Khumalo v Zibagwe Rural District Council (Civil Appeal 270 of 2003; SC 21 of 2005) [2005] ZWSC 21 (23 March 2005)

1 SC 21/05 DISTRIBUTABLE   (16) Civil Appeal No. 270/03 Judgment No. SC 21/05 FUNGAI   GWANGWARA   KHUMALO     v     ZIBAGWE   RURAL   DISTRICT COUNCIL SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA & GWAUNZA JA HARARE, MARCH 24, 2005 W J Mutezo, for the appellant E T Matinenga, for the respondent GWAUNZA JA: After hearing argument in this matter, we dismissed the appeal with costs and indicated that the reasons would follow.   These are the reasons: The respondent applied to the Labour Relations Officer for authority to dismiss   the   appellant   from   its   employ,   in   terms   of   the   Labour   Relations (General   Conditions   of   Employment)   (Termination   of   Employment) Regulations  1985.     The application  was turned down.     On appeal to  the Senior Labour Relations Officer, the decision to reinstate the appellant was upheld, even though the Labour Relations Officer found that the appellant was guilty of the act of misconduct in question.     His reason for dismissing the respondent’s   application   to   dismiss   the   appellant   was   that   there   were SC 21/05 “mitigating”   circumstances   like   the   appellant’s   long   service   with   the respondent,   the   fact   that   no   financial   prejudice   had   been   suffered   by   the respondent and the appellant’s belief that she was being victimised because she was a war veteran. The learned President of the Labour Court, who heard the respondent’s appeal, set aside the Senior Labour Relations Officer’s order for the reinstatement of the appellant and granted the respondent authority to dismiss her.   The reasons for the decision of the court a quo are set out in the following passage from its judgment: “I agree with appellant’s   submission   that   upon   finding   the respondent   guilty   of   the   acts   of   misconduct,   the   Senior   Labour   Relations Officer ought to have given permission for the dismissal of the respondent. The regulations under which the application was made do not give room for mitigation.       Once   the  offence   is   proved  to   the  satisfaction   of   the   Labour Officer, the Labour Officer is duty bound to grant the authority to dismiss. He has no discretion to act otherwise.   This position was clearly established in the case of Masiyiwa v T. M. Supermarkets 1990 (1) ZLR 166 (SC) where at p 170 paragraph H it was stated: ‘Thus, in the case of s 3(2), the Labour Relations Officer has to determine whether the grounds of suspension are proved or not proved.     If they are proved, he must proceed in terms of sub paragraph (a); if they are not proved, he must proceed in terms of sub paragraph (b).   To put it another way, he has a choice, but that choice is governed not by his discretion, but by his finding. If   he   finds   the   grounds   proved,   he   must   choose   (a)   if   not   proved,   (b)’. (underlining for emphasis). Section 3(2) reads ‘Upon application being made in terms of subsection (1) the Labour Relations Officer shall investigate the matter and may according to the circumstance(s) of the case – (a) Serve   a   determination   or   order   …   terminating   his   contract   of employment   if   the   grounds   for   his   suspension   are   proved   to   the satisfaction of the Labour Relations Officer; or (b) Serve a determination or order on the employer concerned to remove SC 21/05 the suspension of the employee and to reinstate such employee if the grounds … are not proved’. In   the   circumstances   the   Senior   Labour   Relations   Officer   misdirected   himself   by ordering   reinstatement   where   the   grounds   for   suspension   had   been   proved   to   his satisfaction”. This reasoning in my view is sound and unassailable.   The decision of the court a quo can therefore not be interfered with. The appellant sought before this Court, to argue that the court  a quo should   have  found   as   a  “condition   precedent”   that  the  evidence   before  it   did   not support   a   finding   that   the   grounds   for   suspending   the   appellant   had   been substantiated.   This argument is clearly misplaced.   The Labour Court sat to hear the appeal filed by the respondent in casu.   The appellant, who was the respondent then, had   not   filed   a   cross   appeal   to   protest   against   the   finding   of   the   Senior   Labour Relations Officer that she was guilty of the act of misconduct with which she was charged. There was therefore no cause for the Labour Court to consider, much less determine, a matter that had not been placed before it.   The appellant, by raising this matter at this late stage, is clearly clutching at straws. In all the circumstances therefore, and for the reasons outlined above, we found no merit in the appeal, and dismissed it. SANDURA JA: I agree. ZIYAMBI JA: I agree. Mutezo & Company, appellant’s legal practitioners Wilmot & Bennet, respondent's legal practitioners