Fideria v Vidot (CS 30 of 2021) [2024] SCSC 22 (15 March 2024) | Cohabitation property rights | Esheria

Fideria v Vidot (CS 30 of 2021) [2024] SCSC 22 (15 March 2024)

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TN THE SUPREME COURT OF SEYCHELLES Reportable CS30/2021 In the matter between DENIS DONALD FIDERlA (rep. by Karen Domingue) AND VANESSA MARY VIDOT (rep. by Daniel Belle) PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT Neutral Citation: Fideria vs. Vidal (CS3012021) (151h March 2024) Before: Heard: G Dodin 29thJuly 2022, 23rd, 27thJuly, 5thAugust, 2023 and written submissions. Delivered: 15thMarch 2024 JUDGMENT Dodin J [1] The Plaintiff and the Defendant were in a relationship for approximately 9 years. On the 30th March 2017 whilst the parties were still co-habiting, they entered into a Purchase agreement with the Housing Finance Company Ltd, II-1FC", to purchase a three-bedroom house located at Ex-Teachers, Grand Anse, Praslin, namely House No. F02 for the sum of SR 325,000.00. [2] The Plaintiff avers that throughout the course of their co-habitation the Plaintiff was In continuous employment and provided for his child who is still a minor. In addition to [2] The Plaintiff avers that throughout the course of their co-habitation the Plaintiff was continuous employment and provided for his child who is still a minor. In addition to repaying the housing loan the Plaintiff paid for the whole house to be tiled, paid all utility bills as well as all other expenses for the house and the family. [3] The Plaintiff further avers that in January 2019 the Plaintiff vacated the house but kept most of his personal belongings in the house as he goes back and forth to his house. He avers further that despite not living in the said house the Plaintiff maintains the house in a good state of repairs. [4] The Plaintiff avers that the Defendant only started to repay the loan since June 2020 whereas the Plaintiff was paying for the house even prior to entering the agreement with HFC. [5] The Plaintiff is now moves the Court for judgment ordering the Defendant to vacate the house and to remove her name from the Purchase Agreement so that the Plaintiff can become the sole owner of the house. [6] The Plaintiff avers that he is ready and willing to repay the Defendant whatever sums she has paid towards house and/or expanded in terms of payment with regards to the said house or any fumiture and/or fittings therein. [7] The Defendant opposed the Plaintiff s claim maintaining that during this domestic relationship, she too has been in continuous employment and that she particularly contributed to maintain the household and attended throughout the years to the normal chores of laundering, ironing, shopping, cooking and taking regularly care of the minor children as well as contributing towards the repayment of the loan which was in their joint names. [8] The Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff kept a room in the house but avers that he uses it to store his tools and other accessories together with building material and that the Plaintiff places other accessories around the house making the property look more like part of a building site. [9] The Defendant avers that she has been maintaining the house and the household throughout and even after the Plaintiff had vacated the house she occupies the house consistently together with the children notably, the minor child of the Plaintiff for whom she obtained custody. [10] The Defendant also filed a counterclaim moving the Court to order the Plaintiff to vacate the property as he is no longer living there on a regular basis and to order that she has at least one half share in the property which she is willing and able to purchase from the Plaintiff. [11] The Defendant further moves the Court to order that she has the first option to purchase the Defendant's share in the property and that upon such purchase, the name of the Plaintiff should be struck off the purchase agreement and that she becomes the sole owner of the property. [12] The Plaintiff opposed the counter-claim raising similar grounds stated above in the Plaint in support. [13] The Plaintiff's testimony was consistence with the Plaint maintaining that initially and during certain periods of time he was the only person contributing towards the payment for the house because the Defendant was jobless or between jobs. He admitted however that the Defendant made contributions towards the household and towards the loan repayments when she was in employment. As a contractor, he paid lump sums whenever he received contract payments to cover any arrears that may have accumulated. He also made considerable improvements to the house, such as putting tiles, cabinets and marble tops. He admitted that he kept some tools and construction materials at the house but maintained that they were kept in orderly disposition and did not cause any impediment to the use or aesthetic characteristic of the house. [14] Marie- Chantale Nichole testified that she came to know the Plaintiff whilst he was still on secondary student at Praslin where she was teaching and she assisted and helped him with his lessons and exams which resulted in the Plaintiff successfully completing his secondary and post-secondary education at S. I. T. after which the Plaintiff set up his own business as a contractor which he is still running to this day. She testified that she also assisted the Plaintiff with his housing application and at the time the Plaintiff was single. She later became aware that the Plaintiff was in a relationship with the Defendant and that they had a child together. She was also aware that the Plaintiff had been allocated a house for which he was paying but did not know that the Defendant had been added as joint applicant or whether she was also paying for the house but she admitted that the Defendant also made contributions to the household expense as was the Plaintiff. [15] Aline Sanguignon, a legal officer working at Property Management Company testified that the Plaintiff made the original housing application in 2007 and started paying on his own until August 2011 when the Defendant's application was merged with the Plaintiffs. According to the record, Ms Sanguignon opined that the Plaintiff made the greater contribution to the loan for the purchase of the house. [16] The Defendant testified that she initially had her own application for housing but after she started a relationship with the Plaintiff, she was advised to have her name added to the Plaintiffs application which she agreed. She then started making payments towards the house and the loan. Whenever she was in employment payments were made by direct deductions. She also contributed towards the household and the family needs. Tlie Defendant testified further that the Plaintiff moved out of the house in 2015 but kept a room where he returned to stay occasionally and also stored some tools there. She maintains that since the Plaintiff is already living with another woman whilst she has no other place to go and she has custody of the children, of which one is fathered by the Plaintiff, the Court should allow her to remain in the house. She is prepared to pay the Plaintiff his contributions towards the house and the loan. [17] Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed that prior to them being allocated the house, the Plaintiff had started building a house on the Defendant's mother's property whereby the Plaintiff had spent around SCR 25,000 but the project was abandoned after te foundation had been built. [18] The COUlt held a locus in quo and was shown the various places of contention and the foundation of the proposed Defendant's house. At the time of the locus in quo, the Court did not find any tools or material at the house and everything appeared normal and the house reasonably well-kept. [19] In their final submission learned counsel for the Defendant submitted as follows: "1. ThePlaintiffs Case: The Plaintiff is a mason contractor and has been in a relationship with the Defendant for over 12 years. He lived in their common three bedroom house with the Defendant's three children. He avers that he vacated the said house in January 2019 but comes and goes at his discretion as he has kept a room in the house exclusively lor himself. The Plaintiff occupies another residence. The parties started their relationship and both Plaintiff and Defendant individually took turns and applied for a house with PMC which they finally obtained in 2010 in their joint names with a loan of Rs. 325,000. in their joint names too. T his loa n was subsequently reduced by a government concession of 25% of the original sum. There are certain disagreements with regards to how much each one has readily paid as most payments made by each of the parties were acknowledged indiscriminately in favour of their joint account number by Property Management Company (PMC). The Plaintiff claims he has paid more as he had a large income. The Defendant avers that she too was in employment and, she contributed to their relationship. As it was testified in Court, the Plaintiff has had a troublesome and difficult childhood on account of his parent's behaviour and was subsequently in foster care in the family of a teacher with a strong maternal influence over him. This as revealed, was significant and present even throughout the Plaintiffs relationship as an adult, with the Defendant. "The Plaintiff averred that he has alternate accommodation. In his prayer, the Plaintiffis now asking the Court to order the Defendant to furnish the Court with a statement of proof of her contribution towards the acquisition of the property, an order to repay the Defendant her contribution, an order to remove the Defendant's name from the Purchase Agreement, an order; that after the Defendant is paid the amount of her financial contribution and an order for the Defendant to vacate the said house. The Defendant's Case: The Defendant is currently employed in a Day Care, after working as cashier and waitress in hotels on Praslin. She is the mother of the three children, all raised in the parties' said house. Their relationship started when her first child, was 2 years old. The Plaintiff fathered and acknowledged her second child. The third child, a girl is technically not fathered by the Plaintiff. I. After various with spell of infidelity stemming and presumedfrom both sides, threats of physical and verbal violence from the Plaintiff, the Family Tribunal upon occasional claims by the Defendant intervened with an Order granting custody of their relevant child to the Defendant. The Tribunal issued an order for the Plaintiffto refrain from using form of violence verbal or physical or threats of' violence towards the Defendant and to refrain from harassing the Defendant, A monthly payment of Rs. 1000 was awarded for the relevant child and to be paid to Social Security. The Defendant continues to live in the three-bedroom flat on the ground floor with the three children. II. The Defendant was also in employment and contributes also financially towards the repayment of the loan, in addition to other contribution to the relationship notably the normal maternal chores of cooking, washing, maintaining the home for her partner, the Plaintiff; and caring for the upkeep and education of the three children III. The Plaintiff as he averred, vacated the house in January 2019, The PLaintiff is still keeping, the space of one rOOI11 under lock and key for himself, which allows him access to the flat at his own discretion. During the locus we saw the said room, unlocked by the. Plaintiff to be viewed by the Court: a normal size bedroom with a double bed. IV In her prayers, the Defendant prays this Honourable Court to determine the undivided share of each party, an order that she has the first option to buy the share of the Plaintiff: an order that the Plaintiff vacates the house immediately and completely; an order that the name of the Plaintiffbe struck out on him receiving payment for his share, an order to dismiss the Plaintiffs suit and any order that this Honourable Court considers proper and fit in the circumstances of the case. From. June 2020, the Defendant has been paying the loan all by herself. The Defendant submits: 1. As testified before the Court, that she has been in a domestic relationship with the Plaintiff for well over 12 years, the most part of which was characterized by stability and continuity in their relationship. There was one child born in their relationship and the house was in their joint names. 2. The defendant further submits that they qualify for a qualifying relationship when it comes to the division of the property they commonly acquired during that relationship as the following Article provides: Article 259J(a) of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act 2020 stipulates: "The parties to a qualify in relationship which has subsisted for at least seven years will, where the relationship ends inter vivos, share equally the property which has been acquired by each during the relationship in the context of the relationship. " 3. The Defendant further submits that the property has been maintained to this date in their joint names and, given the circumstances that she has contributed towards the relationship, in that she has also paid for part of the loan as she too was employed, she is entitled to at least half of the property. 4. The Defendant further submits that the duplicitous act she is accused of by the Plaintiff stems and is a result of the Plaintiffs own duplicity towards her. 5. Moreover the Defendant submits that given that she will also have to continue to raise their relevant child on her own, that this Honourable Court having regards to the circumstances of the case, that such order as the Court thinks fit relating to the property that is shared for the benefit of the relevant child of the relationship that her own share in the division be increased as this Honourable Court will think fit. Article 2591 (b) In cases to which subparagraph (a) refers the court may, having regards to all the circumstances of the case, make such order as the court thinkfit relating to the property that is shared/or the benefit of a child of the relationship. 6. The Defendant submits thatfor the benefit of their relevant child, who is still a minor, and also for the benefit of her own two children, that she is eager to purchase the share of the Plaintiff as shall be determined by this Honourable Court. This will be possible now that her first son is nOH! an adult and is in employment and will also contribute toward the repayment of the loan and payment ofthe Plaintiffs share. 7. The Defendant also submits that she fears the hardship that she and her children will have to endure if the house is attributed to the. Plaintiff, and she obtains only the payment for her share. This would mean that together with her three children they will have to vacate the house completely. The Plaintiff is connected in the building trade and will have less problem, on his own, to build or buy a house. 8. The Defendant further submits that during the locus, a property for the parent of the Defendant was visited at the request of the Plaintiff where, he stated that he built the foundation of the house which the Plaintiff has estimated the cost at Rs.20, 000. and now liable by the Defendant. The saidfoundation built 15years ago is a rectangle wall of two layers of bricks in the centre of which were old rotten wood and junks with no apparent reinforced concrete nor any visible floor. Furthermore, the Defendant submits that there was no evidence of drawings nor was a copy of planning permission ever produced. The Defendant objects to pay this. Wherefore, the Defendant prays this Honourable Court to dismiss the case of the Plaintiff and to determine the share of each of the parties and to grant the Defendant the first option to buy the share of the Plaintiffso that the Defendant can secure the house for herself and for the benefits of the relevant child and her other children. " [sic] [20] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff made the following submission: "The Plaintiffs Case Defendant The case concerns a three-bedroom house situated at Ex- Teachers, Grand Anse, Praslin. 171ePlaintiff applied with the Government of Seychelles to be assisted with a house on the 121hof April 2006 in his sole name. The Plaintiff' subsequently made a second application 011 the 3rd of 'Marcli 2009. In 201 () 'the Plaintiff started making his contributions towards obtaining a house. After receiving the letter for approval informing the Plaintiff and the Defendant that they have been allocated with a house on the 1?" of March 2011 the Plaintiffand Defendant signed and entered into their house purchase agreement on the 30th of March 2011 with the Housing Finance Company Limited. At the time the house was allocated to the Plaintiff and the Defendant they had been in a relationship for approximately 4 to 5 years. At the time of the parties started their co-habitation the Defendant already had a 2 year-old son and in 2010 the Defendant gave birth 10 the Plaintiffs first and only child with the Defendant. 171ehouse vvas valued at SR 325,000 at the time of allocation and it vvas payable in instalments of SR 1,780 over a 30-year period. The Plain t{if started repaying the house soon thereafter depending on his income as a free-lance contractor. The Plaintiff gave the Defendant money for her to effect payments on his behalf. Over the years, payment from the Plaintiff varied at the time significantly exceeding the instalment figures payable. At the time of the allocation of the house and moving therein the Plaintiffwas earning an average ofSR 25,000. He financed the improvements to the house making it more comfortable by paying and doing the tiling of the house. furnishing it, putting in kitchen counters and cabinets etc ... The Plaintiffmaintained the house by doing the painting himself, and he further contributedfinancially towards the upkeep of the children and payment of the utilities. The relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant broke down in 2017 and in 2019 the Plaintiff moved out of the house. However the Plaintiff kept a room in the house with his personal belongings which he uses each time he comes to his home. The Plaintiffs testimony in his case was supported by his foster mother, Ms Marie Chantale Nichole, 'who testified that her foster son was the one doing the additions and improvements to the house. The Defendant's Case: The Defendant had her own application with the Housing Finance Company prior to March 2011. She and the Plaintiff' agreed that her application would be merged with that of the Plaintiff 'when they both accepted to be beneficiaries of the house allocated at Grand Anse Praslin. When the parties moved into the house, the occupants were the Plaintiff the Defendant, the Defendant's lst child, their son and the niece of the Defendant who was being cared for by the parties as herfather was incarcerated. During the period of 201 1to 2021 the Defendant had different jobs. She worked as a waitress at the Indian Ocean Hotel, at Nouvelle Decouvert, ill a water bottling factory, as a Laundry Attendant at Lemuria Hotel and thereafter at a Take A Hiay and presently at a Day Care Centre. The Defendant earned significantly less than the Plaintiffand she accepted that in her testimony. The Defendant claims that she carried alit the normal chores at the house and that she also contributed towards the repayment of the loan for the house. Submissions of the Plaintiff: The Plaintiff submits that before he ceased occupying the house on afull time basis his relationship with the Defendant had already broken down and he chose to leave as a measure o.fprecaution as the Defendantfiled cases against him before the Family Tribunalfor protection orders although the cases }vere based 011fabrications. He maintained that he has never been charged or prosecuted by the police in connection with reports of violence made against him by the Defendant. The Plaintiff submits that it is the Defendant who was the one that actually used violence against him when she struck him witli a flower vase after he questioned the Defendant in regards to being the father of the Defendant's third child, Aneesa Vidot, who was b01'11at a time when their relationship still subsisted. 171eincident caused the Plaintiff to be hospitalisedfor two days. The Plaintiff submits that he has always maintained the house and the family by catering for most of the expenses and that the Defendant used money which she obtained from a loan, in/ended to tile a toilet, on a shopping spree in South Africa. The Plaintiff further submits that although he had moved out of the house and would Ol1Z)i come and go after 2019 he still maintained his obligations towards the house as he continuously repaid the loan. painted, paid for the utilities, and he also paid maintenance of his son and the Defendant's 3rd child until DNA results proved that he was not thefather of Aneesa. 111 the course ofhis testimony the Plaintiff testified that he has also built afoundation on the Defendant's mother's property at the time that they were co-habiting at the Defendant's mother's house. The Plaintiff intended to build a house for the Defendant and himself where he built the foundation. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant can build on this foundation and thus she would have a head-start on building alternative accommodationfor herself and her children. The Court 'went on a locus in quo and had the opportunityto view thefoundation. Contrary to what was stated by the Defendant in Court, it was found that there is a possibility of building where the foundation is. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant in her submission erred in referring and relying on Article 259 of the Civil Code of Seychelles, Act 2020 which entered into operation in JUZy 202 I. The present case was filed in April 202 J and thus the Civil Code would notfind its application in the present case as at the time that the case was filed the notion of qualifying relationship was unknown to our laws. 771C Civil Code of Seychelles Act 2020 does not have retrospective application and therefore cannot be made applicable to thefacts of this case. 17. Article 6 of the Civil Code ofSeychelles Act 2020 clearly states: "Legislation has no retroactive effect unless that is expressly stated in the legislation or arises by necessary and distinct implication. 1/ In addition, the Plaintiff submits that ill relation to Article 259(5) the relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant as per the pleadings oftheparties and the evidence heard lasted for more than 7 years. Hence, in addition to the fact that the neH' Civil Code cannot be made to apply retrospectively, as stated above, that article does not and cannotfind its application in the present case. There is no property that belongs to the parties and the house still belongs to Property Management Corporation (PMC). Consequently the Plaintiff submits that the prayers 1 to 4 of the Counterclaim ofthe Defendant cannot succeed as the property is not held in co-ownership and neither party hold any shares in the house. The Plaintiff submits that what the parties have is an interest in the house through their contributions towards the repayment of the loan which has an outstanding balance ofSR 51,907.79 as at the I" of J1Ily2023. The Plaintiff in his prayer as listed below does not seek aproperty order from the Court but rather an order in relation to the contributions made and the Purchase Agreement signed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The prayers a/the Plaintiff are: a) AI1 order that the Defendant furnishes the court with a statement and proof of her contribution towards the acquisition of house No. F02 at Ex-Teachers, Grand Anse. Praslin; b) An order that the Plaintiff repays the Defendant for her contribution asproved to the cour by the Defendant; c) An order that upon payment of the Defendant's contribution by the Plaintiff that the Defendant removes her name from the Purchase Agreement; or in the alternative d) An order that upon proof shown that the Plaintiff has paid the Defendantfor her contribution that Housing Finance Company Limited removes the name of the Defendant from the Purchase Agreement and retains the sole name of the Plaintiff on the Purchase Agreement; e) An order that upon payment of her contribution by the Plaintiff that the Defendant vacates the said house: j) Any other orders that this Honourable Court deems fit andproper in the circumstances of the case. The Plaintiff submits that in the case of Georgie Monnaie vs Lina Waye-Hive {2016] Sesc 57 the Plaintiff filed a suit praying for a valuation and apportionment of his share in a property and a house which he had bought and built together 'with the Defendant with a bank loan and asked for the first option to purchase the Defendant'S share. In her statement of Defence, the Defendant admitted that the property had been purchased and built together witli the Plaintiff by way of a bank loan but stated that she was solely making the loan repayments for the preceding hila years. She also stated that the Plaintiff had vacated the house. She prayed for the court to declare that each party had a half share in theproperty. The Learned Chief Justice, Mathilda Twomey, after considering all the legal remedies in existence concluded that only a remedy in equity could assist the parties and she ruled that: 111 the circumstances sections 5 and 6 of the Courts Act are applicable. They provide that: "The Supreme Court shall continue to have, and is hereby invested with full original jurisdiction to hear and determine all suits, actions, causes, and matters under all laws for the time- being in force in Seychelles relating to wills and execution of wills, interdiction or appointment ofa Curator, guardianship of minors, adoption, insolvency, bankruptcy, matrimonial causes and generally to hear and determine all civil suits, actions, causes and matters that may be the nature of such suits, actions, causes or matters, and, in exercising such jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall have. and is hereby invested with, all the powers, privileges, authority, and jurisdiction which is vested in, or capable of being exercised by the High Court ofJustice in England. The Supreme Court shall continue to be a Court of Equity and is hereby invested with powers, authority, and jurisdiction to administer justice and to do all acts for the due execution of such equitable jurisdiction in all cases where no sufficient legal remedy isprovided by the law of Seychelles. tt She also went on to make reference and apply the dissenting judgement of SauzierJ'in Hallock v D'Offay (1983-1987) 3 SCAR (Voll) 295 where he stated: "it would be a denial of justice if the Supreme Court were to decline to use such powers' on the ground that there is no remedy and that the solution to these problems are better left to the legislator. " The Plaintiffsubmits that due to his higher income and thefact that he repaid the loan for a much longer period than the Defendant, the fact that he made the majority of the improvements and paid for the maintenance andfurnishings of the house tilts the balance of equity in hisfavourfor the Court to rule in his favour. It is not denied that the Court cannot award the house to the Plaintiffas it does not belong to either of the parties but the Court is not precluded after it has made a finding on the Defendant's contributions, which isfar less than that ofthe Plaintiff, to accede to the Plaintiffs prayers that: a) the Plaintiff repays the Defendant for her contribution as proved to the court by the Defendant; b) Up071payment of the Defendant's contribution by the Plaintiff' that the Defendant removes her name from the Purchase Agreement; or in the alternative c) upon proof shown that the Plaintiff has paid the Defendant for her contribution that Housing Finance Company Limited removes the name of the Defendant FOI11 the Purchase Agreement and retains the sole name of the Plaintiffon the Purchase Agreement; upon proof of payment of her contribution shown by the Plaintiff that the Defendant vacates the house: The Plaintiff submits that the Court ought to dismiss the Counterclaim of the Defendant and to order that the Plaintiff repays the Defendant for her contributions and that Housing Finance Company Limited removes the name of the Defendant from the Purchase Agreement and retains the sale name of the Plaintiff on the Purchase Agreement. [21] The first issue is whether the provisions of the Civil Code of Seychelles Act 2020 which came into force on 28th in July 2021 is applicable to this case which was filed in April 2021. As submitted by learned counsel for the Plaintiff, Article 6 ofthe Civil Code of Seychelles Act 2020 itself provides that: "Legislation has no retroactive effect unless that is expressly stated in the legislation or arises by necessary and distinct implication. /I It is trite law that statutes should not be applied retroactively unless it was specifically enacted to address the event that had already passed. One should not forget the controversy of Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [19651 AC 75, which was a court case started in Scotland, and ultimately decided in the House of Lords. Eventually, Parliament had to enact a retroactive Act of Parliament, the War Damage Act 1965, which retroactively exempts the Crown from liability in respect of damage to, or destruction of, property caused by acts lawfully done by the Crown during, or in contemplation of the outbreak of, a war in which it is engaged. In the same vein, the provisions of the Civil Code 2020 would not apply to the present case which arose and was initiated before its enactment. [22] Since the parties were not married, the COUl1can only deal with this case in equity, using its inherent powers under the Courts Act, sections 5 and 6 which has been reproduced above by learned counsel for the Plaintiff. [23] Although the case of Esparon v Esparon [20121 SLR 39 is a matrimonial adjustment of property, the principle of equitable distribution was well elucidated by Renaud J who held that; "In determining that equitable balance, the Court normally starts by looking at the legal ownership and then adjusts the shares of each party based on the level of contributions made by each party, be such contributions in cash, in k.ind or otherwise" However, in this case, it is not a matter of who owns the house but rather who should have the best entitlement to the house, considering that the house is still owned by Property Management Corporation and the parties have only contributed towards the loan to acquire the house. [24] From the evidence adduced, the Plaintiff and the Defendant have both had their names included as joint loan account holder in the agreement with PMC. The Plaintiff however started paying before the Defendant and it is also agreed fact that the Defendant abandoned her own application in order to join with the Plaintiff in the joint application. It was also testified to by the Plaintiff, which was witnessed by the Court and reluctantly admitted by the Defendant that the Plaintiff started building a house on her mother's land which was later abandoned. The estimated cost incurred by the Plaintiff for that project was SCR 25,000. [25] In considering the evidence above, I find that the Plaintiff made more efforts towards the allocation of the house and also made a greater contribution towards the repayment fo the loan than the Defendant. Having gone over the record of contribution submitted as exhibit, I find that the Plaintiff has contributed at least 60% . From the record of the Defendant's contributions, I find that she contributed not more than 40 % towards the loan repayment. [26] In respect of the abandoned construction on the Defendant's mother's property, I find that the same was undertaken and financed by the Plaintiff who invested the sum ofSCR 25,000 with the consent of the Defendant and her mother. [27] In respect of the household contributions, I find that the Plaintiff and the Defendant contributed more or less equally although the Plaintiff, being a contractor contributed occasionally larger sums than the Defendant. [28] I also take into account that the Plaintiff's minor child is also living in the house together with the Defendant's minor child and the Defendant's adult child. Whilst generally, the children can claim no right against their parent's property during the lifetime of the parent, the Court is mindful that decisions taken equitably do not adversely impact and disrupt the wellbeing and best interest of the minor children of the litigants. [29] Consequently, the COUli determines the claims and counterclaims made by the Plaintiff and the Defendants as follows: In respect of the Plaintiff s claim for: a. An order that the Defendantfurnishes the Court with a statement and proal of her contribution towards the acquisition of House No. F02 at Ex-Teachers, Grand Anse, Praslin, the Court is satisfied from the evidence adduced that the Defendant made substantial contributions amounting to 40%)towards the housing loan. b. An order that the Plaintiffrepays the Defendant for her contribution as proved to the Court by the Defendant; the COUlifinds it more equitable to grant to the Defendant the first option to repay the Plaintiff 60% contribution in view that the Plaintiff is not permanently residing in the house whilst the Defendant is still residing there with the minor children ofwhom one is the child of the Plaintiff. c. An order that upon payment of the Defendant's contribution by the Plaintiff that the Defendant removes her name from the Purchase Agreement; the Court finds that only if the Defendant is unable to repay to the Plaintiff his 60% contribution within one year, the Plaintiff shall have the option to pay the 40% contribution of the Defendant and have her name removed from the purchase agreement. d. An order that upon proof shown that the Plaintiff has paid the Defendant for her contribution that Housing Finance Company Limited removes the name of the Defendant from the Purchase Agreement and retains the sole name of the Plaintiff 011 the Purchase Agreement; the Court repeats order c. above. , . ' . e. An order that upon payment 0,( her contribution by the defendant that the Defendant vacates the said house; the COUltrepeats order c above. f. The COUItestablishes the 60% contribution of the Plaintiff at 60% of the loan minus the outstanding balance as at the date of judgment. g. The COUltawards the Plaintiff the sum of SCR 25,000 spent on the construction of the proposed house for the Defendant which the Defendant shall pay not later than one year from the date of this judgment. h. The Defendant is given one year to make all of the above payments after which the name of the Plaintiff shall be removed from the loan agreement and the Plaintiff shall have no right to remain in the house, failing which the Plaintiff shall have the subsequent one year to pay the Defendant 40% share calculated in the same formulae as order f. above, after which payment, the Defendant's name shall be removed from the purchase agreement and the Defendant shall have no right to remain in the house. [30] In view of the above findings and orders, the Plaint and the counterclaim only succeed as far as they are consistent with the above decisions and orders. [31] Since the case is legal aided, I make no order for cost. Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 15tb day of March 2024. G Dodin Judge 22