S v President of the Republic of Malawi Ex Parte Dr. Bakili Muluzi & Anor. (Misc. Civil Cause 99 of 2007) [2008] MWHC 2 (15 January 2008)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAWI PRINCIPAL REGISTRY MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NUMBER 99 OF 2007 BETWEEN: THE STATE       AND THE   PRESIDENT   OF   THE   REPUBLIC   OF MALAWI………………………………….. RESPONDENT  EX PARTE DR BAKILI MULUZI……..1ST APPLICANT                     JOHN Z. U. TEMBO…….2ND APPLICANT CORAM: HON. POTANI, J. Kasambara, Counsel for the Applicants Mbendera, Nyamirandu and Chalamanda Counsel for the Respondent Mdala, Court Clerk R U L I N G 1. INTRODUCTION This   matter   is   before   the   court   through   the   judicial   review machinery within the purview of order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.   The two applicants are leaders of two major political parties in this country in terms of representation in the National Assembly.  The matter arises from appointments by the respondent, the President of the Republic of Malawi, of some nine   personalities   as   members   of   the   Malawi   Electoral Commission  a body created and mandated by law to oversee national electoral processes.   The appointments were made by virtue of section 75 of the Constitution as read with section 4 of the   Electoral  Commission   Act.     The  grievance  the   applicants have is that contrary to what the law stipulates, the appointments were   made   without   consulting   them   hence   they   beseech   the court   to   declare   the   appointments   unlawful   and   consequently null and void. 2. FACTS The history of the matter is to be traced from November 23, 2006,   when   the   respondent   initially   made   appointments   of members   of   the   Malawi   Electoral   Commission.   Those appointments   sparked   some   legal   challenge   by   five   political parties in the names of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Malawi   Congress   Party   (MCP),   the   Alliance   for   Democracy (AFORD), the Peoples’ Progressive Movement (PPM) and the Peoples’   Transformation   Party   (PETRA)   who   commenced Miscellaneous   Civil   Cause   Number   182   of   2006   seeking   the nullification   of   the   appointments   on   the   ground   that   the respondent did not consult them as required by section 4 of the Electoral   Commission   Act   in   making   the   appointments.     As events turned out, it was later conceded by the respondent that the   aggrieved   parties   were   indeed   not   consulted   as   it   was discovered   that   the   letters   written   to   them   as   part   of   the consultation   process   were   in   fact   not   delivered   to   them. Therefore,   by   a   consent   order   dated   January   19,   2007,   the appointments were declared null and void. Realising the pivotal role members of the Electoral Commission play in national electoral processes which are a crucial aspect of our   young   democracy,   respondent   on   February   7,   2007, ventured   into   a   fresh   process   of   appointing   members   of   the Electoral   Commission   by   writing   to   all   leaders   of   political parties   represented  in the National  Assembly  on the intended appointments.  In essence, the letter which is among the exhibits from   the   respondent   set   out   the   names   and   resumes   of   the intended   appointees  and invited  feedback from  the  addresses, that is, concerned political parties by February 26, 2007.   The letter   was   delivered   to   the   concerned   political   parties   on February 8 and 9, 2007.   It is to be noted that on January 30, 2007, prior to the respondent’s letter of February 7 but in the aftermath of Miscellaneous Civil Cause Number 182 of 2006, the 2nd  applicant, as Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, on behalf of all parties represented in the National Assembly wrote to the respondent communicating the common stand taken by the parties that in their understanding of the law the consultation process in appointing members of the Electoral Commission has to be in such a way that each political party represented in the National Assembly should nominate persons to   represent   it   in   the   Electoral   Commission   such   that appointments by the respondent must be from such nominees. This letter was received by the respondent on February 12, well after the respondent’s letter of February 7.   Responding to the letter   on   February   22,   the   respondent   expressed   total disagreement with the proposal of appointing members of the Electoral   Commission   from   nominees   of   political   parties represented in the National Assembly and gave his reasons for disagreeing; one such reason being the need to have a politically neutral Electoral Commission.   The respondent in his response also drew to the attention of the concerned political parties his letter   of   February   7   and   the   intended   appointees   therein   and solicited  their endorsement by the  concerned political  parties. Specifically   regarding   the   letter   of   February   7   from   the respondent  to the political  parties  represented  in the National Assembly   on   the   intended   appointees   to   the   Electoral Commission, there appears to have been no response except for the   Malawi   Congress   Party   (MCP)   and   the   Peoples’ Transformation Party (PETRA).  In its response dated February 22, the MCP put forward five nominees.  In the case of PETRA as   per   the   response   of   February   23,   it   made   three   major observations,   that   is,   firstly   relating   to   the   suitability   of   one intended   appointee   on   account   of   her   long   stay   outside   the country  which  in   the  party’s  view  could   adversely   affect   her interaction with the public, secondly the suitability of appointees aged above 65 in view of the strenuous nature of the work to be involved and thirdly the absence of appointees from some key district notably Mzimba and Lilongwe.  What followed next was the decision by the respondent on March 12, about 33 days from this   letter   of   February   7,   appointing   the   intended   appointees spelt out in the letter of February 7 as members of the Malawi Electoral Commission publication of which was made on March 15.     Following   the   publication   of   the   appointments,   the applicants on March 23 commenced the present proceedings.  At the commencement of the proceedings, the applicants obtained stay and injunction orders  ex parte  restraining the respondent from   swearing   the   appointees   into   office   pending   the determination   of   the   matter.     The   respondent   unsuccessfully applied to have the ex parte orders vacated. 3. ARGUMENTS AND SUBMISSIONS The court has been presented with elaborate and lucid written and   oral   arguments   by   counsel   for   the   parties   together   with relevant legal authorities on the matters in issue.  As a starting point,   the   core   and   all   encompassing   ground   on   which   the applicants’   case   hinges   is   that   the   appointments   by   the respondent amount to an exercise in futility in that the law was not complied with.   In canvassing the case for the applicants, counsel has advanced specific areas of argument. The first area of argument taken up by counsel is that the appointments were made   without   consultations   in   the   legal   sense.     Among   the several   cases   relied   on   by   counsel   as   to   what   constitutes consultations  in the  legal  sense is  Union of  India v. Sankal Chand   Himatlala   Sheth   and   Chand   ANR  1977   INSC   178 decided by the Supreme Court of India in which among others it was held as follows: “Consultation   …   means   full   and   effective   not   formal   or unproductive, consultation.” The   court   went   on   to   observe   that   deliberation   is   the quintessence of consultation which implies that each case must be considered separately on the basis of its own facts.  It is the contention of counsel that the respondent in this case failed to examine the merits of the views of the applicants and instead took a rigid approach thereby creating no room for deliberation which   is   at   the   core   of   full   and   effective   consultation. According to counsel, the respondent’s rigidity manifests itself from his outright rejection, as being unlawful, the applicants’ proposal   that   they   should   make   their   nominations   for appointment.  It is the applicant’s submission that the contention by the respondent that appointing nominees by the applicants would   compromise   the   independence   of   the   Electoral Commission as provided for in section 76(4) of the Constitution and section 6 of the Electoral Commission Act is baseless firstly because  the  applicants  never at  all  intimated  that  they  would appoint   their   members   and   secondly   because   belonging   to   a political party per se does not mean losing one’s independence. Counsel   further   argues   that   the   respondent’s   rigidity   and therefore   failure   to   fully   and   effectively   consult   is   also demonstrated   by   the   manner   the   concerns   by   the   Peoples’ Transformation Party (PETRA) were treated in that they were not responded to but ignored completely as irrelevant.  On this point, it is the submission of counsel that the  Union of India case stands for the proposition that once views of the consulted are   ignored,  prima   facie  there   are   no   consultations   unless reasons for ignoring them are given. The   second   area   of   argument   advanced   by   counsel   for   the applicants which is linked to the alleged lack of consultations in the legal sense is basically that the proposal by the applicants to submit their nominees for appointment which was rejected by the respondent is a matter of constitutional convention that has evolved over the years and therefore is the acceptable mode of the consultation process.  It is the submission of counsel for the applicants   that   a   convention   should   not   be   confused   with   a custom as the respondent’s counsel seem to in their insistence that for a practice to graduate into a convention, it must have existed since time immemorial.   According to counsel for the applicants, there are three basic tests for a convention as laid down by a well known jurist in the name of Jennings and these are   precedence,   obligation   and   reason   for   the   rule.     On precedence, it is the case advanced by counsel that the Electoral Commissioners that oversaw the Elections in 1994, 1999, 2004 were   all   appointment   by   way   of   nominations   from   political parties   represented  in  the National  Assembly.    Regarding  the obligation test, counsel has submitted that the test is satisfied in that   the   applicants   who   are   seasoned   politicians   have consistently employed the practice before which demonstrates that they had the conviction that they had an obligation to do so. With respect to the reason for the practice, the submission of counsel is that the test of free and fair elections depends on the public’s   acceptance   of   the   legitimacy   of   the   Electoral Commission as such the practice came about as political parties felt that appointments from their nominees gave the Electoral Commission   the   much   desired   legitimacy.   Counsel   has dismissed the respondent’s stand point that the convention, if at all it has been proved, is illegal as it effectively takes away the power   of   appointment   which   the   law   clearly   vests   in   the president since according to counsel the final appointment still remains with the respondent.   Counsel has urged the court to recognise both the law and convention as important except that with the law there is laid down procedure for enactment which is not the case with convention. Responding to the applicants’ case, it has been argued that the respondent was not dismissive to the views of the applicants that they be allowed to make nominations for appointment.  In this regard, it is the observation of counsel that the respondent, by letter dated February 22, 2007, explained to the applicants the reasons for not going along with their suggestion.  It is further the respondent’s submission that the definition and essence of consultation   as   was   held   in  Kembol   v   The   State   and   Enga (1990) PNGLR 67 means seeking views and not obligation to follow   the   views.     In   other   words,   the   consulting   person   is perfectly entitled to ignore the views of the consulted person.  In this regard, it is the submission of the respondent that the fact that the views of PETRA were not taken on board in itself does not   mean   that   there   were   no   consultations.     Further,   the respondent argues that the case he has to answer is that of the applicants and not anything to do with non­parties to the matter such as PETRA. Regarding the reliance placed by the applicants on a supposed convention   that   works   in   such   a   way   that   political   parties represented in the National Assembly have to make nominations for appointment, the case for the respondent is that for a practice to  pass  the  test  of  an established   convention,  four  conditions must   exist   namely;   the   practice   must   exist   since   time immemorial, it must be reasonable, it must have some continuity and it must have certainty.  It is the contention of the respondent that much as continuity and certainty may have been established in this case, it is a far cry to begin to suggest that the tests of existence since time immemorial and reasonableness have been satisfied.     A   far   cry   because   according   to   the   applicants   the alleged convention has been in place since 1994 which is within recent and living memory.  The convention falls short of being reasonable, it is the respondent’s contention, in that it is contrary to   section   76(4)   of   the   Constitution   and   section   6   of   the Electoral Commission Act as it tends to erode the independence bestowed upon the Electoral Commission by those provisions. A convention must supplement and not run counter to the law, it is   the   respondent’s   submission.     An   argument   has   also   been canvassed by the respondent that even if it is accepted that the alleged convention started in 1994, it is to be observed that the Electoral Commission Act was enacted in 1998 and yet it never incorporated the convention which clearly means that the law intended to do away with it and therefore no matter how one defines a convention the alleged convention can not bind the respondent. 4. DETERMINATION The   case   at   hand   is   one   triggered   by   the   exercise,   by   the respondent,   of   Presidential   powers   of   appointment.     In   this regard,   as   rightly   submitted   by   counsel   for   the   respondent, section 89(1) (d) of the Constitution which gives the respondent general powers to make appointments is the starting point.  The section  confers upon the  respondent  the  power to  make such appointments as may be necessary in accordance with the power conferred upon him by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. What is important to note is that in making appointments, the respondent is duty bound to conform with the Constitution or an Act   of   Parliament   as   the   case   may   be.     In   the   case   of appointment of members of the Electoral Commission which is the bone of contention in this case, their appointment primarily features in section 75 of the Constitution.  The section, however, does not confer any specific power of appointment.   It simply states that the appointment has to be in accordance with an Act of   Parliament   and   that   Act   happens   to   be   the   Electoral Commission Act.   It is section 4(1) of the Act which provides for   the   power   and  mode   of   appointment   and   it   is   worded   as follows: “The   president   shall,   subject   to   the   Constitution   and  in consultation   with   the   leaders   of   the   political   parties represented   in   the   National   Assembly   appoint  suitably qualified persons to be members of the Commission on such terms and conditions as the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament shall determine.” (emphasis added) It   is   clear   from   the   above   quoted   section   that   in   appointing members of the Electoral Commission, the respondent is duty bound to do so in consultation with leaders of political parties represented in the National Assembly like the applicants.   As highlighted earlier in this judgment, the present case hinges on whether or not such consultations were made by the respondent. The obvious fact that has led to the present case is that section 4(1) of the Electoral Commission Act does not prescribe how the consultations by the respondent are to be done.  In Fletcher v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1947) 2 All ER 496 at page 500 Morris, J. had this to say on consultation: “The word consultation is one that is in general use and that is well understood.   No useful purpose would, in my view be served by formulating words of determination.   Nor would it be   appropriate   to   seek   to   lay   down   the   manner   in   which consultations must take place.  The Act does not prescribe any particular   form of consultation.    If a  complaint  is  made of failure to consult, it will be for the court to examine the facts and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   to   decide   whether consultation was, in fact, held. (emphasis supplied). The above quoted  dictum  by Morris, J. is instructive as to the approach to be taken by the court where an Act, as in the case of the Electoral Commission Act does not prescribe the mode of consultation and there is a complaint of failure to consult as in the present proceedings.   The approach to be taken is for the court to examine the facts and circumstances of the case and decide whether consultation was, in fact, held. The   facts   of   the   case   amply   reveal   that   before   making   the disputed appointments, the respondent by letter of February 7, 2007,   wrote   all   leaders   of   political   parties   represented   in   the National Assembly on the intended appointments.   It is worth noting that before the respondent’s letter of February 7, the 2nd applicant on January 30 wrote to the respondent on behalf of all the other concerned political parties floating the suggestion that they be allowed to put forward nominees for appointment in line with   previous   practice.     It   alleged   by   the   applicants   that   by writing his letter of February 7 containing proposed appointees before responding to the 2nd  applicants letter of January 30, it shows that the respondent had already made up his mind on the appointments  so much so that the purported consultation was merely cosmetic.   It is to be observed that the 2nd  applicant’s letter of January 30 only reached the respondent on February 22 as   evidenced   by   the   date   stamp   for   the   respondent’s   office thereon.  This only goes to show that by the time the respondent wrote and despatched the letter of February 7, he was not aware of the letter by the 2nd applicant of January  30.  It can therefore not be correct to say that the fact the respondent wrote the letter of February 7 before responding to the 2nd  applicant’s letter of January 30 shows that the respondent had already made up his mind   on   the   appointments   and   was   all   out   to   ignore   any representations by the applicants.  This is further demonstrated by   the   fact   that   after   receipt   of   the   2nd  applicant’s   letter   on February   12,   the   respondent   subsequently   on   February   22 responded to that letter giving detailed reasons why he did not go along with the proposals by the 2nd applicant and leaders of other   concerned   political   parties.     It   would   be   pertinent   to observe that after the respondent’s letter of February 22, the 2nd applicant’s response dated February 27 was again in the form of nominations   for   appointment,   a   move   earlier   rejected   by   the respondent. In the Union of India case relied on by the applicants, the court noted with approval the definition of consultation in Stroud’s Judicial   Dictionary   quoting  Rollo   v   Minister   of   Town   and Country Planning (1948) 1 All ER 13 and Fletcher v Minister of Town and Country Planning  (1947) 2 All ER 946 in the context of expression “consultation with any local authorities” as follows:­ “Consultation means that, on the one side, the Minister must supply sufficient information to the local authority to enable them  to tender advice, and, on the other hand, a sufficient opportunity   must   be   given   to   the   local   authority   to   tender advice.” The definition of consultation in the  Rollo  and  Fletcher  cases has been criticised as being narrow as a result courts now favour a   wider   interpretation     as  was   held   in    Re   Hanoman   (Carl) (1999) 65 WIR 157 as follows­   However,   modern   trends   indicate   that   the   consultation process embraces more than just affording an opportunity to express   views   and   receive   advice.   It   involves   meaningful participation and overall fairness and although it inevitably involves   the   exercise   of   a   discretion,   inherent   in   that discretion is the obligation to act fairly and reasonably within the boundaries of the statute authorizing the exercise of the discretion.’’ The   court   in   the  Union   of   India  case   employed   the   wider definition   of   consultation   and   in   so   doing   it   stated   that consultation must be full and effective and not just formal or unproductive   and   for   that   to   be   achieved   there   must   be deliberation.  In the present case, the respondent gave sufficient information to   the   applicants   regarding   the   names   and   resumes   of   the intended appointees to enable the applicants to tender advice on their suitability for appointment.  It took about 33 days from the date the respondent provided the information to the applicants to the   time   the   respondent   finally   made   the   appointments.   This intervening period, in the view of this court, gave the applicants sufficient   opportunity   to   tender   advice.     Did   they   tender   the advice?  In a sense they did through the 2nd applicant’s letter of January 30 albeit coming earlier than the respondent’s letter of February 7 as in essence the letter of January 30 directly related to the matters covered in the respondent’s letter of February 7. As  earlier noted, the respondent replied to the 2nd  applicant’s letter   of   January   30   explaining   why   he   never   favoured   the proposals therein. This exchange of proposals and views on the intended appointments,  in the view of the court, is indicative that   there   was   deliberation   over   the   matter.   After   the respondent’s letter of February 22 the applicants never gave any other advice other than their earlier stand.  It was then that the respondent proceeded to make the disputed appointments The question that may arise then is whether the respondent was bound   to   follow   the   advice   or   proposal   put   forward   by   the applicants.   Put differently, can it be said that by rejecting the proposal  or   advice  by  the   applicants  the   respondent   failed  to consult.  In considering this question the court finds the decision of High Court of Botswana in  Sesana and others v Attorney General  (2006) B W H C 1 highly persuasive.   It was held in that case that: “Consultation does not require the decision maker to accept the views of t those he consults.  He may quite properly reject their views, as long as he takes them properly into account before doing so.” In   the   case   at   hand   the   facts   show   that   before   rejecting   the applicants’ proposal on how the appointments were to be made, the   respondent   considered   the   proposal   as   evidenced   by   his letter of February 22, 2007 setting out reasons for rejecting the proposal.     He   was   not   merely   dismissive   as   alleged   by   the applicants. Further   the   case   of  Morobe   Provincial   Government   v   The State and Somare  (1984) PNGLR 212 buttresses the position taken by the High Court of Botswana.  It was held in that case that: “the   term   consultation   is   a   much   less   forceful   term   than “recommendation.” In essence the court agrees with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that consultation should not be confused with recommendation as the latter entails the   final   step   before   a decision is made and plays a prominent role in the final decision while  consultation  has very little effect on the final decision. The   respondent,  therefore,   cannot  be faulted  for  rejecting  the proposal by the applicants. The present case, however, is not just about rejection of views of the consulted.   It goes beyond that as it is the contention of the   applicants   that   the   respondent   acted   contrary   to   an established   convention   requiring   the   respondent   to   make appointments from nominations put forward by political parties represented in the National Assembly. There   is   no   contention   that   the   members   of   the   Electoral Commissions that conducted the 1999 and 2004 elections were appointed   by   the   1st  applicant,   then   President   of   the   country, from nominees of political parties represented in the National Assembly.   The point of contention is whether that manner of appointment constitutes a constitutional convention binding on the respondent.  Counsel for the parties is at variance as to the tests   applicable   in   ascertaining   whether   a   particular   practice constitutes   a   binding   convention.     On   the   one   hand,   the applicants’ submission is that the applicable test has three facets namely; precedence, obligation and reason.  On the other hand, it is the respondent’s case that the applicable test is fourfold, that is, immemorial, reasonableness, continuity and certainty. In   the   quest   to   determine   whether   the   practice   of   making appointments   to   the   Electoral   Commission   from   nominees   of political parties constitutes a binding convention, the court has stumbled   over   Hilaire   Barnett’s  Constitutional   and Administrative Law 5  th    Edition  which offers some assistance on   the   question.     On   page   31   the   learned   author   writes   as follows as to what constitutes a convention: “A conventional rule may be said to exist when a traditional practice has been consciously adopted and recognised by those who operate the Constitution as the correct manner in which to act in a given circumstance.  A practice will be seen to have become a convention at the point at which failure to act in accordance with it gives rise to legitimate criticism. Sir Ivor Jennings once suggested that three questions must be asked   in   order   to   determine   whether   a   convention   exists. First,   are   there   any   precedents   for   the   convention?     ‘Mere practice’, he tells us, is not enough.  The fact that an authority has always behaved in a certain way is no warrant for saying that   it   ought   to   behave   in   that   way.   What   more,   then,   is required?   According   to   Jennings,   that   turns   on   the normativity of the practice: … If the authority itself and those connected with it believe that   they   ought   to   do   so   (behave   in   certain   way),   then   a convention   does   exist   ….   Practice   alone   is   not   enough.    It must be nominative. Finally, Jennings argues that neither practice nor precedent is sufficient.  In addition, there must be a reason for the rule … the creation of a convention must be due to the reason of the thing because it accords with prevailing political philosophy.” The facts of the present case show that there is some precedence on   the   practice   of   making   appointments   from   nominees   of political parties represented in the National Assembly.  There is also   every   indication   that   in   implementing   the   practice   the authority, that is, the presidency and those connection with it, being the concerned political parties, believed that they ought to behave in that way as evidenced by the averments by the 2nd applicant in his affidavit in reply sworn on October 31, 2007, the contents of which are not at all disputed.   It can therefore safely be said that the practice gained some normativity.   It is also to be noted that in the affidavit in reply just referred to the 2nd applicant gives the rationale and reason behind the practice, that   is,   in   order   to   ensure   that   members   of   the   Electoral Commission  are  acceptable to all  stakeholders  thereby giving the   Commission   legitimacy,   a   prerequisite   to   free   and   fair elections.  In view of these observations the conclusion that has to   be   reached   is   that   the   practice   has   passed   the   test   of   a convention as laid down by Jennings and echoed by Barnett in his   book  Constitutional   and   Administrative   Law.    The suggestion by the respondent that for practice to qualify as a convention, it must have existed since time  immemorial does not   seem   to   be   supported   by   the   learned   jurists.   Indeed according   to  O   Hood   Phillips   and   Jackson;   Constitutional and   Administrative   Law,   8  th    Edition    page   135   paragraph 7­001, the validity of a convention does not require immemorial antiquity. An   argument   has   been   advanced   by   the   respondent   that   the convention   the   applicants   seek   to   rely   on   is   not   binding   on account   of   being   unreasonable   because   it   effectively   runs counter  to   section   76(4)  of   Constitution  and  section  6  of   the Electoral Commission Act in that it has effect of compromising the independence of the Commission; the argument being that if Commissioners are to be appointed from nominees of political parties, they are bound to toy their political party lines at the expense   of   professionalism   and   objectivity     in   discharging discharging     their   duties.     Such   an   argument   is   not   wholly correct.   As rightly argued by counsel for the applicants, it is fallacious as it does not automatically follow that belonging to a political   party   makes   one   lose   their   independence   or professionalism.   Certainly, it cannot be said that the disputed appointees   do   not   have   political   party   inclinations.     They   do have and yet that, in itself, does not necessarily mean that they would not discharge their duties in a professional, neutral and objective manner.  The respondent has also sought to argue that the   convention   is   unreasonable   in   that   it   takes   away   the appointing power from the respondent in whom such power is vested by the law in section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act as read with section 75 of that Act and section 89 1(d) of the Constitution.  While to some degree such an argument has merit, it  is  not entirely  correct  since  at the end of the day it is the respondent   who   decides   who   to   appoint   among   the   so   many nominees put forward by the concerned political parties. In the light of the foregoing remarks and observations, it is the finding of the court that in making the disputed appointments, the respondent failed to follow an established convention.  What then is the consequence?  Is it that the appointments are null and void?  To answer this question, it must first be recognised that conventions are there to supplement the law.  It is submitted by Barnett in Constitutional and Administrative Law referred to earlier that conventional rules being non legal rules, the courts have no jurisdiction to enforce breach  of such rules although they may give recognition to them as the court has done in this case. See also  O. Hood Phillips and Jackson; Constitutional and   Administrative   Law,   8  th    Edition    page   137   paragraph 7­003. Further the cases of Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd  (1976)   Q. B.   752   and  Reference   re   Amendment   of   the Constitution  of Convention  (1982) D. L. R. (3d)1, 84 reaffirm the proposition that unlike laws, conventions are not enforceable by the courts. Professor Colin Munro as quoted by Barnett in Constitutional and Administrative Law  stated as follows in relation to the enforceability of conventions: ‘’The   validity   of   conventions   cannot   be   the   subject   of proceedings in a court of law. Reparation for breach of such rules will not be affected by any legal sanction. There are no cases which contradict these propositions. In fact, the idea of a  court   enforcing   a mere  convention   is  so  strange  that   the question hardly arises” The  consequence of  beach of a convention,  it  has been said, would   probably   be   severe   public   criticism   and   loss   of popularity. In other words, as Barnett puts it in his book referred to earlier, the consequence of violating a conventional rule is political   rather   than   legal.   However,   it   is   recognised   by   the various   commentators   that   in   cases   where   breach   of   a convention also leads to breach of law the court would have the jurisdiction to enforce breach of the convention.  In the case at hand,   as   earlier   found   by   the   court,   in   so   far   as   the   law   is concerned   the   respondent   fulfilled   the   requirement   for consultation in making the disputed appointments. 5 CONCLUSION In   the   final   analysis   the   court   rules   that   departure   by   the respondent   from   the   practice   followed   by   his   predecessor   in appointing   members   of   the   Electoral   Commission   merely constitutes   breach   of   a   convention   which   the   court   has   no jurisdiction to enforce.   In so far as the law is concerned, the respondent acted within the parameters.   The applicants’ case must therefore fail and it is consequently dismissed. The upshot of the court’s finding is therefore that there is no basis   for   the   sustenance   of   the   stay   and   injunction   orders obtained   by   the   applicants   restraining   the   respondent   from swearing into office the appointees. Consequently the orders are hereby discharged. 6. COSTS The question of costs has greatly exercised the court’s mind.  As a general rule, costs follow the event.  What this simply means is that the successful party ordinarily gets the award of costs. The court however, has the discretion as to what order to make. It   is   to   be  recalled   that   in   its   ruling   of   July   2,   2007,  on   the respondent’s   application   to   discharge   the   stay   and   injunction orders, the court did rule that costs incidental to that application would   be   for   the   successful   party   in   the   substantive   hearing which   as   it   has   turned   out   is   the   respondent.     That   order   is hereby re­affirmed.  As regards costs of the substantive judicial review  hearing,  the  court   takes  the  view  that   considering   the importance   of   the   issues   raised   by   the   matter   to   our   young democracy,   the   appropriate   order   would   be   that   each   party should bear its own costs and so it is ordered. Pronounced   in   Open   Court   this   Day   of   January   16,   2008,   at Blantyre. H S B Potani JUDGE