CATHERINE ADJABENG VRS FRANK BOATENG (C5/1/09) [2022] GHACC 337 (6 October 2022)

CORAM: HER HONOUR BERTHA ANIAGYEI (MS) SITTING AT THE CIRCUIT COURT ‘B’ OF GHANA HELD AT TEMA ON THURSDAY, 6TH OCTOBER, 2022 CATHERINE ADJABENG - PETITIONER SUIT NO. C5/1/09 VRS FRANK BOATENG - RESPONDENT --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------- JUDGMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Both parties to this action acted through their lawful attorneys. The petitioner presented the petition through her lawful attorney and the respondent answered through his lawful attorney. Although matrimonial matters are in personam and in divorce proceedings, it is desirable to have the parties themselves testify, the law is clear that a party need not testify in his own case. Atuguba JSC (As he then was) in the case of Musama Disco Christo Church v. Prophet Miritaiah Jona Jehu-Appiah, Civil Appeal No. J4/31/2012, dated 11th November 2015, (Unreported) decided: ‚I thought that the law has always been that any competent person with knowledge of the subject-matter could give evidence for a party. And if it is the party himself who has tasked a knowledgeable person to testify for and on his behalf, nobody else has the right to challenge that. In other words, I have always thought that the party to a case has full liberty to decide who should talk for him. . . . all the decided cases make it clear that a party need not testify by himself.‛ I would now proceed to the petition. The petitioner in her petition presented to this Court on the 16th day of January, 2009, prayed the court to dissolve the marriage between her and the respondent. She further sought a declaration that the landed property identified as plots No 12 and 29 and measuring 70* 200 situate and lying at Jerusalem, Afienya is the joint property of the parties in equal shares. She also sought Page 1 of 20 for the relief of financial provision and that the respondent’s share of the aforesaid plots be given to her as the financial provision claimed in her third relief. Finally, she prayed that the respondent be ordered to pay costs incidental to this suit. In his answer, the respondent cross petitioned for a formal declaration that the marriage was dissolved in 2002, an order for the property at Afienya to be shared by giving the respondent 2/3 and the petitioner 1/3, the property at Somanya be shared equally among the parties, that the petitioner refunds to the respondent the value of the building materials and the deep freezer sold out by the family of the petitioner and for each party to bear their own costs in the proceedings. UNDISPUTED FACTS There is no dispute that the parties to this action celebrated their marital union under customary law in 1996. There is also no dispute that prior to the celebration of their union, they represented themselves as a couple for several years with the full knowledge of their family. Although the respondent was resident in Italy, he always stayed with the petitioner in her home whenever he returned to the country and his daughter who is the respondent’s attorney in this case, used to live with the petitioner even though the parties were not married. The petitioner finally joined the respondent in Italy in 1994 and they celebrated their customary marriage in 1996. The parties are at idem that a piece of land at Afienya was acquired for the purpose of constructing their matrimonial home. It was the brothers of the petitioner who acquired the land on behalf of the parties. That they both returned to Ghana from Italy in the year 2001 with the intention of relocating to America. By which time the block works for the matrimonial home- a four bedroom house had been completed. Page 2 of 20 At the time of their return home, the cloth that held and fastened their marriage together was tearing apart at the seams and so they did not live together in Ghana. The respondent left for the U. S. A in the year 2001 and the petitioner also did same in 2002. They have since lived separate lives in the U. S. A. This is as far as the parties agree. THE CASE OF THE PETTIONER In the evidence in chief of petitioner attorney, she says that she began working as a seamstress when she arrived in Italy. Later on, she had a job as a factory hand. That they operated a joint account with the sole aim of pulling their resources together to build their matrimonial home. That the respondent had exclusive access and control over the said account and all her earnings were handed over to the respondent to deposit in the said joint account. She tendered in evidence EXHIBIT C series as proof of her income. That the respondent refused to let her know what was happening to the said joint account and did not disclose his own contributions to same. She continued that she had her own reservations as to how much the respondent contributed to the joint account and since he failed to show her any evidence of his contribution, she contends that the majority if not all the money that was used to acquire their matrimonial home were from her earnings which she handed over to the respondent. She tendered in evidence EXHIBIT B series as photographs of the said matrimonial home in its uncompleted state. She denies that their customary marriage was dissolved in 2002. THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENT According to the respondent, between the year 1994-1997 when the petitioner joined him in Italy, she was not working due to the language barrier. He continues that they Page 3 of 20 operated a joint account between 1997 and 1999 when the said account was rendered inactive. That he solely acquired the land on which the matrimonial home is situated in 1994 when he was not married to the petitioner. That it was the brother of the petitioner who acquired the land on his behalf and without his consent, added the name of the petitioner to the documentation. He tendered same in evidence as EXHIBIT 2. That he returned to Ghana in 1999 to realize that all moneys sent to Ghana to the petitioner’s brothers for the construction of the building had been used for other purposes. That from then, no work was carried it on the house until 2006 that he the respondent sent money to Ghana for the roofing of the house. He continued that 2/3rd of the amount expended on the building was contributed by him. He tendered in evidence EXHIBIT 3 and 4 series as proof of the amounts he spent on completing the property. That the customary marriage was dissolved in 2002 and he informed the petitioner of this. She however doubted his intentions and requested that the drinks be sent formally to her and he did so. He attached EXHIBIT 5 as proof of the receipt covering the said sent drinks. That the dissolution of the customary marriage was done by two of his brothers and his attorney and the senior brother of the petitioner; Davis Adjabeng. That the petitioner has since changed her name from Catherine Boateng to her maiden name Catherine Adjabeng and all her immigration files no longer bear his name. That as further confirmation of the dissolution of their marriage, when the petitioner’s mother died in 2009, neither he nor his family were informed formally as in laws per the requirements of Krobo custom. Petitioner appeared to have abandoned his third and fourth reliefs as he only prayed for a formal declaration that the marriage was dissolved in 2002, an order for the property at Afienya to be shared by giving the respondent 2/3 and the petitioner 1/3 and for each party to bear their own costs in suits. Page 4 of 20 At the close of pleadings, the issues for the court to determine are; 1. Whether or not the customary marriage celebrated between the parties has been dissolved customarily 2. If not, whether or not the marriage between the parties has broken down beyond reconciliation 3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled an equal or 1/3 share of the matrimonial home at Afienya 4. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to respondent’s share of the matrimonial home at Afienya as financial settlement 1. Whether or not the customary marriage celebrated between the parties has been dissolved customarily On issue one, it is trite that it is he who asserts who bears the burden of proof. Whereas the petitioner claims that the customary marriage celebrated between she and the respondent still subsists, the respondent denies same and says that the said marriage has been dissolved. As it is he who is making, the claim, he bears the burden of leading positive evidence to establish the existence of his claim in the mind of the court. Gbadegbe JSC in Sagoe v. SSNIT [2011] 30 GMJ 133; [2012] 52 GMJ 47 at 58 held: ‚The party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the incidence of the legal burden…‛ Such evidence must not only be cogent and positive, but must be sufficient to establish his claim on a balance of probabilities. See the case of Nortey v. African Institute of Journalism and Communication [2014] 77 GMJ 1 at 30 in which Akamba JSC stated that ‚This Court pointed out in Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd. [2010] SCGLR [2011] 31 GMJ Page 5 of 20 174 the various methods of producing evidence which includes the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal or court.‛ According to the respondent, upon his instructions, four of his family members, two male and two female; with one of the females being the attorney, went to the senior brother of the petitioner sometime in 2002 to dissolve the customary marriage. It was to this same senior brother that the customary marriage rites were performed in 1996. Respondent’s only witness testified and said in 2002, upon the instructions of the respondent, he sent a message to Davis Adjabeng who was then living at Tema community 11, to arrange for the dissolution of the traditional marriage. That the said Davis Adjabeng was the senior brother of the petitioner and as her father was dead as at the time of the marriage, it was to the said senior brother that the marriage rites were performed as the petitioner is a Krobo and Krobo’s are patrilineal. He continued that Davis Adjabeng later invited him for the marriage between the parties to be dissolved and on the appointed day, he went with some family members including respondent’s attorney to dissolve the marriage. That because there is no marriage between the parties, when the petitioner’s mother died recently, they were not informed or invited to the funeral to perform the necessary customary rites as demanded by Krobo custom. He maintained his story under vigorous cross examination by learned counsel for the petitioner. I generally found him to be a truthful witness who was in Court to speak the truth as to what he knew. At pages 81-82 of the record of proceedings; Page 6 of 20 Q: You also claim in paragraph 7 of your evidence in chief you stated that the respondent informed you to arrange with petitioner’s family for the dissolution of their marriage. A: That is not so. He rather called me to say that he had spoken to his in-law and that he would have one of the family members by name Ray Boateng to direct myself and my junior brother to the family house of the petitioner to dissolve the marriage. So we come to see Ray and she took us to Davis Agyabeng’s house and we delivered the drink to dissolve the marriage. Q: So it is your case that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent was dissolved on 2002. Not so. A: Yes My Lord. We sent the drinks in 2002. Q: Can you tell the court which month of 2002 you and your entourage went to dissolve the marriage. A: It has been sometime and so I have forgotten. It is about 21 years now and so I cannot recall. Q: You see, you cannot remember because there was no such dissolution of the marriage. A: We presented the drinks to them. Q: And it is also your case that you presented the drinks with your team to only Davis Agyabeng. A: That is so. We handed it to him because he is the one we know as our in-law. Q: So are you saying it is against the Krobo custom to have gone to see only one person from the petitioner’s family without any witness to dissolve the marriage. A: We called him earlier about our coming and so I cannot tell whether he had informed any other members of the family. Page 7 of 20 The petitioner on her part denies that this customary dissolution ever took place. Petitioner’s attorney under cross examination by learned counsel for the respondent, at page 26 of the record of proceedings, answered that it was to Davis Adjabeng that the marriage rites of petitioner to the respondent was performed to; Q: You would agree with me that the marriage rites for the petitioner were performed to Davis Agyabeng who inherited petitioner’s father? A: Yes, please From the evidence, the said Davis Adjabeng passed on in 2013. That would mean he was very much alive in 2002. Also at page 27 of the record of proceedings; Q: You would also agree with me that after petitioner was married, her name was Catherine Boateng? A: She was writing both Adjabeng and Boateng. Q: When petitioner travelled to Italy, she went with the name Catherine Boateng. Is A: Q: A: Q: that correct? Yes. You would also agree with me that the petitioner is currently known as Catherine Adjabeng? Yes please. I am suggesting to you that after the divorce in 2002, the petitioner changed her name from Catherine Boateng to Catherine Adjabeng? A: That is so, but it is not because the marriage is dissolved. However, when they were returning from Italy, they had some misunderstanding, so she started writing Adjabeng. Petitioner’s mother died in 2009. Correct? Yes. Q: A: Q: Was the respondent informed about that fact in accordance with Krobo custom? Page 8 of 20 A: Yes please. Q: Was the respondent made to perform the necessary customary rites as an in-law is demanded by Krobo custom? A: We informed him but he did not turn up. Then at page 34 of the record of proceedings, still under cross examination, the petitioner attorney answered; Q: Who informed respondent about petitioner mother’s death. A: Q: A: I personally did so. Through what means? I know his sister and so I rang her and informed her and she in turn told me that she would call respondent and inform me and give me a feedback and that was the last I heard of her. Again at page 35; Q: Per the custom of Krobo’s, you would agree with me that when an in-law dies, the husband is supposed to perform a ritual called ‚Yo se do fie me‛ A: Q: Yes. However, the respondent was outside, he was invited but he refused to come. I am putting it to you that he was not made to perform this ritual because the marriage was dissolved. A: The marriage has not been dissolved. If so, I would have been aware of that. It appears that the petitioner’s dispute of the dissolution of the customary marriage is not in good faith. This is because her very own actions appear to be in confirmation of the dissolution of the marriage rather than otherwise. Her own EXHIBIT C series which are her payslips from her time of employment in Italy bear her name as ‘’Boateng Catherine Adjabeng’’. Her attorney also confirmed that she bore those names when she Page 9 of 20 migrated to Italy but has now changed same. The ‘Boateng’ is the name of the respondent. The question any reasonable man would ask is why the petitioner would go through the process of reverting to her maiden name is the marriage to she and the respondent was still subsisting? By her own action of reverting to her maiden name, she was informing the whole world that she was no longer married to the respondent. If she had never changed her maiden name upon her marriage to the respondent, then there would have been no issue about her name. But the fact that she reverted to her maiden name after travelling to the U. S. A is an indication that she was aware that her marriage to be respondent no longer existed. Again, the answer of the respondent attorney as to how the respondent was informed about the death of petitioner’s mother is an indication that the family did not consider the respondent to be their in law. As the petitioner attorney himself admitted, per the custom of Krobo’s the appropriate step would have been to inform the respondent and his family by the presentation of a bottle of schnapps. This was not done. He rather informed the respondent’s sister on phone. That is not the custom per his own evidence. Even though the respondent was outside the country, he had family here in Ghana and so if the petitioner’s family still considered him as an in law, then the appropriate procedure of informing the respondent and his family should have been followed. The petitioner attorney’s answer that he did not know about the dissolution and that if some had been done, he would have known about it is neither here nor there. As an attorney, he was testifying for and on behalf of the petitioner and not in his own Page 10 of 20 capacity. Davis Boateng as the senior brother of the petitioner, had acted in the stead of her late father and accepted the drinks for the celebration of the customary marriage between the parties. In that stead, he very much had capacity to accept the drinks indicating the dissolution of their marriage. Respondent also tendered in evidence EXHIBIT 5. It is a receipt from Quality Box and Pack, (your package sender) dated the 11th of June, 2004. It was sent to Catherine Boateng by Frank Boateng and the contents of the shipment are described as ‘’drink divorce schnapps’. Although the street name is different, the remainder of the address used to send the package i.e city/state and zip code are the same as used by the petitioner as her address in this petition. That is an indication that drinks were sent to the petitioner personally for the dissolution of their marriage. According to the respondent attorney, this was done at the behest of the petitioner as she requested for same after being informed that the dissolution had been done already to her senior brother. Upon these pieces of evidence which I find credible, I hereby find that the customary marriage between the parties was dissolved in 2002. That the petitioner is fully aware of this and had since held herself out as being divorced from the respondent. Accordingly, I hereby declare that the customary marriage between the parties has been dissolved since 2002. On this basis, issue two becomes moot as there is no longer any marriage to be dissolved between the parties. Page 11 of 20 As an orbiter, if indeed the petitioner considered their marriage not to have been dissolved, then the appropriate procedure per Section 41(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 323) for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court for dissolution of the customary marriage should have been by way of an application and not a petition. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled an equal or 1/3 share of the matrimonial home at Afienya 3. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to respondent’s share of the matrimonial home at Afienya as financial settlement I would consider issues 3 and 4 together. On issue three, the law as espoused by the Supreme Court is that any property acquired by the spouses during the course of their marriage is to be presumed to be jointly acquired. In other words, property acquired by the spouses during marriage is presumed to be marital property. See the case of Arthur (No 1) v. Arthur No 1) [ 2013-2014] SCGLR 543, Vol. 1 which re-affirmed the decision in the oft cited case of Gladys Mensah v. Stephen Mensah [2012] 1 SCGLR 391 in which the veritable Dotse JSC in delivering the judgment of the court, gave effect to the provision in Article 22 of the Constitution, 1992. The principle to be applied in the distribution of marital property is that of equality is equity. A spouse making a claim for property settlement must first lead evidence to establish the existence of the properties that were acquired in the course of the marriage. It is only after that that the court can proceed to apply the equitable doctrine of equality in distributing the property. According to the petitioner, in the course of her marriage to the respondent, they acquired a four bedroom house at Afienya. The sum of her evidence is that she worked Page 12 of 20 for five years and handed over all her income to the respondent for the purpose of him depositing same in a joint account which was to be used for the construction of the matrimonial home. She admits that as at the time they returned to Ghana in 2001 from Italy, that matrimonial home was at lentil level or that the block works were completed. She tendered in evidence EXHIBIT C series as proof of her income. They are payslips from April 1996 through to July, 2001. All of them are in the name of the petitioner and they indicate the company she was working in and the amount she was receiving as her salary. The respondent does not deny that they operated a joint account for the purpose of building the house. His admission provides the best form of proof of the petitioner’s claim. There is no better proof of a fact than an admission and it is elementary that where an admission is made by an opposing side, there is no need to call any evidence in proof of the claim. See the case of In Re Asare Stool; Nikoi Olai Amontia IV v. Akortia Oworsika [2005-6] SCGLR 637. Respondent however says that it was not until 1997 that the petitioner began to work and she only worked between 1997 and 1999. It is trite that the Courts prefer documentary evidence as proof. Pwamang JSC held in the case of Nana Asiamah Aboagye v. Abusuapanyin Kwaku Apau Asiam [2018] DLSC 2486 ‚… the settled principle of the law of evidence is that where oral evidence conflicts with documentary evidence which is authentic, then the documentary evidence ought to be preferred over and above the oral evidence.‛ See also the cases of Nana Asiamah Aboagye v. Abusuapanyin Kwaku Apau Asiam [2018] DLSC 2486, per Pwamang JSC Page 13 of 20 Contrary to the respondent’s claims, EXHIBIT C series show that the petitioner worked consistently every month between April, 2006 and July, 2001. That is a period of five years and three months. That far exceeds the two year period that the respondent wants this court to believe the petitioner worked. The respondent further claims that he solely purchased the land on which the four bedroom house is situated in 1994 when he was not married to the petitioner. That when the petitioner’s brother who purchased the land was preparing the documentation, he did so in his and the petitioner’s name without his knowledge and consent. Petitioner tendered in evidence EXHIBIT 2. It is an indenture which indicates that in 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Frank and Kate Boateng acquired the said land. As already indicated, the Courts prefer documentary evidence as proof. Although the parties celebrated their marriage in 1996, the evidence on record is that prior to that, they held themselves out as husband and wife to the whole world. This in itself is evidenced by amongst others, EXHIBIT 2. Even if I am to believe the claim of the respondent, the question remains; what did he do about this addition of petitioner’s name without his knowledge and consent to a land which he had solely purchased? He avers that he found this out in 1999. He does not indicate what steps he took to reverse this. Most importantly, prior to 1999, he admits that he and petitioner had decided to pull resources together and build their matrimonial home on the said land. He also admits that for this purpose, they had a joint account. That would mean that whilst he was leading the petitioner on to invest her income into the building for it to be their matrimonial property, he believed that the land belonged solely to him. That would be an act in bad faith. Page 14 of 20 As it stands, I do not believe his claim that he acquired the land solely and the respondent’s name was added to the documentation without his consent and knowledge. His attorney at page 69 of the record of proceedings, had answered; Q: Your Exhibit ‘IB2’ indicates that the said two plots of land belong to Mr. and Mrs. Frank Kate Boateng. A: Yes My Lord. Q: And that the oath of proof was executed on 8th September 1999. A: It is so. It is because the respondent had a good intention that they would jointly develop the house. Her answers indicate that the said land was acquired with the intention of it being the property of both the petitioner and the respondent. Petitioner contends in her evidence that she handed over her earnings to the respondent to deposit in their joint account. That he never accounted for same and did not show her any proof of his own contribution to the said joint account. The respondent denies this and says he contributed more to the construction of the house. Whereas the petitioner tendered in her pay slips as proof of her earnings, the respondent did not tender in any proof save for his assertions. Respondent tendered in evidence all receipts for things he purchased for the roofing and other works of the house from the year 2006; after the dissolution of the marriage. That indicates that he is a person of record. I find it strange that he did not provide any form of evidence of the joint account which he says is ‘’inactive’ in his evidence in chief and which the respondent attorney under Page 15 of 20 cross examination says is ‘’dormant’’. At page 64 of the record of proceedings, the respondent attorney had answered; Q: And it was the same year 2001 that the joint account of the parties was closed. A: No My Lord. Q: When was the joint account closed? A: The account became dormant from 1999. Q: Do you have any evidence to prove what you are saying? A: No please. An inactive account is not a non-existent account and he could have contacted his bankers and done the needful for the purpose of producing a record of the account between the stated periods to enable the court determine how much he contributed to the joint account. He could also just like the petitioner, have provided proof of his income to indicate how much he was earning at the time. he did not do any of this. In the absence of any such evidence, and particularly with regard to respondent’s ability to produce documentary evidence indicating how much and for what he had spent years after the dissolution of the marriage, I find that I agree with the contention of the petitioner. It appears that it is solely her earnings which were used for the construction of the house up to the completion of the block works. At page 74 of the record of proceedings, the respondent attorney had answered; Q: You see, you have no evidence to prove all that you are saying before this court. A: My evidence is that they built the house up to window level and did not even complete all the block work. That is my grounding. The petitioner does not dispute the inputs made into the completion of the house by the respondent since 2016. I thus hereby find that whereas the petitioner funded the construction of the building from the initial stages up to the lentil level, the respondent Page 16 of 20 continued with same and finished it. The parties thus jointly acquired the said house which was meant to be their matrimonial home. I accordingly find that is a marital property. The principle to be applied in the distribution of marital property is that of equality is equity. See the majority decision in the Supreme Court decision of Peter Adjei v. Margaret Adjei [ Civil Appeal No. J4/06/2021) delivered on the 21st day of April, 2021. Pwamang JSC in reading the majority decision held that ‚property acquired by spouses during marriage is presumed to be marital property. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the property will be shared in accordance with the ‚equality is equity’’ principle except where the spouse who acquired the property can adduce evidence to rebut the presumption’’ In applying the equality is equity principle, I hereby find that the parties are entitled to an equal share of the four bedroom marital property at Afienya. On the final issue, the petitioner prays that the respondent’s share of the matrimonial home be settled on her as financial provision. In the case of Oparebea v. Mensah [1993- 94] 1 GLR 61, the court held that in order to determine a claim made under section 20 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, the court must examine the needs of the party making the claim and not the contributions of the parties during the marriage. Factors to be considered in arriving at an equitable decision include the earning capacity or income of the parties, property or other financial properties which each of the parties has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, the financial needs, Page 17 of 20 obligations and responsibilities of each of the parties and the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage. The evidence on record is that after the dissolution of the marriage, no provision was made financially for either party. The respondent attorney agreed that per Krobo custom, it is only when a woman has been accused of adultery that no financial provision would be made for her. The petitioner was not accused of adultery as a basis for the dissolution of their marriage. At page 44 of the record of proceedings, the respondent attorney answered; Q: The narration you gave to the court about what led to the dissolution of the marriage, there was nothing about adultery. Yes please. And in the Krobo custom, when a party is seeking for dissolution of customary marriage, the man in this case is supposed to have compensated the petitioner. Is that not the case except only in cases of adultery. It is so. And in this instance, nothing of that sort happened when you allegedly went to dissolve A: Q: A: Q: the marriage. A: Yes My Lord. Thus from petitioner’s personal law which the respondent testified to, such provisions should have been made. Again, although the home was built as a matrimonial home, it is only the respondent who has benefited from its use till date. At page 72 of the record of proceedings, the respondent attorney had answered; Q: You would agree with me that as we speak, there are occupants in the matrimonial home of the parties. A: Yes, My Lord. Q: Who are those occupants? Page 18 of 20 A: Respondent’s cousins. Q: Since when did they take occupancy of the place? A: It has been long. Q: Do those occupants pay rent to the respondent or they are there for free? A: No. Q: And the petitioner is not aware of all these and has not consented to same. A: No My Lord. It is because even though her money is in the house, it did not get to the level where it could be inhabited. Then at page 74 of the record of proceedings, she had answered; Q: And you would agree with me that the respondent has benefited in the said property more than the petitioner? A: Yes, please. He benefited in that from 1999 that he came to take the document(s) of the house from his in-law Davis Adjabeng he has continued to work on the house till same was completed in 2017. As the matrimonial home is a jointly acquired property equally owned by both parties, it is fair that the parties are put in the same position with regard to its use and benefit. Accordingly, I hereby settle 15% of the respondent’s share of the matrimonial home on the petitioner as her financial provision. For the avoidance of ambiguity, the petitioner is to have 65% share of the matrimonial home whilst the respondent is entitled to 35%. Each party is to bear their own costs in suit. (sgd) H/H BERTHA ANIAGYEI (MS) (CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) Page 19 of 20 DIVINE KAFUI AKPALOO FOR THE PETITIONER KOFI SAFO KANTANKA FOR THE RESPONDENT Page 20 of 20