Equity Bank Ltd v Eustace Ndung'u Munyori [2014] KEHC 73 (KLR) | Review Of Orders | Esheria

Equity Bank Ltd v Eustace Ndung'u Munyori [2014] KEHC 73 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAKURU

CIVIL APPEAL N0. 109 OF 2009

EQUITY BANK LTD.................APPELLANT /APPLICANT

VERSUS

EUSTACE NDUNG'U MUNYORI.................RESPONDENT

RULING

By a ruling delivered on 8/3/2013, this court dismissed the appeal herein for want of   prosecution.  The order dismissing  the    appeal  was  made  after  the  respondent moved the court for  dismissal of the appeal on  the ground that since filing  of the  appeal and obtaining orders of stay of execution, the appellant has taken no step to have the appeal heard and determined.

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the  appeal, the appellant (applicant) brought the notice of motion dated  24/4/2014 seeking  to  set  aside  the  said  ruling  and  order.  The applicant also seeks an order of stay of execution and/ or proceedings in the lower court (Nyahururu PMCC N0. 404 of 2006) pending the hearing and determination of the application.

The  application   is    supported  by   the   affidavit   of   the applicants' advocate, Tim  Agufana Liko,  and is premised on the  grounds  that   on  13/ 11/2009  the  applicant  was granted a conditional stay of execution of the  judgment  of the  lower  court pending the  hearing and  determination  of the   appeal,    that    the  applicant  complied with  all   the conditions imposed by the  lower  court for  stay of execution; that  following an  application  by  the   respondent for   the dismissal of the  appeal, on  8/3/2013  this court dismissed the  applicant's appeal for want of prosecution.

Contending that  it  was not aware  of  the  date  slated for hearing of  the   respondent's  application for  dismissal and that the  dismissal of the appeal exposes it to execution; the applicant  urges the   court to  review   and/ or  set aside the order dismissing the appeal.

In opposition to the  application, the  respondent through its advocate, Nancy  Njoki  Mureithi, filed  the  affidavit sworn on 29th April, 2013 and filed  in  court on  2nd May, 2013. In that affidavit the respondent’s advocate has admitted that the   pleadings served on  the  applicant's advocate were  not endorsed with  the  date of hearing. Notwithstanding that admission, the   respondent's advocate contends that the applicant could not  have  mounted any  plausible defence to the  application.

The   respondent's  advocate  argues  that   despite  several notices having been served on  the  applicant to  prosecute the  appeal, then it  failed  to  heed   the  notices. She singled out, the  ultimatum given  to  the  applicant on  27. 1.2012  to take  the   necessary steps  and  fix  the   appeal for   hearing within sixty  (60) days. Contending that the  applicant  failed to   prepare  the   record  of  appeal  and   fix  the   appeal  for hearing with  the  time  ordered by  the  court and at all,  she argues that no  mischief was   occasioned  by  the irregular service and that no  prejudice would be  occasioned on  the applicants if the  orders sought are  denied.

On  24/4/2013,  when the  instant application was called for hearing, the  advocates for the  parties, with  the  concurrence of the  court, agreed to  have  the  application disposed off  by way  of  written submissions.  Subsequently, filed and exchanged submissions.

In the   submissions filed  for  the   applicant, it  is reiterated that the  applicant was  not   served with any hearing notice of  the   application for  dismissal. It is contended that since the   applicant's advocate was not   seized with sufficient information regarding the  application for  dismissal, it could not  attend court for  the  hearing of the application. The fact that the  respondent was not served with a hearing notice of the  application for   dismissal  is   said  to   be   a  sufficient ground for  review of the  ruling and the  order for  dismissal. In this regard, reference is made to  Ramco Ltd  v.  Mistry Jadra  Parbat  &  2 others Nairobi  HCCC NO. 171 of 2001for  the proposition that where service is irregular a court ought to set aside any  ex parte orders ex debito  justiticiae.

Reiterating  the   contention that  its  advocate's discovered the  order of the court only  after the  respondent's advocate wrote to  their advocate threatening  it  with execution, the applicant  has   argues  that   discovery of   the  ex  parte judgment was a new  and important matter which it  could not  get  seized of despite exercise of due diligence.

Concerning the  application for  stay, it  is submitted  that if the  prayer  for    review    is  granted,  the  appeal  will  be automatically reinstated. Further that upon reinstatement of the  appeal, a stay of execution is necessary to  avoid  the reinstated appeal being rendered nugatory.

The     application   herein  is  said   to    have    been    filed immediately  after  the   applicant  got   to   know about  the ruling and order of the  court hereto. The  applicant is also said  to    be    willing,  ready  and   able   to    abide  by    any conditions  imposed  by   the    court  and/ or   furnish  such security as may  ordered by the  court for  grant of the orders sought.

In reply the respondent has reiterated the  contention that the   applicant was given   various notices to  prosecute the appeal  to   no   avail. The   respondent  maintains  that  even after   being  given    the    sixty  (60)   days  ultimatum,   the applicant  failed to  take steps necessary to  prosecute the appeal. The  respondent pointed out that the  Sixty (60)  days ultimatum issued by this court was never extended.

Concerning the applicant's argument that owing to  the irregular service it could not  have attended court to  defend the  application for  dismissal of the  appeal, it  is submitted that with   due  diligence, the   applicant's    advocates could have  known about the  date set down for  hearing.

Arguing that  discovery of  the  ex  parte  ruling  does  not amount  to  a new   and  important matter  which was not within the appellants'  knowledge even  after exercise of due diligence.   The    respondent  have  submitted  that   the appellants  could  have  known  about  the  date  slated  for hearing of the  application by making an inquiry in  court or calling  the   respondent's  advocate  to   inquire  about  the hearing date.

Reiterating the contention that the  delay in  prosecution  of the  appeal was  inordinate and inexcusable, the respondent referred to  the  decision in  Et Monks &  Company Ltd v. Evans (1985) KLR 584 in  support of  the argument that the  applicant was duty bound to  move  the court as fast as possible  to  get   his  appeal  heard  and  determined.  It  is submitted that the applicant having failed to  do  so  has no right to complain that its appeal was  dismissed.

Further that the  discretion of the court to set aside ex parte orders should be  exercised to  avoid   injustice or  hardship resulting   from  accident   inadvertence   and   excusable mistake  or   error  but  not  to  assist  a  person who   has deliberately sought  whether  by   evasion  or   otherwise  to obstruct or delay the  course of justice.

In this case, the  appellant having failed to take any steps to prosecute its  appeal since 17. 6.2009, and even after having been given an ultimatum to do so,  is said to be undeserving of the  exercise of the  court's discretion in  its favour.

I have read and considered the   application herein, the response thereto and the submissions by the respective parties. The sole  issue for  determination  is  whether the court should exercise the  discretion vested in  it in  favour of the  applicant?

The law applicable to the application:-

Under Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules a court has power  to  review  its own  orders.  The   Order provides as follows:-

"(45)(1)  Any person considering himself aggrieved-

(a) by a decree or  order  from  which an appeal is allowed, but   from which no appeal has been preferred; or

(b)  by  a  decree or order from which no appeal is  hereby  allowed, and  who from the discovery of new and important matter or  evidence which, after the  exercise of   due  diligence, was not  within   his   knowledge  or could not be  produced by  him  at the time when the decree was  passed or the  order  made  or   on    account   of some  mistake  or   error  apparent  on the  face  of   the  record, or   for   any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain  a   review   of   the   decree  or order,  may  apply  for   review  of judgment to the  court which passed the decree or  made the order without unreasonable delay."

This legal position flows   from Section  80 of   the  Civil Procedure Act which gives  a Court power to  review its own order where an appeal has not  been  preferred against its order for sufficient cause.

Whether the court should exercise  the   discretion vested in  it in  favour of the applicant?

In   the   instant application it   is   not   in   dispute that the applicant’s advocate was   not   aware of the   date slated for the   hearing of  the   respondent's application for  dismissal. That notwithstanding, it is contended that with due diligent the applicant would have got to know of the date slated for the   hearing   of   the     application.   The    respondent  has submitted that the  applicant's  advocate would easily have known  about   the  hearing  date  if   he    had   called  the respondent's advocate and/ or  made an inquiry in  court.

I   agree.  Instead   of   conducting  the    court  and/or   the respondent's advocate to clarify on  the  issue of the hearing date, the  applicant's advocate opted to  sit  pretty and wait, when he  knew very  well  that the  court had already given  it ultimatum to fix the  appeal for  hearing. He now moves this court for   review   on   the   basis that he   did   not know the hearing date of the application for dismissal. In that application there is nothing to prove that the applicant took any steps towards prosecution of the appeal as ordered by the court. Besides, there is no prayer for extension of the court's ultimatum.

In view of the foregoing the question to ask is what justice would review of the orders serve?

In  my  view,  granting the  orders sought would only  serve to prolong the   life  of  this appeal is  already enjoying its 6th year in  court. Without any  evidence of the  applicant's willingness to prosecute the  appeal expeditiously, I decline to   exercise  the    discretion  vested  in   this  court  in  the applicant's favour.

The upshot of the foregoing is that the application has no merit and is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Dated  and delivered  this 27th day of June 2014 at Nakuru.

H A OMONDI

JUDGE