Ebusuapayin Mbrayie Vrs Ebusuapayin Kwofie and Another [2022] GHADC 145 (9 November 2022)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD IN THE WESTERN REGION ON WEDNESDAY AT AGONA NKWANTA ON THE 9TH NOVEMEBR 2022 BEFORE HIS WORSHIP SIDNEY BRAIMAH DISTRICT MAGISTRATE EBUSUAPAYIN MBRAYIE SUING FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF NANA WR/AA /DC/A1/22/2020 EWIAMANLE IV STOOL OF AKWIDAA VRS 1. EBUSUAPAYIN KWOFIE OF AKWIDAA 2. EBUSUAPAYIN OLOKO AKA ISAAC COBBINAH JUDGMENT The indorsement on the writ of summons caused to issue by plaintiff against the defendants sought the following reliefs: “(a) Declaration of title to the land in situate and lying at Akwidaa being the property of Nana Ewiamale Stool. (b)Recovery of possession of the said land (c)Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, assigns, privies and all those who claim interest through them from interfering with the house the subject matter of dispute. (d) Cost including legal fees. On application by motion on notice for joinder; the 2nd defendant was joined to the suit on the 14th of April, 2021. The matter is a part-heard suit commenced by my predecessor and upon subsequent adoption of the record of proceeding by the court with the consent of the parties; the court proceeded with the hearing culminating in the judgment being delivered today. It is the case of the plaintiff that some time ago in 1851 to 1852, Borloh Kofi family led by their ancestor Borloh Kofi migrated from Eguafo near Elmina from the Central Region to a area now known as Akwidaa and requested for a parcel of land from his ancestor Nana Oboonu to settle thereon. According to plaintiff; Nana Oboonu perceiving of a possibility of generational conflicts between his people and that of the Borloh Kofi declined the petition. However, on further deliberation, Nana Oboonu rescinded his early decision and granted the petition by directing Borloh Kofi to the elders of Akwidaa on the matter. According to plaintiff; Nana Oboonu and elders of Akwidaa subsequently identified the land in dispute to Borloh Kofi and his family to settle on subject to the obligation of payment of homage or annual royalties to Chief Oboonu in their lifetimes and the generations afterward in perpetuity. Borloh Kofi and his family now known as Borloh Kofi Asamakama family accepted the grant and settled on the land in dispute and adhered to the stipulated conditions of the grant for many generations without any incident or interference. The plaintiff contended that the land granted to Borloh Kofi Asamakama family belongs to Nana Ewiamanle Royal Stool of which he is the head of family. The plaintiff again submitted that Borloh Kofi family has recently declined to pay the annual royalties due to his family and were accordingly summoned before the Overlord of Ahanta; Otumfuo Baddoe Bonsoe at Ahanta Arbitration Council on the issue. The plaintiff asserted that 1st defendant failed to adhere to the summons by Ahanta Arbitration Council and the arbitration award was in his favour. The plaintiff further submitted that although his family and Borloh Kofi Asamakama family belong to the same external family; they do not inherit each other and therefore without the payment of annual royalties; Borloh Kofi Asamakama family does not have the right to occupy the land in dispute. On his part; PW1, the purported Kumgyahene and Gyasehene of Akwidaa advanced that a chieftaincy dispute arose in Akwidaa in 2006 and that when the conflict subsided; 1st defendant engaged him and Tufuhene to assist him to take back possession of the land in dispute which the plaintiff’s family had recovered possession from his family. According to PW1, they requested 1st defendant to present some items to enable them to intercede on his behalf and engage plaintiff’s family on the matter but 1st defendant did not provide the items needed. PW1 believes that the land in dispute belongs to plaintiff otherwise 1st defendant would not have sought to engage him to intercede on his behalf with the plaintiff. The defendants and their witnesses vehemently denied the evidence adduced by plaintiff and his witness to ground their case. The 1st defendant is the head of Nana Borloh Kofi Asamakama family of Akwidaa. The 2nd defendant is the head of Nana Akulo Numa Dodoto Asamakama family of Akwidaa. The defendants describe and identify the plaintiff as the head of Frankaduse Asamakama family of Akwidaa. The defendants submitted that an ancestor of 1st defendant and his people migrated from Techiman area to Ahanta and were settled by the then Chief of Akwidaa, Nana Akulo Numa of Royal Dodotu Asamakama family of Akwidaa on the land in dispute over 300 years ago as members of Nsona (Asamakama) clan. According to the defendants, the condition of the grant was for Borloh Kofi Asamakama family to pay annual tribute or toll of one-third of proceeds of the land from the occupants of the land in dispute to Akulo Numa Dodoto Asamakama family. DW1 supported the case for the defendants and asserted that he is a member of 1st defendant family and an occupant of a portion of the land in dispute. DW1 corroborated the practice of paying tolls by the occupants of the land in dispute to the 2nd defendant family as their allodial owner. On his part; DW2, contended that he is the Secretary to Kumagyahene of Anona Royal family of Akwidaa and that his family land shares boundary with Borloh Kofi Asamakama family land and that their common boundary is a stream which stretches up to Cape Three points Forest Reserve. DW2 acknowledges Nana Akolu-Numa Dodotu Asamakama family as the allodial owner of his family lands and that of Borloh Kofi Asamakama family. In his evidence, 2nd defendant submitted that he was installed as head of family in 2016 and that he came to meet and has continued the tradition of receipt of tolls from the Borloh Kofi Asamakama family for the grant of land in dispute to them. At the close of hearing, the record disclosed these incontrovertible facts; that plaintiff is the head of family; that 1st defendant is the head of Borloh Kofi Asamakama family of Akwidaa of which DW1 is a member; that 2nd defendant is the head of Akulo-Numa Dodotu Asamakama family; that the Borloh Kofi Asamakama family was granted the land in dispute for not less than 170 years ago; that the occupation and possession of the land in dispute by Borloh Kofi Asamakama family is subject to payment of royalties or tolls to their allodial owner. On the record, the following issues are raised for determination: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff lacks the capacity to institute the present action against the defendants? 2. Whether or not the plaintiff has established the identity and extent of the land in dispute? 3. Whether or not the plaintiff has established the roots of title to the land in dispute? 4. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession from the defendants? 5. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his reliefs? In civil case, a party who asserts assumes the burden of proof. The court in the case of Yorkwa v Duah [1992-93] GBR 272 explained the legal requirements in sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), on the burden to adduce evidence and burden of persuasion which together constitute the standard of proof, Brobbey JSC, in that case held: “I am of the view that the expression burden of persuasion should be interpreted to mean the quality, quantum, amount, degree or extent of evidence the litigant is obliged to adduce in order to satisfy the requirement of proving a situation or fact. The burden of persuasion differs from the burden of producing evidence... the burden of producing evidence means the duty or obligation lying on a litigant to lead evidence. In other words these latter sections cover which of the litigating parties should be the first to lead evidence before the other’s evidence is led...” Accordingly, the plaintiff who is the proponent of this case has the obligation to lead evidence in order to avoid a ruling being made against him. The rules of evidence are also trite that the burden of proof may shift from the plaintiff who bore the primary duty to the other. It is not necessarily borne throughout the case with a Plaintiff or Defendant. This legal principle is stated at section 14 of NRCD 323. It states that: “Except as otherwise provided, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting”. In reference to the above statutory provision; the Supreme Court in the case of Re Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu v Kotey [2003-2004] SCGLR 420 held at holding 5 that: “It is trite learning that by the statutory provisions of the Evidence Decree 1975 NRCD 323, the burden of producing evidence in any given case is not fixed, but shifts from party to party at various stages of the trial, depending on the issue(s) asserted” In the discharge of the burden of proof; the courts have in legion of cases reiterated that it is the quality of evidence that proves and discharge the burden on the person who assumes the burden of proof and not the number of witnesses called. (See Akrofi v Otenge [1989-1990] 2 GLR 244, Baah Ltd v Sule Brothers [1971] 1 GRL 110; Bisi v Tabiri [1987-88] 1 GLR 360; Gyamfi v Bada [1963] 2 GRL 596 and Takoradi Flour Mills v Samir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR 882. What amounts to prove in law was espoused in Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190 at 192 explained what amounts to prove in law. I reproduce: “Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means. Where a party makes averment capable of proof in some positive way, e.g. by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances, and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness box and repeating that averment on oath, or having it repeated on oath by his witness. He proves it by producing other evidence of facts and circumstances, from which the court can be satisfied that what he asserts is true”.(See Zabrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2GLR 221) Another legal requirement in land cases as in the instant case is that the plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness in the case of the defendant. (See Tanoh v Abban-Mensah and Ors Part 1 (1992/93) GBR 308 C. A) Before proceeding to evaluate the evidence on record, the court will determine the issue in respect of the admissibility of exhibit A series. It would be recalled that plaintiff in addition to his witness statement filed 8/06/21 subsequently filed notice of filing of plaintiff’s exhibits. The filed exhibits are exhibit A, which are documents of family history and ancient writings; exhibits A1-A6 which are purported copies of receipts issued by Nana Ewiamanle Stool in March 2008, May 2008 and October 2008; exhibit A7; a copy of a document relating to an arbitration award between 1st defendant and one Nana Akwidaa dated 13th July, 2019. In his address, counsel for defendants submitted that the documents tendered in evidence as exhibit A series are required to be stamped pursuant of section 32 of Stamp Act, 2005 [Act 689] and therefore under the holding in Lizori Ltd v Ms Evelyn Boye [2013] GMJ 66 SC inadmissible. The court respectfully disagrees with the submission by counsel for defendants. The court finds that Act 689 is applicable to the receipts admitted in evidence and not to documents relating to family history or ancient writing. [See exhibits A1-A6]. It would be recalled that prior to the adoption of the record of proceeding by the court, the plaintiff had already testified and had been cross-examined as a witness wherein the afore-mentioned pre-marked exhibits attached to plaintiff’s witness statements were adopted as his evidence-in-chief. This practice of tendering, admitting and marking exhibits as part of Case Management Conference has been adjudged to flout section 6 of Evidence Act, 1975 [NRCD 323]. Case Management Conference does not constitute part of the hearing of a case as the parties are then unsworn and an objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be lawfully determined at that stage. The admissibility or otherwise of evidence at the Case Management Conference has been conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court in Republic v The High Court, Commercial Division, Accra, ex parte: Kwabena Duffour, Attorney-General& Others (Interested Parties) Civil Motion No J5/05/2021, delivered on 10th February,2021 (Unreported) SC. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that procedure for admission of evidence stated in section 6 of NRCD 323, which is a statute, prevails over comparable procedure any subsidiary legislation like CI 59 or C. I. 47 and any dispute between the two enactments shall be resolved in favour of the Evidence Act, N. R. C. D 323. Accordingly, the court is of the humble opinion that any exhibit marked and admitted in evidence outside the ambit of section 6 of NRCD 323 is irregular and therefore void. Granted without admitting that exhibits A series were properly admitted through the procedural route by way of Case Management Conference, the court agrees in part with counsel for defendants that exhibit A1-A6 requires stamping in accordance with the Stamp Duty Act, 2005 (Act 689). In Lizori Ltd V Mrs. Elizabeth Boye & Anor [supra], Supreme Court said, such unstamped document should not be admitted at all. The legal effect is that, plaintiff’s unstamped documents/receipts ought not to have been admitted in evidence in the first place with or without objection. In Phipson on Evidence (10th Edition) at page 855 paragraph 2053, the learned authors stated thus “If inadmissible evidence has been received whether with or without objection, it is the duty of the judge to reject it when giving judgment and if he has not done so, it will be rejected on appeal, as it is the duty of the court to arrive at their decisions upon legal evidence only”.(See: Frimpong & Anor v Rome (2013) 58 GMJ 131 CA, Juxson-Smith v KLM Dutch Airlines (2005-2006) SCGLR 438, Thompson V Total Ghana (2011) 34 GMJ 16 SC) Those unstamped exhibits cannot be rectified under section 6 of the Evidence Act. (See: Martin Alamisi Amidu v Attorney General & 2 Ors UT Bank Ltd. (Receivership Claimant) (2019) 149 GMJ 1.) The stamp duty is a statutory imposition and therefore parties cannot be allowed to flout it anyhow. Similarly, no judge has authority to grant immunity to a party from the consequences of breaching an Act of Parliament such as Act 689. The judicial oath enjoins judges to uphold the law, rather than condoning breaches of Acts of Parliament. (See: Republic V High Court (Fast Track Division) Accra; Ex parte National Lottery Authority (Ghana Lotto Operators Association and Others-Interested Parties) 2009 SCGLR 390, Network Computer System Ltd. V Intelsat Global Sales and Marketing Ltd (2012) 1 SCGLR 218) For the above reasons, the court therefore rejects and excludes exhibits A1-A6 as evidence. In respect of exhibit A, the court finds that the documents do not comply with section 18(2) of Public Record and Archives Administration Act, 1997 [Act 535) and Sections 148 and 162 of NRCD 323. I reproduce section 18(2) of Act 535: “18. Legal validity (2) A copy of or an extract from a public record in the custody of the director, examined and certified as a true and authentic copy or extract by an officer authorised by the director and bearing the seal of the Department is admissible as evidence in any proceedings without further proof, if the original record would have been admissible as evidence in the proceedings.” Sections 148 and 162 of NRCD 323 are also applicable rules of evidence on the admissibility of public record. The provisions refer to writings authorised by law to be: “recorded or filed and has in fact been recorded or filed in an office of a public entity in Ghana and is from an office of a public entity” Accordingly, same must be read and construed together to give effect to the intention of parliament on the issue. I reproduce sections 148 and 162 of NRCD 323. “Section 148—Authentication of Public Reports and Records. Authentication or identification of a writing may be by evidence that- (a) the writing is a public record, report, statement or data compilation and is from an office of a public entity in Ghana; or (b) the writing is one authorised by law to be recorded or filed and has in fact been recorded or filed in an office of a public entity in Ghana and is from an office of a public entity in Ghana where items of that nature are regularly kept” Section 162—Copies of Writings in Official Custody. A copy of a writing is presumed to be genuine if it purports to be a copy of a writing which is authorised by law to be recorded or filed and has in fact been recorded or filed in an office of a public entity or which is a public record, report, statement or data compilation if- (a) an original or an original record is in an office of a public entity where items of that nature are regularly kept; and (b) the copy is certified to be correct by the custodian or other person authorised to make the certification, provided that the certification must be authenticated.” On the requirement of section 18(2) of Act 535 and sections 148 and 162 of NRCD 323, the record must demonstrate the extract or copy of the public record emanated from an office of a state institution or public entity and that it is a kind of document that should be filed in an office or required to be filed in an office of a public entity and is indeed filed in such an office where such document are regularly required to be filed and kept; that the duplicate or copy has been certified by a person who normally has custody of the document or a person authorised to certify same to be correct and that the certification is authenticated. In Okudzeto Ablakwa and Anor v Attorney General and Anor [2012] 2 SCGLR 845, the Supreme Court set out some of the legal requirements to establish the authenticity of an official document albeit relevant. The court held inter alia that, such a document must have a heading and state the source from which it emanated. It must be dated. It must be certified and bear the name of the person who normally has custody of the document or a person to authorized to certify it. On the record, the exhibit A shows clearly, that the documents were purportedly issued by the Regional Archivist of Public Record & Archive Administration Department [PRAAD] in Sekondi in 7th July, 2009 as evidenced by the embossment of the stamp of the Regional Archivist. The identity of the person who signed the document did not appear on exhibit A. The appearance of the name of the signor on the document is so crucial in the sense that it must satisfy the legal requirement in respect of the determination as to whether the person is an official who normally has custody of such document or that he was duly authorised to kept such records. Again, there is an additional requirement that the document must also be certified by that person. Accordingly, the question that now lies before the court is whether a stamp of a head of a department of a public entity embossed on a document is sufficient to evidence certification as contemplated under section 162 of NRCD 323. An inquiry in the body of NRCD 323 and Interpretation Act, 2009 [Act 792] by the court did not state how certification should be done. The court takes judicial notice that unlike the wording used in section 162 of NRCD 323, section 120(2) of NRCD 323 is clear that the certification by an independent witness must be in writing. In construing the meaning or structure “certification” and “certify copy” by which a copy of an official writing may be certified, the court resorted to judicial precedent and legal textbooks. Osborne’s Concise Law Dictionary, 11th edition defines certification as: “A statement in writing by a person having a public or official status concerning some matter within his knowledge’” The dictionary also defines certify copy as “ A copy of a public document , signed and certified as a true copy by an officer to whose custody the original is entrusted and admissible as evidence when the original would be admissible” Blacks Law 8th edition as defines certification of a document as: “1. The act of attesting.2. The state of having been attested. 3. An attested statement. 4. The writing on the face of a check by which it is certified.” It further defines a certified copy as: “A duplicate of an original (usu. Official) document, certified as a exact reproduction usu. by the official responsible for issuing or keeping the original.” Indeed, in Ablakwa v A-G (supra), the Supreme Court stated emphatically that an official stamp embossed on the face of a copy of official document cannot make the document a “certified true copy” as a stamp does not indicate the source of the document or where the document was certified. Brobbey JSC in applying section 162 of NRCD 323 to a copy of an official document relied on by the Attorney-General stated the following in that case: “If exhibit AG1 was tendered as an official copy of a record, then it should have complied with the law regulating such copies. As stated in section 162, it should have been certified by the official from the office where the original is kept. That official should be the one who is the custodian of a person authorized to make the certification. The requirement here would have been met by the certification being made by the custodian of the original or an affidavit from the State Attorney to the effect that the certification was made by such an official from the Office of the Cabinet.” It is evident from the legal definitions and the legal authority cited above that merely stamping a copy of an official document does not satisfies the legal requirement of certification or certified copy. It is the humble opinion of this court that certification or certifying a copy on a document requires a written statement on the face of the copy of the document by a person who has custody of the original document or his duly authorised representative to establish that the document comes from proper custody and that the content of the document is correct. Accordingly, the court is of the respectful view that the failure by plaintiff to comply with the stated statutory requirements renders the afore-mentioned exhibits inadmissible ab initio and therefore rejected by the court. In respect of exhibit A7, the purported arbitration award was granted in favour of Nana Akwidaa. The plaintiff in his evidence asserts that the said arbitration award was in his favour and therefore claims a personal benefit from it yet exhibit A7 does not refer to him personally as a party to the purported arbitration or as a representative of another party. Again, exhibit A7 does not refer to the land in dispute except that the purported arbitration award is made personal against 1st defendant. The court finds no probative value in exhibit A7 and accordingly assigns negligible weight to it. The court now proceeds to determine issue 1. The law is settled that a person’s capacity to sue, whether under a statute or rule of practice, must be found to be present and valid before the issuance of the writ of summons, else the writ will be declared a nullity. Accordingly, when the capacity of a party to the suit is challenged as in the instant case, the court is bound to determine the issue as a preliminary legal issue before proceeding to determine the case of its merit. In Republic vs. High Court, Accra, Ex parte Aryeetey (Ankrah Interested Party, [2003-2004] SCGLR 398, it was held that: “Any challenge to capacity therefore puts the validity of a writ in issue. It is a proposition familiar to all lawyers that the question of capacity, like the plea of limitation, is not concerned with the merits so that if the axe falls, then a defendant who is lucky enough to have the advantage of the unimpeachable defence of lack of capacity in his opponent, is entitled to insist upon his rights: see Akrong v Bulley [1965] GLR 469 SC.” In the endorsement on the writ of summons, the plaintiff stated his capacity as “suing for himself and on behalf of Nana Ewiamanle IV Stool of Akwidaa”. He also describes himself in the Summary of the Subject matter in dispute on the writ of summons as Ebusuapayin of Asamakama of Akwidaa. Subsequently, the plaintiff deposed at paragraph 2 of affidavit in support of motion on notice for interlocutory injunction as the head of Nana Ewiamanle Royal stool. In paragraph 2 of his witness statement, plaintiff deposed that he is the head of Asamakama Royal family of Akwidaa. Under cross-examination, plaintiff stated that he is the head of family of Frankaduase Asamakama family of Akwidaa. I reproduce the relevant portion: Q. Are you the Ebusuapayin of Frankaduase family? A. Yes It is patent on the record that the plaintiff has assumed to himself the title of the head of different families from which he hails from and through which he purports to sue in the representative capacity. The court finds that the record is bereft of any explanation for the different names assigned to various families that plaintiff purports to be the head of family. It would be recalled the roots of the case for the plaintiff is that the 1st defendant’s family were granted the land in dispute by his ancestors and as such the court finds it material to identify with certainty the true and proper name of plaintiff’s family. Again, in determining the capacity of plaintiff, the court also considers whether the land in issue is a stool, family, clan or individual land. At paragraph 5 of his witness statement; plaintiff further asserts that the 1st defendant’s family occupies Odikro stool in Akwidaa which pays homage and royalties to Nana Ewiamanle Royal Stool of Akwidaa. That averment conclusively suggested that the royalties and homage were observed to Nana Ewiamanle Stool and not plaintiff’s family. Again, the plaintiff admitted under cross-examination that the land in dispute is a stool land. I refer to the relevant cross-examination. Q. When Nana Akulo-Numa was Chief of Akwidaa, was the stool land yours? A. Yes. Q. Prior to Nana Ewiamanle (current chief) you were Safohen to the Akwidaa Stool. A. Yes Q. So I put it to you that as a Safohene Stool, you can never be the owner of stool land. A. It is true that any Supi Safohene of Stool owns stool land. On the same issue; PW1 also admitted under cross-examination that the land in dispute is stool land. I refer: Q. You agree with me that the land in dispute forms part of Akwidaa stool land. A. Yes Q. Do you agree with me that plaintiff is not the Chief of Akwidaa. A. He is not the Chief of Akwidaa. He is head of family. It is important to note that prior to the quoted exchanges above; plaintiff stated under cross-examination that there is a substantive and current chief of Akwidaa known as Nana Ewiamanle II. Accordingly, in the case of a stool land, the proper person to sue and be sued is the occupant of the stool or where the stool is vacant; through it regent or caretaker if any. In Bukuruwa Stool v Kumawu Stool [1962] 1 GLR 493, holding 1 states the following: “Only the occupant of a stool can sue and be sued in respect of stool property. When a stool is vacant the regent or caretaker or other person appointed by the council of stool elders may sue and be sued:” The particular Stool as a corporate sole that exists in perpetuity is owner of its stool lands. In that regard, the Stool is distinct and separate from the Royal Stool family. The distinction between the incidents that attach to properties of the stool in particular stool family from the properties that attach to the families within the same stool family has been clarified by the Supreme Court in holding 2 of Boateng alias Beyeden v. Adjei [1963] 1 G. L. R. 285, S. C. I reproduce: “(2) The stool has a legal personality quite distinct from the individuals and branch families that make up the stool family. Individuals and branch families are therefore in law capable of holding properties in their own right unaffected by the incidents which attach to properties of the stool family.” It can discerned from the capacity in which plaintiff sued that he is declaring a personal interest and a common interest and grievance with the purported Nana Ewiamanle IV Royal Stool and that the grant of the reliefs sought would inure to his personal benefit in addition to the common benefits he shares with the Stool. The evidence on record did not disclose any personal interest of plaintiff in this matter or community of interest to that of the purported Nana Ewiamanle IV Stool. Granted without admitting that plaintiff is the head of the appropriate family and lineage to install or enstool chiefs in Akwidaa, he must establish that he is duly authorised by the Stool to institute the present action on its behalf. If indeed, there is a substantive chief of Akwidaa as alleged by plaintiff; then he is the proper person to sue in this matter except where the plaintiff had been actually invested with that capacity by the Stool and therefore has the legal right to sue. The court finds that no such authority has been disclosed by plaintiff on the record. Unlike family land; the stated exceptions in Kwan v Nyeni [1959] GLR 67 are not applicable to stool land. Apart from the chief, or when the stool is vacant; the regent or caretaker no member of the Royal Stool family is competent to sue on behalf of the stool even when the stool property is in real danger of being lost. (See Owusu and Ors v Gyamfi and Or [1981] GLR 612). On the admission by plaintiff and his sole witness that the land in dispute is stool land and that the plaintiff is a head of family and not a chief; and having been put to strict proof of his capacity in the present action; the court finds that the plaintiff woefully failed to establish his capacity. The court accordingly dismisses the case for the plaintiff an awards cost of Ghc5000.00 for the defendants taking into consideration inter alia; the length of trial, the processes filed and the number of adjournments. Interest thereof shall take effect from today until the entire amount is fully paid. HW Sidney Braimah Magistrate Counsel for defendants: Mr Appiah Adjei Yeboah Asuamah.