Faridah Nakazibwe v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition 15 of 2019) [2024] UGCC 28 (11 March 2024)

### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA

# [CORAM Geoffrey Kiryabwire; Irene Mulyagonja; Christopher Gashirabake; Eva Luswata and Oscar Kihika JJCCI

### CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 15 OF 2019

#### BETWEEN

Faridah Nakazibrn€........ ........ Petitioner

### AND

The Attorney General. Respondent

### JUDGMENT OF GEOFFREY KIRYABWIRE, JCC

# Introduction

This Petition is brought under Article 137 of the Constitution of Uganda 1995 as amended (hereafter referred to as the Constitution).

The Petitioner seeks Orders and Declarations that: -

- 7. An Order directing the Rules Committee to lay before Parliament all Rules uhich haue been enacted pursuant to Sections 4 7 and 42 Judicature Act, Cap.73. - 2. A declarqtion that the Judicature (Judicial Reaieu) Rutes S. L No. 7 7/2OO9, in as far as it purports to cast the Media Council Disciplinary Committee a.s an administratiue body is inconsistent uith and in contrauention of Atticle 42 Constitution. - 3. A declaration that the Judicature (Judicial Reuieut) Rules S. L JVO. 7 7/2OO9, in as far as it purports to subject decisions o/ subordinate Courts, such as, the Media Council Disciplinary Committee, as if it were an administratiue bodg is inconsistent uith and in contrauention of Article 129 (1) (d) of the Constittttion" - 4. A declaration that the Media Council Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court established pursuant to Article 729 (1) (d.) Constitution. - 5. A declaration that the only remedy against decisions of the Media Council Disciplinary Committee is an appeal pursuant to

At-t. 139 (2) Constitution to the extent permitted ba utritten law.

- 6. A declaration that the subordinate courts are at liberty to instruct independent counsel to defend themselues against any legal proceedings challenging their decisions through ultra uires proceedings. - 7. An Order directing the respondent and the Chief Justice to carry out a census of the laws of the Republic of Ugnada and enact a statutory instrument listing the subordinate courts present utithin the Republic of Uganda pursuant to Att. 133 (1) Constitution. - 8. A perrnanent injunction order restraining Courts fro\* registering any judicial reuieu proceedings against decisions deliuered by subordinate courts, including but not limited to the Media Council Dis ciplinary Committee. - 9. An order that the Respondent be liable for costs of this Petition..."

The Petition is supported by the affidavit of Ms Faridah Nakazibwe the Petitioner and media personality.

The brief facts constituting the Petition can be discerned from paragraph 10 of the Petition and briefly are that the Petitioner is aggrieved by the following publications in the media about her namely: -

- a. WWW.redpepper.co.us - b. Hello! And

3l

c. Red Pepper

Lodged a complaint before them with the Media Council Disciplinary Committee.

The said Complaint was listed as Faridah Nakazibwe Versus Red Pepper Publications Ltd, Media Disciplinary Case No. 01 of 2017. The Media Council Disciplinary Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Committee") found in favour of the Petitioner in that CASC

The Red Pepper Publication then sought judicial Review by the High Court of the decision of the Disciplinary Committee in

- a. The Red Pepper Publication Ltd V the Media Council Disciplinar5r Committee and the Attorney General MC No 644 of 2005 - b. The Red Pepper Publication Ltd V the Media Council Disciplinaqr Committee and the Attorney General MC No 73 of 2OO9 and - c. The Red Pepper Publication Ltd and T\rsiime Richard V the Attorney General MC No 237 of 2Ot3.

In all the above matters the Attorney General was the Respondent and counsel for the Disciplinar5r Committee. It is the case for the Petitioner that the Attorney General cannot be made liable as a Respondent for the decisions rendered by the Disciplinary Committee. This is because the Petitioner takes the view that the Disciplinar5r Committee is a subordinate court and therefore cannot be the subject of Judicial Review under the Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules, S.l. No. 11 of 2OO9 (hereinafter referred to as the "Judicial Review Rules") as this would inter alia be a usurpation of the role of Parliament and also a contravention of Articles 42 and 139 (21 of the Constitution.

It is also the case for the Petitioner that the Judicial Review Rules have never been tabled before Parliament contrary to Section a 1 (5) of the Judicature Act by the Respondent who also happens to to an Ex-Officio member of Parliament.

The Respondent filed an Answer to Petition. In the said Answer, the Respondent Attorney General averred that the Petitioner is not entitled to the declarations, orders and other reliefs sought in the Petition. The said Answer is supported by the Affidavits of Mr Paul Ekochu a lawyer and Chairman of the Media Council of Uganda.

The Respondent denies allegations set forth in the Petition and contends that the Disciplinary Committee is not a court as defined by the Judicature Act. It is the position of the Respondent that the Disciplinar5r Committee makes quasi-judicial and not administrative decisions for which an appeal lies to the High Court. Furthermore, the Judicial Reviews were properly made by the Rules Committee of the Chief Justice and purpose of laying the said Rules before Parliament was to notify them of their existence and not to have said Rules validated.

#### Issues

The Parties hereto did not agree as to the exact wording of issues for determination. Each party adopted their own issues in their written submissions. However, the Petitioner proffered the following issues for the determination of the Petition and I shal1 endeavour to cross reference and harmonise them with those of the Respondent where relevant: -

- 1. Whether the Petition disclose a cause of action? - 2. Whether the Media Council Disciplinary Committee is SUBORBINATE COURT under Art. 129 (1) (d) , I29 (3), L39(2)', 257 (t) (p) ,257 (1) (cc) or an ADMINISTRATIVE BODY under Art. 42 Constitution? - 3. Whether the Chief Justice or the Rules Committee Enacting S.1 No. lll2OO9 and S. I No. 32 l2Ol9 subjecting the subordinate court - Media Council Disciplinary Committee to judicial review proceedings violated Articles 42,79 (2), L26 (L), 126 (2), I28 (l), 128 (4), 129 (1) (d) , 129 (3), 131(1), 131 (2), Art. 133, 134 (2), 139 (2),257 (t) (p) and Article 257 (1) (cc) Constitution? - 4. Whether the only legal remedy against Media Council Disciplinary Committee decisions is an appeal pursuant to Art. 139 (2) Constitution? - 5. Whether the office of the Chief Justice should pass a statutory instrument, listing a-11 subordinate courts present in the Republic of Uganda, pursuant to Art. 133 (1) Constitution?

- 6. Whether subordinate courts are entitled to independent counsel other than the Attorney Genera-l pursuant to Art. 119 (3) and Art. 1 19 (4) (d) Constitution? - 7. What remedies are available to the parties?

### Parties

The Petitioner was represented by Mr Jimmy Muyanja. The Respondents was represented by Ms Jackline Amusugut State Attorney.

## Preliminary matters

The Petitioner sought by oral application at the commencement of the hearing, to amend the Petition to include reference to The Judicature (Judicial Review) (Amendment) Rules 2Ol9 (SI No 32 of 2Ol9l. Counsel for the Petitioner argued that it had been an oversight not to include the said amended Rules in the Petition. The written submissions of the Petitioner however had mention of the amended Rules. We Ruled on the said application and declined to accept the amendment as we found that the omission was not a clerical error, a spelling mistake, a misdiscription of a party or subject matter nor was it in the interests of justice to allow the said amendment. The said amendment had in any event come into force after the Decision of the Disciplinary Committee which is the subject to this Petition.

I shall now proceed to determine the issue as herein under.

# Issue No. 1: Whether the Petition discloses a cause of action?

## Case for the Petitioner

It is the case for the Petitioner that the Petition does disclose a cause of action. For this proposition, the Petitioner proffers the following three general arguments.

First, the Parties have different interpretations as to whether or not the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court? The Petitioner argues that the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court while the Respondent disagrees and argues that the Disciplinary Committee is a public body that renders quasi-judicial decisions.

Secondly, Article L37 of the Constitution provides locus standi to a Petitioner to allege that any Act of Parliament or other law or anything done in or under the authority of any law or act or omission by any person or authority is inconsistent \Mith the Constitution (See Krispus Ayena Odongo V AG 2O2O UGCC page 23 line 15-19 and CEHHURD V AG 2019 UGSC 69).

Thirdly, that the issues raised by the parties hereto must be resolved by this court so as not to leave uncertainty in the law (Moses Mwandha V AG 2Ol9 UGCCS lines 10-3O). In this regard no article of the constitution is ring fenced from interpretation and no person or institution is excluded from respecting and or upholding the Constitution. ### Case for the Respondent

For the Respondent it was argued that this Petition presented no cause of action. The Respondent for their part proffered... lines of argument to support proposition that the Petition does not disclose a cause of action.

First, that the Petition offends Rule 3 of the Constitutional Court (Petitions and References) Rules 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Court Rules) by not showing on the face of the grounds which Act or thing done by the Respondent contravenes the provisions of the Constitution. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the grounds of the petition were mere arguments that require enforcement rather than interpretation of the Constitution. Counsel for the Respondent argued that the impugned provisions can only be inferred from the declarations and prayers sought in the Petition though without precision. In this regard we inter alia were referred to the matters in Eng Edward Turyomurug:fendo K. & 2 Ors V AG & 4 Ors Constitutional Petition No. 25of 2OO9 and Mbabali Jude V Edward Sekandi Constitutional Petition No 28 of 2012.

Secondly, counsel for the Respondent submitted that it is the case for the Petitioner that an Order be made that the Judicial Review Rules be placed before Parliament. Counsel argued that this was not a matter for Judicial interpretation.

Thirdly, Counsel for the Respondent submits that it is the case for the Petitioner that the Attorney General the Disciplinary Committee being a subordinate Court should have hired an independent

Counsel and cannot hire the Attorney General to represent it. However, counsel for the Petitioner argued that Rules 4 and 5 of the Constitutional Court Rules require that where the Attorney General is not a party then still the Attorney General should be served meaning that the Attorney General at all times is a party to a Constitutional matter in this Court.

Finally, counsel for the Respondent submits for remedies, the Petitioner seeks this Court to make Orders without showing the Court the basis for those Orders.

### Consideration and determination of the issue.

I have addressed my mind to arguments of the Parties and the authorities relied upon for which I am grateful.

It is now well settled law and reiterated on the authorities that under Article L37 of the Constitution that this Court has no jurisdiction in a Petition unless it involves a question of constitutional interpretation. This was emphasised in the matter of Ismail Serugo and Attorney General Constitutional Appeal No 2 of 1998 where Justice Kanyeihamba JSC held: -

"...u)hen it comes to ...the jurtsdiction of the Court of Appeal as a Constitutional Court...that Constitutional Court had no original jurisdiction merely to enforce rights and freedoms enshrined in tlrc Constitution in isolotion to interpreting the Constitution and resoluing any dispute as to the meaning of its prouisiorts..."

When it comes to crystalizing as to whether a question of interpretation of the Constitution has crystallised, the hold of Mulenga JSC in the Serugo Matter (Supra) when he held that a Petition discloses a cause of action if it describes the act or omission complained of and shows the provision of the Constitution with which the act or omission is alleged to be inconsistent or alleged to have contravened by the act or omission and prays for a declaration to that effect. As already stated the onus to prove any such allegation rests with the Petitioner.

In this matter the Petition has a number of facets. The main thrust of the Petition however is contested notion proffered by the Appellant that the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate Court under the provisions of the Constitution Inter alia Article 129 (1) (d); L39 (2); 133 (1) and 42 of the Constitution of Uganda. The Respondent does not agree with this notion of the Petitioner. Counsel for the Respondent argues that the grounds in the Petition are argumentative and not crafted well within the meaning of Rule 3 of the Constitutional Court Rules. Whereas I agree with the Respondent on the strength of the decision of Eng Turyomugendo (Supra) that Petitioners are to ensure that they present to court a clear, brief and concise petition to enable the Respondent know what requires interpretation, I find on the face of the Petition that this contested question is clear. What I can agree with is that the drafting of the Petition was wanting in some respects but ultimately the question for interpretation on what is a subordinate court under the constitution is discernable.

I however agree with the Respondent that the Petition is laced with other areas of disagreement that do not require interpretation. This includes the arguments that the Judicial Review Rules need to be put before Parliament and that the Attorney General should not be the Respondent in this matter. These are procedural and not interpretation issues and therefore disclose no cause of action.

In the final result I find that this ground succeeds in part as disclosing a question for constitutional interpretation.

Issue No. 2: Whether the Media Council Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court under Articles L29 l1) (d), L29 l3l, L39 l2l, 257 (U (c) and (p) or is an administrative body under Article 42 of the Constitution.

#### Case for the Petitioner

Counsel for the Petitioner offered a four-point test to establish whether an institution is a subordinate court or an administrative body. These are following: -

- 1. Is the subordinate Court created by Parliament pursuant to Art 129 (3)? In response to this question, Counsel answered in the affirmative referencing Section 3O of the Press and Journalists Act (Cap 105). - 2. Whether the subordinate court established by Parliament pursuant to Art 129 (31 and 257 (t) (p) is vested with'Judicial power" and jurisdiction to "dispense justice"? In response to

this question, Counsel answered in the affirmative referencing Sections 9 (1) (C); 31 (1) and 33 (a)-(b) of the Press and Journalists Act (Cap 105)

- 3. Whether the subordinate court's procedure is established by Parliament pursuant to Art 129 (3) of the Constitution. In response to this question, Counsel answered in the affirmative referencing Sections 3l (2) -(3); 33 (a); and 34 (1) of the Press and Journalists Act (Cap 1O5). - 4. Whether the subordinate court decision is made appealable by Parliament pursuant to Art 139 (2) of the Constitution. In response to this question, Counsel answered in the affirmative referencing Section 34 (1) of the Press and Journalists Act (Cap 105) which a right of appeal to the High Court.

Counsel submitted that the above tests were sufficient to show that the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court as envisaged in the Constitution.

### Case for the Respondent.

Counsel for the Respondent disagreed that the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court envisaged under the Constitution.

Counsel submitted that the four-way test proffered by the Petitioner has no basis in law at all and that we should ignore it. Furthermore, the four-way test has no nexus with the known rules of constitutional interpretation like the mischief/purposive rules which help discern the object and intent of Parliament.

Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Petitioner on the authority of Male Mabirizi V Attorney General Constitutional Petition No 49 of 2Ol7 had the burden to prove that the Disciplinary Committee was indeed a subordinate court; but had failed to do so. In particular Counsel argued that none of the articles of the Constitution that the Petitioner cited directly refer to the Disciplinary Committee as a subordinate Court.

On what a subordinate court is, we were referred to the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General V Joseph Tumushabe, SCCA No. 3 of 2005 where Mulenga JSC (as he then was) found that: -

"... To my understanding, the classification betuteen superior and subordinate courts in Article 23 only relates to the mode of establishment of the Courts, namely "cottrts established by the Constitution" being the superior courts, and courts "established by Parliament" under the authority of the Constitution" being subordinate courts. The classification does not relate to the appellate hierarchy of the cottrts"

Counsel argued that there is nothing to suggest that the word "subordinate" is synonymous with the word "lower" and therefore not all subordinate courts are necessarily lower than the High Court in appellate hierarchy". He argued that had Parliament wanted the Disciplina4r Committee to be a subordinate court, then it would have directly provided for it. However, the Press and Journalist Act establishes the Disciplinary Committee as an administrative body under Section 30 thereof. This Disciplinary Committee has the primary role of disciplinarlr control which is a function of the Media Council under sections 8 and 9 of the Press and Journalist Act which are administrative in nature within the meaning of Article 42 of the Constitution.

## Consideration and determination of the issue.

I have considered the submissions of the parties and the authorities relied on for which I am grateful.

The question for interpretation here is whether the Disciplinary Committee is a subordinate court and how does it differ from an administrative body? Article 257 (1) (cc) The Interpretation provision of the Constitution provides: -

((

subordinqte coutt means a courl subordinate to the High Court..."

Article 129 (1) (2) Further provides that judicial power of Uganda shall be exercised by the courts of judicature which shall consist of: -

(d) such subordinate courls os Parliament may by law establish, including qadhis' courts for marriage, diuorce, inLrcritance of property and guardianship, as maA be prescribed by Parliamerlt..."

On the other hand, the Constitution provides under Article 42 that if a tribunal is an administrative body then: -

# 42. Right to just and fair treatment in administratiae decisions

AnA person appearing before any administratiue official or body has a right to be treated justty and fairly and shall haue a right to a.pplA to a court of lout in respect of any administratiue decision taken against him or her..."

The Supreme Court and this Court have had occasion to address the question as to what amounts to a subordinate court under the Constitution. In the matter of Joseph Tumushabe (Supra) in the Supreme Court, Mulenga JSC (RIP) discussed and answered this question. The Learned Justice made it clear that the Parliament has in its wisdom the power to make provision for the jurisdictions and procedure of courts. Parliament also has the power to determine in which appellate hierarchy the subordinate court shall have in relation to the High Court. Justice Mulenga held that whereas Section 15 of the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust Act (Cap 95) provides that Appeals from the Tribunal under that Act would lie to the Court of Appeal, this did not mean that the Tribunal was a superior court. He however found that the General Court Martial (from which, appeals lie to the Court Martial Appeal Court) is both a subordinate court within the meaning of Article 129 (1) (d) of the Constitution, and therefore is lower than the High Court in the hierarchy of courts.

It follows therefore that appeals from such bodies cannot form a basis of determining what a subordinate court is as proffered by test number 4 offered by the Petitioner. This puts into doubt the four-part test argued by the Petitioner.

On the other hand, this Court in Asaph Ruhinda Ntengye and Anor and Attorney General Constitution Petition No 333 of 2016 found that the Industrial Court to be a subordinate court. The Court found that the Industrial Court though a subordinate court had concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court. However, in determining what the intent and purpose of the Parliament was in setting up the Tribunal under the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, as a subordinate court this Court addressed itself to the following provisions. First, Section 16 (1) of the Act which provides

"... An award or decision of the Industrial Court shall be enforceable in the same waA a.s a decision in a ciuil matter in the High Cottrt..."

Secondly, Section 10 (2) of the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act 2006 provides that the Judges of the Industrial Court should have qualifications similar to those of a Judge of the High Court is therefore in harmony with Art. 151 (a) of the Constitution.

Section 30 of the Press and Journalists Act establishes the Disciplinar5r Committee and provides: -

((

1) There is established a disciplinary committee consisting of--

(a) the chnirperson of the council, who shall be the chairperson of the committee;

(b) the secretary to the council, utho shall be the secretary to the committee;

(c) four members elected bg the council from among their number.

(2) The council shall, when hearing disciplinary cases, appoint an aduocate of not less than fiue years' standing to aduise the dis ciplinary co mmitte e.

(3) Four members of the committee shall forrn a quontm..."

There is no provision under this Act for the members of the Disciplinary Committee to have the same qualifications as a judicial officer.

Section 31 of the Press and Journalists Act then provides how the Disciplinary Committee works and provides: -

# <sup>3</sup>7. Complaints against a journalist

(1) A complaint or an allegation against a journalis| uhich if proued uould constitute professional misconduct, may be made to the disciplinary committee bA anA person, and tlrc complaint or allegation shall be reduced into utriting.

(2) The secretary shall, upon receipt of a complaint, uithin thirty dags refer the matter to the committee uhich shall fix a date for the hearing of the complaint.

(3) The committee shall giue the journalist against uhom the complaint or allegation is made an opportunity to be lrcard and shall furnish him or her uith a copA of the complaint and any other releuant document at least fourteen days before the date fixed for the hearirtg..."

The Act then under Section 32 and 33 provides for the procedure and decisions of the Disciplinary Committee and provides: -

((

### 32. Procedure of the committee

The procedure to be folloued bg the committee in the hearing of the complaint shall be as prouided in the First Schedule to this Act.

#### 33. Committee's decision

Afier heartng the journalist to uhom the complaint relates and after considering the euidence adduced, the committee maA

dismiss the complaint if no ground for a disciplinary action is proued, or if a ground for a disciplinary action is proued, impose anA or a combination of the follouing penalties-

(a) that the journalist be admonished or be required to apologise to the aggrieued partg in the manner specified bg the committee, including the same boldness o.,f lettering on the page wlrcre the article appeared in tlrc neuspaper;

(b) that the practising certificate of the journalist be suspended for a specified period not exceeding six montLs;

(c) that tLrc media organisations uhich published the matter that led to the complaint paA compensation to a person uho suffered /oss or injury as a- result of the miscond7tct..."

It is important to note that the procedure of the Disciplinary Committee under Section 32 of the Press and Journalists Act is the same as the Media Council as a media regulator during their regular meetings under Section 1O (1) of the sarne Act (see Schedule No 1 to the Act).

Section 34 provides for appeals from the Disciplinary Committee to be lodged at the High Court.

It is evident to me that the membership, procedure used and remedies of the Disciplinary Committee are not consistent with that of a subordinate court but are rather supportive of the Media Council functions in regulating the media profession.

Looking at the Press and Journalists Act and applying Article 129 (l) (2) and the legai authorities reviewed above I find that Parliament did not intend that the Disciplinary Committee to be a subordinate court but rather that it functions as an administrative tribunal.

In the fina-l result I answer this ground in the negative and find that the Disciplinary Committee is an administrative body/tribunal and not a subordinate court.

Issue No. 3 Whether the Chief Justice or the Rules Committee enacting SI No 11 of 2OO9 and SI No 32 of 2OL9 subjecting the subordinate court - the Media Council Disciplinary Committee to Judicial Review proceedings, Violated Articles 42, 79(21, L26 ltl, L26 (21, t2a (1), 128 l4l, L29 (1) (d), L29 l3l, 131 (11, !3L l2l, 133, L34 l2l, 139 l2l 257 (1) (p) and 257 (U (cc) of the Constitution?

As already discussed above, this Court did not grant leave for the Petitioner to amend their Petition to include SI No 32 of 2019 even though the Petitioner extensively cited it in their written submissions. I consequently shall deem any reference to SI No 32 of 2019 in the written submissions as struck out.

Secondly, this ground and or question is premised on the Disciplinary Committee being a subordinate court which I found not to be the case. That being SO, I find it moot to answer any Constitutional question linking the Disciplinary Committee not being a subordinate court to the powers of the Chief Justice or Rules

Committee under the Constitution and or Judicature Act as argued by the Petitioner.

In the final result I find that this issue is moot and I decline to answer it.

Issue No. 4 Whether the only remedy against the Media Council Disciplinary Committee decisions is an Appeal pursuant to Article L39 l2l of the Constitution?

Article L39 (2) of the Constitution provides: -

" . . . Subject to the proulsions of this Constitution qnd any other law, the decisions of any court louer than tlrc High Court shall be appealable to the High Court..."

This provision refers to "any court lower than the High Court". Once again I find that an interpretation of this provision in relation to the Disciplinary Committee is moot as I have already found that the said committee is not a subordinate court.

In the fina-l result I find that this issue is moot and I decline to answer it.

Issue No. 5: Whether the Office if the Chief Justice should pass a statutory instrument, listing all subordinate courts present in the Republic of Uganda, pursuant to Article 133 (1) Constitution?

### Case for the Petitioner

Under this ground, counsel for the Petitioner in the main argues that it is in the public interest that the office of the Chief Justice passes a statutory instrument outlining the subordinate courts.

### Case for the Respondent

The Respondent did not address itself to this issue.

### Consideration and determination of the issue

Article 133 of the Constitution provides for the Administrative powers of the Chief Justice and states: -

The Chief Justice-

(a) slmll be the head of the judiciary and shall be responsibte for the administration and superuision of all courts in Uganda; and

(b) may issue orders and directions to the courts necessary for the proper and elficient administration of justice..."

I find that this issue does not raise any question for Constitutional interpretation and looks more like a hanging remedy that is not founded on the resolution of any question for constitutional interpretation.

23l

I accordingly strike out this issue.

# Issue No. 6z Whether subordinate Courts are entitled to independent counsel other thdn the Attorney General pursuant to Article 119 (3) and Article 119 (4) (d) of the Constitution.

This issue relates to subordinate courts and I have found that the Disciplinary Committee is not a subordinate court. It seems to me that this issue is also moot since the underlying question has been resolved in the negative.

In the final result I find that this issue is moot and I decline to answer it.

## Issue No. 7: What remedies are available to the parties.

### Conclusion

The substantive question in this Petition has been answered in the negative. This had the effect of collapsing subsequent issue in this Petition as moot. It follows that the Petitioner is not successful in this petition and therefor is not entitled to the remedies prayed for. I therefore dismiss it each party bearing their own costs

### Final Result

Since the rest of the panel agree \Mith the above then this Petition stands dismissed with each party bearing their own costs.

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated at Kampala this $\ldots$ day of $\ldots$ 2025.

Geoffrey Kiryabwire

Justice of the Constitutional Court

$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L}$

$\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$

#### IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA

*Coram: Kiryabwire, Mulyagonja, Gashirabake, Luswata, Kihika, JJCC*

#### **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 15 OF 2019**

#### **BETWEEN**

#### FARIDA NAKAZIBWE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

#### **AND**

ATTORNEY GENERAL ....................................

#### **JUDGMENT OF IRENE MULYAGONJA, JCC**

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Kiryabwire, JCC. I agree with his decision for the reasons given and with the order that each party shall bear its own costs.

Dated at Kampala this $11^{15}$ day of 2025

Konungo Irene Mulyagonja

JUSTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

### IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

[Coram: Geoffiey Kiryabwire, Irene Mulyagonja, Gashirabake, Eva Luswata and Oscar Kihika, JJCCJ

### CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 15 OF 2OI9

#### BETWEEN

FARIDAH NAKAZIBWE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::PETITIONER AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT

### JUDGMENT OF CHRISTOPHER GASHIRABAKE. JA/JCC.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by Hon. Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire, JCC. I concur with the judgment and have nothing useful to add.

Dated at Kampala this ......l.) Ff day of f}'^tft\*r. <sup>2024</sup>

.{-:

Christopher Gashirabake JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL/CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

### IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

[Coram: Kiryabwire, Mulyagonja, Gashirabake, Luswata and Kihika $JJCC$

#### **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO.015 OF 2019**

#### FARIDAH NAKAZIBWE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

#### **VERSUS**

ATTORNEY GENERAL::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

#### **JUDGMENT OF EVA K. LUSWATA, JCC**

I have had the opportunity to read in draft, the judgment of my learned brother Hon. Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire, JCC.

I agree with his reasoning and have nothing useful to add.

**Dated** at Kampala this ....................................

EVA K. LUSWATA JUSTICE OF APPEAL/CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

# IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UGANDA

# [CORAM Geoffrey Kiryabwirel lrene Mulyagonja; Christopher Gashirabake; Eva Luswata and Oscar Kihika JJCCI

# CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 15 OF 2019

## BETWEEN

### AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL... ..... O" RESPONDENT

## JUDGMENT OF OSCAR JOHN KIHIKA, JCC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the Judgment of my learned brother Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire JCC.

The central issue to this Petition was whether or not the Media Council Disciplinar5r Committee was a subordinate court. I am in agreement with the reasoning and finding that the Media Council Disciplinary Committee is an administrative body/tribunal and not a subordinate court.

In consequence thereof, I am in further agreement that this Petition rails and ought to be dismissed with each party bearing their owrr costs.

Dated at Kampala this ....................................

$\frac{1}{2}$

# OSCAR JOHN KIHIKA

### JUSTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT