2 had  already recognized the  assailants,  whom they  not  only named to PW5 a police  officer  at the  earliest opportunity but also  gave  PW5 the direction to  the  appellant's home. PW5’s evidence that he indeed went to the appellant's home following that direction but missed him was not controverted. We find   nothing on   the   record that would   compel us to depart from   that concurrent finding. We affirm   the   appellant was properly recognized by PW1 and PW2 as one of the assailants. His conduct of disappearing from  the  home soon  after  the   incident until  a  year   later  when  he   was   arrested  by   the complainant adds weight  to the  above  affirmation.

28. Turning to the  exercise of the  mandate of the  first Appellate Court, we have had occasion to  revisit its  judgment on  the  record. We find  that the  approach employed by the  learned Judges was  first  of all  to  state the  offence;  review  the evidence tendered  before   the trial Court inclusive of  responses given   by  the witnesses  to  the appellant's  cross-examination questions;  addressed  their minds  to  the central  issues  in  controversy  namely  identification  and  or recognition of the  appellant in connection with  the  offence  charged; applied the guiding principles on  acceptance or  otherwise of evidence of identification or recognition as enunciated in  the case of  Republic versus  Turnbull (supra] and arrived at their conclusions. We find   nothing wrong with   the   approach taken by the  learned Judges in  their reevaluation, reassessing and reanalyzing the  evidence before  them. That approach was  in  line  with  the  guiding principle that "it is the duty of the first Appellate Court to reconsider the evidence, evaluate it and   draw its own  conclusion in order to satisfy itself that there is no  failure of justice but  not  merely to scrutinize the evidence to see  if  there was  some evidence to  support the trial Courts findings and conclusion (See  Simiyu & Another Versus Republic (Supra).

29. The  upshot of the  foregoing is  that, we  find  no  merit in  this appeal. We hereby dismiss it in its entirety.

Dated and delivered at Kisumu this 18th day of July 2014.

R.N. NAMBUVE

………………………..

JUDGE OF APPEAL

F.AZANGALALA

…………………………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

SANKALE ole KANTAI

…………………………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is a true

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