Brighton Soko v Soko (SCZ 8 189 of 2015) [2018] ZMSC 555 (20 July 2018)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA SCZ/8/189/2015 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: BRIGHTON SOKO APPELLANT AND PETRONELLA SAKALA SOKO RESPONDENT Coram: Wood, M us on da and Mutuna, JJS on 10th July and 20th July, 2018 For the Appellant: In Person For the Respondent: In Person JUDGMENT MUSONDA, JS, delivered the Judgment of the Court Cases referred to: 1. Livingstone Stallard v. Livingstone Stallard (1974) 2 ALL. E. R. 766 2. Katz v. Katz (1972) 2 ALL. E. R. 219 3. Ash v. Ash [1972] Fam 135 4. Mahande v. Mahande (1976) Z. R. 287 Legislation referred to: 1. Sections 8 and 9 (1) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act No. 20 of 2. Section 1 (2) (a) [of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 of UK Other Works referred to: J2 1. Passingham B and Harmer C: Law and Practice in Matrimonial Causes: (London: Butterworths: 1985) 2. Mushota L: Family Law in Zambia: Cases and Materials (UNZA Press: Lusaka: 2005) 1.0 INTRODUCTION This appeal arises by way of the appellant’s reaction to the lower court’s judgment by which he was effectively ordered to remain shackled in a marriage which he personally considered to have irretrievably broken down. 2.0 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS 2.1 On 6th July, 2005, the appellant and the respondent celebrated what was intended to be a life-long marital union between them in the office of the Registrar of Marriages at Lusaka Civic Centre in the Lusaka Province of the Republic of Zambia. 2.2 Prior to the tying of the union referred to in the preceding paragraph, the appellant had sired a daughter from his previous marriage who was born on 10th February, 1997 and named Thandiwe while a girl named Pauline had been born to the respondent on 25th August, 1999. I J3 2.3 It appears from the record that marital woes between the appellant and the respondent had been simmering and had their genesis during the period immediately before and after Thandiwe, the respondent’s step-daughter, came of age. a 2.4 Although the actual conflicts which had birthed the above- mentioned marital woes involved the respondent and her step-daughter, the appellant got engulfed in the tension and conflicts between the two primary protagonists on account of what the respondent perceived to have been the appellant’s condonation and encouragement of his daughter’s actions and behavior which the respondent had deemed unacceptable and intolerable and to which she had attributed Thandiwe’s two teenage pregnancies as well as her having two pre-marital children as will be disclosed later in this judgment. 2.5 In consequence of the further escalation of physical/violent conflicts between the respondent and her step-daughter, the former decided to vent-off her anger and frustration by repeatedly taunting the appellant and accusing him of having been behind the pregnancy which had resulted in his daughter’s first child. J4 .6 The appellant did not take kindly to his wife’s accusations which he considered disrespectful, embarrassing, insulting and demeaning. Accordingly, the appellant decided to terminate his marriage to the respondent by launching a divorce petition founded on the respondent’s alleged unreasonable behavior. .0 THE DIVORCE PETITION AND THE GROUNDS THEREFOR . 1 Sometime in October, 2014, the appellant filed a divorce petition in the High Court of Zambia. The petition was founded on Sections 8 and 9 (1) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act No. 20 of 2007. Simply put, the appellant sought to have his marriage to the respondent dissolved on the basis that it had irretrievably broken down by reason of the fact that the respondent had behaved in such a manner that he - the appellant - could not reasonably be expected to continue living with the respondent. .2 The particulars of the unreasonable behaviour upon which the appellant founded his divorce petition were expressed by him in the following terms: J5 (a) That the respondent had been maliciously accusing him of having impregnated and fathered a child with his own biological daughter in spite of the man who had been responsible for the pregnancy having publicly or openly declared his responsibility for the same; (b) That the respondent did not desire to have the appellant’s daughter continue to live with the two parents in the matrimonial home; (c) That the respondent did not desire to have the appellant’s relatives, including his mother, visit the matrimonial home; (d) That the respondent had been threatening to poison her step-daughter and that she and her step­ daughter were always fighting; (e) That the respondent had been hiding the appellant’s critical documents including title deeds to his property which had gone missing within the matrimonial home; J6 (f) That the respondent no longer loved nor trusted nor respected the appellant or the appellant’s views or opinions; (g) That the respondent wilfully hid or destroyed food items and household goods including decoders, fans, cutlery, etc. so that her step-daughter could not enjoy the benefit of using the same or in order to starve the appellant’s daughter; (h) That the respondent had described the appellant’s mother as a witch when she visited for the purpose of accessing medical treatment; (i) That the respondent routinely yelled at him in front of her young sisters and used foul and disrespectful language towards the appellant which had negatively affected the appellant. THE HEARING At the hearing of the petition, the appellant testified on his own behalf as “PW1”. He began his testimony by confirming his assertions and allegations in his petition as filed. I J7 4.2 The appellant emphasized a number of the assertions in his petition including the fact that he had been maliciously accused of having impregnated his own biological daughter simply because his wife did not want his daughter and her child to live with them in the matrimonial home. 4.3 The appellant also placed emphasis on the allegation in his petition that there were persistent fights both in and outside the matrimonial home between his daughter and the respondent with each threatening to kill the other. On one occasion, the appellant’s daughter almost hit the respondent with an offensive weapon to the extent that the appellant, the respondent and the appellant’s daughter ended up at Chilenje Police Station where they were counselled on the need to live in harmony as a family. 4.4 The appellant also testified that, apart from family members, even people from the Church had been invited to help with the conflicts between his wife and his daughter but that all such efforts and initiatives had been in vain as the respondent insisted on having the appellant’s daughter, who was 18 at the time of the hearing of this matter, leave the matrimonial J8 home. 4.5 In the face of the respondent’s demands to have the appellant’s daughter and her baby leave the matrimonial home if peace was to be restored at home, the appellant also maintained that his daughter and her child could never leave the matrimonial home because his daughter’s biological mother passed on way back while none of the appellant’s relatives had the wherewithal to look after his daughter and her child. 4.6 The appellant also told the court below that, quite apart from the conflicts between his daughter and the respondent, the latter did not want his relatives to visit them and that she had been exhibiting aggression towards them whenever they had visited. 4.7 The appellant also complained to the trial judge that his wife had no respect for him and that, in spite of being a graduate, she repeatedly described him as a ‘dull man’. 4.8 He further complained that the respondent persistently J9 taunted him as not being man enough and even claimed that she had been keeping so many men who were interested in her at bay because she was still tied to him in marriage and flatly told the appellant that she regretted the day she met him. 4.9 In concluding his evidence in chief, the appellant told the trial court that his relationship with the appellant was distasteful and that ever since his daughter came of age, there had been explosions between his daughter and the respondent because the latter could no longer take advantage of her as she was doing when his daughter was young. According to the appellant, the problems and animosity between the respondent and his daughter started when she was young save that they could not manifest at the time on account of the fact that his daughter had been too young to react. 4.10 The respondent did not cross-examine the appellant. 4.11 The appellant called one witness, Ms. Tikambenji Phiri, his aunt, who testified as “PW2”. 4.12 PW2 opened her testimony by telling the trial court that the J10 respondent never looked after the appellant’s relatives, including his mother, well whenever they visited the appellant’s home. She alleged that this happened even when his mother was unwell. Consequently, the appellant’s relatives stopped visiting the couple. 4.13 PW2 further complained that whenever the appellant’s relatives, including his mother, visited the appellant’s home, the respondent would leave them at home without food and only returned late at night. She also complained that whenever relatives visited the appellant’s house, they would sit under a tree because they were too scared of the respondent who never cared for them but treated them like beggars. 4.14 As with PW1, PW2 was not cross-examined by the respondent. 5.0 THE RESPONDENT’S DEFENCE 5.1 Although the respondent did not file an Answer to the appellant’s petition, she did indicate in the ‘Acknowledgement of Service’ Form which was delivered to her simultaneously JI 1 with the service of the petition upon her that it was her desire to defend or contest the divorce petition. Accordingly, the respondent testified on her own behalf opposing the divorce. She also called one witness who testified on her behalf. 5.2 In her testimony, the respondent admitted the fights with her step-daughter. She also told the trial court that at the time when she and the appellant got married, her step-daughter was young and that she accepted her as her own and took care of her. 5.3 According to the respondent, her step-daughter subsequently started misbehaving when she came of age. The respondent complained about her step-daughter bringing men or boys in her bedroom when she was barely 14 years old. She also complained over the fact that her step-daughter did whatever she wanted without her father (the appellant) doing anything to control her and that, in point of fact, the appellant found himself in the curious position of being controlled by his own daughter. 5.4 The respondent further testified that, as a result of her step­ daughter’s behavior, she was forced to leave the matrimonial J12 home sometime in January, 2012 and started living with her mother in Kabwata. Subsequently, the respondent moved to another location before the appellant proposed a reconciliation with her. 5.5 According to the respondent, following the appellant’s proposal to reconcile with her, she returned to the matrimonial home only to face what she described as a much graver situation. 5.6 The respondent further testified that, contrary to the appellant’s claims, she never removed any cutlery from the kitchen of their matrimonial home but that it was her step­ daughter who moved all the cutlery from the kitchen and put them in her bedroom where she started cooking from. The respondent further alleged that subsequently, the appellant even decided to buy cutlery for his daughter which she started using for her cooking in her bedroom. She further complained that aside from giving his daughter money for buying food for their home, her husband even started buying food which he was taking to his daughter’s bedroom and J13 which food was cooked by the step-daughter and eaten by the two in the girl’s bedroom. 5.7 The respondent also testified in the court below that her husband would be in his daughter’s bedroom from 17 or 18 hours up to 02:00 hours the following morning. The appellant would spend all these long hours in his daughter’s bedroom while only dressed in a pair of shorts and a vest. The respondent further alleged that she would remind the appellant that it was a taboo for him to wash his daughter’s blood-stained underwear, his daughter’s baby’s nappies and for him to spend such long hours in his daughter’s bedroom while he was inadequately dressed. 5.8 According to the respondent, there was a connection between her step-daughter’s first pregnancy and the fact that her husband spent very prolonged hours with her in her bedroom and at awkward hours. 5.9 The respondent also complained that, on one occasion, her step-daughter insulted her and boiled cooking oil which she almost poured on her. On another occasion, the girl got a knife which she wanted to use to stab the respondent but ended up J14 stabbing the appellant on his wrist. The girl even went to the extent of alleging that the respondent was a prostitute who had killed her (the step daughter’s) biological mother so that she could start enjoying her father’s money. 5.10 The respondent, however, denied all the accusations which the appellant had levelled against her in the petition. 5.11 In spite of all the difficulties in her marriage, the respondent told the trial judge that she opposed the divorce as she still loved her husband but added that her step-daughter should leave the matrimonial home if peace and harmony were to be restored to the matrimonial home. According to the respondent, at 18 years, her step-daughter was old enough to look after herself. The respondent concluded her testimony in chief by telling the court below that her step-daughter is violent and is capable of killing and must leave the matrimonial home. 5.12 Under cross-examination by the appellant, the respondent reiterated that her step-daughter had threatened to kill her but denied having threatened the appellant and his daughter with death. She also denied having told the father to her step­ J15 daughter’s child that he was not the one who had been responsible for the girl’s pregnancy. 5.13 The respondent further told the court below in answer to questions which were put to her by the appellant in cross- examination that the appellant’s sisters, namely, Sarah and Esnart, had wanted to beat her up and that she had complained to him about this. 5.14 The respondent’s witness, Sophia Bwendo Sakala (“RW2”)’s brief testimony was to the effect that the appellant’s relatives had been complaining about the appellant’s marriage with a foreigner (RW2 was the respondent’s Zimbabwean mother). According to RW2, the respondent repeatedly complained about the fact that the appellant paid more attention to his daughter and not to herself as his wife. 5.15 Consistent with its duty to ascertain key issues around the divorce petition, the trial court took the liberty to put some questions to the appellant. One of the appellant’s responses to those questions was to the effect that he would go into his daughter’s bedroom for the purpose of checking on his daughter’s baby because his wife could not do so owing to her J16 fights with his daughter. The appellant also told the trial court that he was concerned over his daughter’s child because his daughter was still childish. The appellant also confirmed that he did, indeed, wash his daughter’s underwear because he considered himself as both his daughter’s father and mother and that, consequently, he felt obliged to perform those dual roles. 5.16 The appellant further informed the court below that his mother was a cancer patient and that he could not burden her with the responsibility of looking after his daughter. 5.17 The appellant concluded his testimony by telling the court below that he did not think that his wife loved him because her actions suggested otherwise. 6.0 CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER AND DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 6.1 The trial court considered the petition and the evidence which the two parties to the same had placed before it in the context of the applicable law. The trial court’s consideration of the matter started off with a brief reference to Section 9 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act No. 20 of 2007 which sets out the J17 five facts, the proof of any one of which by a petitioner would entitle a court to come to the conclusion that a marriage has broken down irretrievably. For completeness, it would be open to a petitioner to anchor or found their petition on any one or more of the five facts which are specified in Section 9(1). 6.2 In the context of this petition, the relevant fact which was projected is that which is contained in Section 9 (1) (b) of the Act, which is to the effect that . the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. ” 6.3 In its further discourse, the trial court cited two English cases namely, Livingstone Stallard v. Livingstone Stallard1 and Katz v. Katz2 to fortify its reasoning and adopted the following passage from the latter: “Behaviour is something more than a mere state of affairs ... such as for example, a feeling that the wife is not reciprocating his love, or not being as demonstrative as he thinks she should be. Behaviour in this context is action or conduct by one which affects the other and must have some reference to the marriage.” J18 According to the trial judge, the test for unreasonable behavior is that the respondent must have behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. In the words of the learned trial judge, "... the court must decide whether the respondent's behavior is sufficiently grave to fulfill that test, that is, to make it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to endure living with the respondent.” Following her ladyship’s scrutiny of the evidence which had been adduced before her in relation to the particulars of the respondent’s alleged unreasonable behavior, she came to the conclusion that the appellant’s marriage to the respondent had not broken down irretrievably. According to the learned trial judge, none of the problems which the appellant and the respondent had been going through in their less than blissful marriage had gone "... to the root of their marriage. The problems between the couple arose as a result of Thandiwe’s behavior... [The appellant] also allowed his other relatives too much leeway in the marriage. ” J19 6.7 The learned trial judge also reasoned that, to the extent that unreasonable behavior constitutes a lawful basis for divorce, it is the behavior of the respondent which is the important issue and not that of Thandiwe or the other relatives, in determining whether the marriage has broken down irretrievably.” 6.8 In the context of the marriage in issue, the trial judge did not consider that there were any "... serious problems between the petitioner and the respondent” [to warrant divorce] especially that they had "... continued cohabiting in their matrimonial home as husband and wife” even up to the time when the petition was being heard. 6.9 After observing that the appellant had, somehow, invited the disrespect, mistrust and the absence of love for him which the appellant had complained about in relation to the respondent as a result of his own actions and behavior, the learned trial judge concluded her judgment in the following terms: “It is [the appellant’s] behavior of washing nappies and Thandiwe’s underwear and spending ... awkward hours in his daughter’s room which had caused the respondent to disrespect him. I cannot fault her. [He] allowed his daughter to control him, which is unacceptable [but it is] not a consideration to J20 determining if the marriage has broken down irretrievably... [The] marriage has not broken down irretrievably on account of the respondent’s behavior such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with her. I opine that the marriage between the parties can be salvaged if the petitioner can change his behavior towards Thandiwe.” The judge consequently proceeded to decline to dissolve the appellant’s marriage to the respondent by dismissing the appellant’s petition. 7.0 THE APPEAL AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL 7.1 The appellant appears to have been shocked by the outcome of his petition in the court below as he could not comprehend that he could remain shackled in a marriage that he considered anything but a legal shell which had been emptied of all its essence and value. 7.2 Accordingly, the appellant has now approached this ultimate court seeking to have us disturb the judgment of the lower court on the basis of the following grounds which were embedded in the Memorandum of Appeal relating to this appeal: J21 "1. The learned trial Judge misdirected herself in fact when she did not state exactly in the Judgment why she found the Respondent’s behavior not amounting to unreasonable behaviour. 2. The learned trial Judge misdirected herself in law and in fact when she did not address the fact that the test for unreasonable behavior is subjective and the Petitioner must find it intolerable to live with the Respondent. 3. The Judgment of the Court contains the statement which the Appellant did not say that he admitted to washing his daughter’s underwear because he could not have a maid due to the Respondent’s attitude. 4. The Judgment of the Court did not consider the Respondent’s unreasonable behavior but mainly focused on the Appellant. 5. The Judgment of the Court did not provide an analysis of the evidence adduced before it to show that the marriage had not broken down irretrievably just because the parties live in the same house.” THE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant, who continued to appear in person, confirmed having filed his written Heads of Argument upon which he entirely relied. He also orally reiterated his desire to be divorced from the respondent. For her part, the respondent did not file any arguments but unequivocally resiled from the position she had taken in the court below by expressing her desire to divorce. ft J22 8.2 We have endeavoured to relate the grounds of the appellant’s appeal as they occur in the Memorandum of Appeal to the appellant’s Heads of Argument and have established that virtually all the grounds which were set out in the Memorandum of Appeal are not in sync with the appellant’s Heads as filed. For this reason, we propose to take a holistic approach in this judgment on the basis that we have understood the appellant’s arguments as having constituted a broad complaint against the trial court’s failure to find that his marriage to the respondent had broken down irretrievably on account of the allegations which he had set out in his petition. 9.0 CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL AND DECISION 9.1 According to the judgment of the court below, the test which should be employed to determine a divorce petition which is anchored or founded on unreasonable behaviour as enjoined by Section 9 (1) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, No. 20 of 2007 is that the respondent must have behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. f J23 9.2 There has been much judicial and juristic discourse around the notion of irretrievable break-down of marriage founded on the behavior of a spouse on account of which the party petitioning for divorce cannot reasonably be expected to live with such a spouse. 9.3 Bernard Passingham and Caroline Harmer have asserted, in their highly regarded text, Law and Practice in Matrimonial Causes as follows: “In one sense the phrase ‘cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent’ poses an objective test, in contrast to the expression ‘the petitioner’ finds it intolerable to live with the respondent in Section 1 (2) (a) [of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 of UK which reads exactly the same as Section 9 (1) (b) of our the Matrimonial Causes Act No. 20 of 2007]. But the words ‘the petitioner’ and ‘the respondent* do not refer to ordinary reasonable spouses who are placed in that position, but to the actual persons concerned” (emphasis ours). 9.4 The assertion which Passingham and Harmer have highlighted in the above passage was the subject of judicial elucidation by Bagnall, J in the English case of Ash v. Ash3, when he said, at page 140: “The ‘petitioner’ means the particular petitioner in the case under consideration. J24 In order, therefore, to answer the question whether the petitioner can or cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent, in my judgment, I have to consider not only the behavior of the respondent as alleged and established in evidence but the character, personality, disposition and behavior of the petitioner. “The general question may be expanded thus: Can this petitioner with his or her character and personality, with his or her faults and other attributes, good and bad, and having regard to his or her behavior during the marriage, reasonably be expected to live with this respondent?” (emphasis ours) The excerpt which has been quoted above was adopted and described as ‘instructive’ by this court in Mahande v. Ma han de4. 9.5 In relation to the matter at hand, it seems to us that, indeed, while the learned trial judge appeared to have deeply pondered over the importance and decisive role of the respondent’s behavior, no or no serious consideration was accorded to the appellant (as the petitioner), his character, his personality, his disposition, his faults and other attributes, good and bad, in relation to the particular respondent involved as we said in Mahande4. 9.6 In our view, instead of stopping at condemning or blaming the J25 appellant for tolerating and condoning his daughter’s bad behavior or allegedly allowing himself to be controlled by his daughter and thereby incurring his wife’s contempt, the trial court ought to have considered whether, having regard to his entire ‘baggage’, this particular petitioner could reasonably be expected to live with the type of respondent that the court was dealing with in the context of the petition which was before that court. 9.7 In his Heads of Argument, the appellant reiterated his grievances against the respondent: that she does not respect him; that she belittles and insults him and hurls abuses at him in the presence of her cousin and his own daughter; that she does not trust him and repeatedly reminds him about the more credible men who had been proposing love to her but whose proposals she cannot presently accept because of her marriage to the appellant and that he fathered a child with his own daughter. 9.8 Although the respondent generally and, in our view, barely, denied the appellant’s allegations against her, her bare J26 denials did little to discount the allegations in question. In fact, the veracity of the appellant’s allegations was somewhat affirmed by the lower court’s observation that she could not fault the respondent for her behaviour and disposition towards the appellant. 9.9 Added to what has been adverted to in the preceding paragraph, there is the issue of Thandiwe, the appellant’s daughter. The trial court opined that the marriage in question can be salvaged or rescued if the petitioner can change his behavior towards Thandiwe. 9.10 Some of the questions which have troubled us in relation to the lower court’s opinion are: Is the issue of Thandiwe as simple as the court was projecting it to be? What about Thandiwe’s disposition towards her step-mother and vice- versa? And the disposition of the appellant towards Thandiwe vis-a-vis his disposition towards his wife? 9.11 In our view, and with great respect to the learned judge below, the litany or myriad of troubling issues around the marriage under inquiry cannot be resolved merely by securing a change in the appellant’s behavior towards his daughter. In taking J27 this view, we are mindful of the initiatives and interventions which were alluded to in the course of the trial, for the purpose of saving the marriage. 9.12 While we share in that sacred notion that it is not in the interest of society to have marriages dissolved on the slightest of pretexts, we consider that the learned judge in this matter took a superficial or casual view of what we consider to have been deep seated problems which have beleaguered the marriage in question. 9.13 The trial judge opined that the marriage could be salvaged... By who, if we may ask? The respondent says: 7 love my husband. I oppose the divorce but my husband should chase his daughter". In response, the petitioner says the things which he believes about his wife and which things the latter could not challenge on account of her decision not to cross- examine the appellant. The appellant also maintains that he cannot chase his daughter for whom he regards himself as both the mother and father. 9.14 In our view, far from sharing the trial court’s optimism about the prospects of this very troubled marriage, we consider that J28 the petitioner, given his character, personality, disposition, his weaknesses and other attributes, cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent in question, particularly in the light of her own disposition, traits etc. as the evidence below revealed. 9.15 In taking the view which we have taken, we have paid careful attention to the reasoning which we adopted in Mahande4, namely that when considering the respondent’s behaviour in the context of a divorce petition founded on ‘unreasonable behaviour’ as enacted in Section 9(1) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act No. 20 of 2007, it is not just the behaviour of the respondent which is decisive but, equally crucial and as much decisive, is the way in which such behaviour relates to or interacts with the character, behavior, personality, disposition and other traits and attributes of the particular petitioner involved. 9.16 In our view, had the lower court carefully approached the matter which was before it in the light of what we have noted at 9.14 and 9.15 above, it would not have erred in the way it did by expressing optimism about a marriage which had J29 become anything but a legal shell which had been emptied of its legal essence, its substance and, indeed, its very soul. 9.17 In her book, Family Law in Zambia: Cases and Materials, Mushota, L acknowledges the impact of the Divorce Reformer of 1969 in England when she observes that: “Marital problems (particularly divorce) should be resolved quickly, without exacerbating bitterness, distress and humiliation.” For the avoidance of doubt, the divorce law relating to Christian or statutory marriages in this country has almost exclusively been shaped by English law for a very long time indeed. 9.18 To conclude: we do share in the notion which is widely accepted under English divorce law and which Mushota, L alluded to in her book that: “If a marriage which is going down the drain is not capable of being saved or rescued, end it, and do so quickly.” This appeal must succeed and, accordingly, the marriage which was celebrated on 6th July, 2005 between the appellant and the respondent before the Registrar of Marriages at the J30 Lusaka Civic Centre in the Lusaka Province of the Republic of Zambia is hereby dissolved and a decree nisi to that end is hereby pronounced. The said decree shall stand absolute and an appropriate notice to that effect issued by the Registrar of the High Court unless due cause is shown to the contrary within a period of six weeks from the date of this judgment. The parties will bear their respective costs. SUPREME COURT JUDGE M. MUSONDA, SC SUPREME COURT JUDGE