Eastleigh Hawkers Association v Nairobi City County, Inspector General of Police, Eastleigh Business District Association [2016] KEHC 1390 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO.  384 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONTRAVENTION  OF ARTICLES 10,19,20, 21,22,23,43,46,47 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE   RULES, 2013

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACT

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE ACT

BETWEEN

EASTLEIGH HAWKERS ASSOCIATION……...……...…………..PETITIONER

AND

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY ……..…….………………………1ST RESPONDENT

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE……….……………2ND RESPONDENT

EASTLEIGH BUSINESS DISTRICT ASSOCIATION…..3RD RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Vide  a notice of motion  dated  15th September  20165 and filed in court on 15th September 2016, the petitioner herein Eastleigh  Hawkers  Association, being a duly  registered  society under the Societies Act Cap 108  Laws of Kenya  vide  their  Certificate of Registration No. 453673 dated 24th July  2014  seek from this  court  against the  respondents  Nairobi City County, Inspector  General of Police  and Eastleigh Business District   Association orders that:

1. Spent

2. An interim order of  injunction do issue  against  the respondents  jointly  and severally restraining  them whether  by themselves, their  servants  or agents, or howsoever from evicting, restraining  and  otherwise  forbidding  members of the petition from carrying  on their business as hawkers  off 1st Avenue  and 2nd Avenue  ( the designated  area)  of Eastleigh   Central  Business District  until interpartes  hearing   this application.

3. That an order of injunction do  issue  against the respondents  jointly and  severally restraining  the respondent  by themselves, their servants  or agents, or  howsoever from evicting, restraining, or forbidding members of the petitioner  from  carrying their business as hawkers  in the designated   area  until final determination of the petition.

2. The application which is  brought under  the Constitution  of Kenya  2010 (Protection of Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice  and Procedure  Rules, 2013 is predicated  on the grounds that: The  petitioner  is a Society comprising about  6,000 members  who are hawkers  selling  a variety of merchandise in the  designated  area as a means of earning  a living  for themselves and members of  their families; That  members of the petitioner and  their  families  are approximately  20,000 souls  whose  livelihood  depend on the  hawking  business  of the petitioner’s  members; That since 2nd September 2016 when the respondents violently evicted members of the petitioner the petitioners’ members have been forbidden by force from plying their trade; That this action has caused untold misery to members of the petitioner and their families; That the 1st respondent had promised  to find  an alternative  trading area for the  petitioners’  members  before  they could be  moved out of the  designated area; That they were evicted before an alternative trading area had been found.

3. The notice  of motion is further  supported by a supporting  affidavit  sworn by Jeff Ouma  Iteba the chairman  of the petitioner sworn on  15th September  2016  annexing  certificate   of registration  of the society, their constitution, correspondence with the City County of Nairobi and newspaper  reports; and a further affidavit  of the same deponent sworn on  19th September  2016  and filed in  court on 20 September 2016 and filed in  court ion 20th September 2016 annexing  copy of  photograph for  the site of the designated  area from whence the petitioners  were operating (hawking) their businesses from. before they were allegedly violently  evicted  on  2nd September 2016.

4. The notice of motion is anchored  on  the humble  petition of the petitioner/ applicant herein  filed on 15th September  2016  dated  15th September  2016  seeking for permanent injunction and temporary injunction, similar  to the orders  sought in  the notice of motion  subject of this ruling.

5. Only the respondent entered an appearance through their Advocate Mr Ogola.  The 2nd and 3rd respondents did not appear.

6. The  application  was on 16th September  2016  certified  as urgent  by Honourable  Onguto J who  directed  that  I hear this  matter on 21st September2016.  Regrettably, the 1st  respondent’s counsel was  not ready for the  hearing on the said date  as he had  just been served the previous day hence  the court directed  the application  to be heard  today interpartes.  When this matter was called  out  today  at 9. 10 am, Mr Ilako  advocate  holding  brief for Mr Ogola  for the 1st respondent sought for  an adjournment to enable them get documents from their instructing  client  as it  had been  difficult   to do so.  This court declined to grant any adjournment and directed the petitioner/ applicant advocates to proceed with their application.

7. Mr L.M.Ombete counsel for the petitioners/applicants submitted in support of his clients’ application, while relying on the grounds, supporting affidavit, further affidavit and all the annextures thereto.

8. Mr L.M. Ombete  emphasized  on  behalf  of his clients  that the actions of the 1st respondent  which are  in essence meant  to implement  the pressure  asserted  to it  by the 3rd  respondent  was   meant  to deny the applicants  their livelihoods  and the  right to  inherent  dignity.  That  as the County  Government  had committed  itself  to  allocating the hawkers  an alternative area to carry out  their businesses, it  was  mischievous of them to proceed to evict the petitioners’ members from the designated site while   negotiations  were ongoing  as exhibited by annextures  JOO 5 a,b,c and  d.

9. Further, that the action of evicting  the applicants from designated  area denied  them the right  to inherent decent  living, housing, education and food for themselves and their children, which rights are  guaranteed  by Article  43  of the Constitution.  That even the Governor  himself  had by  the annexed newspaper report  promised  not to evict  the  applicants  from the designated  area   until an alternative site  was found  hence  the violent  eviction  was illegal.

10. In addition, it  was  submitted that  since the petitioners  herein are not  parties to the Petition No. 14/2016  wherein the 3rd respondents  had sued  the 1st  respondent  asking  for eviction  of the petitioners, and  as there  is no eviction   order from the court, it  was   illegal  to evict  the applicants  hence   the court should exercise  its  discretion and authority to restore the  evicted  hawkers to the designated  area until the petition is heard  and determined, in order  to respect  the dignity  of the petitioners who   have a right  to do business and   eke a living.

11. Mr Ilako holding  brief  for Mr  Ogola  had no response  to the submissions  by Mr L.M  Ombete  Advocate   who appeared  jointly  with Mr  Nyauchi for the petitioners/applicants.

12. I have  anxiously  considered the applicants’/ petitioners’ Notice of Motion  dated  15th September  2016  supported by a supporting  affidavit, further  affidavit, the annextures  and the main petition which  was  filed contemporaneous  with the application.  I have also considered the submissions by counsel for the applicants    and the fact that the application is largely not opposed.

13. The burden of proof lies on he who alleges.  In this  case,  the burden of proving that their rights were  being violated or threatened to be violated lies on the petitioners/applicants  in their application  which seeks   for an order of  injunction to  issue  restraining  the respondents from  evicting, restraining  or forbidding  members  of the petitioner Association from  carrying   on their  business as hawkers  in the designated  area until final determination of this petition as filed, which petition seeks  for a permanent injunction.

14. The single most issue for determination in  this motion  heard exparte  is therefore  whether the  applicant/petitioner has proved  on the evidence  available, that they  are entitled  to the injunctive orders  sought in  the notice  of motion.

15. In his submissions, Mr L.M. Ombete commenced  by seeking for an interim mandatory injunction to compel  the 1st  respondent  to allow  the petitioners  to return  to the  designated  areas of business  until the hearing  and determination of their petition.

16. However, my  meticulous  perusal of the petition and the Notice of Motion   does not  reveal  any prayer for a mandatory injunction being sought, seeking for restoration of the petitioner’s  members  back into  the designated  area, now that  it is trite, from the  applicant/petitioner’s application and petition, the members  of the petitioner   were violently  evicted  from the site  on 2nd September  2016  with the  assistance  of the police.

17. A mandatory injunction which is  a conservatory  order in  constitutional  petitions  must  be specifically pleaded  for the  court to grant  it.  The court cannot speculate whether the injunction sought in the Notice of Motion and the petition is a mandatory or prohibitory injunction.  It is clear  in my mind  that the  applicants  herein sought for a  prohibitory injunction in their  pleadings  throughout  and   never  attempted  to  amend their pleadings to include  a mandatory  injunction to enable  this court   consider it on its merits.  This court must  remind  the parties  that  they are  bound by their  pleadings  and that  they cannot  be found  asking for  bread  in their petition  and  interlocutory  application,  but  when they appear  in court, they urge the  court to grant them a snake  or a stone.  Trial by ambush is abhorred  by  the law that is why pleadings are  filed  and served  upon the adverse  party  to notify  them  of the  kind of case   to expect  and to  respond to.

18. In this case, the applicants  having been  effectively evicted  from the designated  area  where they lawfully carried  out their  businesses  and paid taxes  to the  1st respondent, the only  remedy that this  court  would give  them at this stage  would be  a mandatory  injunction  to  restore  them back into the designated area,  assuming that they  established a  prima facie  arguable  case in this first instance.

19. Instead, whereas the applicants clearly sought for a prohibitive/restraining injunction in their pleadings, they changed tact in their submissions and asked for a mandatory injunction.  Courts are liberal in granting leave to amend pleadings.  In the case, the petitioners had the opportunity even to seek for oral leave to amend their pleadings.  There   was   no such attempt.  In my humble view, although the application  was not  defended, the orders  of mandatory injunction  as sought  in the submissions  are not  simple  orders  which the court can  on its  own motion  grant.  They are   substantive  reliefs   which a party  must plead  and invite  the adverse  party  to respond to and even where  there is no response, which cannot   be  interpreted  to mean concession  in disputes  of this  nature, the party  applying for  such a mandatory  conservatory  order in a constitutional  petition must  demonstrate  to the satisfaction  of the court  that on the material  presented , a court  properly directing  itself  will conclude that there  exists  a right  which has  apparently  been infringed by the   opposite  party  as to call  for  an explanation  or rebuttal  from the  opposite  party.

20. The petitioners were ably represented by two senior advocates Mr L.M. Ombete and Mr Nyauchi.  If they were acting pro se, this court would have had reason to doubt their legal prowess.  But that is not the case here.  In my view, it would  be  prejudicial  to the respondents  if this  court  was  to consider the merits  of the mandatory injunction  sought  through  submissions  when the  respondents  were only  served with  pleadings  which sought  for a temporary  prohibitive  injunction   and   which they  may  have ignored to respond to, after  all, knowing that the court, which is  deemed to know the law, cannot  make such  a serious  error  of law  by granting  a mandatory  restorative injunction  which the  applicants  never  sought for in their  petition and in this  interlocutory  proceeding.

21. In the end, I find that the prayer for a mandatory injunction is not grounded to warrant consideration and I accordingly reject it.

22. On the  prayer for  temporary injunction  restraining  and forbidding the eviction  of the petitioners/ applicant’s  members from  carrying on their business  as hawkers  in the designated  area until   the final  determination of this petition, this court  notes that an injunction is designed  to either stop/prohibit/restrain  or compel some act  or action on the  part of the  respondents.

23. In the instant case, what is sought to be restrained or prohibited or to be forbidden has already taken place.  Where an eviction has already occurred, then there   is nothing for this court to restrain, forbid or to preserve.  In other words, interlocutory  injunctions are granted  prior to the  trial,  of an action or until  further order  is made  in order to preserve  the status quo until the court  can hear  the dispute fully.  An injunction can  issue to restrain an obstruction to justice. Where there is  nothing  to be preserved like in the instant case where the  applicants/petitioners have  already been  evicted, the court  is being asked to  issue orders  in vain.  Court orders are never issued in vain.

24. Where it  would be  impossible  to enforce a   prohibitory  injunction like in this case,  it would be  a waste of Judicial  time and resources  to venture  into the  territory of setting  out principles  applicable for grant of interlocutory  injunctions  even in constitutional  or Judicial Review  applications.

25. In Gatirau  Peter Munya  Vs Dickson  Mwenda  Githinji & 2 Others  SC  Petition 2/2013  the Supreme Court  set a threshold  for the issuance of conservatory interim   orders in a Constitutional Petition  as follows:-

“……….The test  for the grant of  conservatory orders under  the constitutional applications  must  qualified   to take  into account  the premium  that the constitution  places  upon the enjoyment  of fundamental rights.  Such premium is to be seen  in the easy access  to the court that it  granted  to the applicants  in terms of locus standi  and the  formality  of documentation      ( See Article  22 of the Constitution).

In such circumstances  the balance of convenience  test upon an arguable  case  being  demonstrated  by the applicant  is more  appropriate to preserve the enjoyment  of rights  pending  hearing and determination of the petition  for breach  of fundamental human rights  and freedoms.

Needless to state  in terms  of  Article  24   of the Constitution, the balance of  convenience  must involve  balancing  the rights  of the applicant  against the  rights  of others  whose  enjoyment  of those  or other  rights  may be  jeopardized  or affected by the enjoyment  by the  applicant  of the rights  ion question”

26. In the instant  application, and from  the submissions of Mr L.M. Ombete, it   clearly emerges that there  are competing  interests  of the petitioners  who seek to use the space  for hawking  business  until  an alternative  area  or location is found for them, and the interests of the  3rd respondents seeking vide Petition No. 14/2016 to compel the 1st respondent  to implement  rights relating  to a clean  and healthy  environment.

27. It therefore follows that this court in considering  whether   a  conservatory  order  can issue, and besides  the test  set out in the Peter  Gatirau  case   by the Supreme Court, the court must have  the proper prayers  before it, capable  of enforcement, while  taking into account the provisions of Article 22(3) (d) of the Constitution  which calls  upon this court to observe  the rules  of natural justice.  In other words, to determine  that the applicants  are entitled to  a mandatory  injunction  when they   specifically  sought for  an interlocutory  injunction, even in  the absence of any opposition  to the application, would  in my view  be denying the respondents an opportunity to be heard  on the oral prayer for  mandatory injunction yet, from those oral submissions of the applicant’s counsel, there  are competing   interests  of parties  to this petition and  application, which  issues   are being   litigated  in another  matter before this  court in a different file.

28. On the whole, I find that an arguable case for a prohibitory injunction has not been made out by the petitioners.  Accordingly, I decline to grant the prayers sought in the Notice of Motion dated 15th September 2016.  The same   is dismissed.

29. Each party to bear their own costs.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 29th September 2016 at 2. 30 pm.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of

Mr L.M Ombete and Mr Nyauchi for the Petitioners/applicants

N/A for the Respondents

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