The appellate court found that while there was clear evidence of penetration into the complainant's vagina, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the penetration was effected by the appellant's penis, as required for a conviction of defilement under Section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act. The medical evidence and contemporaneous statements indicated penetration by fingers rather than by penis. The court held that the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case were not material enough to negate the fact of penetration, but they did affect the nature of the offence proved. The appellant's rights to a fair trial were not infringed, as he was supplied with all necessary documents, was informed of his rights, and was able to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof. Applying Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court substituted the conviction for defilement with a conviction for sexual assault under Section 5(1)(a)(i) of the Sexual Offences Act, as this was a minor and cognate offence supported by the evidence. The sentence of life imprisonment was set aside and replaced with a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment, which the court deemed sufficient for the offence committed.