Charles Steven Mbindyo v National Land Commission,African Inland Church & Agricultural Development Corporation [2016] KEHC 1338 (KLR) | Judicial Review | Esheria

Charles Steven Mbindyo v National Land Commission,African Inland Church & Agricultural Development Corporation [2016] KEHC 1338 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  396  OF 2016

IN THE MATER OF: AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDERS   OF PROHIBITION AND CERTIORARI

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW   REFORM ACT, CHAPTER 26 LAWS OF KENYA

BETWEEN

CHARLES STEVEN MBINDYO ……………….......................…...….APPLICANT

VERSUS

NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION   …………........................……..RESPONDENT

AND

AFRICAN INLAND CHURCH........……….......................1ST INTERESTED PARTY

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION...2ND INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

1. Vide  a chamber summons  dated  30th  August  2016  and filed in court  on the same day, the exparte applicant  Charles  Steven  Mbidyo  seeks from this court   orders:-

a.  Spent

b. That the applicant  be granted  leave  to apply for an order of certiorari to  quash the decision of the respondent   National Land   Commission contained in its  letter dated  9th August 2016   to conduct  the  title   review  hearing scheduled  for  2nd d  September   2016  at Nairobi   in respect of  the subject  property being title  number  LR No. 9917/4  registered  as IR 47655;

c. That the applicant be granted leave to apply  for an order of prohibition to  prohibit  the respondent  whether acting   by itself, its agents, officers, servants   or whosoever  from conducting  the review  hearing  scheduled   for the  2nd September  2016  at Nairobi  or at all  in respect of the applicant’s  title  LR No. 9917/4  registered  as IR  47655.

d. That  the leave so granted to  apply fir  orders of certiorari  and  prohibition  does operate as a stay   of the decision of the respondent  contained in its letter  dated 9th  August  2016  to conduct   the title review   hearing in respect of the subject  property being title  No.  LR 9917/4 with the effect that the hearing scheduled for 2nd September   2016 at Nairobi be and is hereby stayed.

2. The chamber Summons is brought  under the provisions of Order  53  Rules  1,2, and  3  of the Civil Procedure Rules  and all  other  enabling  provisions  of Law. The said chamber summons  is premised  on 27 detailed  grounds  on the face of  the application  and supported  by a statement  of facts, affidavit  verifying  facts and exhibits  annexed  thereto.

3. The facts  relied on which also  form grounds  of the application  are  that the  applicant herein  is the  registered  owner of the subject parcel of  land described  as LR  No. 9917/4 registered  as IR 47655 measuring  4,224. 0 hectares  situate   in Konza   area, within Machakos  County   having purchased   it from Lands   Limited, a subsidiary  of Agricultural Development  Corporation  (ADC) the  2nd   interested party  in 1989 and the transfer thereof effected on 4th July  1989.

4. That   in the early 1990’s  the applicant  received  attempts  to coerce  him to surrender  a portion of the said  land under  dubious   circumstances, which attempts  he thwarted  and continued  to enjoy quiet  possession but  that in 2015  unknown  people  invaded the said land and purported to take possession which  prompted the applicant to report the matter to the  Directorate  Investigations which  found that  one Justus  Wainaina  had purported to secure registration of  some fraudulent  subdivisions of the  subject property   LR  No. 9917/5-13.

5. That  the said Justus Wainaina  purported to act on instructions of   Cheptumo of Cheptumo  & Company  Advocates  and he is now  facing criminal charges vide  criminal  539/2015  which is  ongoing, which case is  related to the said alleged  subdivisions  of the subject  property.

6. That the firm of  Cheptumo & Company  Advocates have purported to act for African  Inland Church the 1st interested  party and vide their  letter dated  21st April  2016  to the respondent National Land Commission, they seek  to have the applicants  title reviewed  and even cancelled  by the respondent under Section  14 of the National Land  Commission Act.

7. That the full tenor and purpose of that letter  is to seek  to coerce the applicant to accede to some mutual  understanding  between ADC, the  then commissioner of lands and the applicant to have   1588. 4 hectares  of land out of   the subject   land transferred to the 1st interested party, which  arrangements  the applicant   is not party to.

8. That the applicant  is aggrieved  by the  decision of the respondents to conduct  a review   hearing  and  he has written   to them a  letter of objection  since  the purported dispute   is of  private   nature  wherein  the 1st interested party  seeks to enforce  a purported  mutual  understanding  to have part  of the  applicant’s   suit property  transferred to  it.

9. That  since the  dispute is a  private one the respondent National Land Commission  had no  jurisdiction to adjudicate  and determine    such private  disputes  relating to agreements  and or  mutual  understanding  as per the  complaint  letter dated  21st April  2016  by the  1st  interested party.

10. That given the nature of the complaint there is no challenge to the manner in which the applicant acquired the suit property.  That  since  the same dispute  is  subject  of criminal proceedings  pending  against  Justus  Wainaina, the intended  hearing  smacks  impropriety, is untoward, is in  error of jurisdiction, unjust, unwarranted   and highly prejudicial  to him and the outcome  of the said  criminal   trial.

11. That in any event  the  claim   by the 1st interest party  is statute  barred  since the  applicant has been in actual occupation and possession of the suit property  for the past    26  years  and that there was no  attempt  to enforce  any  purported  agreement  for all  those years.

12. That  this court  should intervene  to grant   the orders sought to prevent  a hearing for  review  of the  title by  the respondent  which is  bereft of  any jurisdiction.

13. That  unless leave is  granted, and to  operate  as stay, proceedings  will be  prejudice will be   suffered  and that the applicant  has  presented  an arguable   case to warrant  leave sought  to be  granted  to enable  him file  Judicial Review  proceedings to serve the  interests of  justice.

14. The application was brought under certificate of urgency on 31st August 2016.  I certified it  as urgent   and directed  the applicant to serve  the respondent  and interested  parties for  interpartes  consideration  of the application for  leave and for stay.

15.  On 2nd  September  2016  the 2nd interested  party appointed  Cheptumo & Company  Advocates  to represent  it in the  matter and  a replying  affidavit   was filed.  It is sworn by Anthony Ademba on 2nd September 2016 and filed the same day.  The 2nd interested party in opposing  the application for leave  and stay contends  that the  applicant  irregularly acquired the  suit  property  measuring  4225 hectares   after  a transfer  of the entire  parcel   was signed under a   mistake  of fact  thereby  conveying  the entire   land contrary to the  allotment  letter which only  conveyed  2,4,28 hectares  of land excluding  the homestead.

16. That the applicant  accepted  the  offer of 2,428 hectares  of land as the  portion  he  was  allotted and  the remainder  he  was  to hold  as custodian  in trust  for  the 2nd  interested  party until further notice.  That  the applicant used his  influence  as the Permanent  Secretary for Treasury  to have the entire  parcel of land  transferred  to him leading  to negotiations for him  to surrender back the  excess land which   the applicant  agreed  and he  was given  a credit  note for  the surrendered  portion.

17. That the  1st interested  party  was then offered  4864  acres  subject to payment  of stamp duty  and survey  fees which  it did pay and a consent to transfer  that portion to the 1st interested  party  was granted by the 2nd interested party but  that the applicant  despite  knowledge  of all these  refused to hand  over documents  prompting the  Commissioner  of  Lands to issue  another surrender of the portion  of the land  as agreed.

18. That those are  the stated circumstances  that prompted  the dispute to be referred to National Land Commission  which has  the mandate  to review   dispositions  of public land  to establish  their   propriety or legality.  That the invitation letter to the applicant by the respondent is simply to accord him a hearing to determine the legality of the suit title.  That this matter is meant to frustrate the lawful inquiry into the legality and validity of the title and is prematurely before the court.

19. Finally, that the 2nd interested party is a stranger to criminal proceedings mentioned.

20. The 1st interested party and the respondent did not file any grounds of opposition or replying affidavit but they appeared by their legal counsels.

21. The application  was orally  canvassed before me  on 7th September  2016  with Mr  Kago appearing  and submitting  on behalf of the applicant; Mr Mbuthia  acting for  the  1st  respondent  whereas Mr Odhiambo   represented  the 2nd interested  party.  There was no appearance for the 1st interested party.

22. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Kago  submitted, relying on the grounds, statement  of  facts, verifying  affidavit  and annextures  that the  applicant  has an  arguable  case to  warrant   further interrogation  at a substantive  stage.  That the applicant seeks to challenge   the decision by the respondent to review title to his property since he believes that it has no jurisdiction to do so over private land as is in this case.  Further, that there is a private dispute seeking to enforce a mutual understanding between the parties.  That the review  hearing  is in  bad taste  and illegal, only  seeking to create  a cause of  action for the  1st  interested  party hence the respondent  must  be stopped  from assuming jurisdiction.

23. Further, that there is a pending criminal case cr No.539/2015 over the suit land hence the review of title   will prejudice that case.

24. On whether leave  once granted  should  operate as stay of review  of title   process, it  was  submitted  by Mr Kago   that it is  in the discretion  of the court  to grant stay so as to  preserve   the substratum  or subject  matter of the suit  and  for the proceedings not to be  rendered nugatory   to the prejudice  of the applicant   who should   have his day  in court.

25. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Mbuthia submitted that leave to apply for judicial review remedies is not a matter of course.  That the respondent  is simply exercising  its constitutional and statutory  mandate  under  Article  68 and Section  14 of the Constitution and   the National Land Commission  Act  respectively  hence it  should be left   to work as  an independent  constitutional commission.

26. That although  the suit property is privately  registered, it is  subject to an  inquiry  by National Land Commission   because  the applicant  acquired it from the  2nd interested  party which  is a public  body.

27. Further that a notice to be heard is not a decision to be challenged   and finally that criminal courts do not determine legality of titles to land.

28. Mr Odhiambo  acting for the   2nd interested party submitted  that the applicant  is estopped  from claiming  that the suit  land is  private since  he admits purchasing  it from  Lands Limited a subsidiary of Agricultural  Development  Corporation ( 2nd interested  party)  which is a public  state corporation.

29. Counsel for the 2nd interested parties adopted submissions by Mr Mbuthia and added that there is no decision by the National Land Commission presented before this court capable of being challenged by way of Judicial Review.  That the Section  14(3) of the  National Land Commission Act mandates  the commission to inform and or  invite  any party which it had done hence the commission  should not  be curtailed  from  doing its  work.

30. In addition, it  was submitted that it  is not  disclosed   how the notice and the intended  hearing  is unlawful, ultra vires or biased  against  the  applicant and that  no prejudice  has been expressed.

31. That under Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, a party must exhaust all the available avenues before coming to court.  That in this case, the applicant should appear before   the National Land Commission to make a representation   and only approach   the court after a hearing.  Mr Odhiambo urged this court to dismiss the application for leave with costs.

32. In rejoinder, Mr Kago submitted that the letterJMM7  inviting the applicant  for a hearing   is a  resolution  by the commission hence a  decision  to review  the applicant’s  title since the commission  in so doing is invoking its powers  under  Section  14  of the National Land Commission Act,  which is the subject of these proceedings.

33. Further, that the respondent cannot be allowed to conduct its affairs cata Blanche as it is   subject to the law.  Further, that the   court should determine   at this stage whether   there is jurisdiction to determine disputes between private individuals   on enforcement of mutual agreements.

34. In addition, it was submitted that there is no estoppel because Lands Limited is a private company.  That there is  a jurisdictional error, irrationality, failure to adhere to rules of natural justice  which are relied  on by the applicant and that there  is  the potential mischief   inherent  in the intended  review  process hence this court process   is timely   since jurisdiction which has been raised  goes to  the root of  everything.  On prejudice, it   was submitted that as long as there is no jurisdiction then any proceeding   by the National Land Commission is a nullity.

35. Further, that  Section  14 of the National Land Commission   Act does not  give the commission omnibus  powers  but  that the  section should be read  in the context  of Articles 63,64 and  68  of the Constitution.  Mr Kago urged that this is a matter which requires to be interrogated   and that to do justice, the applicant should not be shut out of the legal process.

Determination

36. I have carefully considered  the application by the applicant  and all the supporting  documents  which include  statement  of facts, verifying   affidavit  and the exhibits  annexed   thereto.

37. I have given  equal  consideration  to the  replying  affidavit  filed by the  2nd respondent  and its annextures.  I have    also considered   the oral submissions by the respective parties’ advocates.

38. There are 2 issues for determination in this application namely:

1.  Whether   the court should  grant leave  to the applicant  to institute    Judicial Review  proceedings and

2. Whether, if leave is so granted, it should operate as stay of the decision by the    respondent to review the applicant’s title.

39. The  requirement  that leave to apply for Judicial Review  orders  must be  sought  and  obtained is first intended  to exclude   vexatious  and frivolous  applications which  may prima facie  appear to be  abuse of the process  of the court, or those  applications  which may be  statute  barred. However, the court  should  exercise  its discretion and grant  leave to apply if on the  material  available the court  considers, without  delving  into the matter  in depth, that there is an arguable case.

40. At this  stage  where leave is being sought, the role  of the court  is to  filter the material  placed before   it for  purposes  of weeding out  hopeless  cases  at the nascent  initial stages  in order to save the time for the court and  for the parties by ensuring that futile claims  do not find their  way  into the court  process  and  also, that  public bodies  are not  paralyzed  from exercising  their public  statutory  or constitutional mandates  because of  pending frivolous  claims  before courts of law.  This principle was enunciated in the case of Matiba V Attorney General Nairobi HCC Miscellaneous Application 790/1993.  Republic V the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Planning and National Development   Exparte Kaimenyi [2006] 1 EA 353.

41. Waki  J in Republic  V County Council  of Kwale  & Another  Exparte  Kondo  & 57  Others  Mombasa  HCC Miscellaneous  Application  384/95  stated that:

“ The  purpose  of application for leave to apply for Judicial Review  is firstly  to eliminate at an  early   stage  any application   for  Judicial Review  which are  either frivolous  or  hopeless and secondly  to ensure that the applicant  is only  allowed to proceed  to  substantive  hearing is the court is satisfied  that there  is a case  fit for further  consideration.  The requirement that leave  must be  obtained  before making  an application  for Judicial Review  is designed  to prevent the  time of the  court being  wasted by  busy bodies  with misguided or trivial  complaints  or administrative  error, and  to remove  the uncertainty  in which public   officers  and authorities  might be  left as  to  whether  they could  safely proceed  with administrative  action while  proceedings  for Judicial Review  of it  were actually pending even though  misconceived.  Leave may  only be  granted therefore  if on the material  available  the court is of the view, without  going into the matter in depth, that there is an arguable  case  for granting the relief   claimed  by the applicant, the test  being  whether  there  is a  case  fit for  further  investigation at a  full interpartes  hearing of  the  substantive  application for  Judicial Review.  It is an exercise of the court’s discretion but as always   it has to be   exercised judicially.”

42. In Mirugi Kariuki V Attorney General Civil Appeal No. 70/91 [1990- 1994] EA 156 the court stated that :

“ The  law relating to Judicial  review  has now  reached  the stage where  it can be  said with confidence  that, if the subject  matter in respect of  which  prerogative  power is  exercised in justiciable, that  is to say if it is a  matter on which  the court  can adjudicate, he exercise  of the power is subject to review  in accordance with   the principles  developed  in respect of  the review  of the exercise of statutory  power…….the controlling  factor in determining  whether the  exercise   of prerogative  power sis   subject to  judicial review  is not  its  source  but its  subject matter.  It is  not the absoluteness  of the discretion nor the authority of exercising  it that matter  but whether  in its   exercise, some of  the person’s  legal rights  or interests have  been  affected.  This makes   the exercise of such discretion justiciable and therefore subject to Judicial Review.  In the instant  appeal it is  of consequence that the Attorney General  has absolute  discretion  under Section 11(1) of the Act if in its exercise  of the appellant’s  legal rights  or interests  were  affected.  The applicant’s complaint in the High Court   was that this   was so and for that reason he sought leave of court to have it   investigated.  It is wrong in law for the court to attempt an assessment of the sufficiency of an applicant’s interests without regard to the matter of his complaint.  If he  fails to  shoe, when  he applies  for leave, a prima  facie  case, on reasonable   grounds   for  believing that there  has been a  failure of public  duty, the court  would be  in error if it  granted leave.  The curb represented by the need for the applicant to show, when   he seeks leave to apply, that he has a case, is an essential protection against abuse of legal process.  It  enables  the  court  to prevent  abuse by busy bodies, cranks  and other mischief  makers……….In this  appeal, the issue  is  whether the appellant  in his application  for leave to  apply for orders of  certiorari  and mandamus demonstrated   to the High Court  a prima  facie  case for the grant of  those orders   clearly, once   breach  of the  rules of  natural justice   was   alleged, the exercise  of discretion   by the Attorney  General  under Section  11(1) of the Act  was brought  into question.  Without   a rebuttal to those allegations, the appellant certainly disclosed a prima facie case.

For that, he should have been granted leave to apply for   the orders sought.”

43. Again, in CA 175/2000 Republic V Communications Commission of Kenya & 2 Others Exparte East African TelevisionNetwork Ltd (2000) KLR 82 the Court of Appeal held that   leave to apply for Judicial Review Orders   should be granted if, on the material available, the court considers   without going into the matter in-depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave.

44. Further in Re Bivac International SA (Bureau Vevitas) [2005] 2 EA 43.  The High Court stated that:

“Applications for leave to apply  for orders of Judicial Review  are normally  exparte  and such an  application  does restrict  the court to threshold   issues namely, whether  the applicant  has an  arguable  case, and   whether  if leave is  granted, the same should operate  as a stay.  Whereas  Judicial Review  remedies  are at the  end of the  day discretionary, that  discretion is a judicial  discretion and for this  reason a court has to  explain how the discretion  if any  was  exercised  so that  all the  parties   are aware of the factors  which  led to the exercise  of the court’s  discretion.  There  should be an arguable  case  which without  delving into details  could  succeed  and an arguable  case is  not ascertained by the court by tossing  a coin or  waving   a magic wand  or raising   a green flag, the  ascertainment of  an arguable  case is  an intellectual  exercise in this  fast  growing  area  of the law  and one  has to  consider  without making any  findings, the  scope  of the Judicial review  remedy sought, the grounds  and the  possible  principles  of administrative   law involved  and not  forget  the ever expanding frontiers  of Judicial Review  and perhaps  give an  applicant  his day in  court   instead of denying  him……like the biblical mustard  seed which  a man took  and sowed  in his  field  and which the  smallest  of  all seeds  but when  it  grew  up it became the biggest  shrub of all and became  a tree so that the birds  of the air  came and sheltered  in  its branches, judicial review  stemmed  from the doctrine  of ultra  vires  and the  rules of natural justice   and has  grown to become   a legal tree with branches  in illegality , irrationality, impropriety  of procedure     ( the  three …….) and has  become  the most powerful enforce of constitutionalism, one  of the greatest promoters  of the rule   of law   and perhaps one of the  most powerful tools  against  abuse of power and  arbitrariness.  One  can  safely state that the growth  of Judicial Review  can only be compared  to the  never ending  categories of negligence  after celebrated case of  Donohue Vs  Stephenson in the last century.  Although leave should not  be granted as a matter of routine, where  one is in doubt one  has to consider  the wise words of Meggany J in the case    of John Vs Rees  [1970] ch 345 Page  402   that in the  exercise  of the discretion on whether  or not  to grant  stay, the court   takes into account  the needs  of  good  administration.”

45. From the above  authoritative  decisions, which  I find  good law, it clearly  emerges that it  is not a  mere formality  that leave  to apply for judicial  review  remedies  shall be   granted.  There are several factors which a court has to take into account.  On the other hand, the burden of proof lies   on the applicant to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that he had a prima facie arguable case for leave to be granted.

46. In other words, in order to invoke the discretion of the court in his favour, an applicant must show that the application is, after all not frivolous, vexatious or abuse of court process.  The application must also be made within six months of the date when the decision sought to be challenged   was made.

47. Article 67 of the Constitution establishes the National Land Commission (NLC).  Among the functions of the National Land Commission is, subject   to Article 68 c (v)   of the Constitution and pursuant to Section 14(1) of the National Land Commission Act No. 5 of 2012 to:

“……….on its own  motion  or upon  a complaint  by the National  Government  or County Government  a community or an individual; review  all grants  or dispositions  of public  land  to establish their  propriety or legality”

(3)  in the exercise of the powers under Subsection (1)  the commission  shall give  every person  who appears to the commission to  have an  interest in the grant  of disposition concerned, a notice  of such review  and an opportunity  to appear   before it  and to inspect  any relevant documents.

(4) After hearing the parties in accordance with Subsection (3) of the commission shall make a determination.

(5)  Where the commission shall direct   the Registrar to revoke the title.

(6) Where the commission finds that the title   was irregularly acquired, the commission shall take   appropriate steps to correct the irregularity and may also   make consequential orders.

(7) No revocation of title shall be effected against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a defect   in the title.

(8)  In the exercise of its power under this section the commission shall be guided by the principles set out under Article 47 of the Constitution.

48. From the above provisions of  the law,  it is clear that any person  can lodge  a complaint  to the National Land Commission or the Commission can on its  own motion review  all grants or dispositions of   public  land to establish  their  propriety    or legality.  But before  carrying  out the review, the commission  is mandated   to serve notice  upon the affected   persons and  to  give them  a fair hearing, in accordance   with Article  47  of the Constitution  and now the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, 2015 which implements Article 47 of the Constitution.

49. On  9th August   2016,  the respondent  National Land  Commission issued a  notice to the applicant   informing  him that the commission  had received  a complaint  from Cheptumo & Company  Advocates acting for the  1st interested party African Inland Church, which complaint  relates to a dispute   that had  persisted  since 1993 on the subject   of submission  of LR 9917/4 and allocation  of LR No. 9917/8 portion  to African Inland  Church – Review  of grant   registered  as 47655/1.

50. The said notice called upon the applicant to attend a hearing on 2nd September   2016   Friday at 10. 00a.m.  at ACK Garden, Annex 7th Floor Boardroom next to Ardhi House.  The notice also asked the applicant to send five copies of his representation and reminded him that he could send a representative.

51. Upon receipt of that  notice, the  applicant on 16th August 2015 instructed  his advocate  Mr H. Kago to respond  to the notice, giving  reasons  why he  would not  attend the hearing  of   review of grant  and he has persisted  to date that  he  will not  attend that hearing   hence, this application for leave.

52. Among the reasons for his persistent refusal to participate in the review process given by the applicant   is that   the land is private land and not public land.  Secondly, that the dispute  is of a  private  nature   between him and  Agricultural  Development  Corporation for the benefit  of African Inland  Church  and that  he cannot  be compelled  to enforce  a mutual  understanding  or an agreement  to surrender  part of the  land.  Finally and more importantly, that the commission  has no jurisdiction  to hear  that dispute  which is  subject of a criminal case pending  in court, and that he  has been  in occupation of the suit property  for over   26  years hence  any claim over that land  is statute  barred.

53. On the other hand, the respondent and  the 2nd  interested   parties  contend that the respondent  is simply exercising its constitutional mandate  under Articles  67  and   68  of the Constitution  and statutory  powers under Section 14  of the National  Land Commission  Act to  carry  out an inquiry  to determine   the legality  or propriety  of  the suit  title, since the transfer  of the  whole  land to the  applicant  by Lands Limited,  a  subsidiary  of Agricultural  Development  Corporation which   is a  public corporation, was  by mistake  and that the  applicant had owned  up  to that mistake  and accepted  to rectify by surrender of the excess acreage, to enable the  2nd interested party effect a transfer of  the said parcel  to the  1st   interested party.

54. Whereas  I have  no doubt in my mind that  the National Land Commission has a constitutional and statutory  mandate  to review  all grants  and dispositions to public  land, and whereas  I do not agree with   the applicant’s  contention that the  land in issue is private  land  and not  public land for reasons  that the land previously belonged to the public(Agricultural  Development  Corporation)    and therefore  the commission has power to investigate how that land  was converted from public  to private  land  and acquired by the  applicant who was in authority at the material time; I am  persuaded that there  is an  arguable  issue for  consideration  at a full hearing  among others, that of  whether or not  the respondent  has  jurisdiction  to review  grant  over land   which the  applicant  has held and occupied for  a period  of over  26  years.

55. The issue for  jurisdiction goes  to the  root of the matter and it is only  fair and just that  the applicant  has  his day in court as  contemplated  in Article  50(1) of the  Constitution  which stipulates that  (i)  Every person  has the right to have any  dispute  that can be  resolved   by the application  of law decided in a fair  and  public hearing  before a court  or, if  appropriate, another independent  and impartial tribunal   or body.”

56. In my view, upon the  court  resolving all issues   relating  to jurisdiction  which are  quite  broad, it can  still  refer  the  matter for  adjudication to another  court or  independent  tribunal or body, including  the respondent herein.  I do not find any merit  in the respondent insisting  that it  must hear  the dispute at this  stage where  serious issues  of jurisdiction of the commission  have been  raised, and  warranting  a further  in-depth investigation.

57. Accordingly,  I am satisfied  that  the applicant  has established  a prima facie  arguable  case which  warrants  grant of leave.

58. In the end, I hereby grant to the applicant  herein Charles  Steven Mbindyo  leave to apply for   Judicial Review  Orders of certiorari and prohibition as prayed  for  in prayers No. 2 and  3  of the chamber summons   dated  30th August   2016.  The substantive motion to be filed and served within 21 days from the date of this ruling.

59. On whether   or not  to grant  stay of  hearing for review  of the grant  until the hearing  and determination   of the main  motion, it is  my view that where it  is shown that failure  to grant stay  will render the substantive motion if  determined in the  applicants  favour  nugatory, it is  appropriate    to grant  stay so  as to  preserve the subject  matter.  In this case, the resolution by the commission to review the grant is a decision that is reached by the commission and therefore capable of being implemented by hearing the complaint for review even in the absence   of the applicant.

60. In Taib  A. Taib  V The   Minister  for Local Government  & Others  Mombasa  HC Miscellaneous Application 158/2006  Maraga J ( as he then  was )  stated that:

“As  injunctions  are not  available   against the  Government  and pubic  officers, stay is a very important  aspect of the JudicialReview   jurisdiction……in Judicial Review  application the court should always   ensure that the exparte  applicant’s  application is not rendered   nugatory by the acts  of the respondent  during the pendency of the  application and therefore  where the order  is efficacious the court  should not  hesitate   to grant it    though it  must never be forgotten  that the stay  orders are  discretionary  and their scope and  purpose   is limited.   The purpose    of a stay  order in  judicial review  proceedings it to prevent    the decision  maker from  continuing  with  the  decision   making process if the decision   has not been made or to suspend the validity and implantation of the decision that has been  made and  it is not  limited to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings as it encompassed  the administrative   decision making process   being  undertaken  by a public    body such  as local authority  or the minister  and the implantation   of the decision such    a body  if it  has been  taken.  It is however not appropriate   to compel a public body to act.  A stay order   framed in such a way to compel the respondents to reinstate   the applicant before hearing the respondent   cannot be granted.”

61. In this case, I am persuaded  that the manner  in which   the application is framed, if a stay  of review  hearing  is not  granted, then  the outcome of  the substantive   motion  if successful  may be  rendered  nugatory  and therefore  an academic exercise.

62. In addition, it is not appropriate to have two parallel legal processes going on simultaneously, that of hearing for review of the grant and the one challenging that review process.

63. Accordingly, I hereby  order that the leave herein granted shall operate as stay of hearing of review of the grant of the subject  property registered  as IR 47655  until the substantive motion if filed  is heard and determined or until  further  orders  of this court.

64. I make no orders as to costs.

Orders accordingly.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 22nd day of September 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of

Mbuthia for the Respondent and h/b for Mr Odhiambo for 2nd interested party

Mr Mathini h/b for Kago for the exparte applicant

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