Festus Kimutai Langat v Retirement Benefits Appeal Tribunal, Trustees of Telposta Pension Scheme & Attorney General [2017] KEHC 4225 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  3 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY FESTUS  KIMUTAI LANGAT  FOR AN ORDER OF CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS DIRECTED TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT RETIREMENT BENEFITS APPEAL TRIBUNAL IN RETIREMENT BENEFITS  APPEAL TRIBUNAL NO.  9 OF 2011

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA   GIVEN AT NAKURU, CIVIL SUIT 204 OF 1998

BETWEEN

FESTUS KIMUTAI LANGAT…………………...………………….APPLICANT

VERSUS

RETIREMENT BENEFITS APPEAL TRIBUNAL…........…1ST RESPONDENT

TRUSTEES OF TELPOSTA PENSION SCHEME …........2ND RESPONDENT

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL………………………….......3RD RESPONDENT

RULING ON LEAVE

1. The exparte applicant is FESTUS KIMUTAI LANGAT.He seeks in his   application  dated  5th January 2017  seeks  leave  of this court   to apply for  Judicial Review  order of Certiorari  to quash the decision  of the 1st  respondent  Retirement Benefits Appeals Tribunal (RBAT) dated 2nd    December  2016   dismissing  the  applicant’s   notice of motion   dated  9th June  2016;  leave to apply   for Judicial Review  order of mandamus  to compel  the  1st respondent  to uphold  and  bind themselves  with the court’s judgment   delivered  on 14th October   2009  at  Nakuru, in Civil Suit  No. 204  of  1998  Festus Kimutai Langat vs Kenya Posts & Telecommunications, and order payment of the applicant’s pension dues in accordance with the said judgment   in respect of the applicant’s last basis salary.

2. The exparte applicant’s case is that he is an employee of Kenya Posts & Telecommunications.  That vide HCC 204/98 at Nakuru, he filed suit for unfair dismissal from employment, which suit was heard and   determined   in his favour against his former employer.  The judgment in that suit was determined on 14th October 2009 where D.K. Maraga J (as he then was) granted a declaration that the applicant’s dismissal was unlawful.  That the court also  awarded the applicant arrears half salary for the period of interdiction from March 1997 up to  February 1998 amounting to shs 148,950 and one month’s  salary  of kshs  42,985 in lieu  of notice.

3. It is further claimed that the  issue of  the applicant’s  last  pay slip  was subject  of court’s  determination  on the aspects  of terminal  dues  as well as the applicable last salary  and that  the  court found the  applicant’s last  salary to be kshs 42,985 and not the  1997  of shs  28,710.  That on 10th June 2011 the applicant filed an appeal to the 1st respondent Retirement Benefits Appeals Tribunal claiming for retirement benefits from the Trustees of Teleposta Pension Scheme and obtained judgment in his favour.

4. The applicant claims that the 2nd respondent paid him a sum of shs  2,106,224  applying  the  previous  salary  of shs  28,710  on 27th March  2016 contrary to the 2nd respondent’s allegation that the  payment   was pegged  on the last  final salary.

5. The applicant  then filed  a  notice of  motion dated  9th June  2016  before the 1st respondent  Retirement Benefits Appeals Tribunal challenging  the  aforesaid payment  and on  2nd  December  2016  the 1st respondent stated that the tribunal was not the appropriate  forum for enforcing judgments, decrees or orders of the High Court.

6.  According to the applicant, the decision  of the tribunal was made  in error  as the Tribunal  did not  take  into account  the  fact that it has  the  same  powers as the  High Court  and  so, enforcing an order of the court would be well within its jurisdiction.

7. Further, that as it is the Appeals Tribunal that ordered the 2nd   respondent  to pay the applicant his dues, the 2nd respondent  could not  allege  that it   was not part of the  suit and  or that the judgment  in the  civil suit  does not  bind it.

8. The applicant averred that  Section  49  of the Retirement  Benefits  Act empowers the 1st  respondent to make   orders that  were sought  and  to enforce  the  said decree  or order  from the High Court  at Nakuru since   the  applicant  was  not paid  his  correct amount.

9. In addition, it was alleged that the  1st respondent  has  a legal duty to make a decision  that is  not  injurious  to the  applicant  to whom  the  Tribunal owes a duty  to, as  long as  it is not  acting  beyond  its mandate.

10. The applicant therefore accuses the 1st respondent of committing an error by denying its responsibility and hence, the prayer that it should be compelled to review its decision since the error is very apparent.

11. The chamber summons was supported by the statutory  statement,  verifying  affidavit   and  annextures  which  include a decree in  Nakuru HCC  204  of 1998  and the ruling of  2nd  December   2016  by the 1st  respondent  Tribunal.

12. The  1st and  3rd  respondents  did  not file  any replying affidavit  or even  submissions  opposing  the  application  although  Miss  Ngelechei counsel for the 1st and 3rd respondents intimated  to court that she  was not  opposed to leave being granted to the exparte applicant to institute judicial review proceedings. Counsel however associated herself with submissions filed by the   3rd respondent trustees of Teleposta Pension Scheme.

13. The 2nd respondent  filed  a replying affidavit  on  15th February   2017 sworn by Peter Rotich the Administrator and Trust  Secretary  of the  2nd   respondent  contending that following   the  1st respondent’s  ruling  of  11th November  2011  the  2nd  respondent duly paid  the applicant  the  sum of kshs   2,106,224  being  his pension  dues  based on the  final pensionable   salary, which  pension  payment  was  based  on the  Trust Deed  and  Rules of the  Scheme  and  information  provided by the  scheme sponsor.

14. Further, it was deposed that the applicant was dissatisfied  with the  sums paid  to him so  he  filed an application  before the  1st respondent  vide notice of motion dated 9th June  2016   seeking  for enhancement  of the amount paid  to him, and  citing Nakuru HCC  204/1998 wherein  the  2nd respondent  was  not a  party hence  the judgment  in personam was only binding upon  parties to the suit.  Further that  the issue of  the applicant’s  final pay  was not an issue  in the civil suit  and that therefore the figure  arrived at  in the decree  may have been  in error.

15. The 2nd respondent contended that in any event,  the calculation  of the applicant’s half   salary  based  on shs 48,950  brings  it to  shs  24,825  hence the salary  had been  correctly calculated  and  paid in accordance  with  the  Trust Deed  and Rules of the Scheme  and in accordance   with the information  provided  by the scheme  sponsor.

16.  It was further claimed that Section 49 of the Retirement  Benefits Authority Act  which confers  jurisdiction on the  2nd  respondent does not  give it  power to  enforce  judgments  of the High court. That therefore there is no prima facie case with real issues for   hearing hence, the application is misplaced and does not warrant an inquiry.

17. The applicant  and  2nd  respondent   filed submissions on  23rd February 2017 and 6th March 2017 respectively, which   submissions  mirror  the  grounds   in support of the application  and  the depositions  in the replying affidavit of Mr Rotich  in opposition  which I shall  not reproduce but which I  reiterate.

18. The two parties also relied on several authorities for and against the leave sought. The  applicants cited  Republic  vs  Kenya Vision  2030  Delivery Board & Another exparte Engineer Judah Abekah [2015]eKLRwhere Korir J on the of mandamus while maintaining that the error by the 1st respondent is apparent as regards its jurisdiction and that therefore this  court has the  power to issue Certiorari  and  Mandamus.

19. On the part  of the 2nd  respondent, it  was  contended that there is  no prima  facie  case for investigation  by this court; that  the Tribunal  had not power to enforce  judgments  of the High  Court and  that the  2nd respondent  was  not a party to the previous  proceedings  before the High Court  hence it   was not bound by  that judgment.

20. On the scope of Judicial Review, the case of Council of  Service  Union  & Minister  for Civil Service  [1985] AC 374  at  401D cited  by Anyara Emukule  J ( as he  then was) in Republic vs Cabinet Secretary National  Treasury & Another exparte Car  Importers  Association  of Kenya[2016]  e KLRwas  cited. The 2ndrespondent also cited Municipal Council of Mombasa v Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd Civil Appeal No. 185/2001 where the Court of Appeal set the parameters for Judicial Review.

21. It was  also argued by the 2nd respondent that this application is frivolous and   without merit, citing  Sylvana  Mpambwanayo  Ntaryamira  V Allen Waiyaki Gichuhi & Another [2015] e KLRcitingRepublic   V Land Dispute Tribunal Court Central Division & Another  Exparte  Nzioka [2006] 1 EA  321.

22. It  was further  argued that the Tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction that was not  conferred  on it  by  the statute.  Reliance  was  placed  on Republic Vs Attorney General  & 3 Others exparte  KAA  Staff Retirement Benefit Scheme [2015] e KLRciting  exparte May fair Bakeries  Ltd v  Rent  Restriction Tribunal  and   Rivit  R(KIRT) Raval  Nairobi  HCC  246/1981.

23. It  was  further contended that there  was  no demonstration  of illegality, irrationality or impropriety to warrant intervention  by this  court for Judicial Review and the case of Republic v Attorney General & 3 Others  Exparte KAA Staff Retirement  Benefit  Authority  was cited  as  well as  EA  Railways  Corporation V Anthony Sefu Dar esaalam HCC 19/1971[1973] EA 327.

24.  the 2nd  respondent  urged the  court to dismiss  the  application for leave  with costs.

DETERMINATION

25. I have considered the foregoing and in my  humble view, the only  issue  for determination is whether  the  applicant  deserves  the leave sought  to apply for  Judicial Review  orders of Certiorari   and  Mandamus.  The requirement  for leave   was set out  by a three judge bench  comprising   Bosire, Mbogholi Msagha  and  Oguk JJ in Matiba vs  Attorney General HCC  Miscellaneous  Application No. 790 of  1993  in which the court  held  that leave is supposed to exclude  frivolous, vexatious or applications  which prima facie  appear to be abuse of the process  of the court of  those application which  are statute  barred.

26. A similar  holding   was made in  Republic  vs Land  Disputes Tribunal  Court Central Division  and  Another Exparte  Nzioka [2006] 1 EA  21  where Nyamu  J ( as he  then was)  held that   leave should  be  granted, if  on the material  available   the court considers, without  going into  the matter  in-depth, that there is  an arguable  case for  granting  leave and that leave  stage is  a filter  whose purpose  is to weed  out hopeless  cases at the  earliest  possible time, this saving  the  pressure  on the courts  and  needless  expenses for  the applicant  by allowing  malicious  and  futile  claims  to be weeded  out or eliminated  so as to prevent   public  bodies  being  paralyzed  for months  because of  pending  court action  which might  turn out  to be  unmeritorious.

27. The same position was upheld in Republic vs The Permanent Secretary Ministry of Planning and National Development Exparte Kamenyi[2006] 1 EA 353and in  Republic  vs  County Council  of Kwale  & Another  Exparte  Kondo  & 57  others  HC  MCA  384  of  1996; Mexner &  Another  vs Attorney General [2005]  2 KLR 189.  In  the latter  case the court   held that leave of the  court is  a prerequisite  to making  a  substantive  application for  Judicial Review  and that  the purpose of the leave is to filter out frivolous  applications  hence the granting of  leave or otherwise involves  on exercise  of Judicial  discretion.

28. The  circumstances  which guide the  grant of leave  to apply for Judicial Review  remedies   were set  out in Mirugi  Kariuki  v Attorney  General CA  No. 70  of  1991  [1990-1994] EA  156; [1992] KLR  as follows:

“ If  he[ the applicant] fails  to show, when he  applies for leave, a prima facie  case on  reasonable grounds for believing  that there  has been  a failure  of public  duty, the court could  be in error  if it   granted  leave.  The club  represented  by the need  for the applicant  to show when he seeks  leave to  apply, that   he has  a  case, is  as essential  protection  against abuse of the  legal  process.  it  enables  the  court to  prevent  abuse  by busybodies, cranks  and  other  mischief makers…..”

29. In Re Bivac  International  SA(Bureau Veritas ) [2005]  2 EA  43  HCK the  court expressed  itself  thus:-

“ Application for leave  to apply for  orders  of Judicial Review  are normally  exparte  and  such  an application  does restrict  the court  to threshold  issues  namely  whether  the  application has an arguable case, and  whether if  leave is  granted  the same should operate as stay.  Whereas Judicial Review  remedies  are at the  end of the day discretionary that discretion  is a judicial discretion and, for  this reason  a court has to  explain how the discretion, if any  was  exercised  so that   all the parties  are aware of the factors  which led  to the exercise  of the court’s discretion .

There should  be an arguable  case which  without  delving into  the details could succeed and an arguable case is not  ascertained  by the court by  tossing  a  coin or  waving  a magic  wand or raising  a  green flag, the  ascertainment  of an arguable case is an intellectual  exercise  in this  fast  growing  area of  the law and  one has to consider without making  any findings, the scope  of the judicial review remedy sought, the grounds on the possible  principles  of administrative  law involved  and not forger  the  ever expanding  frontiers of  Judicial Review  and  perhaps  give an  applicant   his day in court instead  of  denying  him. Although leave should not  be granted  as a matter of  routine, where  one is in doubt  one has to  consider  the wise words  of Megarry,J  in the case of [John V Rees] [1970]  ch-345  at  402 that in the exercise if the discretion whether or not to grant stay, the court takes into accounts the needs of good administration.”

30. The above  position  was  appreciated  by Majanja  J in JR  139/2014 Vania Investments  Pool Ltd & Capital  Markets  Authority  & Others  in which the learned  judge stated:

“  I do  not read  the Court of Appeal  to be saying the court  should not  have  regard  to the facts if the case or  have at  best a cursory glance  at the arguments.

As I stated  in Ocean Freight  Transport  Company Limited vs  Purity  Gathoni and  Another  Nairobi HC Miscellaneous  Application JR  No.  249  of  2011 [2014] e KLR, in my view, the reference   to an arguable  case in W’a Njuguna’s  case is not   that the issue is  arguable  merely because one  party asserts  one  position  and the other  takes  a  contrary view.  The duty of the court to consider the facts is not lessened by the mere conclusion that the case if frivolous or that leave is underserved by examining the facts.  Indeed if  leave  was  to be considered  a matter of right  then the purpose  for which  leave us  required  would   be rendered  otiose.”

31. From the foregoing  case law  it is  established  that the grant  of leave to  commence  Judicial Review  proceedings  is not a mere formality  and that leave is not  granted  as a matter of course.  (See Sylvana Mpabwanayo Ntaryamira v Allen Waiyaki Gichuhi & Another [2016] e KLR per Odunga J.

32. The applicant  for leave is therefore under  an obligation to show  to the court that  he  has  a prima  facie  arguable  case  for grant  of leave.  Whereas he is not required at that stage  to go into  the  depths  of the application, he has  to show that he has  not come to court after  an inordinate delay  and  that the  application  is not  frivolous, malicious and  or futile.  The grant of leave being an exercise of discretion the conduct of the applicant must also be considered.

33. In this case,  the applicant  avers  that the  1st respondent  erred  in finding that  it has no jurisdiction to enforce  judgments of the High Court yet Section 49 of the Retirement Benefits  Authority Act  gives it  such mandate  to exercise  power  as  would the  High Court.  Secondly, that as the 1st respondent  had  passed  judgment and  ordered   the  2nd respondent to  pay the  applicant  his  unpaid  dues, the  2nd respondent cannot argue or  allege that  it  was  not part of the suit  and  that therefore the  same  decision in the  civil suit   does not  bind it. It was claimed that in any case, the 2nd respondent does not exist  without the  existence of  the Corporation which  was  the defendant   in  the civil  suit at  Nakuru.

34. It was submitted that the 1st respondent owes a legal duty to the applicant to make a decision that is not injurious  to the  applicant  to whom  the Tribunal  owes  a duty, as  long as  it is not  acting  beyond  its mandate.  That the 1st respondent acted in error for it to deny responsibility and hence it should be compelled to review its decision since the error is very apparent.

35. The  2nd  respondent  fully  supports the  position taken by   the  1st respondent Tribunal and so does the  3rd  respondent  Attorney General despite having no issue with leave being granted.

36. I have perused Section 49 of the Retirement Benefit Act and nowhere   does it confer   upon the Tribunal powers of the High Court.  The only mention of the High Court is Subsection (4) with regard to award of costs and the scale prescribed for suits in the High Court.  It therefore  follows that  there is no  arguable  case  with regard  to the claim that  the 1st respondent  erred in denying responsibility of enforcing  orders, judgments  and  decrees   of the High Court.

37. The section provides:

“49. Powers of Appeals Tribunal

(1) On the hearing of an appeal, the Tribunal shall have all the powers of a subordinate court of the first class to summon witnesses, to take evidence upon oath or affirmation and to call for the production of books and other documents.

(2) Where the Tribunal considers it desirable for the purpose of avoiding expense or delay or any other special reason so to do, it may receive evidence by affidavit and administer interrogatories and require the person to whom the interrogatories are administered to make a full and true reply to the interrogatories within the time specified by the Tribunal.

(3) In its determination of any matter, the Tribunal may take into consideration any evidence which it considers relevant to the subject of an appeal before it, notwithstanding that the evidence would not otherwise be admissible under the law relating to admissibility of evidence.

(4) The Tribunal shall have power to award the costs of any proceedings before it and to direct that costs shall be paid in accordance with any scale prescribed for suits in the High Court or to award a specific sum as costs.

(5) All summons, notices or other documents issued under the hand of the chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be issued by the Tribunal.

(6) Any interested party may be represented before the Tribunal by an advocate or by any other person whom the Tribunal may, in its discretion, admit to be heard on behalf of the party.

38. The powers of the Tribunal referred to above have nothing to do with exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court except as far as award of costs are concerned. Furthermore, the section is clear that the Tribunal shall exercise powers as those of the subordinate court as far as  the summoning of  witnesses, taking of evidence upon oath or affirmation and calling  for the production of books and other documents is concerned.

39. In addition, it is at section 51 of the Act where the Act makes it clear that:

“51. Costs

(1) Where the Tribunal awards costs in an appeal, it shall, on application by the person to whom the costs are awarded, issue to him a certificate stating the amount of the costs.

(2) Every certificate issued under subsection (1) may be filed in the High Court by the person in whose favour the costs have been awarded and upon being so filed, shall be deemed to be a decree of the High Court and may be executed as such:

Provided that an order for costs against the Government shall not be enforced save in the manner provided for by the Government Proceedings Act.”

40. It follows that the High Court is only referred to as far as the filing of costs awarded by the Tribunal are concerned, not implementation of decisions of the Tribunal.

41. Secondly, albeit  it is claimed  that the  1st respondent  erred  in finding that  the  2nd respondent  which  was not a party to the  civil case could not be bound by the High Court judgment, as it  paid to the applicant monies  following  the  judgment  of the  1st  respondent, this  court finds   that the attack  on the decision  of the  1st respondent is an attack on  the merits  thereof  and  not on the legality, irrationality/unreasonableness or procedural impropriety of the decisions or decision  making  process.  the  1st respondent  may have  erred in  law and  fact in  arriving  at the decision  that it  did.  However, that error can only be   corrected by an appellate court and not a court exercising Judicial Review jurisdiction.  As was held in Municipal Council of Mombasa vs Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd CANo.  185/2001 the Court of Appeal made it clears that:

“Judicial Review is concerned with the decision making  process, not with the  merits  of the decision  itself;  the court  would concern  itself  with such  issues  as to whether  the  decision makers  had the  jurisdiction, whether  the  persons  affected  by the decision   were heard   before it  was made  and  whether  in making  the decision  maker  took into  account relevant   matters or  did take  into account   irrelevant  matter.  The court should not act  as  a Court of Appeal  over the  decider which would involve going into the merits of the decision  itself  such as whether there  was or there  was not sufficient   evidence to  support  the decision .”

42. In this case, it has not  been demonstrated that prima  facie, the   1st respondent  in its   ruling  of  1st December  2016   acted contrary to the  rules of  natural justice or  acted  illegally, irrationally and  or with  procedural  impropriety.  What the applicant is seeking   to challenge is the merits s of the decision of the 1st respondent which does not warrant  this court’s intervention by way of Judicial Review. In EA Railways Corporation V Anthony Sefu.  Dar HCC 19/71 [1973] EA 327, the court held and I concur:

“ An  allegation that  a tribunal has misconstrued  the provision of the law  or  regulation  does not  entitle  the  court to  question  the decision  reached in Judicial Review proceedings.  Whereas that may be a ground for appeal, it does not amount to a ground for Judicial Review.  It ought  to  be appreciated  that there is   a  distinction  between taking  into account  relevant or  irrelevant   matters  which are   grounds  for  Judicial Review and merely misconstruing a statutory  provision or regulation which do not Ipso facto  constitute   grounds for  Judicial Review.

43. The applicant  wants this court to  determine  in the intended  motion,  whether  or not  the  1st respondent   erred in  law and  fact in refusing  to exercise   jurisdiction conferred  by  Section  49  of the Retirement  Benefits  Act  and  whether   or not  the  1st respondent   was  correct in  its  ruling that  the  2nd respondent  not being  a  party to the  Nakuru  HCC Civil suit   No.  204/2009 could be bound by that judgment of Maraga J (as he then was).  With utmost respect to the applicant, those issues are beyond the scope of Judicial Review.  They are matters which the court exercising appellate jurisdiction would, pursuant  to Section  78  of the Civil  Procedure Act, re-examine  and  re-evaluate and  reassess, based on the available  evidence   and  arrive at  the court’s  own independent  conclusion, by way of rehearing  of the case.

44. For the  above  reasons, I find  that this  application does not  raise an arguable  prima  facie  case for the court to  carry  out an  inquiry  into the  matters complained  of in the  application for  leave.

45. Accordingly, I find the application dated 1st December 2016 not merited.  I decline to grant it and dismiss it with no orders as to costs.

Dated, signed and delivered   in open court at Nairobi this 15th day of May 2017.

R. E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Maina for the applicant

N/A for respondents

CA: Mohamed