THE REPUBLIC VRS. HIGH COURT (GENERAL JURISDICTION 8), ACCRA EX PARTE DANIEL OFORI (J5/85/2024) [2025] GHASC 4 (22 January 2025)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA – AD.2025 CORAM: LOVELACE–JOHNSON (MS) JSC (PRESIDING) ASIEDU JSC GAEWU JSC DARKO ASARE JSC ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC CIVIL MOTION NO: J5/85/2024 22ND JANUARY, 2025 THE REPUBLIC VRS. HIGH COURT (GENERAL JURISDICTION 8), ACCRA EX PARTE DANIEL OFORI … APPLICANT ECOBANK GHANA LIMITED … INTERESTED PARTY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ RULING Page 1 of 24 MAJORITY OPINION DARKO ASARE JSC: INTRODUCTION My Lords, this is an application seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this court by way of judicial review for an order of certiorari directed at the High Court, General Jurisdiction 8, to bring up into this Court for purposes of being quashed and quashing the ruling of the court dated the 2nd day of May 2024; a declaration that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain execution of a judgment of the Supreme Court; and an order of prohibition prohibiting the High Court (General Jurisdiction 8] from entertaining any proceedings and/or application(s) to restrain the execution proceedings commenced in the suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021) as ordered by the Supreme Court. GROUNDS FOR APPLICATION The grounds for the application are set out by the Applicant as follows: - i. The High Court has no jurisdiction to grant an order of interlocutory injunction to stay execution pending appeal in respect of the garnishee proceedings in Suit No. CM/MISC/0829 when there is no appeal pending in respect of those proceedings. Page 2 of 24 ii. By its decision of 2nd May 2024, the High Court wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to entertain an application [for injunction pending appeal] by the Interested Party to restrain the execution of a final judgment of the Supreme Court in the suit intituled Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. Daniel Ofori v. CM/MISC/0829/2021). Particulars. a. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any process whatsoever to suspend the execution of a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court which the Supreme Court expressly directed the High Court to execute for the benefit of the Applicant. b. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order of interlocutory injunction under the provisions of Order 25 rule 1 after a final judgment, even of the High Court. c. The High Court has no jurisdiction, under the provisions of Order 43 rule 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, to entertain an application to stay execution of judgments of the Supreme Court which it is required by the Supreme Court to execute. Page 3 of 24 d. By the principle of estoppel per rem judicatam the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings to reopen for determination the very matters determined by the Supreme Court against the Interested Party. iii. The High Court has no jurisdiction to determine de novo a point of law already determined by the Supreme Court: a. The High Court, by virtue of article 129(3) of the Constitution, ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court which held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter to question any judgment of a court higher in the hierarchy than the High Court. b. The High Court ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court all of which Supreme Court decisions held that the Interested Party is not entitled to a stay of execution of the judgment of the Supreme Court. BACKGROUND To provide context and clarity, this analysis will commence with a concise summary of the salient events leading up to the decision under attack. Following a judgment entered in favour of the Applicant, the Supreme Court directed that the said judgment be enforced by the High Court. The Applicant initiated Page 4 of 24 garnishee proceedings, while the Interested Party filed a new suit to set aside the Supreme Court's judgment, citing fraud. The High Court dismissed this suit, and the Interested Party appealed. The Interested Party then applied for an injunction to prevent the Applicant from enforcing the Supreme Court's judgment, pending the hearing of the appeal. The Applicant raised a preliminary objection by motion and argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this application. However, the High Court dismissed this objection, ruling that it had jurisdiction since the execution process was pending before it. This decision has led to an application for judicial review, with the Applicant arguing that the High Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of the Supreme Court's judgment, especially since no appeal is pending. The Applicant also claims that the High Court wrongfully assumed jurisdiction and should not have determined a point of law already decided by the Supreme Court At its core, the present application for judicial review rests on the fundamental assertion that the High Court lacked the requisite jurisdictional competence to entertain, let alone adjudicate, the merits of the injunction application. As learned Counsel for the Applicant forcefully argues in his Statement of Case: - “…. the High Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain any process to suspend or stay the enforcement of a final judgment, order or decree of the Supreme Court. This point is quite trite. It is entirely in the province of every court to enforce its judgments, orders and/or decrees.” Page 5 of 24 Learned Counsel for the Applicant further submitted that when directed by the Supreme Court to execute any judgment emanating from the Court, a High Court cannot go beyond that directive to impose any terms or conditions on its own such as a stay of execution. Referring to Rule 28 of CI 16, and the case of Ex Parte Kumoji [2000] SCGLR 211, Applicant's Counsel submits as follows: - “This provision makes clear what the High Court was to do based on the Supreme Court Order requiring execution of its judgment to be undertaken by the High Court. The High Court is obliged to enforce the judgment in terms of the Court's directive. The High Court cannot go beyond the confines of the direction and impose any terms or conditions on its own such as a stay of execution of the judgment the Court has directed the High Court to execute. This is the also the import of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Republic v High Court, Accra: Ex parte Kumoji.” The question then is whether the Applicant was right in contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction at first instance to even entertain let alone adjudicate the injunction application, and that by merely deciding to entertain the said application for purposes of refusing or granting it, the High Court had acted in excess of jurisdiction. Page 6 of 24 To properly contextualize this inquiry, it may perhaps be necessary to briefly recount the basic legal principles that inform the exercise of this Court's judicial review jurisdiction under Rule 61 of CI 16. APPLICABLE LAW The principles governing the grant of an application for judicial review under the provisions of Article 132 of the Constitution and Rule 61 of CI 16 are now so well entrenched as not to require any detailed re-statement here. Suffice to say that certiorari is a discretionary remedy granted on grounds of jurisdictional excess or deficiency, breach of natural justice, or patent error on the record rendering the decision a nullity Save in clear cases of jurisdictional defect or egregious breach of natural justice, certiorari will only succeed if the error of law is manifestly apparent on the face of the record Certiorari is not concerned with the merits but is a complaint about jurisdiction or some procedural irregularity. The above statement of the law has been re-affirmed in a plethora of judicial decisions like Republic v Court of Appeal, Accra, Ex-parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612 at 619 Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex-parte Ghana Medical Association (Arcman- Akumey — Interested Party) [2012] 2 SCGLR; The Republic v High Court, Accra Ex- parte Attorney-General (Ohene Agyapong Interested Party) [2012] 2 SCGLR 1204; as well as Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex-parte Tetteh Apain [2007-2008] SCGLR 72 Page 7 of 24 The following passage by this Court in the case of Republic v High Court (Commercial Division) Ex Parte The Trust Bank (Ampomah Photo Lab and 3 ors, Interested Parties) [2009] SCGLR 164, (at p.169-171), provides perhaps the most pristine roadmap regulating the parameters for the exercise by the Supreme Court of its supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts: - "The current law on when the prerogative writs will be available from the Supreme Court to supervise the superior courts in respect of their errors of law was restated and then fine-tuned in the Republic v High Court Accra, Ex Parte CHRAJ [2003-2004] SCGLR 1 and Republic v Court of Appeal, Ex Parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612, respectively. In my view, the combined effect of these two authorities results in a statement of the law which is desirable and should be re-affirmed. This Court should endeavour not to backslide into excessive supervisory intervention over the High Court in relation to its errors of law. Appeals are better suited for resolving errors of law. In the Ex Parte CHRAJ case, this Court, speaking through me, sought to reset the clock on this aspect of the law (as stated at pages 345-346) as follows: "The Ruling of this Court in this case, it is hoped, provides a response to the above invitation to restate the law on this matter. The restatement of the law may be summarised as follows: where the High Court (or for that matter the Court of Appeal) makes a non-jurisdictional error of law which Page 8 of 24 is not patent on the face of the record (within the meaning already discussed), the avenue for redress open to an aggrieved party is an appeal, not judicial review. In this regard, an error of law made by the High Court or the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as taking the judge outside the court's jurisdiction, unless the court has acted ultra vires the Constitution or an express statutory restriction validly imposed on it. To the extent that this restatement of the law is inconsistent with any previous decision of this Supreme Court, this Court should be regarded as departing from its previous decision or decisions concerned, pursuant to Article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution. Any previous decisions of other courts inconsistent with this restatement are overruled." The fundamental principle gleaned from the authorities is that the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction, albeit expansive, does not extend to scrutinizing non- jurisdictional errors better suited for resolution through the appellate process. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction should only be invoked in the most exceptional and manifest cases, lest it devolves into a forum for indiscriminate challenges to lower court decisions. Now, does this present case involve an error that can be scrutinized and remedied through the exercise of this Court’s judicial review powers? Page 9 of 24 CONSIDERATION In dismissing the Applicant’s preliminary objection against the assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the Interested Party’s application for interlocutory injunction, the High Court had delivered itself as follows: - “This case commenced in the High Court and has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court and the execution of the apex Court's judgment is being levied in this Court as directed by the Supreme Court so this Court can entertain applications. The garnishee proceeding is taking place in this court and thus, gives the court the right to entertain applications that are brought before it until execution is completely levied. Secondly, since the execution process is pending in this Court even though the judgment is that of the Supreme Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with it as execution is being levied here. I do not find the process filed by the Defendant as irregular as injunction applications under Order 25 Rule 2 of C. I. 47 can be brought even after the trial of the case or matter whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in the Party's Writ, Counterclaim or Third-Party notice. Accordingly, the instant application is refused”. My Lords, the task confronting this Court is to critically examine the arguments of the Applicant against the decision of the High Court and satisfy ourselves, as to whether the High Court properly exercised jurisdiction to entertain the Interested Party’s Page 10 of 24 injunction application for purposes of refusing or granting it, and if so whether the decision was amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. A bare perusal of the materials on record in this application reflects that the objection raised against the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction application and adjudicate upon it, is not rooted in any statutory proscriptions. Admittedly, the Applicant asserts that the enforcement proceedings were initiated pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28 of CI 16, which according to Applicant’s Counsel, explicitly precludes the High Court from going beyond the strict directives to enforce the judgment in question. Rule 28 states as follows: - 28. Execution of judgment by court below “Where the Court directs any judgment or order to be enforced by any other court, certificate in the Form 12 set out in Part I of the Schedule to these Rules under the seal, of the Court and the hand of the presiding justice setting out the judgment or order shall be transmitted by the Registrar to that other court, and the latter shall enforce the judgement or order in the terms of the certificate.” We have reviewed the record in the light of Rule 28 of CI 16, and apart from the fact that this provision does not contemplate situations where the Supreme Court judgment Page 11 of 24 to be enforced is itself the target of fraud-based impeachment proceedings, we find nothing in the language used in that provision which commends itself to the interpretation urged on this Court by learned Counsel for the Applicant. The well- established position of the law is that where the intention of the legislature is to oust the original jurisdiction of the High Court from determining any particular question or matter, it must do so in express, clear and unambiguous language in giving effect to them. Even so, such clauses are construed narrowly. This principle has been a cornerstone of this Court's jurisprudence, shaping our interpretation of various Rules of Court on multiple occasions. See for instance Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex Parte: Magna International Transport Ltd (Ghana Telecommunications Co Ltd-Interested Party) [2017-2018] 2 SCLRG (Adaare) 1024, and The Republic v High Court (Criminal Division 9), Accra, Ex Parte: Ecobank Ghana Limited & Ors Civil Motion No J5/10/2022; 18th January 2022. See as well Republic vrs. Military Tribunal Ex Parte Ofosu – Amaah [1973] GLR 227. The view of the law we have held above also aligns with the long-standing legal position that the circumstances under which the High Court would legally assume its original jurisdiction in any matter are as a general proposition of the law, governed by procedural rules established by statute, and any challenge to its jurisdiction must be viewed with skepticism absent clear statutory prescriptions. This is the same view of the law expressed by Kpegah JSC in the case of Republic v Adu-Boahen and Another [1993-94] 2 GLR 324 at page 339: - Page 12 of 24 “…the circumstances under which any adjudicating body could assume jurisdiction in any matter and determine same are regulated by rules of procedure established by statue. This is what Lord Blackburn referred to in Re Green (supra) as the "ordinary procedure" of the tribunal or court.” The analysis above reveals that the Applicant's jurisdictional challenge, which contests the High Court's original jurisdiction to entertain the injunction application particularly in the specific context of impeachment proceedings premised on allegations of fraud, is fatally flawed due to the lack of statutory foundation, thereby depriving the grounds for judicial review in this present case, of any merit. Apart from the lack of statutory or procedural basis for the jurisdictional challenges, it is also doubtful whether the plethora of judicial authorities relied upon by the Applicant articulate a discernible principle of law that strips the High Court of its jurisdiction to entertain applications arising from enforcement proceedings, especially in circumstances where the judgment being enforced is concurrently subject to impeachment proceedings grounded on allegations of fraud. Despite the impressive array of authorities cited by learned Counsel for the Applicant, we have been unable to identify any direct precedent supporting the contention that the High Court, as a Constitutionally established superior court, vested with original jurisdiction in all matters, lacked the authority to entertain the Interested Party’s injunction application, even if only for the limited purpose of refusing or granting it. Page 13 of 24 Indeed, a careful review of the cited authorities has yielded no direct precedent supporting the proposition that a High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain interim applications related to a Supreme Court judgment being impeached for fraud. It is well settled that fraud vitiates even the most solemn act. De Grey, C. J., in Rex Vs. Duchess of Kingston [ 2 Smith L. C. 687] observed that 'Fraud' is an intrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical and temporal". In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, it is stated that "in applying this rule, it matters not whether the judgment impugned has been pronounced by an inferior or by the highest Court of judicature in the realm, but in all cases alike it is competent for every Court, whether superior or inferior, to treat as a nullity any judgment which can be clearly shown to have been obtained by manifest fraud." (emphasis) The long-settled practice of the Court is that the proper method of impeaching a completed judgment on the ground of fraud is by action, and in the context of fraud- based impeachment proceedings, a court is entitled to exercise appropriate jurisdiction, to ensure in all cases that a successful Party, does not end up with a pyrrhic victory after judgment is delivered. See for instance the views of Benin JSC in the case of The Republic v High Court Commercial Division, Accra, Ex Parte: Ivory Finance Company Ltd, Interested Parties: Ital Construct International Ltd & 3 Ors Civil Motion No Page 14 of 24 J5/20/2016; 19th May 2016, where clear pronouncements were made by this Court to the effect that in appropriate cases, a stay of execution may be granted in fraud based impeachments proceedings, if the interests of justice so dictate. In the landmark decision of Joseph v. Jebeile and Another [1963] 1 GLR 387, the Supreme Court many years ago underscored the long-standing policy of the law to view favourably, applications for stay execution of judgments involving considerable financial amounts. This guiding principle assumes heightened significance in proceedings to impeach a judgment for fraud, where the court's inherent jurisdiction may be exercised to prevent a successful party from being deprived of the tangible benefits of its judgment, particularly in cases involving large financial stakes, such as the present one. In this regard, it must be made clear that the exercise of the court's jurisdiction is not vitiated merely because its underlying reasoning may be erroneous. In our considered opinion, the basis for the court's decision is immaterial, provided it acts within its jurisdiction. Consequently, any error in the court's decision would be characterized as an error within jurisdiction, rather than a jurisdictional excess. It follows therefore that the Applicant's contention that the High Court Judge exceeded her jurisdiction by entertaining the injunction application on the basis of a non-existent appeal, is flawed. Page 15 of 24 In this instant case, it is significant to draw attention to the fact that the High Court Judge was aware of the duty she was called upon to discharge. In her Ruling dated the 2nd of May 2024, she very clearly stated the duty she was to discharge as follows: “…. since the execution process is pending in this Court even though the judgment is that of the Supreme Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with it as execution is being levied here. I do not find the process filed by the Defendant as irregular as injunction applications under Order 25 Rule 2 of C. I. 47 can be brought even after the trial of the case or matter whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in the Party's Writ, Counterclaim or Third-Party notice ….” Evidently, the High Court Judge felt obliged to examine the application which had been placed before her on its merits, unconstrained by any statutory procedural rules that specifically ousted her jurisdiction from doing so. Given the peculiar circumstances of the injunction application, which was premised on an action to impeach a judgment for fraud pending before the same High Court and targeted at the same Supreme Court judgment sought to be enforced, the High Court Judge was compelled to assume jurisdiction and did not consider herself bound by the principles enunciated in Ex Parte Kumoji (supra) which decision instructively, was not even related to an action to impeach a judgment for fraud. The High Court Judge considered herself duty-bound to assume jurisdiction under the High Court Rules of Procedure to grant necessary reliefs Page 16 of 24 in respect of pending proceedings, as a refusal to do so would have effectively denied the Interested Party a merits-based hearing, and occasioned manifest injustice. Learned Counsel for the Applicant castigates the High Court Judge for entertaining an injunction application brought on the back of a non-existing appeal. That complaint, even if warranted, may be one that goes to a wrongful exercise of discretion based on extraneous considerations, rather than a complaint of jurisdictional overreach. It finds no favour with this Court. Upon a thorough examination of the record and careful consideration of the submissions urged on this Court by learned Counsel, we are satisfied that the High Court Judge was well within her jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the injunction application, rendering the jurisdictional challenge, unfounded. In the end, we are satisfied that any error allegedly committed by the High Court Judge was a jurisdictional error, that is to say one that was committed within the scope of her jurisdiction, rather than outside it. In the circumstances we think that this is an appropriate case where our discretion ought to be exercised against the grant of the instant application for judicial review. This Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the discretionary character of the remedy of certiorari. For instance, in Republic v High Court, Denu; ex parte Agbesi Page 17 of 24 Awusu II (No. 2) (Nyonyo Agboada (Sri III) Interested Party) [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 907, Atuguba JSC explained (at p. 914) that: "It is well-known that certiorari is a discretionary remedy and therefore it does not follow that when the technical grounds upon which certiorari lies are established, it will be pro tanto granted." As to the claim for prohibition, our view is that apart from the fact that there is nothing in the processes filed by the Applicant which in our estimation, meets the necessary threshold for establishing the grounds and scope required for the discretionary order of prohibition, as established by our courts in such cases as Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (Addo Interested Party) [2003-2004] SCGLR 312, the record shows that the claim for prohibition is now moot, as the High Court has rendered a final ruling on the Interested Party's injunction application, rendering any prohibitory order futile. Given the cumulative effect of the considerations outlined above, the conclusion is inescapable that this Court's judicial review jurisdiction under Rule 61 of CI 16 has not been properly invoked, and the instant application for certiorari and prohibition should fail. The application for certiorari and prohibition is accordingly dismissed. Page 18 of 24 (SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS) (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) DISSENTING OPINION ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC; This application and the application in Suit No. J5/93/2024 (bearing the same title) for which this Court has just delivered its ruling, arise from the same factual background. Both applications also sought to achieve the same purpose; to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to strike at the decision of the High Court (General Jurisdiction 8), Accra to injunct or suspend the execution of the final judgment of this Court. Page 19 of 24 The distinction between the two applications however is that, the ruling of the High Court against which this application was brought, was delivered first in time, on 2nd May 2024. My understanding from the record was that when the Interested Party filed the application for injunction to suspend the execution of the judgment of this Court, the applicant herein filed an application in that Court to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the application in the first place. The High Court dismissed that application by its said ruling of 2nd May 2024. That ruling is the subject of the instant application. Following that ruling, the High Court then proceeded to hear the substantive application which it eventually granted by its ruling of 5th June 2024. This second ruling resulted in the application in Suit No J5/93/2024 for which we have already delivered a decision. I recall that at the hearing of the two applications before us, I drew Counsel’s attention to the fact that by virtue of the application in Suit No J5/93/2024, which was to attack the substantive ruling of the High Court, the instant application which was merely to attack a ruling in what appeared to be a preliminary objection, had turned moot. My view at the time which I still share was that, our determination of the application in Suit No. J5/93/2024 will effectively dispose of the instant application. This Court did not press the matter when Counsel took a contrary view which resulted in both applications being heard separately. Page 20 of 24 In this application, the applicant seeks the following reliefs: i. An order of certiorari directed at the High Court, General jurisdiction 8, to bring up into this Court for purposes of being quashed and quashing the ruling of Her Ladyship Justice Ellen Mireku dated 2nd day of May 2024 in the case intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (numbered Suit No. GJ 0829/2021). ii. A declaration that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain execution of a judgment of the Supreme Court. iii. An order of prohibition prohibiting the High Court [General Jurisdiction 8] from entertaining any proceedings and/or application(s) to restrain the execution proceedings commenced in suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021) as ordered by the Supreme Court. The grounds on which the application was brought are stated as follows: i. The High Court has no jurisdiction to grant an order of interlocutory injunction to stay execution of proceedings pending appeal in respect of the garnishee proceedings in Suit No. CM/MISC/0829 when there is no appeal pending in respect of those proceedings. Page 21 of 24 ii. By its decision of 2nd May 2024, the High Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction to entertain an application [for injunction pending appeal] by the Interested Party to restrain the execution of a final judgment of the Supreme Court in the suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021. Particulars. a. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any process whatsoever to suspend the execution of a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court which the Supreme Court expressly directed the High Court to execute for the benefit of the Applicant. b. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order of interlocutory injunction under the provisions of Order 25 rule 1 after a final judgment, even of the High Court. c. The High Court has no jurisdiction under the provisions of Order 43 rule 11 of the High Court [Civil Procedure] Rules, to entertain an application to stay execution of judgments of the Supreme Court which it is required by the Supreme Court to execute. Page 22 of 24 d. By the principle of estoppel per rem judicatam the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings to re-open for determination the very matters determined by the Supreme Court against the Interested Party. iii. The High Court has no jurisdiction to determine de novo a point of law already determined by the Supreme Court: a. The High Court by virtue of article 129(3) of the Constitution, ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court which held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter to question any judgment of the court higher in the hierarchy than the High Court. b. The High Court ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court all of which Supreme Court decisions held that the Interested Party is not entitled to a stay of execution of the judgment of the Supreme Court.” In Suit No J5/93/2024 I delivered a dissenting opinion in which I articulated reasons why I think the High Court committed errors of law on the face of the record which go to jurisdiction and render the decision a nullity by entertaining and granting the application for injunction. Given that almost the same grounds and legal arguments in that application have been set out in the present one, I come to the same decision in this application. I uphold all the grounds for this application and grant all the reliefs sought. Page 23 of 24 (SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) COUNSEL TSATSU TSIKATA ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANT WITH THADDEUS SORY ESQ. AND NANA BOAKYE MENSA-BONSU ESQ. SEKYERE DUODU ESQ FOR THE INTERESTED PARTY WITH SAMUEL ADUAMUAH ADDO ESQ. Page 24 of 24