Emaku and Another v Emalu Ojamuge (Taxation Appeal 7 of 2023) [2024] UGHC 818 (27 August 2024)

The Republic of Uganda

In the High Court of Uganda at Soroti

Taxation Appeal No. 0007 of 2023

(Arising from Taxation Application No. 0047 of 2023)

(Arising from Civil Suit No. 0028 of 2018)

in Recursive

$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L} \mathcal{L}$

1. Emaku Joseph

2. Opejo Stephen ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

## Versus

Emulu Ojamuge Charles ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

(An appeal arising from the taxation award of His Worship Ntalo Nasulu Hussein, Deputy Registrar Soroti High Court)

Before: Hon. Justice Dr Henry Peter Adonyo

Judgement on Appeal.

1. Background.

This application was brought by way of Chamber Summons under section $62(1)$ of the Advocates Act, section $79(1)(b)$ of the Civil Procedure Act, regulation 3 of the Advocates (Taxation of Costs)


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- Appeal and Reference Regulations and the Advocates (Remuneration $\mathsf{S}$ and Taxation of costs) Regulations for orders that; - 1) The orders, decision and taxation certificate of the Learned Deputy Registrar in taxation application no. 47 of 2023 be set aside or reviewed. - 2) The costs of this application be provided for. 10 - 2. Grounds.

The grounds of this application as set out in the affidavit sworn by Emaku Joseph on his behalf and that of the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant are;

- 1. That the Respondent filed Civil Suit No. 028 of 2018 in which he was seeking for orders of eviction against him and the 2<sup>nd</sup> appellant, a permanent injunction, general damages and costs of the suit. - 2. That Civil Suit No 028 of 2018 was granted with costs against him and the $2^{nd}$ Appellant. - 3. That as the result of the ruling in Civil Suit No. 028 of 2018, 20 Counsel for the Respondent filed the bill of costs against him and the $2^{nd}$ Appellant.

4. That the Learned Deputy Registrar erred when he proceeded to tax the bill of costs and allow a sum of Ugx 86,932,800/= (Eighty-Six Million Nine Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Shillings Only) which was manifestly high and excessive and awarded in a biased manner.


- 5. That he is advised by his lawyers that the Learned Deputy Registrar erred in law when he allowed a sum as instruction fees which sum is excessive in the circumstances. - 6. That he is advised by his lawyers that the Learned Deputy Registrar erred in law when he considered and allowed items which did not comply with the law. - 7. That the Learned Deputy Registrar did not follow the principle that costs should not be so high to the level of denying access to justice. - 8. That the Learned Deputy Registrar erred when he allowed items in the bill of costs without evidence of receipts. - 9. That he is advised by his that the Learned Deputy Registrar did not follow the principles relating to taxation of the bill of costs. - 10. That he and $2<sup>nd</sup>$ Appellant were also advised by their lawyers, that a bill of costs is an actual statement of disbursements made and services rendered and that the bill of costs presented by Counsel for the Respondent is not true.

The respondent in his affidavit in reply stated;

1. That the contents of Paragraph 2 in the Affidavit of the Emaku Joseph are admitted and he hastens to add that much as Civil Suit No. 28 of 2018 sought for remedies of eviction, a permanent injunction, general damages and costs, the suit was based on trespass.

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- 2. That Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Affidavit of Emaku Joseph are false and are not specific in nature as they do not show which parts or items of the bill the taxing master erred while conducting taxation. - 3. That the bill of costs was taxed in accordance with the law and in any case no evidence of bias against the taxing officer has been furnished or demonstrated by the Appellants. - 4. That the contents of paragraph 9 in the Affidavit of Emaku Joseph are false and he is informed by his lawyers that the bill of cost was taxed in accordance with the law and in any case the taxing master demonstrated how he arrived at the quantum of instruction fees he allowed - 5. That he is further informed by his lawyers that it is not enough merely to state that the instruction fees were excessive, it was incumbent upon the Appellants to demonstrate the exact error committed by the taxing master in awarding the instruction fees. - 6. That he is further informed by his lawyers and in specific reply to the contents of Paragraph 11 in the affidavit of Emaku Joseph, that the costs awarded in entirety were in accordance with the law, commensurate to the work done and expenses incurred. - 7. That the contents of Paragraph 12 in the Affidavit of Emaku Joseph are false and he is informed by his lawyers that the said paragraph is not specific on the items which required receipts if

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any, and in any case, it's not a mandatory requirement for receipts to be produced during taxation proceedings.

The appellants in rejoinder stated that the items which were not taxed in accordance with the law include items 1, 34, 35, 36, 38,39, 40, 43 and items 45 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 where the Respondent did not attach receipts. That the taxing master did not demonstrate how he arrived at the quantum of instruction fees since the value of subject matter was low.

3. Representation.

The appellants were represented by Kob Advocates & Solicitors while

the respondent was represented by M/s Alaka & Co. Advocates. This 15 matter proceeded by way of written submissions and the same have been duly considered in its determination.

Issues.

Counsel for the appellants raised two issues for determination:

20 1. Whether the Respondents bill of costs was rightly taxed following the provisions of the law.

2. What remedies are available to the parties?

5. Submissions.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the circumstances under which a Judge of the High Court may interfere with the taxing masters 25 exercise of discretion in awarding costs were restated by the **Supreme**

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## Court in Bank of Uganda vs Banco Arabe Espanol Civil Application no. 23 $5$ of 1999.

Counsel submitted that the sum allowed by the taxing officer was harsh and manifestly excessive and the same should be reduced within the confines of the remuneration rules. That the taxing officer erred in law and principle when he failed to follow the well so settled principles of taxation of costs hence awarded excessive instruction fees which was contrary to what the appellant had proposed at Ugx 2,000,000/= and the taxing master in his ruling did not give the reasons which backed up his award of the instruction fees.

- Counsel further submitted that under Regulation 57 of the Advocates 15 (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Regulations it is provided that in all causes and matters in High Court an Advocate shall be entitled to charge as against his client the fee prescribed in the $6<sup>th</sup>$ schedule to the Regulations. - That this schedule provides an arithmetic method of calculating the 20 fee for instructions to sue or defend a suit or to present or oppose an appeal. In cases where the value of the subject matter can be determined from the amount claimed or judgment (6<sup>th</sup> schedule paragraph $I(a)$ (iv)). - That in this circumstance, the value of the suit land was ascertainable 25 and the taxing master did not need to use his discretion in awarding the instruction fees but rather to calculate and come up with the appropriate fee which he did not.

- That it was a clear case where the Respondent only pleaded trespass $\mathsf{S}$ which is not as complex as the cases involving fraud and as such, and counsel prayed that the taxing officer awarded excessive instruction fees since the case was not complex as it was based on trespass. - Counsel additionally submitted that it is trite law that the taxing master owes it to the public to ensure that costs do not rise above a 10 reasonable level so as to deny the poor access to court and must be such as to attract recruits to the profession. See: Joyce Lubega vs **Century Bottling Co. Ltd taxation Appeal No. 17 of 2020 citing the case** of Attorney General vs Uganda Blanket Manufacturer's SC Civil Application no. 17 of 1993). 15

Counsel added that items 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24 and 25 were taxed without following the law as the same were not on record. Further that items 34, 35,36,38,39, 40, 43 and 45 the appellants proposed that Ugx 100,000/= should be allowed since Counsel did not spend the hours in court as he pleaded in the bill of costs since under 20 all those items, the matter was adjourned as the Trial Judge was indisposed and adjourning a matter cannot take 2 hours.

Regarding disbursements counsel submitted that the taxing officer wrongfully allowed amounts for disbursements which were not

proved as required by the guiding principles for the proper assessment 25 of the losses incurred by the client.

That this also helps the taxing officer to make accurate determination $\mathsf{S}$ of the client's losses and create an understanding of the claimed damages/losses.

That in this circumstance, there was no proof of the disbursements or production of receipts at the taxing hearing by the Respondent to enable the taxing officer to tax the bill. Yet under Regulation 51 of the 10 Advocates (Remuneration & Taxation of costs) Regulations requires that all receipts or vouchers for all disbursements charged in a bill of costs to be produced at the taxation if required by the taxing officer. Counsel relied on Juliet Kabugo vs Uganda National Roads Authority

Misc. Appeal no 43 of 30 2020 while citing Aisha Agaba vs Mable 15 Bakaine Taxation Appeal No.4 of 2011 where it was held that claims for disbursements must be specifically proved and that claims for reimbursement must be as much as possible kept within the reality of indemnifying the client by replacing what she actually spent and avoid the process of unfairly enriching litigants or their advocates. 20

That the failure by the Respondent to produce receipts to proof disbursements under Items 56-70 made the taxing officer to award the costs which were manifestly high and excessive.

Counsel finally prayed that since the Ugx. 86,932,800 was allowed on an illegality and being harsh, the same should be set aside and the 25 appeal be allowed with costs to the appellants. In reply, counsel for the respondent submitted that the bill of $\overline{5}$ Costs was taxed in accordance with the law and guiding legal principles on taxation.

That indeed prior to taxation, the Appellants herein objected to any pre-taxation meeting and preferred the bill to be taxed by Court and that it was only the 3<sup>rd</sup> Defendant, Departed Custodian Board who 10 agreed to the pre-taxation meeting and the same was conducted, and the fees in the bill were agreed between it and the Respondent. However, such could not be endorsed by court since the Appellants herein had objected to a pre-taxation meeting.

- Counsel further submitted that the Appellants are only challenging the 15 quantum of costs awarded by the taxing officer. That this is seen in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the affidavit in support of the Application deponed by Emaku Joseph. He submitted that the said paragraphs are not specific in nature and do not show which parts or - items of the bill the taxing master erred while conducting taxation. 20 Furthermore, the bill of costs taxed in accordance with the law, judicial discretion and in any case no evidence of bias against the taxing officer has been furnished or demonstrated by the Appellants.

Counsel submitted that the sum allowed as instruction fees was reasonable bearing in mind that much as suit was for trespass, declaratory orders, an eviction order, permanent injunction, among others it involved property which was formerly expropriated and

required extensive legal arguments as can be discerned from the $\mathsf{S}$ evidence adduced and final submissions made.

That much as the property was not valued, during taxation proceedings, the Respondent in his submissions stated that the property was valued at over 1 billion Ug. Shillings which fact was by implication agreed to by the Appellants herein in their submissions where they stated that the value of the property was over $100,000,000/$ = (One Hundred Million).

Counsel further submitted that the Appellants have failed to point out which specific principles of taxation the taxing officer failed to follow and thus it's not a duty of this Honourable Court to do so.

That in any case if the Appellants had an issue with the valuation as proposed by the Respondent, it was incumbent upon them to have valued the property though the value of the land was not the one in contention.

- Counsel added that Items 2-53 are statutory in nature and the 20 Appellants have not cited any other law that provides for less than the amounts stated therein. That in any case, counsel for the Appellants was not the one who prosecuted the matter but received instructions to appeal the Judgment of this Honourable Court to Court of Appeal and thus is not in the best position to determine for how many hours 25 - each appearance took.

Counsel additionally submitted that items 54-70, are in respect of transport costs incurred by counsel for the Respondent when he came


to court on various occasions which is covered under Regulation 13 of $\mathsf{S}$ the Advocates (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Regulations.

Finally, counsel for the respondent prayed that this appeal be dismissed with costs since the respondent has demonstrated that the taxing officer exercised his discretion judiciously while taxing the bill of costs.

## 6. Determination.

The circumstances in which a Judge of the High Court may interfere with the Taxing Officer's exercise of discretion in awarding costs were restated by the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco 15 Arabe Espanol, S. C. Civil Application No. 23 of 1999 (Mulenga JSC (RIP)) to be the following:

> "Save in exceptional cases, a judge does not interfere with the assessment of what the taxing officer considers to be a reasonable fee. This is because it is generally accepted that questions which are solely of quantum of costs are matters with which the taxing officer is particularly fitted to deal, and in which he has more experience than the judge. Consequently, a judge will not alter a fee allowed by the taxing officer, merely because in his opinion he should have allowed a higher or lower amount.

Secondly, an exceptional case is where it is shown expressly or by inference that in assessing and arriving at the quantum of the fee

allowed, the taxing officer exercised, or applied a wrong principle. In this regard, application of a wrong principle is capable of being inferred from an award of an amount which is manifestly excessive or manifestly low.

Thirdly, even if it is shown that the taxing officer erred on principle, the judge should interfere only on being satisfied that the error substantially affected the decision on quantum and that upholding the amount allowed would cause injustice to one of the parties."

In *Makumbi and another v Sole Electrics (U) Ltd [1990–1994] 1 EA 306* 15 (SCU) at pages 310 – 311 Manyindo DCJ stated:

> "The principles governing taxation of costs by a taxing master are well settled. First, the instruction fee should cover the advocates' work, including taking instructions as well as other work necessary for presenting the case for trial or appeal, as the case may be.

> Second, there is no legal requirement for awarding the appellant a higher brief fee than the respondent, but it would be proper to award the appellant's counsel a slightly higher fee since he or she has the responsibility to advise his or her client to challenge the decision.

> Third, there is no mathematical or magic formula to be used by the taxing master to arrive at a precise figure. Each case has to be decided on its own merit and circumstances. For example, a

lengthy or complicated case involving lengthy preparations and research will attract high fees.

In a fourth, variable decree, the amount of the subject matter involved may have a bearing. Fifth, the taxing master has discretion in the matter of taxation but he must exercise the discretion judicially and not whimsically. Sixth, while a successful litigant should be fairly reimbursed the costs he has incurred, the taxing master owes it to the public to ensure that costs do not rise above a reasonable level so as to deny the poor access to Court. However, the level of remuneration must be such as to attract recruits to the profession. Seventh, so far as practicable there should be consistency in the awards made. See Raichand v Quarry Services of East Africa Limited and others [1972] EA 162, Nalumansi v Lule Supreme Court of Uganda civil application number 12 of 1992 (UR), Hashjam v Zanab [1957] EA 255 and Kabanda v Kananura Melvin Consulting Engineers Supreme Court civil application number 24 of 1993 (UR).

As far as an appellate Court is concerned the following two principles apply upon a review of taxation. First, an appellate Court will not interfere with an assessment of costs by a taxing master, unless he has misdirected himself in a matter on principle, but if the quantum of an assessment is manifestly extravagant, a misdirection of principle may be a necessary inference. See: Steel Construction and Petroleum Engineering (EA) Limited v Uganda

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Sugar Factory Limited [1970] EA 141, Kabanda v Kananura Melvin Consulting Engineers (supra) and Attorney-General v Uganda Blanket Manufacturers Supreme Court civil application number 17 of 1993 (UR)."

In Republic v The Minister for Agriculture ex parte W'Niugung and Others [2006] 1 EA 359 (HCK), it was held thus: 10

"It was necessary to specify clearly and candidly how she had exercised her discretion. Discretion, as an aspect of judicial decision-making, is to be guided by principles, the elements of which are clearly stated and which are logical and conscientiously conceived. It is not enough to set out by attributing to oneself discretion originating from legal provision, and thereafter merely cite wonted rubrics under which that discretion may be exercised, as if these by themselves could permit of assignment of mystical figures of taxed costs.

Taxation of costs as a judicial function is to be conducted 20 regularly, on the basis of rational criteria which are clearly expressed for the parties to perceive with ease. Regularity in this respect cannot be achieved without upholding fairness as between the parties; the taxing officer is to provide only for reasonable compensation for work done; the taxing officer should 25 avoid the possibility for unjust enrichment for any party and ought to refuse any claim that tends to be usurious; so far as possible, the taxing officer should apply the test of comparability; the

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taxing officer should endeavour to achieve objectivity when $\mathsf{S}$ considering ill-defined criteria such as public policy, interests affected, importance of matter to parties or importance of matter to the public; the taxing officer should clearly identify any elements of complexity in the issues before the court and in this regard should revert to the perception and mode of analysis and 10 determination adopted by the trial judge; the taxing officer ought to describe accurately the nature of the responsibility which has fallen upon counsel; the taxing officer should state clearly the nature of any novel matter in the proceedings; the taxing officer should determine with a measure of accuracy the amount of time, research and skill entailed in the professional work of counsel."

Bearing the above binding authorities in mind, I will now consider the items subject to this appeal.

î. Instruction fees.

Counsel for the respondent in his bill of costs had placed instruction 20 fees at Ugx. 140,000,000/=, the Deputy Registrar taxed off Ugx. 70,000,000/= and awarded Ugx. 70,000,000/= as instruction fees.

In his ruling, the taxing master stated that all parties agreed that instruction fees should be paid and Reg. 6(2) provides factors that govern the taxing master.

The next paragraph of the ruling states thus;

"The value of the subject matter is 1,000,000,000/=. However, the $3<sup>rd</sup>$ defendant contends that there is no such valuation. The 1<sup>st</sup> and $2<sup>nd</sup>$ defendant contend that the value exceeds 100,000,000/= and therefore they should pay 2,000,000/= and the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant contends it should be 30,000,000/=. I have analysed the law, the submissions and discretion. The instruction fees for the plaintiff following the 10% rule will be above 100,000,000/=.

*Court in its discretion will award 70,000,000/=. The 70,000,000/=* is hereby taxed off."

The plaint in Civil Suit No. 0028 of 2018 from which the bill of costs arose, was filed by the respondent as against the applicants herein and 15 the Departed Asians' Property Custodian Board jointly and severally for a declaration that the defendants had no interest whatsoever on the property in LRV 142 Folio 14, plot No. 18 Gweri Road in Soroti Municipality, a declaration that the plaintiff is the lawful proprietor of the suit property, a declaration that the letter of the Executive 20 Secretary of the DAPCB dated 13<sup>th</sup> March 2018 in respect of the suit property was void ab initio, a declaration that the acts of the applicants staying on the suit property amounts to trespass, an eviction order, permanent injunction, general damages for trespass, interest and costs of the suit. 25

The value of the suit property was neither pleaded nor led in evidence through a valuation report, the judgment also does not make mention of the value of the suit property.


$\mathsf{S}$ It is therefore important to understand where the figure of $\overline{5}$ 1,000,000,000/= that was relied on by the taxing master arose from.

The submissions of the plaintiff now respondent in respect of the taxation introduced the claim that the suit property was 1,000,000,000/=. To quote counsel verbatim;

"We do humbly that the fee of Ug. Shs. 140,000,000 as pleaded 10 is justified considering the fact that the suit before the court was so involving, complex and relating to trespass and determination of expropriated property laws which is one of the specialised areas in land practice in Uganda. Furthermore, much as no valuation report was attached to the property, the fair market value of the said property is over 1,000,000,000/=".

Under Item 1 (1) of the 6<sup>th</sup> Schedule of The Advocates (Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Rules, as amended in 2018, instruction fees are calculated on the basis of the value of the claim or value of subject matter where the value can be ascertained from the pleadings.

The expression 'subject matter' does not necessarily mean physical property, depending on the context, it may refer to;

(a) in a money suit to the amount claimed and

(b) in a suit relating to property to the right or title of the plaintiff 25 alleged to have been infringed.

In the latter context, it has reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. (See: Simba Properties Investments Co

Limited and 5 Others v Vantage Mezzanine Fund II Partnership and 6 $\mathsf{S}$ Others (Civil Appeal 2 of 2023) 2023 UGCommC 60 (10 July 2023)

In **Simba Properties Investments Co Limited** (Supra) it was further found that when the suit is founded on some claim to or question in respect of property, it is the value of the claim or question and not the value of the property which is the determining factor.

I agree with the above findings; and in respect to Civil Suit No. 0028 of 2018 and as noted above; there was no monetary value attached to the suit, it was simply for declarations as to ownership of the suit property and eviction orders.

15 This is the value the taxing master was supposed to consider when determining the instruction fee to award to the respondent.

Relying on a claim that the suit property was over 1,000,000,000/= which value was never pleaded nor proved by any evidence led during the trial was erroneous and therefore application of the wrong principle.

Secondly, the taxing master in his ruling relied on <u>reg. 6(2)</u>. Regulation 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration and taxation of costs) Rules provides for special fee for exceptional importance and complexity, it states thus;

(1) In business of exceptional importance or of unusual complexity, an 25 advocate shall be entitled to receive and shall be allowed as against his

or her client a special fee in addition to the remuneration provided in $\mathsf{S}$ these Regulations.

(2) In assessing that special fee regard may be had to-

(a) the circumstances in which the business or part of the business is transacted;

(b) the nature and extent of the pecuniary or other interest involved; 10

(c) the labour and responsibility entailed; and

(d) the number, complexity and importance of the documents prepared or examined.

As was held in Republic v The Minister for Agriculture ex parte W'Njuguna and others [2006] 1 EA 359 (HCK); 15

> "...the taxing officer should clearly identify any elements of complexity in the issues before the court and in this regard should revert to the perception and mode of analysis and determination adopted by the trial judge;

The taxing officer ought to describe accurately the nature of the 20 responsibility which has fallen upon counsel;

> The taxing officer should state clearly the nature of any novel matter in the proceedings; the taxing officer should determine with a measure of accuracy the amount of time, research and skill entailed in the professional work of counsel."

In this instance save for stating that he was relying on Reg. 6(2), the $\mathsf{S}$ taxing officer does not mention which complexity or importance that arose in Civil Suit No. 28/2018 that would warrant an award of a special fee to the advocate of the respondent. The taxing master did not specify clearly how he exercised his discretion and reached a sum of

Ugx. 70,000,000/=. 10

> As noted above the claim in Civil Suit No. 28/2018 was for declaratory orders as to ownership of the suit property LRV 142 Folio 14, plot No. 18 Gweri Road in Soroti Municipality, which property was once under the mandate of the DAPCB.

- The facts of the matter were straightforward; the suit property had 15 been previously vested under the Expropriated Properties legal regime, after the expulsion of the Indians from Uganda in 1972, the respondent's grandmother applied to the DAPCB and she was allocated the suit property for which she took possession till the - former owner repossessed the same in 1995 for the remainder of his 20 lease.

After the former owner's lease expired and the land reverted back to the Land Board the respondent's mother applied to Soroti DLB and she was allocated the suit property and after her offer lapsed the respondent applied to the Land Board in 2017 for allocation of the suit property which application was approved.

To prove his case, the respondent was the sole witness and he adduced documentary proof of his ownership. The defendants in Civil


- The production of vouchers or receipts seems to have been left at the $\mathsf{S}$ discretion of the Taxing Officer and since he did not deem it necessary to require their production, I cannot find that he exercised a wrong taxing principle, thus I cannot interfere with his discretion. I am also of the view that the expenses therein were justified in the circumstances. - 7. Conclusion. 10

This appeal succeeds in part only in respect of Instruction Fees which I have found to have been taxed and awarded based on a wrong legal principle.

The rest of the taxed amount are found to have been awarded upon the exercise of judicial discretion of the taxing master, which discretion 15 this appellate court finds no grounds to interfere with. Thus they remain as taxed.

8. Orders:

This appeal partly succeeds and the following orders issued.

- a) The order of the Taxing Master in regard to Instruction Fees 20 having been reviewed is set aside and reduced from Ugx. 70,000,000/= to Ugx. 20,000,000/=. Instruction Fees of Ugx. $20,000,000/$ = is awarded. - b) As for Items 34,35,36,38,39,40,43 these were taxed at 100,000/= as proposed by the appellants and there is no need to review the same. They would remain as taxed.


400,000/= but 200,000/= was taxed off. Given that there is no proof $\mathsf{S}$ that counsel did not spend the said hours in court I will not interfere with the same.

## iii. Items 56-70.

- These relate to disbursements on counsel's travel expenses to court 10 from Kampala to Soroti. For each item counsel bill his expenses at Ugx. $1,700,000/$ = but the taxing master taxed off 950,000/= awarding 750,000/=. Counsel for the appellants contends that this was erroneous given that counsel for the respondent did not adduce proof - of said expenses. 15

Regulation 51 of the Advocates (Remuneration and taxation of costs) Rules provides that;

Receipts or vouchers for all disbursements charged in a bill of costs (other than witness allowances and expenses supported by a statement

signed by an advocate) shall be produced at taxation if required by the 20 taxing officer.

This regulation uses the words IF REQUIRED BY THE TAXING MASTER. This requirement clearly makes production of receipts for all disbursements a prerequisite only if required by the taxing officer and

in this instance the taxing master did not deem it fit to ask for this 25 receipts.

Consequently, I find that the award of Ugx. 70,000,000/= as instruction $\mathsf{S}$ fees manifestly high based on the application of a wrong principles regarding value of the subject matter and complexity of the suit.

The application of the above principles substantially affected the quantum of instruction fees as seen in the taxing masters ruling. I

- would therefore reduce the same from 70,000,000/= to 20,000,000/= 10 having considered the nature of the subject matter in Civil Suit No. 28/2018 which was seeking mainly declaratory orders, and the fact the documents relied on were in my opinion not hard to access as they were documents of ownership already in the respondent's possession, - further taking into account the number of witnesses, the hearing 15 period and the number of cases which have discussed expropriated property and reversion of the same to the Land Board.

## Items 34,35,36,38,39,40,43 and 45. ii.

These items all relate to attendance in court by counsel for the respondent. Counsel for the appellants submitted that they proposed 20 Ugx. 100,000/= since counsel did not spend hours in court as he pleaded.

I have noted that items 34,35,36,38,39,40,43 were taxed at 100,000/= as proposed by the appellants and there is no need to review the same. They would remain as taxed.

Item 45 was for attendance on the 26/10/2020 for hearing of the 4<sup>th</sup> defendant's case, counsel claimed he was on court premises for 4 hours and the matter was adjourned. Counsel had billed his time at

- c) As for Item 45 which was for attendance on the 26/10/2020 for hearing of the 4<sup>th</sup> defendant's case, Counsel had billed his time at 400,000/= but 200,000/= was taxed off. I will not interfere with the same. The amount of UGX 200,000/= would remain as taxed. - 10

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d) As for Items 56-70. These relate to disbursements on counsel's travel expenses to court from Kampala to Soroti. For each item counsel bill his expenses at Ugx. 1,700,000/= but the taxing master taxed off 950,000/= awarding 750,000/=. The law leaves discretion for taxing such an item on the taxing master. I cannot interfere with his discretion. They would remain as taxed.

e) The Final Award by the Taxing Officer is hereby substituted from UGX. 86,932,800/= (Eighty-Six Million, Nine Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Shillings) to UGX 36,932,800 (Thirty-Six Million, Nine Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Shillings), accordingly.

I so order.

Hon. Justice Dr Henry Peter Adonyo

Judge

27<sup>th</sup> August 2024

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