Cromwell Mzame v Zablon Mwanyumba Lalu (Suing as Administrator of the estate of Allen Warito Lalu (Deceased) & Salome Yieko [2022] KEHC 1421 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT VOI

CIVIL APPEAL NO. E1 OF 2020

CROMWELL MZAME..............................................................APPELANT

-V/S-

ZABLON MWANYUMBA LALU (Suing as Administrator of the estate of

ALLEN WARITO LALU (Deceased).............................1ST RESPONDENT

SALOME YIEKO..........................................................2ND RESPONDENT

Being an appeal from the judgment and decree in Voi Chief Magistrates Court Civil Case No. 131 of 2018 delivered by Hon. A. N. Karimi (RM)

BETWEEN

ZABLON MWANYUMBA LALU (Suing as Administrator of

the estate ofAllen WARITO LALU (Deceased)....PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

CROMWELL MZAME.................................1ST DEFENDANT

SALOME YIEKO..........................................2ND DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

Background

1. By a plaint dated 3rd April 2018, Zablon Mwanyumba Lalu, the Administrator of the estate of the deceased herein sued Cromwell Mzame and Salome Yieko seeking damages for pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life, lost years, and special damages of Kshs. 22,050.

2. The claim arose out of a fatal road accident that occurred on 16th April 2015 when the 1st Defendant/Appellant, his driver, servant/agent drove motor vehicle Reg. No. KBY 708Y along Mwatate – Voi Road in a careless and negligent manner and caused the said vehicle to collide with the deceased who was walking off the road and causing fatal injuries.

3. Upon taking evidence of the Plaintiff’s 4 witnesses and the defence evidence of Dalmas Mashengu Mwachanje, the trial magistrate came to the conclusion that the Defendants were wholly liable for the accident and made the following awards: -

i. General damages for pain and suffering  Kshs. 100,000

ii. General damages for loss of expectation of life   Kshs. 200,000

iii. General damages for lost years           Kshs. 1,174,330

iv. Costs and interest of the suit from date of judgment until payment in full

4. The 1st Defendant was aggrieved by the determination of the trial magistrate and he preferred the appeal herein on the following grounds: -

1. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in making a finding of negligence against the appellant without evidence and/or in failing to apportion liability and in holding that the respondent had proved her case on a balance of probability.

2. The learned trial magistrate exercised his discretion in making his findings on liability wrongly by, acting contrary to the weight of evidence that was before the court.

3. The learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider judicial precedent, and in failing to appreciate the doctrine of causation and blame worthiness hence arrived at a wrong decision on negligence and liability.

4. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the issue of liability as a matter of fact by failing to analyze and appreciate the evidence on record on the issue of liability and causation.

5. That the assessment of damages for loss of dependency, loss of expectation of life and pain and suffering that were inordinately high as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate.

6. That the learned trial magistrate in assessing damages under the Law Reform Act viz loss of dependency and lost years under the Fatal Accident Act by failing to apply the correct principles in determining the same hence arrived at an erroneous assessment or estimate of damages.

7. That the learned trial magistrate misapprehended the evidence and misapplied, misunderstood and/or overlooked the correct legal principles and judicial precedent and submissions by parties that he made an award under the Law Reform Act and the Fatal Accidents Act, that was inordinately high hence the erroneous estimate of damages, which the deceased and his estate suffered.

8. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in failing to appreciate that dependency is a matter of fact, its subsisting is pegged on the dependant’s life.

9. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to take into account the fact that the beneficiaries both under the Law Reform Act and the Fatal Accidents Act were the same while assessing damages under both heads.

5. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions.

Appellant’s Submissions

6. According to submissions by the Appellant on the jurisdiction of this court, the Appellant cited the case of Mwanasokoni v Kenya bus Services Ltd [1985] where it was held as follows: -

“Although this court on appeal will not lightly differ from the judge at first instance on a finding of fact, it is undeniable that we have the power to reevaluate the evidence on a first appeal if this should be necessary.”

…

“Accordingly, only when a finding of fact that is challenged on appeal is based on no evidence or on misapprehension of evidence or the judge is shown demonstratably to have acted on wrong principles in reaching a finding he did will this court interfere with.”

7. On the Plaintiff’s case not proved on a balance of probability, the Appellant submitted that the burden of proof placed on the claimant in negligence was considered in the case of Ndiritu v Ropkoi & Another C. A. No. 345 of 2000 Nyeri where it was held as follows: -

“As a general preposition, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. This is the purport of Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, which provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.”

…

“The Plaintiff asserted that the accident was solely caused by the negligence of the Defendants’ driver and gave particulars of such negligence which the Defendants denied…issues were subsequently joined. In the vent, each party was under a duty to prove their own assertions.”

8. The Appellant further stated that the above is reiterated in Florence Mutheu Musembi & Geoffrey Mutunga Kimiti v Francis Karenge [2021] eKLR. The Appellant stated that there was contradiction in evidence on page 332 at line 11 to 24 and at line 13 to 18 and page 333 line 6 to 14 which was captured by the trial court on page 347 line 2 to 5 of the Record of Appeal. The Appellant submitted that it cannot be said that contradictory evidence was sufficient to prove the case. That if the court felt neither party allegedly offered consistent satisfactory evidence, then Section 3 (4) of the Evidence Act would come in which provides that what’s neither proved nor disproved is deemed not proved. The Appellant further cited the case of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi (2014) eKLR.

9. On findings of fact contrary to the evidence or misapprehended it or acted without evidence at all, the Appellant cited the holding of the trial magistrate on page 347 line 17 to 34 and page 348 line 1 to 4 of the Record of Appeal. That the trial magistrate seems to blame the Appellant as follows: -

i. Defendant was untruthful

ii. Defendant was overtaking

iii. Impact on the right side of the road

iv. Defendant was in high speed

v. Dead people tell no tales

vi. PW3 saw the deceased from far

10. The Appellant stated on interference with assessment of damages states that the issue of damages and its without prejudice to the submission that liability was not proved. Assessment of damages is an exercise of discretion and the court cannot interfere with it unless the conditions set out in Hidaya Ilanga v Mangema Manyoka [1961] EA 705 are satisfied. On pain and suffering, the Appellant states that damages under this head should always be minimal but the court made an award of Kshs. 100,000 which was inordinately high. The Appellant cited the case of Morris Gitonga (suing as the legal representative of the estate of BM) v Morris Mutunga Kyaula & Another [2017] eKLR where the court awarded Kshs. 25,000, Francis K. Righa v Mary Njeri (Suing as the legal representative of the estate of James Kariuki Nganga [2020] eKLR where the court sustained an award of Kshs. 40,000, and the Court of Appeal in Silverstone Quarry Limited & Another v Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Another (Suing as administrators of the estate of Philip Musyoka Muthoka [2020] eKLR where the court reduced an award under this head to Kshs. 50,000. The Appellant stated that Kshs. 100,000 is inordinately high and the court should interfere with it and award Kshs. 20,000.

11. For loss of expectation of life, the Appellant stated that the court made an observation at page 349 line 22 to 30 of the Record of Appeal. That first, it is not true that the Appellant submitted that damages are not awarded under this head. That at page 152 line 20 to 30, the Appellant made proposals for an award under this head. That secondly, it is not true from the evidence that the deceased had joined politics. That PW1 alleged deceased was a Personal Assistant to a Member of the Count Assembly while the mother alleged he was a secretary. That thirdly, none of the witnesses stated how the deceased’s lifestyle and health were yet they bore the burden of proof. That the finding of him living a normal life was thus without proof. That these are aspects in the case that were specifically within the knowledge of PW1 and PW2 hence they bore the burden of proof under Section 112 of the Evidence Act Chapter 80 of the laws of Kenya.

12. Further to the above, the Appellant stated that the cases of Moses Akumba & Another v Hellen Karisa Thoya [2017] eKLR, Patrick Kariuki Muiruri & 3 Others v Attorney General [2019] eKLR and Vincent Kipkorir Tanui (Suing as the administrator and or personal representative of the estate of Samuel Kiprotich Tanui (Deceased) v Mogogosiek Tea Factory Limited & Another (2018) eKLR were relied on by the trial magistrate who failed to consider the peculiar facts behind the awards in the cases hence misdirected herself. That it is trite for every case to be decided by virtue of its own set of circumstances. The Appellant stated that the court did not take into account that it would make an award for loss of dependency and it has been widely held that awards under this head should be nominal for that reason. The Appellant cited the case of EMK & Another v EOO [2008] eKLR. The Appellant then urged the court to consider the case of Morris Gitonga (Suing as the legal representative of the estate of B M) v Morris Mutunga Kyula & Another [2017] eKLR where the court awarded Kshs. 100,000 and the case of Francis K. Righa v Mary Njeri (Suing as the legal representative of the estate of James Kariuki Nganga) [2020] eKLR where the court awarded Kshs. 80,000. The Appellant urged the court to reduce the amount from Kshs. 100,000 to Kshs. 80,000.

13. On the issue of lost years or loss of dependency, the Appellant submitted that the mother of the deceased was the only dependant aged 59 years as per the plaint. That this would very material in determining the multiplier because dependency is a matter of fact and the life expectancy of a dependant is crucial in determining it. The younger the dependants, the higher the multiplier and the older the dependant, the lower the multiplier. The Appellant states that the trial court took into account only the aspects of the deceased but failed to consider those of the sole dependant and local circumstances. That for failure to consider the age of the dependant, and life expectancy in Kenya, the court failed to take into account important aspects hence this court can interfere with its exercise of discretion in choosing a multiplier. That this was set out in Njowamu Construction Company Limited v Grishon Katua Ndolo & Another [2021] eKLR. That the life dependency in Kenya is currently put at 64 to 69 years as per Joseph Mwangi Wanyeki v Alex Muriithi Mucoki & Another [2019] eKLR which was reiterated in the case of James Njiiri & 2 Others v FPU & Another [2019] eKLR. That the manner of assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act was set out in Chunibhai J. Patel & Another v P. F. Hayes & Others [1957] E. A. 748.

14. The Appellant stated that in the textbook by John Munkman, Damages for Personal Injuries and Death at page 155, 156 and 157 the issue of assessment of damages under the Fatal Accident Act Chapter 32 Laws of Kenya, the principle as stated therein is that one obvious limitation of damages in such a case is that a parent will usually have a shorter expectation than a widow. That in addition, the court must take into account the possibility that the son or daughter will marry, and that the assistance provided will vanish at least or be reduced. That this risk may fairly be allowed for where a parent still has a substantial expectation of life-by taking a smaller number of years’ multiplier.

15. That in further submission to the above, the Appellant cited the case of Dobley v Godwin [1955] 2 ALL ER 166 where the son who was killed was living with the mother supporting her and was aged 29 years and the mother 53. The judge used a multiplier of 15. The Court of Appeal said that this would have been a proper figure as between husband and wife but was too much having regard to the possibility of marriage. Accordingly, a multiplier of 7 years was applied. In submitting further, the Appellant cited the cases of John Migwi & Another v Mashua Hassan Msuka & Another C. A. No. 96 of 2019 Mombasa and Alejandro Campon & Another v Swaleh Brok Islam & Another HCCC No. 248 of 2011 where a multiplier of 15 years was applied. The Appellant submitted that a multiplier of 12 years will suffice as it would take the dependant’s (mother) age to about 73 years which is well above the life expectancy in Kenya of 64 to 69 years. The Appellant thus proposed that loss of dependency be pegged at Kshs. 563,678. 40. The Appellant therefore urged the court to allow the appeal as prayed.

Respondent’s Submissions

16. The Respondent in his submissions stated that the contradictions of DW1’s evidence only buttress the version of events of the Plaintiff’s witnesses in the manner of how the accident occurred. That the photographs on page 56 of the Record of Appeal also adduced by the Appellant on the point of impact also corroborate the version of events of PW3 and PW4 that the deceased was almost off the road when he was knocked by the Appellant. That the version of PW3 on how the accident had occurred as well as the exact point of impact is more plausible as the left side of the Defendant’s vehicle would be the impact that would have been the point of impact only if the deceased was almost finished crossing the road.

17. The Respondent submitted that DW1 also confirmed that the scene of the accident is a stage where normally passengers alight and board public service vehicles. He further stated that he is well aware that pedestrians would normally cross the road at a stage hence a prudent driver ought to exercise extra caution when approaching one. That he further stated that there were people on the side of the road who witnessed the accident and that further the police also visited the scene of the accident. That no evidence was adduced by DWI that the deceased had made a sudden dash across the road so as to make it impossible for him to have avoided the accident. That the deceased was not only hit by the left side of the bonnet, but was further thrown to the windscreen and thereafter onto the tarmac which goes to demonstrate that it was high velocity impact.

18. On analysis of evidence and applicable law, the Respondent submitted that indeed DW1 was driving recklessly at a high speed and ought to have slowed down once he was approaching the stage and noticed from far the deceased alighting and crossing the road. The Respondent cited the cases of Mondo v Jessa [1969] E. A. as was quoted in the case of Lillian Gakethi Mworia v Stanley Mwithimbu M’ithiri [2010] eKLR. That if indeed the deceased would have suddenly crossed the road from behind the matatu and the distance from which DW1 seeing him only being one of metre as he stated in his examination in chief, then the point of impact would have been on the right side of his bonnet and not the left side which is indicative that the deceased was almost done crossing the road. That in the case of Abson Motors & 2 Others v Sinema Kitsao & Another (administrators of the estate of the late Kitsao Kajefwa Kitunga Deceased) [2016] eKLR, the court held that the mere fact that the accident driver was on his correct lane does not entitle him to knock anything on his way.

19. The Respondent made reference to Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act Cap 80 which provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. The Respondent further cited the case of Wilson Saiya v David Winga Odongo (Suing as the legal representative of Helida Awino Odongo - Deceased) [2018] eKLR where the court made a decision on similar circumstances to the current case where the court rendered the evidence of the Appellant highly doubtful and unbelievable. The Respondent submitted that the trial magistrate was correct in holding the Appellant 100% liable for causing the said accident.

20. Under the Law Reform Act on pain and suffering, the Respondent states that the deceased died the following day after the accident and that the deceased must have suffered immensely from the injuries he sustained. PW3 confirmed that the deceased was still alive after he was hit by the Appellant and was taken to Moi Hospital where he passed on the following day. That the trial magistrate was correct in making an award of Kshs. 100,000 as guided by the case of Joseph Kivati Wambua v SMM & Another (suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of EMM - Deceased) as was quoted in the case of Caleb Juma Nyabuto v Evance Otieno Mogaka & Another [2021] eKLR. That the same position was upheld in Civil Case No. 56 of 2014 Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Another v Silverstone Quarry Limited & Another (2016) eKLR.

21. On the loss of expectation of life, the Respondent submitted that the trial magistrate made an appropriate award under this head as evidence was adduced that indeed the deceased was a professional and in good health as per the evidence of PW1 and PW2. The Respondent relied on the case of Premier Diary Limited v Amarjit Singh Sagoo & Another [2013] eKLR.

22. Under the Fatal Accident Act, the Respondent stated that Section 4(1) of the Act defines a dependant as wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. That the Respondent produced the chief’s letter before the court to prove that their mother was a dependant of the deceased. That the Plaintiff has proved on a balance of probabilities through witnesses’ testimony as well as documents such as the letter to the County Assembly requesting the employment details of the deceased. That the Plaintiff has equally proved that the deceased was an educated person as was engaged in active employment throughout his life. That the trial magistrate was correct in holding that the applicable wage was that as contained in legal notice number 196 and 197 of 2013 which gave the appropriate minimum wage of a personal assistant at Kshs. 11,743. 30 as well as multiplier of 25 years as the deceased was 30 years old. The Respondent therefore urged the court to dismiss the appeal herein with costs to the Respondent.

Analysis and Determination

23. This is a first appeal and in the circumstances this Court has a duty to analyze and re-evaluate the evidence adduced in the superior court and to reconsider it to find out if it warranted the decision reached. As was stated in Selle & Another v. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd.[1968] 123 at p 126: -

“…the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put, they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this Court in not bound necessarily to follow the trial Judges findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.”

24. After considering the grounds of appeal, records of the trial court and submissions, the issues for determination are as follows: -

a. Whether the trial magistrate erred in blaming the Appellant for negligence against the weight of evidence adduced.

b. Whether damages awarded were inordinately high.

c. Whether the trial magistrate failed to apply correct principles in assessment of general damages in loss of expectation of life under the Law Reform Act as against loss of dependency and lost years under the Fatal Accidents Act.

d. Whether the trial magistrate considered the life of deceased person’s dependants in assessing damages for loss of dependency.

e. Whether the trial magistrate took int account the fact that the dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act are also the beneficiates under the Law Reform Act when assessing damages.

Whether the trial magistrate erred in blaming the Appellant for negligence against the weight of evidence adduced.

25.  Evidence of the eye witness PW3 and evidence of the police officer PW4 confirm that the driver of the motor vehicle in question DW1 was driving at a high speed in a highly populated area where he ought to have slowed down since there was a stage and in his words he had seen the deceased alighting from a matatu which had stopped in the opposite direction.

26. Thee trial magistrate analysed the evidence before him and found that the driver of the motor vehicle did not exercise reasonable care to avoid the accident as he failed to slow down after seeing the matatu stop and seeing the deceased alight while he was still at a distance. This court therefore finds that grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the appeal cannot stand.

Whether damages awarded were inordinately high.

27. Award of damages is an exercise of the trial magistrate’s discretion and can only be set aside upon a good reason as was held in the cases below.

InFarah Awad Gullet v CMC Motors Group Limited [2018] eKLR,it was held as follows: -

“The jurisdiction of the Court to either award costs or interfere with an award of costs made by the Court appealed from is donated by Rule 31 of the rules of the Court. It provides as follows:

“31. On any appeal the Court shall have power, so far as its jurisdiction permits, to confirm, reverse or vary the decision of the superior court, or to remit the proceedings, to the superior Court with such directions as may be appropriate, or to order a new trial, and to make any necessary incidental or consequential orders, including orders as to costs”.

Further in Mbogo & Another versus Shah [1968] E.A. 93,it was held: -

“An appellate Court will interfere if the exercise of the discretion is clearly wrong because the Judge has misdirected himself or acted on matters which he should not have acted upon or failed to take into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion. It is trite law that an appellate Court should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a Judge unless it is satisfied that the Judge in exercising his discretion has misdirected himself and has been clearly wrong in the exercise of the discretion and that as a result, there has been injustice”

28. For pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life under the Law Reform Act, the deceased was said to have died the following day after the accident and awards under this heading are made according to the time taken before the deceased succumbs to his injuries. Awards where death occurs immediately are normally minimal. Therefore, in this case the award of Kshs. 100,000 for pain and suffering is reasonable.

29. For loss of expectation of life, as held in the case of Mercy Muriuki & Another v Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another (Suing as the administrator of the late Robert Mwangi) [2019] eKLR referred to in the trial court’s judgment, nominal damages should be awarded if death followed immediately after the accident. In consideration of the authorities relied upon which were pronouncements made in 2017 and 2018, this court finds that the same are reasonable. The Appellant had cited the case of Victoria Ng’endo v J. K. Njoroge High Court Civil Case No. 3849 where Kshs. 70,000 was awarded after consideration of the issue of inflation. The authorities are obviously too old to be applicable to the current situation if inflation is to b considered. The failure to adduce evidence on the health and lifestyle of the deceased cannot be taken into account where the deceased died as a result of a road traffic accident.

Whether the trial magistrate failed to apply correct principles in assessment of general damages in loss of expectation of life under the Law Reform Act as against loss of dependency and lost years under the Fatal Accidents Act.

30. The Respondent’s prayers as shown in the plaint dated 3rd April 2018:

a. General damages for pain and suffering

b. Special damages of Kshs. 22,050

c. Loss of expectation of life

d. Lost years

e. Interest on a) and b) at court rates.

31. Submissions by the Appellant and thee Respondent both in the lower court and in the appeal herein on damages for loss of dependency is misplaced as the same was not pleaded. The trial magistrate in the judgment said as much. All the damages sought were under the Law Reform Act and the issue of double compensation should not have arisen in those circumstances.

32. InSheikh M Hassan v Kamau Transporters [1982-88] I KAR 946,the Court laid down guidelines for assessing damages for lost years under the Law Reform Act. Those guidelines are, inter alia:-

a) “The sum to be awarded is never a conventional one but compensation for a pecuniary loss.

b) It must be assessed justly and with moderation,

c) Deduct the victims living expenses during the “lost years” for they would not form part of the estate.

d) A young child’s present or future earnings in most cases would be nil.

e) An adolescent would usually be real, assessable and small.

f) Calculate the annual gross loss.

g) Apply the multiplier (estimated number of “lost working years” accepted as reasonable in each case).

h) Deduct the victim’s probable living expenses of a reasonably satisfying enjoyable life for him or her.”

Following the guidelines in the above authority, this court finds that the trial magistrate properly assessed damages save for the multiplier of 25 years was on the higher side considering the uncertainties and vagaries of life and considering that the deceased who was aid to be a personal assistant to the MCA would have been rendered jobless by the end of the MCA’s term. A multiplier of 20 years would be more reasonable. Damages for lost years should therefore be 11,743. 30 × 12 × 20 × 1/3 = 939,464.

Whether the trial magistrate considered the life of deceased person’s dependants in assessing damages for loss of dependency.

33. The proposition by the Appellant that the age of the deceased’s mother should be taken into account while assessing damages for loss of dependency is totally erroneous, it is not founded in law or principles of equity. It is the age of the deceased that is used to quantify damages.

Whether the trial magistrate took int account the fact that the dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act are also the beneficiates under the Law Reform Act when assessing damages.

34. At page 10 of the judgment, the holding of the court of appeal in the case of Hellen Waruguru Waweru (suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja) v Kiarie Shoe Stores Ltd [2015] eKLR has been referred to set out the principle of double compensation under the law reform Act and Fatal Accidents Act which is that the awards under the Law Reform Act should be taken into account when making awards under Section 4(2) of the Fatal Accident Act. That there is a distinction of the words to be taken into account and to be deducted. That it is sufficient if the judgment of the lower court shows that in reaching the figure awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act, the trial judge bore in mind or considered what was awarded under the Law Reform Act.

35. Although the Respondent had pleaded for special damages of Kshs. 22,050 and the Appellant in his submission had no objection if liability had been proved, this court’s perusal of the judgment of the trial court has established that the prayers that are referred to at page 8 but the trial magistrate failed to make any finding on the same. This was obviously an oversight on the part of the trial magistrate and since the same appears to have been proved in the trial court, it will form part of the award to the Respondent herein.

36. In conclusion, the appeal herein is allowed partially and judgment entered for the Respondent in the following terms:

1. General damages for lost years Kshs. 939,464

2. General damages for pain and suffering Kshs. 100,000

3. General damages for loss of expectation of life Kshs. 200,000

4. Special damages of Kshs. 22,050

5. Costs and interests of the suit from the date of judgment till payment in full.

6. Cost of the appeal to be borne by each party.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT/ONLINE THROUGH MS TEAMS, THIS 10TH DAY OF MARCH, 2022

HON. LADY JUSTICE A. ONG’INJO

JUDGE

In the presence of: -

Ogwel- Court Assistant

Mr. Jengo Advocate for the Appellant

Mr. Righa Advocate for the Respondents

HON. LADY JUSTICE A. ONG’INJO

JUDGE

Court:Judgment to be transmitted to Voi High Court and to the parties by mail.

10. 3.2022