Diisi v Mbarara Stores Limited (Civil Suit No. 39 of 1995) [1999] UGHC 45 (16 March 1999)

Full Case Text

## THE REPUBLIC pRUGANDA IN CIVIL SUIT NO.39 OF 1995

ELIAZARI DIISI PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT BEFORE THE HON. MR JUSTICE V. F. MUSOKE-KIDUUKA **/** -VS MBARARA STORES LTD. =

## JUDGEMENT

In an amended plaint filed in this court on 27th May, 1993, the plaintiff Mr. Eiiazari Diisi, sought, from this court, the following orders:

a) an order declaring the plaintiffthe lawful owner of Plot No.l,

Mbaguta Street, Mbarara Municipality;

- b) an order declaring that (he eviction of the plaintiff on 2.12. I 995, illegal; from the suit property and the locking up of the premises was - c) an order granting (he plaintiff general damages against the defendant.

In **the.**alternative and without prejudice to the thre.e **remedies** set out above, the plaintiff also prayed for:

d) an order requiring the defendant to pay compensation to the plaintiffin accordance with the valuation report prepared by Messrs Byakusheka And Company, Chartered Surveyors and Valuers and Estates Agents, which put the value of the **7** plaintiff's developments at Shs. 150,000,000/-;

e) costs ofthe suit;

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f) interest on c), d) and (e) above from the date ofjudgement till payment in full; **'IO**

g) any further remedy that this court may deem appropriate.

On his part, the defendant, in his written statement of defence, filed in this court on 5Ul June, 1993, presented a counter claim in which he seeks the following remedies:

a) general damages for trespass; *( 5*

b) mesne profits from the date of unfawful re-entry to the date of judgement;

c) costs of the counter claim;

d) an order for vacant possession of the suit property.

This action and counter claim arose from the following circuinstances:

Plot No.1, Mbaguta Street, formerly known as Plot No.1A, Block "A, Mbarara, in this judgement referred to as the "suit" $\Lambda$ means. measures approximately 0.060 hectares. It was first leased out by the Controlling Authority under Instrument No.88872, on 10th January, 1950, to G. K. Thakkar of P. O. Box 15, Mbarara. The initial term was effective from 1st October, 1949. But on 25th March, 1955, under Instrument 128552, the term of the lease was enlarged to 30 years and 11 months, with effect from 1st October, 1949. On 7th August, 1969, under Instrument 177862, the ownership of the lease was transferred to the present defendant. barara Stores Ltd., a private company incorporated in Uganda.

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rMbar-ara Stores Ltd. also owned another lease over the adjacent !?lot Ji No.52/53, High Street.

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It would appear that following the expulsion ofthe Asians, in 1972, the suit property was abandoned and taken over and looked after **]** by the Departed Asians' Property Custodian Board (D. A. P. C. B), which was established under Decree 27 of 1973.

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However, during the war of 1979, which ousted President Idi Amin from power, the developments which were existing on the suit property were destroyed. The suit property eventually deteriorated into an ugly, glaring bush, just in the very' centre ofthe municipality.

It is not clear how the plaintiff got involved with the suit property. There is no evidence to show that he was ever a tenant ofthe D. A. P. C. B. renting shop No.6. Plot No.52/54, High Street also belonged to the defendant and was repossessed by him much earlier than the suit on the suit property. There is evidence though to show that he was a property. In his evidence, the plaintiffsays that he applied for a lease tenant of the D. A. P. C. B. on Plot 52/54, High Street, where he was

over the suit property to the D. A. P. C. B. and to the Town Clerk, Mbarara Municipal Council.

Exh. PS, a letter of offer, written to the plaintiff by the town Clerk, Mbarara, shows that the plaintiff was allocated a lease over the suit property by Mbarara Municipal Council vide Minute R. C/06/92/40(d) of plaintiff on 19th May, 1995, was made to be effective from 1st August, 1993. (Exh. Pl). The grant of a lease to the plaintiff was made under the mistaken view that the defendant's earlier lease had expired and had not been renewed, whereby the property was considered to have reverted to l-o the controlling authority. 17th December, 1992. But the lease interest which was registered by the

Before the allocation of the lease to (he plaintiff by the Council, in December, 1992, the defendant had lodged, in accordance with section 3 of the Expropriated Properties Act. 1982. an application to repossess the suit property'. A certificate of repossession was granted to the defendant • on 16th October, 1995 (Exh. D5).

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By the time the repossession certificate was granted to the defendant, the plaintiff appears to have gone some distance in effecting

property. Three shops on the ground floor were, occupied by tenants. own testimony in court. construction of a double storeyed commercial building on die suit The plaintiffstarted his construction in 1991 or 1992, according to his

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After obtaining a certificate ofrepossession, the defendant made effort to take possession of die suit property. On 2/12/95, the plaintiff employed Messrs Rwendeire Julius,Court Bailiffs,to effect possession of the LCI Chairperson, regained possession of the suit property after cutting the padlocks, which had been placed on the premises by the *IV* **1** bailiffs. The plaintiffsought the assistance of the police who guarded the premises for some time until 8th December, 1995, when an interim premises on the suit property. Before then, the plaintiff had instituted this action seeking the remedies which I listed at the beginning ofthis >S judgement and against which a counter claim was lodged by the defendant. the suit property by the defendant. The plaintiiX with the assistance of injunction was granted to the plaintiff enabling him to regain entry to the

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The parties agreed to six issues for court's determination in this case: The six issues are?

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a) who.is the lawful owner of Plot No.l, Mbaguta Street, Mbarara,

plaintiff were lawful; b) whether tile developments, effected on the suit property by the

c) whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation from the defendant, ifso quantity;

d) whether the eviction of the plaintill was legal;

e) whether the plaintiffs re-entry amounted to trespass; and

f) remedies available to either party;

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I will now analyse the evidence on record in relation to each of the six issues listed above. I will start with the first issue. io

**&gt;** The first issue is "who is the lawful owner of Plot No. I, Mbaguta Street (the suit property)?"

a) who is the lawful owner of Plot No.l, Mbaguta Street, Mbarara, **i - ' ' ' I**

plaintiff were lawful; b) whether the developments, effected on the suit properly by the

c) whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation from the defendant, ifso quantity;

d) whether the eviction of the plaintiff was legal;

e) whether the plaintiff's re-entry amounted to trespass; and

f) remedies available to either party;

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> I will now analyse the evidence on record in relation to each of the six issues listed above. I will start with the first issue.

The first issue is "who is the lawful owner of Plot No.l, Mbaguta Street (the suit property)?"

There is no doubt in my hiind, considering the facts and the evidence on record, that the defendant is the lawful owner of the suit property.

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There is no dispute as to whether the suit property was taken over by the D. A. P. C. B. under Decree 27 of 1973. Both parties arc agreed to that fact. Ji.;

The defendant has produced Exh. D4, which is a certificate oftitle in respect of Plot No.l, Mbaguta Street, Mbarara. From that certificate oftitle, it is clear that the term ofthe lease of 30 years and 11 months **it.** granted to the defendant in 1955, expired some time before 1991, when *I'D* the plaintiff applied for a lease over the suit property. However, by the operation of the provisions of paragraph (b) ofsubsection (2) ofsection 1 of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982, the defendant's lease was deemed to have continued in force until such time as the suit property was dealt with in accordance with the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982.

> Exhibit D5, the certificate ofrepossession, issued to the defendant defendant on.that date; It is also shown. on Exh. P4, the certificate of on 16th October, 1995, shows that the property was repossessed by the

**I** title, that on 1.7.1997, under Instrument No.287934, the defendant's lease was extended for a period of 8 years and 23 days, with effect from $16th$ October, 1995, the effective date of the repossession. That, of course, was in conformity with the provisions of paragraph (b) of $\frac{1}{2}$ subsection (2) of section 1, of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982.

Thus the defendant appears to hold an impeccable title to the suit property and in light of the provisions of section 56 of the Registration $c^2$ . Titles Act, Cap.205, his certificate of title is exclusive evidence of his lawful ownership of the suit property.

The position of the defendant, as as lawful owner of the suit property, in my humble view, sharply contrasts with that of the plaintiff who also holds a counter certificate of title to the same suit property. Indeed no two certificates of title can be both valid in respect of the same property. One of them must be valid and the other invalid. In some cases, both could be valid. But in the instant case, since as I have stated that I find the defendant's title impeccably valid, then the one held by the plaintiff must, almost certainly, be invalid. I will give the reasons for that conclusion.

In his evidence, the plaintiff did not remember when he applied fo: WJ after Mbarara Municipal Council had advertised a total of 12 plots, RC/66/92/42(d). The question for this court to answer is, could Mbarara which the defendant's earlier lease, though earlier expired, had been extended by the operation ofsection l(2)(b) of **to** the Expropriated Properties Act. 1982? which fell under a similar category. According to PW2, Mr. David Bashakara, the Town CIerk,\Mbarara, and Exh. P8, the allocation ofthe lease, by Council, to the plaintiff was done on 17/12/1992, under Minute th.e\_Ieasc over the suit property. He-thought tlic yearwas probably 1991. \ upon the suit property over Municipal Council effect a valid allocation of a lease to (he plaintiff

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That question was exhaustively answered by the Supreme Court of Uganda in the case ofLivingstone Sewanyana vs Martin Alikcr 119921 V KALR 116. In that case, which is almost in all respects similar to the instant one, the respondent had an existing lease on the suit property. application for a lease on the suit property in 1982. The court found that the Minute, under which the Uganda Land Commission had allocated the The lease was due to expire on 31/12/82. The appellant lodged an a lease to the appellant had been made during the month of August,

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still subsisting. In his judgement, Order J. S. C., had the following to say, **\* - ••** 1982, when the respondent's lease was

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"The grant made under that Minute was the root from wluch the offer and the appellant's certificate of title derived their validity. The grant having been made in August, 1982, when the suit property was not available for leasing, owing to the respondent's leasehold, which was still subsisting at the time, the Commission, in my view, was justified in wanting to cancel it as communicated to the appellant's lawyers by Exh.1'3. Further, in my view, the appellant's application in response to wluch the grant was made should .not have been considered and still less approved. It was invalid when it was made because the **10** suit property which it applied for was not available for leasing."

Also see a related decision ofthe Supreme Court in The Departed Asians' Property Custodian board vs Dcnjamin Anyadra SC Civil Appeal No.8 of 1989 (unreported).

except to employ the same language used by The Honourable Justice Oder, J. S. C., in Livingstone Sewanyana's case *{supra).* It is my view certificate of title was also subsequently issued to the plaintiff. in respect i *^0* ofthe suit property, when the defendant's'lease and title to the same In the instant case, I do not think that there is any choice for me that Mbarara Municipal Council granted a lease to the plaintiff, and a

- ' -interest in the suit property and, therefore,, nothing to lease. Since the defendant's lease had been extended by law. The lease granted and the' title issued to tire plaintiff) were, therefore, null and void and of no effect whatsoever from the very beginning. property were in existence. The Council, at the time, had no proprietary

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The plaintiffs counsel advanced the argument that Mbarara Municipality was advised by the D. A. P. C. B. before allocating a lease to plaintiffto the effect that it could go ahead and allocate the plot, since the defendant's lease had expired and was not affected by the Expropriated Properties Act. PW2 stated, in his evidence, that eleven other plots falling under the same category were disposed of by Mbarara Municipal Council in a similar manner at about the same time. It has also been the plaintiff) had been misled as to the position of the law, by a decision of this court, in the case of Gabriel Juma Lutaya vs Gandesha and 15 Kampala Estates Limited. Civil Suit No.860 of 1982, (unreported), which tended to suggest that the suit property, having been owned by a limited company incorporated in Uganda, was not affected by the Expropriated Properties Act. That position of the law was reversed on 1st August, 1994 when the. Supreme Court ofUganda pronounced a contrary **I 2\_T>** argued that both the D. A. P. C.13. and Mbarara Municipality, as well as

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decision in Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute vs The Departed Asians',Property-Custodian Board', SC Civil Appeal No.21 of 1993.

I do not see how these arguments can have any effect on the legality or illegality ofthe ownership ofthe suit property. They could probably, to some extent, be relevant only in respect of the determination ofliabilities, but not in relation to who ofthe parties to this case is or is not the lawful proprietor of the suit property.

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> Accordingly, I have to find, and I do, that the defendant is the lawful proprietor of a valid lease in respect of Plot No.l, Mbaguta Street, Mbarara Municipality.

The second issue relates to the lawfulness of the developments which the plaintiff effected upon the suit property.

From what I have stated in relation to the first issue, in this case, it would logically follow that if the plaintiff's allocation of a lease over the **• • • th** suit property, by Mbarara Municipal Council on 17 December, 1992, from the very beginning, have any lawful connection with the suit was null and void, and of no effect whatsoever,.then the plaintiff did not,

property. The plaintiff had, at no time, any legal or equitable interest in the. suit properly.-. . Consequently; all his-activities on the-suit property were tainted with illegality. He had no legal basis for effecting tlieni.

It has been strongly argued, by the plaintiff that he obtained that effect. Exh. PII shows a stamp purportedly of Executive Director of the D. A. P. C. B., among others, recommending the approval ofthe plaintiff's building plan. .. I do not think that the stamp is genuine. The D. A. P. C. B. never had an Executive Director, but Executive Secretary. I also do not know for what purpose it was found necessary for the Town Clerk of a Controlling Authority. • permission from the D. A. P. C. B. for him to effect developments on the suit property. I am unable to And, on record, any concrete evidence to Executive Secretary of the D. A. P. C. B. to recommend such approval to a

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There is also Exh. D. III, a letter, dated 26th September, 1991, signed by the D. A. P. C. B's. then Acting Chief Engineer, Mr. Okello, IS requiring the plaintiff to forward his bills of quantities, in respect of the proposed developments, to the DA. P. C. D. for approval. It appears the plaintiff never complied with that request. Yet in Exh. PVIII, which was a letter, dated 27th October, 1993, and signed by one E. B. Batemyctlo,

defendant that its position was that the suit property was at that time under the control ofthe original lessor, who was Mbarara Municipal Council, and not under the control ofthe D. A. P. C. B. Ifthe suit property had reverted to the statutory lessee as the D. A. P. C. B. appears to have thought, then it could never have been possible for the D. A. P. C. B., at the same time, to permit the plaintiff to effect developments on a property in which the D. A. P. C. B. had no interest any more, or at least, was disclaiming having any interest. then Ag. Executive Secretary of the D. A. P. C. B., the Board told the

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*..* under hand or at least, unusual dealings between certain officers of the Council and the plaintiff'. There are several examples. One is the fact 24/9/1991, as Exh. PII shows. Yet by that date, the plaintiffhad not yet secured any allocation of a lease over the suit property. The lease December, 1992 (Exh. PVIII); most likely, long after the plaintiffhad commenced upon effecting his developments on the suit property. It, therefore, strikes me as being very- strange, indeed, that Mbarara that the plaintiffs building plan was approved, by the Town Clerk, on It also appears to me, quite clearly, that there must have been some allocation was made to the plaintiffsome 15 months afterwards, on 17dl

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Municipal Council could approve the building plan of the plaintiff when the plaintiff had no title to the suit property.

It is not surprising that the Council did overlook a warning by the defendant, for it not to allocate a lease to the plaintiff, as the defendant had applied for re-possession. The argument that I. D.1, a letter written by Mr. M. H. Thakker to Mr. Justin Sabiiti, then LCV Chairman, made reference to Plots 52/54 and not to the suit property cannot be accepted. I think that letter must be read as a whole and not merely the subject matter only. I have no doubt that the contents of that letter were explicit enough to place the Council on its guard and inquiry. But they obviously ignored it and went ahead to grant the lease some 13 months afterwards.

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It is also not surprising, therefore, that that trend of events continued and culminated into the plaintiff opening commercial operations into a building for which he had obtained no occupation permit. PW2, the Town Clerk, while testifying in court, pretended to recall that an occupation permit had been issued. But there was none and, indeed, none could be produced in court either by the Town Clerk himself or by the plaintiff.

In view ofthe fact that the plaintiffs lease was null and void *ab inityio,* and iir view of all the evidence oirrecordi there is only one reasonable conclusion to be drawn in respect ofissue number two. That **'S1** is, that the plantiff's developments on the suit property were, indeed, unlawful.

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The third issue is whether the plaintiffis entitled to compensation and, ifso, quantity.

It appears to me, that the plaintiff might have been grossly and perhaps innocently misled by two letters which appear to have been written to him by the Honourable Minister of State for Finance and **I'D** Economic Planning. These letters are exhibits P. IX dated 11U1 June, 1996 and Exh. P. X dated 22nd January', 1996. Both letters seem to have encouraged, suggested and advised (he plaintiff that under section 1 i(2) of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982, lie was entitled to automatic and mandatory compensation for the developments which he had effected **15** upon the suit property. With all due respect, I am ofthe view that that was far from being the correct position of the law.

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**1** Act-provides. for a.fonner owner who repossesses his or her property to be liable to pay compensation in respect of any improvements effected by the occupier ofthe property, that section in my view is not mandatory. I:. other words, compensation is not to be automatically paid in all cases where improvements have been effected and repossession take place. The words used in the Expropriated Properties Act are... "shall be liable to pay for the value of any improvements in such property or business to the person or body that effected such improvement." (Emphasis added) in the case of . Eliakira. Ombany.e..vs. Raherat.ul.la. Meharaed. Jaraanl , My brother, the Honourable Justice E. S. Lugayizi, ofthis court, gave good reasons why that provision is not mandator}'. I duly agree with , I While it is true that section 11(2) of the Expropriated Properties High Court Civil Suit No. 541 of 1996 (Unreported).

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where repossession has taken place and there is dispute as to whether ' liability fails upon the former owner to pay for the value of improvements, that issue must be determined judicially and on a case to each case. It follows, therefore, that the question of whether in any given case case basis, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of

him.

In the instant case; tlieiplaintiff came to the suit property under circumstances that are not so clear. He apparently started construction before he obtained any allocation of a lease overthe suit property. null and void, giving him no legal interest in the suit property, which tenant nor a proprietor. In my view, the former owner cannot be liable i?. effected by the plaintiff. was not different from that of a mere trespasser as he was neither a When he eventually did secure a lease over the property, that lease was was already owned by the defendant. Thus the position of the plaintiff such circumstances to pay for the value of any improvements which were

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It appears to me that the plaintiff took a very unwise and precarious gamble. He has to live with the full effect of his actions. The value of the improvements is directly the result of an illegal activity of the plaintiff on the suit property. The plaintiff cannot benefit from his illegal condoning an illegality, something that no court of law should do. Once the illegality has been brought to the attention of the court, it cannot be overlooked. Makula International Ltd, vs His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga And Another f'1982] HCB4. activity. I think that to hold otherwise would amount to overlooking or

from the defendant. I, therefore, hold on issuc.tiutubcr three, that- (he plaintiff is not entitled to recover the value of his improvements on the suit property

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However, in ease I am wrong, on (he issue of (lie liability of the defendant in that regard, then I would totally reject the valuation report made by PW3, Mr. David Byakusheka and his assistant PW4. Ms. Olive Bishuba Bekita. The report relates to the market value of the suit property and not on the value or cost of the improvementsmade by (he **I** extremely exaggerated and the valuation methods used to arrive at that *to* value were seriously faulty and did not take into account the overall crude manner in which the improvements were effected and the numerous and serious structural defects clearly borne out in (hose improvements. plaintiff on the suit property. I he sum of Shs.j 50m, iu mv view, is

> 1 would, instead, duly accept the evidence of l)W2. Mr. Eridad Nyanzi. who impressed me as a very serious quantity surveyor and whose report on the value ofthe plaintiffs improvements on (he suit property is-more detailed, serious and credible. [ would, therefore, ifthe

**J** pfaintiiron the-suit property, award Shs.30,1:79,737.50 do the plaintiff. ' defendant were liable to pay for the value of the improvements of the

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I will (real issues numbers four and five jointly and answer both in the affirmative, in view of what I have already staled in my discussion of issues numbers two and three.

It is my view that as a former owner repossessing his properly, the 1995, the date ofrepossession. That is what section 9(1) of the 'flic plaintiff was not legitimately **I** occupying or managing the property. His position was that of a stranger. It? not known to the law, as lie had nothing legally valid to support his possession of the suit property as against (he defendant. His eviction was an appropriate measure in (hose circumstances. Expropriated Properties Act provides. defendant was entitled to possession *of* the property from 16"' October.

1 will now examine the remedies available to cither party.

The plaintiff cannot secure a declaration to the effect that he is the **LS** lawful proprietor of the suit property. I Jis title was null and void *uhinitio.* There is no legal basis upon which such decimalion can be made.

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property, was not different from that of a mere trespasser during all the entitled to evict him, as he did on ,2/1 2/^^md gain possession ofthe suit . property. I he locking up of(he premises was, therefore, not illegal. on the suit properly by the . time he carried out his activities on the suit property. The defendant was Similarly, since the position ofthe plaintiff, in relation to the suit

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The plaintiff is not entitled to any genera! damages against the defendant. It is, in my view, the defendant who has been tremendously inconvenienced by the conduct of the plaintiff and not the

Similarly, the plaintiff cannot obtain an order requiring the **( t?** him to effect those developments. no valid legal basis connecting him with the suit property or enabling defendant to pay him compensation for the value of his improvements on the suit property. Those improvements were illegal as the plaintiff had

In (he result, I find no merit in the plaintiffs case. I dismiss it with costs to the defendant. His certificate of title to the suit property will also be cancelled.

So much for the remedies sought in this action by the plaintiff. I **I** will now turn to the counter claim.

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The defendant seeks general damages for trespass. I have already held that the plaintiff's position has all along been one of a trespasser ar; His refusal to yield vacant possession of the suit property to the **i** defendant, after the defendant repossessed the suit property, did not improve matters, but only worsened the plaintiffs already bad position. damages for trespass, in respect oftrespass which occurred before he repossessed the property as a former owner. The act oftrespass is committed against someone either in possession or who is entitled to possession. As a former owner, the defendant became entitled to possession only upon repossession. But the defendant himself has also not shown that he had any plans in respect of the suit property, which he **<5** ' could not implement, owing to the plaintiffs trespass. In the circumstances, I would award Shs.5,000,000/- to the defendant, as general damages for trespass. Of course, I am aware that the defendant would not be entitled to recover he has never had any legal *locus standi* in relation to the suit property.

recover mesne profits in tins case. Section 2 ofthe Civil Proced: Act ' defines mesne profits as, 'flic defendant claims mesne profits. I do not think that he can

those profits which the person in wrongful possession ofsuch properly **«** actually receives, or might, with ordinary diligence, have received (here. ?.lh, together with interest on such profits, but docs not include profits due to *■j* improvements made by (he person in wrongful possession."

> Since whatever profits which the plaintiff might have received wci solely due to the illegal improvements made by him the war of 1979, it would appear to me that the defendant's prayer for mesne profits cannot be sustained. Consequently, I grant none. on the suit property the defendant's own developments having been totally destroyed during

The defendant is certainly entitled to an order for vacant possession and the costs of the counter claim.

finally, I dismiss the plaintiffs case against the defendant with **is** costs to the defendant. 1 also enter judgement for the defendant against (he plaintiff, on the counter claim: I make the following orders:

a) an order dismissing the plaintiff's ease against the defendant; b) an order requiring the Commissioner of Land Registration

(ChiefRegistrar ofTitles) to cancel the Certificate ofTitle held by the plaintiffin respect of the suit property;

defendant as general damages for trespass; c) an order requiring the plaintiff to pay Shs.5,000,000/- to the

d) an order requiring the plaintiff to hand over vacant possession ' of the suit property to (he defendant within 30 days from today; c) an order awarding (he costs of (he suit and the counter claim to the defendant; and TO

to the defendant f) an order awarding interest on (c) and (e) above, at court s rate, *L* from the dale ofjudgement till payment in full.

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YjOdusoke=KiGiiuka

(Judge) 16.3.99

## **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

# **IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMP**AT A

# **MISC APPLICATION NO OF 1999**

| ELIAZAERIDUSI | | APPELLANT | |------------------------------|--------|------------| | | VERSUS | | | MBARARA TRADING STORES | | RESPONDENT |

### **ORDER**

This application coming for disposal before Her Lordship the Honourable Justice Kitumba on the 27th day ofOctober, 1999, in the presence ofKenneth Kakuru Counsel for Applicant and Innocent Kihika, Counsel for the Respondent.

IT IS HEREBY Ordered as follows:-

1. That the applicant be and is hereby granted leave to appeal out oftime.

2. That the Notice ofAppeal be filed within 14 days from the date hereof.

3. Costs ofthis application be paid to the Respondent.

DATED at Kampala this day of 1999

### **COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT**

day of GIVEN under my Hand and the Seal ofthis Honourable Court this 1999

#### **JUDGE/REGISTRAR**