Francis Wachiuri Murage & Pwani United Builders v P G K & P M G [2016] KEHC 1210 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CIVIL APPEAL CASE NO.  32 OF 2009

FRANCIS WACHIURI MURAGE………..................................…………......1ST APPELLANT

PWANI UNITED BUILDERS ……………................................…………….2ND APPELLANT

VERSUS

P G K (minor suing  through) P M G (As next friend)……………………..RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises from the judgment and decree of Honourable Murigi (SRM) in Muranga CMCC NO. 402 of 2004 delivered on 17th December 2008.

2. The plaintiff in the lower court was P M G suing as next friend of P G K.  She is the respondent herein.

3. The respondent /plaintiff had sued  the appellants herein Francis Wachiuri Murage  and  Pwani  United  Buildersvide a plaint  dated  6th September  2004 and amended  on 29th May 2007  claiming  for general  damages  and  special   damages  arising  from  an alleged   road traffic accident which occurred  on 11th September 2011 along Kenol Sagana road, while the  respondent   was  travelling  as a passenger  in motor  vehicle  registration No. KAK 344F.

4. It  was alleged   by the respondent  that the driver  of the accident  motor vehicle negligently  drove,  managed  and or controlled  the  2nd appellant’s  motor  vehicle  registration  No. KAH 441U  as a result  of which it collided with  motor vehicle KAK 344F  as a consequence  of which the  plaintiff minor  was seriously  injured.   The injuries  sustained involved:

a) Cut wound on the left forehead and eyebrow.

b) Pelvic fractures involving left superior and inferior public ramii.

c) Fracture  of right olecranon –elbow

d) Blunt injuries over the abdomen with tenderness.

5. The  respondents  blamed  the 1st appellant  for the negligence  on account   that :-  he drove  the motor vehicle  KAH  441U  at excessive  speed   in the  circumstances;  failed  to keep any  proper  look out  or to have  any sufficient  regard for other  traffic  that  was  or might   reasonably  be expected on the road   and in particular the plaintiff’s motor vehicle  KAK  344F; failing to give  any or any adequate  warning of  his approach; failing  to stop, to  slow down, to  swerve  or in any  way  so  manage  or control –the  said motor vehicle  so as to  avoid  the collision; causing  the  said  accident; failing to  obey  the Highway Code;  and also  relied on the doctrine  of  Res ipsa  loquitur.

6. The appellants  herein filed  a defence  to the plaintiff’s claim  denying  the claim  and contending  that the respondent  allowed an  unlicensed  driver to driver motor vehicle  KAK  344F; driving  KAK 344F in an excessive speed; attempting  to overtake  without  ascertaining  the safety  of so doing   and   failing    to heed the   lawful presence of other  vehicles on the road  more particularly KAH  441U.

7. This being a first appeal, this court is obliged to abide by the provisions of Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act to re evaluate and re examine the lower court record and the evidence before it and arrive at its own independent conclusion.  This principle of law was well settled in the case of Selle – Vs – Associated Motor boat Co. Ltd (1968) EA 123where Sir Clement De Lestangstated that:

“This court must consider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though in doing so it should always bear in mind that it neither heard witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect.  However, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he had clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hammad Sarif – Vs – Ali Mohammed Solan (1955, 22 EACA 270).”

8. And in the case of Mbogo – Vs – Shah & Another (1968) EA 93, the court set out circumstances under which an appellate court may interfere with a decision of the trial court as follows:-

“I think it is well settled that this court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the inferior court unless it is satisfied that the decision is clearly wrong because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters on which it should not have acted or because it has failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into account and consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion.”

9. Applying the above principles to this case, and reviewing the evidence in the lower court, the plaintiff/respondent testified  before the trial magistrate and stated on oath  that  her minor son P G  K  then aged  5 years and  3 months  old   was  with her  in the accident  motor vehicle.  He was seated behind.

10. As the issue of   liability was determined in CMCC 402/2004 the next friend plaintiff did not testify in the trial record on how the accident occurred since CMCC No.  402/2004  had been  selected  as a test  suit on liability and in that matter  liability   was determined, and a  finding  of the appellants herein  liable  100%  was reached.

11. The trial  magistrate  in this  case therefore  only assessed damages  for the injuries  sustained  after   adopting  judgment  on liability  in CMCC  402/2004.

12. The plaintiff testified that the minor suffered injuries involving a fracture and a cut on the fore face and his pelvis was injured.  She showed to the court the visible injuries.  He  was  admitted  at Jamii  Hospital  at Karatina and  moved to Avenue  Nursing  Home  the following  day.

13. He remained admitted in hospital for 2 weeks.  The plaintiff produced discharge summary, P3 form and medical reports by Dr Maina Kigo and Dr R.P Shah.  That the minor had not fully recovered because he complained of numbness in his legs.  He also suffered trauma.  He also lost his brother in the accident and that his mother; the next friend hereto too suffered   serious injuries.

14. In cross examination by Ms Gichohi, the plaintiff responded that the minor fractured his right hand and that he had no proper control of his hand.

15. However, as the issue of liability is also raised in this case, it is important to review the evidence as adduced in the test case matter In CMCC 402/2004 where the issue of liability   was determined since that was a test suit. The plaintiff testified that they were passengers in KAK 344F heading towards Kagumo. As the vehicle was going downhill at Kambiti area, a vehicle from Nyeri direction tried to overtake others and in the process, hit motor vehicle Registration No. KAK 441U hit KAK 334F at the door behind the driver.  The plaintiff in that suit further testified that KAH 441U was being driven at a high speed and therefore she blamed its driver for the accident.  Further, that the driver of KAK 334F was charged at Kagumo Law Courts but was acquitted of a traffic offence. She produced court proceedings from Kagumo Law Courts to show that indeed, the driver of KAK 334F was acquitted.

16. The appellants herein never adduced any evidence in the test suit and in CMCC 404/2004 to challenge the respondent’s testimony on how the material accident occurred.

17. trial  magistrate  found that the  appellants  were  wholly  liable  for the  accident  on the  evidence  adduced.  Further, that although the appellants had enjoined a third party, they did not adduce any evidence to prove negligence against the said third party.

18. In CMCC 404/2004 which is the subject of  this appeal, the trial  magistrate  after  adopting the judgment on liability in CMCC 402/2004  and considering  evidence on the  injuries sustained by the  respondent, relying  on several  cited  authorities, awarded the plaintiff kshs 400,000/- general  damages  plus costs  and interest.

19. It is the  above judgment  and  decree which  provoked  this appeal by the appellants who were the defendants in the trial court challenging the decision of the trial magistrate vide the Memorandum of Appeal  dated  2nd February  2009, which sets out three main grounds of appeal namely:

1. That the learned trial magistrate  erred in law and in fact  in finding  the defendants  100% liable for causing the accident  and in failing  to apportion  liability between  the defendants and the third party.

2. That the learned  trial magistrate  erred in law and in fact in  assessing general damages at kshs 400,000 for the plaintiff considering the injuries pleaded and proved, the same was manifestly excessive in the circumstances.

3. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider or have sufficient   regard to the submissions filed on the appellant’s behalf.

20. The appellants  prayed for  apportionment  of liability  and setting  aside of  judgment  on general  damages  and special  damages under  the Fatal Accidents Act  and the Law  Reform  Act  and  or that  quantum  be set  aside and   be substituted  with an award  that is  commensurate with the nature of the  injuries sustained  by the respondent.

21. In this appeal, both parties’ advocates agreed to dispose of the appeal by   way of written submissions.   The appellants filed theirs on 8th April 2015 and submitted on both issues of liability and quantum.

22. On liability, it   was contended  that in the test suit  vide CMCC 402/2004  the trial magistrate  erred in law   and fact   in failing  to consider  evidence  showing that  the accident    was caused  by the negligence  of  the third party  as he  was   the one   charged with the offence of causing  death by  dangerous driving  while  the appellant’s  driver   has never been charged  with any  traffic offence.  Further, that although   the third party driver was not convicted, PW6 PC No. 39842 Ismael Odeny inTraffic case no.  2489/2001(sic) at Kigumo testified that he blamed the third party.

23. The appellant’s counsel  also  submitted that the  respondent  herein had testified   that it  is the third party  driver  who had  swerved and hit  the appellant’s  motor vehicle  and that  it   was the third  party who encroached  on the lane  of the appellant’s  driver   thus causing   the accident.  That the  respondent’s  version of how  the  accident occurred  was contradictory  and that  therefore  liability  should   have been  attached  to the third   party  at 100%.

24. Reliance   was placed on Wainaina  Nganga  Gakuu V Jael Oduor  & 3 Others [2008] e KLR  where  the court held  that  the trial  court erred  in failing to consider  evidence  contained in  the police file which established  on a balance  of  probabilities  that the fourth respondent  third party  was the culprit   in the causation of the accident   by his careless manner  of driving   which led  to his vehicle   veering  into  the wrong   side  of the road  and  into the path of  the  appellant’s vehicle.

25. The appellants further contended that the trial magistrate   should, in the alternative, have   apportioned liability equally between the appellant’s driver and the third party   driver.

26. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Lakhanshi Vs Attorney  General [1971]  EA page  120 where  Lutta JA  cited  with approval  the judgment  of Lord Denning in Baker V market Harborough  Industrial Co-operative Society  Ltd  [1953]that :

“  in a situation where  a  collision had occurred, and  it  was not reasonably  possible   on the evidence   adduced to  decide  who was  to blame, that  liability  should  be apportioned  at  50:50 %  as between  the two motor  vehicles.”

27. In her submissions filed in court on 17th April 2015 the respondent urged the court   to uphold the decision   of the trial magistrate on liability.  It  was submitted that  although  the appellants blame the third party for the accident, the appellants did not  call any evidence  to rebut  the respondent’s claim  and neither  did they adduce  any evidence to prove   the liability   or contribution  of the third  party hence  they cannot   at this stage  be heard  to  seek apportionment  of liability.

28. On the second  ground touching   on general  damages  of kshs  400,000/- It  was submitted that the trial magistrate   was correct   in assessing  damages  the way  she did  owing  to the serious  injuries   sustained  by the  minor.  The respondent urged the court   to uphold   the judgment of the trial court and dismiss this appeal.

29. The respondent’s counsel simply reproduced   submissions in HCCA 30/2009 and filed them herein which submissions I find do not concern this case.

30. The third party Joseph Thiongo Chege filed his submissions on 28th April 2015.  It was submitted that only the 1st appellant instituted third party proceedings.  That  at the   hearing, only   the respondent  in Muranga  CM CC  402/2004  adduced  evidence  to prove  negligence  of  the appellants.  That  the appellants never adduced  any  evidence  to prove the  negligence  of the third party  hence the court could not have apportioned  liability  against the third  party  who, it  was  not proved contributed  in any  way to  the occurrence  of the accident.

31. Reliance  was placed  on Francis  Munyua Wanyoike V Sobhagchand Gosar Shah [1999]  e KLR  HCC 2283  of  1995  where Angawa J  stated that:

“I believe that the defendant has a good defence namely, that the 3rd party   was an unauthorized   driver.  But it is not good enough to state this in the defence.  This allegation must be proved….”

32. The third  party maintained  that the onus  of proving  negligence of the third party lay with  the  1st appellant and that in this case no evidence was adduced  against him   hence the allegations remained mere allegations  which  were never  substantiated. The third   party urged this court to uphold the judgment and decree of the trial   magistrate and dismiss this appeal with costs.

33. In the present case, it must  be made  clear that  in the lower court, in the test suit CMCC 402/2004, the  appellants, despite  enjoining a third party, a Mr Joseph Thiongo  Chege and pleading  that  the third party was wholly  to blame  for the material accident, the  appellants  herein  chose to close their  case without calling any witness to controvert   the  respondent’s  evidence  that the third party driver was  to blame for the  accident, or to prove  that it  was  infact  the third  party who was  wholly  to blame for  the accident or that it substantially contributed  to the occurrence of the material  accident, or  what measures  the  1st  appellant   who was the  driver of he  blamed  motor vehicle  undertook  to  avoid  the said accident.

34. Although Sections  107-109 of the  Evidence Act   are clear   that he who  alleges  must   prove, and therefore  in this case  the respondent  claimant was under  a duty to prove  the negligence  of the appellants,  equally, it  was upon the   appellants  to prove that   the third party   was wholly  to blame   or substantially to blame for the material  accident.

35. In addition it is  a presumption of the law that  a party who has  in his/her  possession evidence   which he fails to  adduce, that  evidence is   presumed  to  have been  adverse  to him.

36. In the   instant case, the appellants only laid claim against the   third party   but opted not to testify to prove the third party’s   liability. Neither did they controvert the respondent’s   testimony as to how the accident occurred.

37. It has been held severally that answers in cross examination do not build a party’s defence.  A party must   adduce evidence to rebut the adverse party’s evidence. Further, that pleadings and submissions are not evidence.

38. In this case, the appellants denied the plaintiff’s claim and shifted blame to the third party.  The appellants neither called evidence to controvert   the plaintiff’s testimony nor called evidence to prove their claim against the third party.  In other words, what was in the appellants’ defence and claim against the third party remained mere allegations devoid of proof.

39. The  consequences  of failure  to furnish  evidence  in rebuttal was canvassed in Karuru Munyoro V Joseph Nduma  Murage  & Another [Nyeri HCC 95/1988] by Makhandia  J (as he then was) as  follows:

“ the  plaintiff proved on a  balance of probabilities  that she  was  entitled  to the orders  sought in the plaint and  in the absence of the defendants, and  their counsel  to cross examine her on the evidence, the plaintiff’s evidence remained  unchallenged  and  uncontroverted.  It was this credible and it is kind of evidence that a  court of law   should be able  to act upon.”

40. Odunga  J in Linus  Nganga  Kiongo  &  3 Others V town  Council of  Kikuyu[2012] e KLR  stated:

“ what are the consequences of a party failing  to adduce  evidence?  In the case of Mole  Knit wear  Ltd V Gopitex    Knitwear Mills  Ltd  Nairobi   HCC  384/2002 Lessit J  citing  Autar Sigh  Bahra  & Another V Raju  Govindji  HCC  548/98 stated:

“ Although  the defendant has denied  liability  in an amended  defence  and counterclaim, no  witness  was called  to give  evidence  on his  behalf.  That  means that  not only  does the  defence rendered by the1st plaintiff’s  case stand  unchallenged  but also  that the claims made  by the defendant  in his defence  and counterclaim must fail.”

41. In  Trust  Bank Ltd  V Paramount  Universal  Bank  Ltd  & 2 Others  Nairobi  HCC 1243/2001  it  was  held that:

“ It is  trite  that  where  a party  fails  to call evidence  in support of its case, that party’s pleadings  remain mere  statements of fact  since in  so doing  the party fails  to  substantiate  its pleadings.  In the  same vein  the failure to adduce any  evidence means   that the evidence   adduced by  the plaintiff against them is uncontroverted and unchallenged.”

42. In the instant case,  it  was not contended that the  respondent’s   evidence  was  conjecture.  The plaintiff was an eyewitness  to  the material  accident. She  testified  as to what  she  saw  and heard.  There   were   no obscure  circumstances which would justify a contrary finding  or apportionment  of liability between  the appellant  and  the third party.

43. Although  it  was  contended   that  the third   party  driver  was charged  in Kagumo  traffic  court  with causing  death   by dangerous  driving, the proceedings   showed that  he  was not convicted.  Further, although   it is submitted  that the  prosecution witness  PC Ismael  blamed the third  party, the court  exonerated  the third party driver from criminal liability.

44. The appellants   herein did not  make any  effort to adduce  any evidence   to prove  otherwise  since the  standard  of proof  in criminal  cases is higher  than the   standard  of proof  required  in civil cases.

45. Nothing prevented  the appellant  from adducing   evidence  to prove  the liability  or contribution of the  third party  to the   material  accident.

46. Section  112  of the Evidence  Act Cap 80 Laws of Kenya   is clear that:

“ when  any  fact is  especially within the knowledge  of  any  party to those  proceedings, the burden  of proving or disproving   that fact is upon him.”

47. In the instant  case, if it    was within  the knowledge  and conviction   of the appellants that the third  party  was   wholly  to blame  for the accident  or that  it  substantially  contributed  to the occurrence  of the accident, then it   was  incumbent upon the  appellants  to adduce  evidence to prove  that   liability  or the  extent  of the third party’s  contribution to the occurrence of the material accident, on a balance   of probabilities.

48. The  1st  appellant   who was  the driver   of the offending   motor vehicle   would   have been the most crucial  witness  as he  would have  given direct  evidence  on the events  that took place that  material  day  of the accident  giving   rise to these  proceedings.  The occurrence of the accident is not denied. The appellant’s driver would have been in a better position to tell the trial court what happened and why. Pleadings that deny negligence are not evidence of  being blameless. Evidence must be adduced. In the  absence  of that evidence of the driver  of the accident motor vehicle to shed  light  on what  the appellants claim  was an accident  solely  caused by the third party, this court   finds that  the trial  magistrate   did not  err in  CMCC 402/2004  when she  found that   the appellants were  wholly  to blame  for the material accident  at  100%   jointly  and severally. I therefore uphold the trial magistrate’s finding and decision and dismiss the challenge by the appellants herein on liability.

49. In my  humble view, the case of Baker Vs Market   Harborough Industrial Corporation Societyis only applicable   where  there  is a   collision  and it  was   not reasonably  possible  on  evidence  to decide  who was  to blame.  In the instant case, it  was possible, on  evidence adduced by the respondent, and which  evidence  was not  rebutted, that the appellants  herein  were to  blame for  the accident.

50. Furthermore, although  the  appellants complain that the trial  magistrate did not  rely  on the  traffic  proceedings, it is clear from the evidence  that the  third party  driver  in the traffic  proceedings  was acquitted and   in the absence  of any evidence  in this  case by   the appellants  to establish a prima facie  case against the third party on a balance of probabilities, the allegations that the  third party was to blame remained just allegations which were never substantiated (see Francis Munyua  Wanyoike V Sobhagchand  Gosar  Shah (supra)  case.

51. I  would, in this case, without  hesitation agree with Mabeya   J in  HCCA  30/2009  where  he relied on Janet  Kaphiphine  Ouma & Another V Marie Stopes  International (K)  HCC 68/2007  by Abida  Aroni J that:

“In this matter, apart from filing the statement of defence the defendant did not   adduce any evidence in support of assertion made therein.  The evidence   of the  1st  plaintiff and   that of the  witness  remain  uncontroverted and  the statement  in the defence   therefore remains mere  allegations……Sections  107 and  108  of the Evidence Act  are clear  that he  who asserts  or pleads  must support the same by way of evidence.”

52. I am  further in total agreement  with the  respondent’s  and   third party’s submissions that in the absence of any  evidence   to rebut  the respondent’s  evidence, it  follows that the respondent, on the  evidence   I have  reviewed, proved  her case  against the appellants on a balance of probabilities.  Accordingly, I find  that the   trial court   was correct  in finding  the appellant  100% liable   jointly and severally since they   did not  adduce  any  evidence   to shift  blame onto  the third  party.

53. There is  absolutely  no basis in case, upon which  I can interfere  with the  finding of the trial  court  to apportion liability at 50:50%  since  no such   basis  was laid  by the appellants  by way of evidence in the trial court.

54. On the ground that the  learned  trial magistrate   erred in law and  fact in assessing  general damages  at shs  400,000  it  was  submitted by the appellant’s counsel that the  trial magistrate  relied on a medical report of Dr Maina  Ruga  dated  5th July  2004  about  2 years  from the date  of the alleged  injury.  Reliance   was placed  on Susan  Wangu Ngugi V Nganga  Thuku   and Edward Mbugua Kungu  HCC  455/2001   where the  plaintiff  sustained  fracture   of the pelvic with  rapture of the urinary  bladder, fracture  of three  ribs  and  fracture  of  the right   collar  bone  and  was  awarded kshs 200,000 general damages.

55. Further  reliance    was placed on Patrick  Muchangi  Ngoroi V David Gitau  and Another  Nairobi HCC  950/2002 where Angawa J on 27th April  2004 awarded  shs  200,000 general damages  for a cut  wound on the head  and fracture  of the left   pelvis   to both pubic  ramii and for pain  and suffering  (sic).

56. The  appellants s  urged this  court to  consider the  warning  by the Court of Appeal  against high awards  in the  case of Kigarari V A. Mary  Arya (1982-88) 1 KARwhere  Nyarangi  JA  at page  770  stated:

“……..As large   amounts are awarded  they are   passed on  to members of the public, the  vast  majority  of whom  cannot   just afford  the burden, in the  form of increased costs  for insurance cover  ( in the  case of accident  cases) or increased fees……”

57. The above  warning, it  was  submitted, was  echoed in Tayab  V Kananu [1982-88] 1KAR 90 that:-

“ ……if the   sums get too  large, we are  in danger   of injurying  the body  politic….as  large  sums  are awarded  so do  premiums  for insurance  rise  higher  and higher.  The appellants  urges the court  to find  that a  shs  150,000 general damages   award  would be  fair  and  just  compensation for the injuries  suffered   by the plaintiff/respondent.”

58. In  a rejoinder  on the issue  of  quantum of damages, the respondent  maintained that  the award by  the trial magistrate   was commensurate with the injuries sustained  by the respondent  minor  and   urged this court  to uphold   the award  made by the trial magistrate.

59. My determination  of this issue  of   quantum  of damages  is that  an  assessment of damages  is a matter of judicial discretion  which can only  be interfered  with by  an  appellate  court if it is  shown that   the trial magistrate  acted on wrong principles  of law or misapprehended  the facts or made  a wholly  erroneous  estimate  of the damages.  This is  a principle of law espoused  in many cases  including Loice Wanjiu  Kagunda V Julius  Gachau  Mwangi CA 142  of  2003  where  the Court of Appeal  stated that:

“ we  appreciate  that the  assessment of  damages  is more  like an  exercise  of judicial  discretion and hence, an appellate  court should not  interfere  with an  award of damages  unless  is it satisfied  that the judge  acted  on wrong   principles   of law  of  had misapprehended the facts or has for those or other reasons made  a wholly  erroneous  estimate  of the damages  suffered.  The  question is not  what the appellate  court  would award  but whether the lower court acted on the wrong   principles( see Mariga  V Musila [1984] KLR 257. ”

60. Applying  the above principles  to this   appeal, the appellant’s  ground  No. 3   was that the award of  kshs   400,000  was manifestly excessive  considering  the injuries   pleaded  and  proved.  In their  submissions, the  appellants  cited several  decisions wherein the Court of Appeal  has warned  against  high awards.  I am   in total  agreement with those  decisions  that  warn  courts against making  high and   unjustified  awards.

61. Awards of general  damages  should indeed  be commensurate  with the injuries   sustained, having  regard to past decisions  and inflation, albeit no two cases can  be the  same.

62. In the instant case, the trial magistrate  in awarding  kshs   400,000 general damages, I note  that the  respondent  had sought  for  shs  700,000  relying  on Machakos HCC  1998/97 Caleb  Otieno  Omondi  V James  Mutua  Mulinge  & Another  where the plaintiff sustained   fractures  of the pelvis, shock  and  concussion, injuries   to the  abdomen  and  fracture  of  the left ribs, and Nakuru  HCC  161/2001 Peter  Njuguna(suing for Hanna  Gathoni Nganga) V Franco  Paglabia  & Another where the   plaintiff  sustained injuries to the right  and inferior  pubic ramii, head  injuries  with  concussion  and  soft  injuries  among  others. In both  cases  the plaintiffs   were awarded  kshs  600,000 general damages.

63. The appellants on the other hand  had submitted  for an award  of kshs   160,000/- based  on the decisions of  James Njuguna  Nderitu  V Elijah  Mulinge  & Another  HCC 1332/90  where the  plaintiff  aged  27 years  sustained  a  fracture  of the right elbow and bruising  of the forehead, bruising of  the right shoulder and right hand.  The fracture  was immobilized  for 2  months.  The  elbow  had healed well  but the  plaintiff who was a  bus conductor  was still unable  to carry heavy  things  with his  right hand and  there  was  restriction in the  rotation  movements   although flexion  was normal, full range and  painless.  He  was awarded shs  150,000 general damages  for pain  and suffering  and loss of  amenities.  They also  relied on Zipporrah Wambui  Kibi V Joseph Bett  Karogo HCC  607/96  where  the  plaintiff  sustained  fracture  of the third  metacarpal bone  of the right hand, superficial   skin injuries  on the  left leg  and contusion to the  back, shs  150,000 general damages  was awarded.

64. The trial  magistrate considered  all the decisions   cited by both the parties’ advocates before arriving at her decision.  The plaintiff/respondent was aged  about  6 years  at the  time of the accident.  The discharge summary  shows several  injuries  including fractures.  The P3 form was also filled on 21st April  2004  about  3 years after the accident  and shows  a tear on the right  eyebrow,  a fracture  of the right  pubic  ramus   and fracture  of left  olecranon-elbow.  The  medical report  by Dr  Maina Karuga  dated  5th July 2004  summed up the respondent minor’s injuries  as pleaded  namely:

i. Cut wound  on the left  forehead and eyebrow.

ii. Pelvic fractures involving left  superior   and inferior  pubic  ramii.

iii. Fracture  of  right  olecranon-elbow

iv. Blunt   injuries  over  the abdomen  with tenderness.

65. The fractured olecranon-elbow was treated through open  reduction.  The wound on the forehead  was satured  and he  was   put on  antibiotics, analgesics  and bed rest.  He remained in hospital  from 11th September 2001  -20th September  2001.  Three years  after the accident  in 2004,  on being  examined, he  complained   of  numbness of walking for long.  He  had a scar   on the left    side extending  to the eyebrow   5cm.  He also  had a scar  over the  posterior aspect of the right elbow  measuring 8cm and movements were normal.  He had no pain or tenderness  in the pelvis  and he walked  normally.  He had suffered  a temporary  incapacity  for  3 months.

66. On the  other hand   the medical  report by Dr R.P. Shah  dated  10th January  2006 confirmed  the  injuries   and the only complaint  was numbness  of legs  on walking  although  the Doctor  concluded   that  in view of the  fact that the respondent minor had  completely  healed, there  was no  cause for   the numbness  of legs.

67. On the  injuries  sustained, although Dr Maina  stated   that there   was fracture  of left   superior  and  inferior   pubic  ramii, the  medical report  by Dr. R.P. Shah   omitted  the double   fracture   which is  apparent   in the discharge  summary  from Avenue  Hospital  that  the X ray  showed  Lt  Superior/inferior  pubic ramus.

68. In other words, I find that the  medical report  by Dr  R. P Shah underestimated  the injuries  sustained  by the plaintiff/respondent minor  especially   on the fracture  of the superior/inferior  pubic ramii.  Nonetheless, it be  appreciated  that the  latter Dr. R.P Shah  examined the plaintiff  about  2  years after the first examination  by Dr Maina  and almost   4 years  after the accident.

69. The trial  magistrate  in her judgment  considered  the evidence  on record  and  the injuries   suffered  by the plaintiff  minor.  She had  the opportunity   to hear the  witness first hand  and see the minor.  I  did not.  That being the case, I do not   find any reason why  I should  interfere with the judicial  discretion  of the trial magistrate as it   has not been demonstrated  that she  acted on wrong  principles or that she failed to consider factors  applicable   in awarding  general  damages.  In addition, I do not  find that  the award of shs  400,000 made  was   excessively  or manifestly   high in the circumstances as at 2009 when judgment was  delivered, since the award was, in my view, commensurate with the injuries sustained by the respondent minor in the comparable cases cited by the respondent’s counsel.  In my humble view, the authorities cited by the appellant’s were not commensurate with the injuries sustained by the minor as compared to the authorities cited by the respondent’s counsel. The authorities cited by the appellants, the injuries sustained were not as serious as those sustained by the minor respondent.

70. Accordingly, I dismiss the ground of appeal on quantum   of damages and sustain the award of shs 400,000 awarded by the trial court.

71. In the end, I find that the appeal herein is without   any merit both on liability and on quantum of damages.  I dismiss this appeal and   uphold the judgment and decree of the trial magistrate both on liability and on quantum of damages.

72. I award to the respondent costs of the appeal to be   paid by the appellants.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 28th July 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Abok h/b for Mereka for the Appellants

Mr Njagi h/b for Mrs Kiarie for the Respondent

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