Chawasarira Transport (Pvt) Ltd. v Nhidza (Civil Appeal 79 of 2004; SC 78 of 2004) [2004] ZWSC 78 (22 September 2004)

1 SC 78/04 DISTRIBUTABLE    (57) Judgment No. SC 78/04 Civil Appeal No. 79/04 CHAWASARIRA      TRANSPORT      (PRIVATE)      LIMITED v                HOSEA       NHIDZA SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE SANDURA  JA,  ZIYAMBI  JA  &  GWAUNZA  JA HARARE, SEPTEMBER 13 & 23, 2004 J Mambara, for the appellant The respondent in person SANDURA  JA:   This is an appeal against a judgment of the Labour Court which ordered the appellant company (“the company”) to pay to the respondent (“Hosea”) his salary and benefits from 3 December 1998 to 9 February 2004, together with interest at the prescribed rate. The factual background may be tabulated conveniently as follows – 1. Hosea   was   employed   by   the   company   as   a   ticket   checker.       On 26 November 1998 the company management held a meeting at which it decided to suspend Hosea from his duties pending the authorisation of his dismissal by the Minister of Labour.   The allegation was that he was incompetent and inefficient in the performance of his duties. SC 78/04 2. On 3 December 1998 the company wrote to Hosea as follows – “You are suspended from duty without pay or any other benefits in terms of section 3(h) of the Labour   Relations   (General   Conditions   of   Employment) Regulations   Statutory   Instrument   371/85.       You   have   been grossly incompetent and inefficient in (the) prosecution of your duties as a ticket checker. You   are   not   allowed   to   visit   our   business   premises   at Graniteside   and   Ardbennie   during   the   period   of   your suspension.” The Regulations referred to should be the Labour Relations (General Conditions   of   Employment)   (Termination   of   Employment) Regulations,   1985,   (“the   Regulations”),   published   in   Statutory Instrument 371 of 1985, which have now been repealed. 3. On 3 March 1999 the company’s application seeking the authority of the   Minister   of   Labour   to   dismiss   Hosea,   which   is   not   part   of   the record   before   this   Court,   was   received   by   the   Ministry   of   Labour. There is nothing in the record which indicates when the application was sent to the Ministry. 4. Uncertain   about   the   procedure   to   be   followed,   Hosea   filed   a   court application   in   the   High   Court   seeking   an   order   setting   aside   his suspension.   That application was dismissed on 2 June 1999 because the   High   Court   was   of   the   view   that   Hosea   had   not   exhausted   the domestic remedies available to him. 5. On 17 September 1999 R. B. Mutsvangwa (“Mutsvangwa”), a labour relations officer, dealt with the company’s application for the authority SC 78/04 to dismiss Hosea.   The company was in default, but Hosea appeared and gave evidence.   At the end of the proceedings, Mutsvangwa made the following determination: “The employee is reinstated without loss of  pay   and   benefits   from   the   date   of   suspension   or alternatively be paid all his wages and benefits for the period of suspension   plus   ten   months   as   damages   for   loss   of employment.” 6. On 24 April 2001 the company, having failed to challenge timeously Mutsvangwa’s determination before a senior labour relations officer, appeared before the Labour Relations Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) (now the   Labour   Court)   and   applied   for   condonation   of   the   delay   in challenging the determination.   The Tribunal took the view that there had not been a proper service of the notice of hearing on the company, quashed   Mutsvangwa’s   determination   and   ordered   a   fresh   hearing before another labour relations officer. 7. On   19 March   2002   the   parties   appeared   before   P Shawatu (“Shawatu”), a labour relations officer, and the company applied for the authority to dismiss Hosea.     That application was subsequently dismissed on 5 April 2002 because Shawatu was of the view that the company’s application for the authority to dismiss Hosea, which had been received by the Ministry of Labour on 3 March 1999, had not been made forthwith as required by the Regulations.     Accordingly, Shawatu ordered the company to reinstate Hosea without any loss of pay and benefits from the date of suspension, or pay him damages in SC 78/04 lieu of reinstatement. 8. Thereafter the matter was referred to a senior labour relations officer at the   request   of   the   company,   and   on   10 October   2002   the   parties appeared   before   A V Mombeirere   (“Mombeirere”),   a   senior   labour relations officer.     Mombeirere set aside Shawatu’s determination on the ground that as the parties were governed by a registered Code of Conduct   (“the   Code”)   they   should   have   proceeded   in   terms   of   the Code. 9. On 30 April 2003 the company’s lawyers wrote to Hosea’s lawyers as follows: “We wish to   confirm   that   we   represented   Chawasarira Transport   when   the   matter   was   heard   by   the   senior   labour relations officer. We   wish   to   confirm   that   Mr Hosea   Nhidza   was   discharged from the services of Chawasarira Transport in accordance with the operating Code of Conduct in the Transport Industry.   The Managing Director presided over the final hearing that led to his dismissal.” 10. On   4 June   2003   Hosea   appealed   to   the   Labour   Court   against   his dismissal.     The appeal was subsequently heard on 9 February 2004 and the Labour Court reserved its judgment, which was later handed down on 12 February 2004.   The result of the appeal was that Hosea’s dismissal   was   set   aside   with   costs   but,   as   Hosea   had   not   sought reinstatement, the Labour Court ordered the company to pay him his salary   and   benefits   from   3 December   1998,   the   date   when   he   was suspended, to 9 February 2004, when the appeal was heard, together SC 78/04 with interest at the prescribed rate. The Labour Court allowed Hosea’s appeal for two reasons.   The first was that Hosea’s dismissal had not been in compliance with the provisions of the Code; and the second was that on the merits the company had not established Hosea’s alleged incompetence and inefficiency. Dissatisfied   with   the   result   of   the   appeal   to   the   Labour   Court,   the company appealed to this Court. At   the   hearing   of   this   appeal,   Mr Mambara,   who   appeared   for   the company,  conceded,   correctly   in  my  view,  that  Hosea  had  not   been   dismissed   in accordance   with   the   procedure   set   out   in   the   Code.       He   added   that   when   the company’s chief executive was advised to comply with the determination made by Mombeirere and proceed in terms of the Code before dismissing Hosea, he said he would not do so because he had already dismissed Hosea. In  my view, the conduct of the company’s  chief  executive is to  be deprecated and condemned in the strongest terms. In   the   circumstances,   the   Labour   Court   found   that   no   disciplinary hearing had taken place and said: “From the above, it is clear that no disciplinary hearing   was   held,   but   only   a   management   meeting   where   the   decision   to suspend (Hosea) was made. SC 78/04 Under the circumstances (the) respondent (the company) failed to prove its case against (the) appellant as it did not follow the provisions of its own Code of Conduct.     The rules of natural justice were flouted with impunity by the respondent.   (The) appellant’s dismissal was therefore unlawful.” I entirely agree with the views expressed by the Labour Court.    The company’s   chief   executive   appears   to   have   proceeded   on   the   basis   that   he   could ignore the Code and dismiss Hosea without holding a disciplinary hearing and giving Hosea an opportunity to defend himself.     He was not even prepared to proceed in terms of the Code when his own lawyers advised him to do so after the determination made by Mombeirere. The   Code,   which   is   part   of   the   Collective   Bargaining   Agreement: Transport Operating Industry, published in Statutory Instrument 94 of 1995, sets out an   elaborate   procedure   which   must   be   followed   from   the   time   an   allegation   of misconduct  is  made  against  an  employee   up  to  the   time   the   employee   concerned appeals   to  the  chief   executive,  from   whose decision   an  appeal   lies  to  the  Labour Court. The determination by Mombeirere, i.e. that the parties should proceed in   terms   of   the   Code,   was   obviously  correct   because   s 101(5)   of   the   Labour   Act [Chapter 28:01] provides as follows: “Notwithstanding   this   Part,   but   subject   to   subsection (6),   no   labour officer shall intervene in any dispute or matter which is or is liable to be the subject of proceedings under an employment code, nor shall he intervene in any such proceedings.” If   the   company’s   chief   executive   felt   that   the   determination   by SC 78/04 Mombeirere was wrong, he should have instructed the company’s lawyers to note an appeal to the Tribunal where the determination would have been challenged.   In view of the fact that he did not do so, the company was bound by the determination and should have complied with it by proceeding in terms of the Code before dismissing Hosea.   As the company, through its chief executive, refused to do so, that is the end of the matter.   The appeal cannot succeed. In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with costs. ZIYAMBI JA:     I   agree. GWAUNZA  JA:     I   agree. Muvirimi & Associates, appellant's legal practitioners