Godfrey Shamanena v Anti-Corruption Commission (2025/HN/150) [2025] ZMHC 61 (13 June 2025)

.. IN THE HIGH COURT F AT THE DISTRICT REG HOLDEN AT NDOLA (Civil Jurisdiction) H COURT OF ZAMBIA 2025/HN/150 IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 58, 75 AND 86 OF THE ANTI CORRUPTION ACT No. 3 OF 2012. AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 38 (4) OF THE FORFEITURE OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT No. 19 OF 2010. IN THE MATTER OF: AN ORDER THAT THE WARRANT OF SEIZURE PLACED BY THE RESPONDENT ON THE APPLICANT'S ACCOUNT IS INVALID AS THERE IS NO FORFEITURE ORDER FOLLOWING THE LAPSE OF 14 DAYS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW DISCHARGE OF THE · AND AND IN THE MATTER OF: AN ORDER FOR DAMAGES FOR THE .,. BETWEEN: J2 ILLEGAL CONTINUED SEIZURE ON THE APPLICANT'S BANK ACCOUNT BY THE RESPONDENT. GODFREY SHAMANENA APPLICANT AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION RESPONDENT BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE M. C. MULANDA IN CHAMBERS . FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr. J. Kayula, Messrs. Kayula & Associates Mr. J. Hara, Messrs. Hara & Co. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr. K. Lukama, Acting Se nior Legal and Prosecutions Officer. Mrs. N. Chisanga-Chizalila, Legal and Prosecutions Officer (Both from Anti-Corruption Commission) .,. J3 JUDGMENT CASES REFERRED TO: 1. Kalandanya and Others Vs. Attorney General and Others, 2022/HPEF / 10. 2. Anti-Corruption Commission Vs. Bowman Chiloshi Lusambo, 2022 /HPEF / 02. 3. C & C Investment Limited, Ace Car Hire Limited, Sunday Maluba Vs. The Attorney General, Appeal No. 32/2003. 4. Savenda Systems Limited Vs. Anti-Corruption Commission and Milimo Ng'andu, 2024/HPEF/015. 5 . Antonio Ventriglia and Another Vs. The People, Appeal No. 37 /2019. 6 . Goqwana Vs. Minister of Safety NO & Others, Case No: 20668/2014. 7 . Brown Field Developers Limited Vs. Banking Fraud Investigations Unit and Others, Petition No. 498 of 2013. 8. National Crime Agency Vs. Westminster Magistrates' Court [2022] EWHC 2631. LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: 1. Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012 - Sections 58, 75. 2. Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 19 of 2010 - S. 38 (3) & (4). • J4 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1. 1 On 27th April 2023, the Applicant took out Originating Summons from the District Registry at Ndola in which he 1s seeking the following reliefs: i. An Order that the warrant of seizure placed by the Respondent on the Applicant's Bank Account is invalid as there has been no forfeiture order following the lapse of 14 days as prescribed by law. ii. An Order that the Respondent returns the Applicant's seized Bank Account as the warrant of seizure is invalid by operation of the law. iii. An Order for damages for the deprivation of the right to property. iv. Further or other relief that the Court may deem fit; and v. Costs of and incidental hereto. 1.2 The Originating Summons was accompanied by an affidavit which was sworn by Godfrey Shamanena (Chief Nkana) , the Applicant herein. JS 2.0 APPLICANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 2.1 The Deponent averred that he was the Director and Shareholder of Bisma Investment Limited, which owned a mining licence number 13811-HQ-GML. He deposed that on 20th August 2021, Bisma Investment Limited offered to sell its aforementioned mining licence to Pridegems Mining Limited, a subsidiary of Grizzly Mining Limited, for USD 5,000,000. A contract was subsequently executed between Bisma Investment Limited and Pridegems Mining Limited for the sale of the said licence at the price of USD 3, 000,000. A copy of the contract of sale was exhibited and marked "GS3" . 2.2 The Deponent further averred that on 5 th September 2022, Pridegems Mining Limited, through its holding Company, Grizzly Mining Limite d, made its last instalment payment of USD 165, 000 , into his account, which he holds with the Zambia National Commercial Bank in Kitwe. He avowed that on 8 th September 2022, the Respondent caused to b e issue d a Restriction Notice on his said account a nd served the same on J6 the Bank. A copy of the said Restriction Notice marked "GSS" was exhibited. 2.3 The Deponent deposed that on 15th September 2022, the Respondent inquired from him the source of the money in his account, to which he clarified as explained above. 2.4 He further deposed that, when the initial 9 months' restriction notice period prescribed by the law was about to expire, he inquired from the Respondent's Director General, when he would be allowed access to his account. The Director General responded that the Respondent had extended its investigations into whether or not the necessary taxes were paid on the transaction in question. To expedite the said investigations, the Deponent furnished the Respondent with the Tax Assessment Report and Property Transfer Tax Clearance Certificate, which were issued to him by the Zambia Revenue Authority , showing that Bisma Investment Limited fully paid the necessary taxes on the transaction in issue . J7 2.5 Despite providing the Respondent with the Tax Assessment Report and Property Transfer Tax Clearance Certificate, the Respondent had not responded to him. · 2.6 At the expiry of the nine months' restriction notice period on 7 th June 2023 , the Deponent attempted to have access to his Bank account. His account was, however, still restricted despite not having been served with a further and fresh final six months ' restriction notice as prescribed by the law. 2.7 The Applicant approached the Respondent's Director General again. He queried why his account was still restricted. The Director General responded that the Respondent was waiting for the Report from the Zambia Revenue Authority on the tax compliance, based on the documents the Applicant had furnished the Respondent. 2 .8 Two days before the expiry of the fifteen months' mandatory Restriction Notice period prescribed by the law, the Respondent placed on the Applicant's Bank account a Warrant JS of Seizure. That the Respondent served the same on the Applicant's Advocates on 12t h December 2023 . Copies of the Respondent's Affidavit in Support of Warrant of Seizure, as well as the actual Warrant of Seizure, were exhibited and marked "GS9". 2 .9 The Deponent avowed that he was advised by his Advocates and verily believed the advice to be true, that property seized under the Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012 , and where no forfeiture order had been made against the property within 14 days after the property was seized, the said property must be returned to the person from whom it was seized. 2.10 He avowed that his Bank account was seized on 4 th December 2023, and no order of forfeiture had been sought or granted against his property, despite the property having been under the warrant of seizure for a period exceeding 16 months. The Deponent further avowed that he had been advised by his Advocates, and verily believed the advice to be true, that the J9 warrant of seizure, which purportedly exists on his bank account, is, for the aforementioned reason, illegal. 2.11 It was the Deponent's further averment that he was further advised by his Advocates that the failure by the Respondent to return to him the seized bank account after the effluxion of 14 days was an act of illegality. That the aforesaid Respondent's action had caused him to suffer damage, as he was denied basic necessities of life, as well as medical attention on account of his advanced age and ill-health. He was further advised by his Advocates, whose advice he verily believed to be true, that apart from discharging the illegal warrant of seizure, this is a proper and fit case for the Court to grant him damages for the aforesaid deprivation. 3.0 APPLICANT'S SKELETON ARGUMENTS 3.1 The Applicant caused to be filed Skeleton Arguments in support of the Affidavit in Support. Counsel submitted that Section 58 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act empowers JlO the Respondent to seize the Applicant's Bank Account. He submitted that, unlike Section 61 of the Act, which stipulates the lifespan of the restriction notice, Section 58 did not provide for the timeframe that a warrant of seizure would endure on a property affected by it. 3.2 Counsel submitted that the absence of a timeframe, however, did not imply that the warrant of seizure would exist on the property in perpetuity. He submitted that although the Anti Corruption Commission Act did not elaborate on seizures and forfeitures, Section 75 of the Act mentions that the provisions of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, 2010 , shall apply to the aforementioned matters. That, Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act provides a timeframe of how long the seized property can remain in the possession of the Respondent. 3.3 Counsel submitted that under Section 38 (3) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, the seized property should be at the end of forty-eight hours after seizure, returned to the person Jll from whose possess10n it was seized, if information had not been laid in respect of a relevant offence, unless such property was kept to afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. That, in casu, no information was laid within forty-eight hours from the date of seizure of property, in respect of any relevant offence, nor had the Applicant been charged with any offence concerning the seized property. 3.4 Counsel submitted that, as for Section 38 (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, it provides for return of the seized property, unless a forfeiture order has been made against the property within fourteen days after the seizure of the property or that the property may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. That, the maximum period the Respondent can be in custody of a seized property was, therefore, fourteen days if no forfeiture order is made. Otherwise, after fourteen days, the property ought to be returned to a person from whose custody it was seized. Jl2 3.5 It was submitted that, in this case, the property in issue was seized from the Applicant on 4 th December 2023, which exceeds sixteen months to the present. That, within the said period, no forfeiture order had been made to justify the deprivation of the Applicant of his property. Counsel contended that, arising from the said failure, the continued purported seizure of the Applicant's Bank Account by the Respondent was illegal. Consequently, the Respondent should be ordered to return the said property to the Applicant. 3.6 It was further submitted that Section 38 of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act acts as a safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of an individual's property, which, without it, would erode the fundamental right to own property. Counsel submitted that in the case of KALANDANYA AND OTHERS Vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS 1 , the Court found the Notices of Seizure invalid and discharged them after no action was taken after their placement on the Appellants' bank accounts for over fifteen months. That, although the foregoing case was concerned with Section 15 of the Prohibition and J13 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, No. 14 of 2001, the said Section was similar to Section 58 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act. 3.7 Counsel contended that, in casu, the Respondent having offended Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, the seizure notice placed on the Applicant's Bank Account is, therefore, invalid and the Court should discharge it and order the immediate access by the Applicant to his Bank Account. 3 .8 It was further submitted that the Applicant, having been illegally deprived of his property, h e was caused to suffer damage, destitution and extreme anguish. Counsel submitted that the Applicant is, therefore, entitled to damages. 4.0 RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 4.1 On 9 th May 2025, the Respondent filed its affidavit in opposition to the Applicant's affidavit in support of the J14 Originating Summons. The said affidavit was sworn by Malala Mavwali, a Senior Investigations Officer in the employ of the Respondent. 4.2 The Deponent did not dispute the Applicant's averments relating to how Bisma Investment Limited, a mining company in which the Applicant was Director and Shareholder, sold its mining licence to Pridegems Mining Limited, a subsidiary of Grizzly Mining Limited. Further, the Respondent did not deny that Grizzly Mining Limited made its last instalment payment of USD 165, 000 of the purchase price into the Applicant's ZANACO Account on 5 th September 2022. 4.3 The Deponent averred that the Respondent received two complaints, dated 25th July 2022 and 8 t h September 2022, respectively , which alleged that between 1st January 2022 and 30th September 2022, the Applicant had possession of funds suspected to be proceeds of crime. The complaints further alleged that the Applicant was involved in illicit activities of money laundering and had property suspected to be proceeds JlS of crime. Further, that the Applicant was a conduit for the execution of illicit activities by politically exposed persons. The said complaints were exhibited and marked "MMla-b". 4.4 The Deponent averred that, following the receipt of the aforementioned complaints, he instituted investigations. His investigations revealed that between 20th January 2022 and 8 th September 2022, the Applicant had been receiving funds, allegedly as payment towards the sale of Bisma Mining Limited's mining licence, in which the Applicant was the proprietor of the Company. 4.5 On 8 th September 2022, the Deponent caused to be issued by the Respondent, a Restriction Notice on the Applicant's Dollar Account No. 0510411200235, held at ZANACO Bank, Industrial Branch in Kitwe. The same was served on the Bank. He avowed that a copy of the said Restriction Notice marked "GSS", was exhibited by the Applicant in his affidavit in support. J16 4 .6 The Applicant challenged the aforementioned Restriction Notice before the Kabwe High Court under Cause No. 2022/HB / 91 , wherein he sought an order to reverse it, but the order was denied. A copy of the Ruling denying the Applicant the said order marked "MM2" was attached. 4.7 Following the expiration of the Restriction Notice on 7 th June 2023, the Restriction Notice was extended for a further six months, and it finally expired on 6 th December 2023. 4 .8 Thereafter, the Respondent wrote to the Zambia Revenue Authority requesting all relevant documents relating to tax compliance in respect of the sale of Bisma Mining Limited. To date, the Zambia Revenue Authority has not responded to the Respondent's request. The Deponent avowed that the requested documents were necessary to corroborate the documents which were provided to the Respondent by the Applicant. That, ZRA ought to independently verify the authenticity of the documents availed to the Respondent by the Applicant and confirm the Applicant's tax status. Jl7 4.9 The Deponent further avowed that, to effectively continue conducting investigations into the allegations, he caused to be issued a Warrant of Seizure on the Applicant's Dollar Account. The same was duly served on ZANACO and the Applicant's Advocates. A copy of the Warrant of Seizure marked "MM4" was exhibited. 4.10 The Applicant challenged the Restriction Notice and Warrant of Seizure before the Lusaka High Court - Economic and Financial Crimes Division, under Cause No. 2024 /HPEF / 03. The Court, in its Judgment delivered on 21 st June 2024, held that the failure by the Respondent to serve a fresh Restriction Notice on the Applicant renders it null and void. The Court further held that the issuance of a Warrant of Seizure by the Respondent was not done in bad faith , and therefore was not oppressive and an abuse of the Respondent's power and authority. 4 . 11 The Deponent deposed that he was advised by the Respondent's Counsel, and verily believed the same to be true, J18 that a Warrant of Seizure, being an investigative tool, can be issued in the course of investigations and goes beyond the effects of a Restriction Notice. That, the Respondent's ongoing investigations against the Applicant, were not limited only to the payment of the property transfer tax from the sale of Bisma Mining Limited. That, it also extends to possible money laundering and the manner in which the Applicant received funds from Grizzly Mining Limited as payment for the sale of the mine to Pridegems Mining Limited, a subsidiary of Grizzly Mining Limited. 4.12 The Deponent further averred that he was advised by the Respondent's Counsel, and verily believed the same to be true, that contrary to the Applicant's averment that, where no forfeiture order is made, of the seized property within fourteen days from the date of seizure, the seized property must be returned to the person from whom it was seized, the correct position was that a Warrant of Seizure under the Anti Corruption Act had no timeframe. Jl9 4.13 He further averred that he was advised by the Respondent's Counsel that this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the reliefs the Applicant is seeking, since there is a subsisting Warrant of Seizure which was issued by the Subordinate Court. Further, that a Warrant of Seizure can only be cancelled or declared invalid by the issuing Court and not any other Court of competent jurisdiction. 5.0 RESPONDENT' S SKELETON ARGUMENTS 5.1 It was submitted that Section 58 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act clothes an officer of the Respondent who h as reasonable suspicion that any movable or immovable property is tainted, to seize such property, with a warrant. Counsel further submitted that a Warrant of Seizure is an investigative tool which grants the Respondent temporary custody of the property and prohibits the dealing or disposal of the property by the Applicant. In support of the submission, the Court was referred to the case of ANT I-CORRUPTION COMMISSION Vs J20 BOWMAN CHILOSHI LUSAMB02 , wherein the High Court's Economic and Financial Crimes Division stated that: "While both the Restriction Notice and a Warrant of Seizure restrict or prohibit the dealing, disposal, conversion or movement of the subject property, a Warrant of Seizure goes a step further by granting the State, temporal custody or control of the subject property." 5.2 It was further submitted that a warrant of seizure is intended to protect the property from dissipation. 5 .3 Counsel submitted that the Applicant's argument that Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act enjoins the Respondent to return the bank account to the Applicant, is flawed and a total misconception of the law. That, the law ref erred to specifically refers to property seized under Part III of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, which does not form part of the evidence or which is not tainted property. Counsel argued that Section 58 of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act J21 is independent of Part III of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act. That, a seizure warrant under the Anti-Corruption Commission Act relates to offences allegedly committed under the said Act, whereas the seizure under the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act relates to offences committed under that Act. It was submitted that, in casu, investigations were still ongoing to determine whether or not the Applicant's property is tainted. 5.4 Counsel further submitted that the Applicant's action is intended to use these civil proceedings to arrest or disturb the ongoing criminal investigations against him. That, the Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to grant an order to return the seized bank account to the Applicant where there are ongoing criminal investigations. In support of the foregoing submissions, the Court was referred to the case of C & C INVESTMENT LIMITED, ACE CAR HIRE LIMITED, SUNDAY MALUBA Vs. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL3 , wherein the Supreme Court stated that: J22 "Clearly, any Order to release the property would have an impact on the criminal investigations. We do not find that it was farfetched for the Judge to conclude, in these circumstances, that there was an attempt, through these civil proceedings, to arrest criminal investigations." 5.5 It was further submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to cancel or declare a Warrant of Seizure which was issued by the Subordinate Court, invalid. In support of the submission, Counsel relied on Section 102 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code , Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia, which provides as follows: "Every such warrant shall remain in force until it is executed, or until it is cancelled by the court which issued it." 5.6 The Court was further referred to the case of SAVENDA SYSTEMS LIMITED Vs. ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION AND MILIMO NG' ANDU4 , wherein the Economic and Financial Crime Division of the High Court stated as follows: J23 "Having carefully considered the application and the reliefs sought, we find that there is a subsisting Warrant of Seizure issued by the Subordinate Court. Thus we find that this matter is incompetently before us and is dismissed for warrant of jurisdiction." 5.7 Counsel submitted that these proceedings are , therefore, improperly before this Court. He submitted that the Applicant's a ction should, in the circumstances, be dismissed with costs to the Respondent. 6.0 HEARING OF THE MATTER 6.1 At the hearing of the matter on 16th May 2025, Counsel for both parties relied on their clients' respective affidavits and Skeleton Arguments and augmented them with oral submissions. A scrutiny of the oral submissions, however, shows that it is a repeat of the arguments contained in the parties' respective Skeleton Arguments. I shall not, therefore , restate them here . J24 7.0 COURT'S DECISION 7 .1 I have carefully considered the parties' respective affidavit evidence, as well as their arguments. 7 .2 The case for the Applicant is that a warrant of seizure was placed on his ZANACO Bank Account, thereby preventing him from having access to the said account. The Applicant argues that, although the Anti-Corruption Act does not specify the duration for which the warrant of seizure applies to the seized property, it does stipulate that all issues relating to seizures and forfeitures under the Act, shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act. 7 .3 It was contended that Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, prescribes forty-eight hours and fourteen days, respectively, within which the seized property should be returned to a person from whom it is seized, unless the property may afford evidence as to the commission of an J25 offence, or that an information has been laid for a relevant offence. Further, in respect of Section 38 (4), unless the forfeiture order has been made. 7. 4 That, in casu, none of the circumstances that could cause the Respondent to continue possession of the Applicant's property beyond forty-eight hours and fourteen days, respectively, had occurred. The Applicant, therefore, seeks the Court's order that the Respondent return to him his seized Bank Account for the reason that the Warrant of Seizure was invalid. 7 .5 On the other hand, the Respondent argues that the existence of the Warrant of Seizure on a seized property has no expiry date. That, it can exist on a seized property as long as the investigations in a matter are still ongoing. The Respondent further argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to declare a Warrant of Seizure which was issued by the Subordinate Court, invalid. J26 7 .6 The Respondent having challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine these proceedings, I shall first determine this issue to see if I possess the requisite jurisdiction to determine the Applicant's action. i. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 7. 7 As I have already stated above, the Respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the Applicant's action, because the Warrant of Seizure on the Applicant's bank account was issued by the Subordinate Court. The Respondent contends that it is only the Subordinate Court which has the jurisdiction to cancel it and not the High Court. Several High Court decisions were cited in support of the aforementioned contention, which are not binding on this Court. 7.8 Although the Respondent argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to declare the Warrant of Seizure, which was issued by the Subordinate Court, invalid, I am of the J27 considered view that the issue which falls to be determined in this matter relates to the lifespan of a warrant of seizure and not whether or not it was properly issued. The issue of whether or not the Warrant of Seizure in this matter was validly issued by the Subordinate Court was settled by the Lusaka High Court (Economic and Financial Crimes Division) under Cause No. 2024/HPEF/03, in a matter between the parties. The Court held that: "We find that the decision by the Respondent to issue a Warrant of Seizure on the Respondent's Account was not done in bad faith, oppressive and an abuse of the Respondent's power and authority." 7.9 The main issue in this matter is whether or not the Warrant of Seizure can remain on a person's property for as long as the Respondent's investigations are still ongoing or if it can eventually lapse after some time. The Applicant contends that the Warrant of Seizure has expired and, therefore, it has no effect on his bank account, and he should be given access to the funds in his account. J28 7.10 The Respondent contends that the Warrant of Seizure has not expired and, as such, it has been properly prohibiting the Applicant access to his bank account. 7 .11 The foregoing, in my view, has nothing to do with the cancellation of the Warrant of Seizure which the Subordinate Court issued, because if the Court finds that the said warrant has expired, there will be nothing to cancel. In short, the issue before me is whether or not the Warrant of Seizure is still active or has expired to have the necessary effect on the Applicant's Bank Account. 7 .12 After the Court discharges the warrant of seizure, the Applicant desires to have access to the funds in his bank account. The Respondent argues that the Applicant ought to make the application to discharge the warrant of seizure before the Subordinate Court, the Court that issued it. The subject matter in these proceedings concerns the funds in the Applicant's bank account, which the Respondent seized through a warrant of seizure. J29 7.13 The issue to resolve here is whether or not the Subordinate Court has the relevant jurisdiction to deter mine the issue relating to the Applicant's seized funds in the bank account. It is not in dispute that any proceedings relating to the seized funds in the Applicant's bank account are civil in nature. The Subordinate Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to property in civil matters is constrained by the value of the property. Section 20 of the Subordinate Courts Act, Chapter 28 of the Laws of Zambia, as read together with Statutory Instrument No. 12 of 2024, gives the ceiling of the value of property in respect of which the Su bordinate Court has jurisdiction in personal suits. The maximum value of property in respect of which a Chief Resident Magistrate , who is the most senior Magistrate, has jurisdiction in personal suits is K 1, 000 , 000. 7 . 14 In the case of ANTONIO VENTRIGLIA AND ANOTHER Vs. THE PEOPLE5 , the Supreme Court offers valu able guidance. In this case, a police officer swore an affidavit that he was seized of the conduct of investigations of the K2 million in the J30 Appellants' joint bank account, which he suspected had been stolen. He said that, if the said money was not preserved, his efforts to conclusively investigate the report would be prejudiced. Consequently, he sought an order detaining and preserving the said sum of money. 7 .15 The prosecutor applied under Section 41 (3) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act for, and was granted by the Subordinate Court presided over by the Chief Resident Magistrate, an ex parte order restraining the Appellants from dealing with the said money. The Appellants applied to discharge the said restraining order before the Chief Resident Magistrate, who discharged it. 7.16 The prosecutor appealed to the High Court under the Court's criminal jurisdiction. The High Court restored the restraining order. On appeal by the Appellants, the Supreme Court held that: "In this case what was in issue was a sum of K2 million, in today's currency. The limit of the court that heard J31 the application was K30,000. Clearly, the sum involved was beyond the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Court, as correctly pointed out by counsel for both parties. Since the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act defines court as either the High Court or Subordinate Court, the public prosecutor should have realized that this particular application was beyond the jurisdiction of the subordinate court; so that he should have made the application before the High Court. Therefore, to the extent that the Subordinate Court had no jurisdiction to hear this particular application , the proceedings before it were a nullity." 7 . 17 In casu, as a lready stated a b ove, t his Court is n ot concerned with the power of th e Sub ordin ate Court to issu e a warra n t of seizure, wh ich it can legally issu e under its criminal juris diction. Th e con cern of this Court is wh eth er th e warrant of seizure can be dis cha rged so t h at th e Applican t can h ave access to h is USD 165, 000.00 seized by th e Respon den t . Clearly, USD 165 , 000 .0 0 at today's exch a n ge r ate exceed s K4 million , which is way beyond the juris diction of the J32 Subordinate Court to determine. I hold, therefore , that asking the Applicant to approach the Subordinate Court would be an exercise in futility. As guided by the Supreme Court in the ANTONIO VENTRIGLIA case, supra, the correct forum to approach is the High Court, as the Applicant has done. 7 .18 Having clarified in the manner I have done, I find the Respondent's contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction to cancel the Warrant of Seizure, which was issued by the Subordinate Court, misconceived. Consequently , I find that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine the Applicant's action and I shall proceed to do so. ii. WHETHER THE WARRANT OF SEIZURE LASTS INDEFINITELY 7 .19 The question to resolve is whether, when issued, a Warrant of Seizure is for an indefinite period. That it would last as long as the Respondent is still carrying out investigations relating to the seized property. J33 7 .20 The Applicant contends that although Section 58 of the Anti Corruption Act does not provide the duration of the Warrant of Seizure, Section 75 provides that matters relating to seizure and forfeiture should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act. He argues that Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act sets out the procedure of dealing with the seized property under Section 58 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 7 .21 The Applicant contends that the aforementioned Section 38 (3) provides a period of forty-eight hours from the date of seizure within which the seized property should be returned to the person from whom it was seized, unless the property may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or information had been laid in respect of a relevant offence. As for Section 38 (4) , the Applicant contends that the same provides for the return of seized property within fourteen days of seizure unless it may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or that a forfeiture order has been made against J34 the property within the said period. That in this case, none of the conditions mentioned above are applicable, which would cause the Respondent to retain the Applicant's property. 7 .22 On the other hand, the Respondent contends that Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act do not apply to the seizures under the Anti-Corruption Act. The Respondent asserts that the aforesaid provisions relate to seizures under the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act and do not extend to those under the Anti-Corruption Act. That, the Warrant of Seizure has no timeframe for its expiry, · but can continue to subsist so long as the Respondent continues with its investigations in the matter. 7.23 The police, and by extension, all law enforcement agencies, who include the Respondent, h ave a sacrosanct duty to investigate criminal activities once a complaint has been made. The power to investigate crimes ought to be exercised unabated. J35 7 .24 In this regard, Section 58 of the Anti-Corruption Act empowers an officer of the Anti-Corruption Commission under a warrant to seize property where he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in question was derived or acquired from corrupt practices or is evidence relating to an offence. The Warrant of Seizure issued under Section 58 of the Anti Corruption Act, is one of the tools of investigations which permit a n officer to seize property for such purposes as m ay be necessary for the investigation. In the case of GOQWANA Vs. MINISTER OF SAFETY NO & OTHERS6 , the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa stated: "Provided there is no abuse of process, the issuing of search warrants and the seizure of articles consequent thereupon is a vital, indeed necessary, element in the effective combatting of crime." 7 .25 However , it must be understood that any seizure of property has the potential to interfere with the right of an individual to possess property as guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, J36 the actions by investigating authorities should not infringe upon this fundamental right without proper justification. 7 .26 As already stated above, the question falling for determination in this matter is whether or not, when issued, the Warrant of Seizure lasts in perpetuity, provided the investigations have not been concluded. 7 .27 The Applicant has referred the Court to Section 75 of the Anti Corruption Act, which he says gives power to resort to the provisions of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act when dealing with seizures under the Anti-Corruption Act. The said Section 75 provides as follows: "The provisions of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, 2010, shall apply in relation to the seizure and forfeiture of any proceeds or property corruptly acquired by any person and any other related matters." 7 .28 It is not in dispute that the freezing of the Applicant's bank account was done under a warrant of seizure issued under J37 Section 58 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Act. Therefore, the issue to resolve here is whether or not Section 75 above relates to property seized under Section 58 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Act. To get a b etter perspective of the issue, I have decided to reproduce Section 58 (1) hereunder: "Where in the course of an investigation into an offence under this Act, an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that any movable or immovable property is derived or acquired from corrupt practices, is the subject matter of an offence or is evidence relating to an offence, the officer shall, with a warrant seize the property." 7 .29 Whereas Section 75 of the Anti-Corruption Act talks about the seizure and forfeiture of any proceeds or property corruptly acquired by any person, Section 58 (1), on the other hand, relates to property seized based on an officer's reasonable susp1c10n that it was derived or acquired from corrupt practices. I do not think that Section 75 relates to property seized based on an officer's suspicion. '\ J38 7 .30 There is no dispute that seizu re of property under Section 58 ( 1) serves to preserve assets while an investigation is ongoing a nd legal matters are being resolved, preventing their dissipation or waste. I hold th e view that there is no way the Legislature would h ave given the officers power to seize property suspected to have been derived or acquired from corrupt practices, only to return the property within a period of forty-eight hours or fourteen days , when corrup tion cases are usually complex and investigations into them may take tim e to be con cluded. 7 .3 1 The foregoing positions seem to get support from Section 58 (2) and (3) of the Anti-Corruption Act , which provides as follows: "(2) An officer who seizes any property pursuant to subsection ( 1) shall prepare and sign a list of all the movable or immovable property seized under that subsection and of the places in which the property is found. '\ I J39 (3) An officer shall se rve a copy of the list referred to in subsection (2) on the owner of the property or on the person from whom the property was seized, not later than thirty days from the date o f seizure." 7 .32 In subsection (3), an officer is required to serve a copy of the list of the seized property upon the owner of the property or on the person from whom the property was seized, not later than thirty days from the date of seizure. This simply shows that an officer has thirty days within which to serve a copy of the list of the seized property on the owner of the property or on the person from whom the property was seized. 7.33 If the officer only has a maximum of fourteen days and a m1n1mum of forty-eight hours within which to deal with the seized property or return it to the owner, as argued by the Applicant, the Legislature would not have given him thirty days within which to serve a list of seized property. Otherwise, by the time the officer would be serving such a list, the retention of the property by the officer would have become illegal. • J40 7. 34 For the reasons stated above, I hold that the seizure of property under Section 58 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Act is not subject to the provisions of Section 75 of the Act. Therefore, I hold the view that the provisions of Section 38 (3) and (4) of the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act do not apply to a seizure under Section 58 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Act. 7.35 It is not in contention that under Section 58 (1) of the Anti Corruption Act, no timeframe within which the investigating officer should hold the seized property for purposes of an investigation is provided. Because of that, the Respondent contends that a warrant of seizure grants the investigating officer custody of the seized property so long as the investigation is still ongoing. The Applicant vehemently argues that the investigating officer cannot hold on to the property in perpetuity. 7 .36 The question to resolve is wh ether or not the investigating officer can hold on to the seized property under a warrant of seizure for as long as the investigations are ongoing. In its J41 submissions in this matter, the Respondent acknowledged that a warrant of seizure m erely grants the State temporary control over the seized prop erty until investigations are concluded. Indeed, a seizure of property should temporarily grant custody of the seized property to the investigating officer while investigations to determin e whether it was derived or acquired through corru pt practices are still ongoing. Consequ ently, Section 2 of th e Anti-Corruption Act defines the term "seizure" as follows: "temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of any property or temporarily assuming the custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or a notice by the Director General." 7 .37 Black's Law Dictionary, 8 t h Edition, on page 1504, defines the word "temporary" as follows: "Lasting for a time only; e xisting or continuing for a limited time ." J42 7 .38 It follows, therefore , that seizure of property under a warrant of seizure issued pursuant to Section 58 (1) of the Anti Corruption Act does not last in perpetuity. It lasts for a period of investigation. In the case of BROWN FIELD DEVELOPERS LIMITED Vs. BANKING FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS UNIT AND OTHERS7 , the High Court of Kenya stated: " ... the resultant seizure ought not be absolute but only for the period of investigation. Certainly, the period of investigation must not be an indefinite period if only to ensure that a person's property is not absolutely appropriated or expropriated through a warrant of seizure." 7 .39 However, the test to apply by a court faced with an application to set aside the warrant of seizure and the return of the seized property to the person from whom it was seized was set out in the case of NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY Vs. WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES' COURT8 , wherein it was held that: • J43 "It is also not controversial that, on a set-aside application, a court considering the application of the threshold test may need to bear in mind the dynamic nature of the law enforcement investigations provided for, and that that may in turn require the evaluation of the factual matrix not to be backward-looking only, or confined to review of the original decision. The court may have to examine afresh, by considering an evolving picture and updated evidence, whether it can now be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting - or not." 7 .40 As can be deciphered from the foregoing decision, the Court ought to examine if, by the investigations so far carried out, there is still evidence which can satisfy it that there are still reasonable grounds to sustain the investigating officer's initial suspicion that the seized property was derived or acquired from corrupt practices. In doing so , the Court ought to consider the complexity of the investigation by evaluating the facts so far known to it. Therefore, I hold that each case ought to be determined on its merits. • J44 7.41 In the present case, the Respondent's basis for freezing the Applicant's bank account was that the Applicant received funds from Grizzly Mining Limited for the purported sale of Bisma Investment Limited's mining licence to Pridegems Mining Limited, a subsidiary of Grizzly Mining Limited. 7.42 The Respondent suspected the said funds to have b een proceeds of crime. It was on that basis that the Respondent, with a warrant, seized the Applicant's bank account in which the said funds are held. The Respondent launched a n investigation to ascertain whether or not payment of the necessary taxes was made for the transaction by the Applicant. Consequently, the Respondent wrote a letter to the Zambia Revenue Authority to confirm whether the Applicant paid all the necessary taxes . 7.43 On his part, the Applicant furnished the Respondent with the Tax Assessment Report and Property Transfer Tax Clearance Certificate, which was issued by the Zambia Revenue Authority to him, to show that Bisma Investm ent Limited • J45 complied with its tax obligation 1n respect of the sale of its mining licence to Pridegems Mines Limited. 7.44 The Respondent asserted that investigations have not been concluded in the matter, because, despite having written to the Zambia Revenue Authority requesting all relevant documents relating to tax compliance, no response has been received. The Respondent contended that the said response is necessary to corroborate the documents which were furnished to it by the Applicant. Lack of receipt of response from the Zambia Revenue Authority on tax compliance, relating to the said sale of the mining licence, is the only reason the Respondent advanced for its failure to conclude investigations. 7.45 It is not in dispute that the Applicant's bank account has remained frozen for a period of more than sixteen months. The basis of the Respondent's continued freezing of the account is that the matter is still under investigation. The investigations relate to whether or not Bisma Investment Limited complied with tax obligations. • J46 7.46 As mentioned earlier, the Applicant provided the Respondent with all relevant documents relating to the payment of taxes to the Zambia Revenue Authority. The Respondent still awaits a response from the Zambia Revenue Authority. Zambia Revenue Authority, like the Respondent, is a government institution. I hold that a response from the Zambia Revenue Authority on whether or not Bisma Investment Limited paid all the necessary taxes cannot take more than sixteen months to be given, when such information is readily available. 7.4 7 It is my considered view that the continued seizure of the Applicant's property by the Respondent, for such a long time, for the reasons given, cannot be said to be a temporary custody of the Applicant's property . I hold, therefore, that the continued freezing of the Applicant's bank account, purportedly for investigation, for an indefinite period, undeniably amounts to appropriation of the Applicant's property by the State through a warrant of seizure. J47 7.48 Accordingly, I order that the warrant of seizure placed on the Applicant's ZANACO Bank Account No . 0510411200235 be discharged forthwith, and the Applicant is hereby given access to his bank a ccount. 7.49 Concerning the Applicant's claim for damages for the deprivation of the property right, I refuse to grant the same, because the warrant of seizure was not invalid after the expiry of the fourteen days of its issue. Each party shall bear own costs. . 7 .50 Leave to appeal is granted. ~zoz Nnr £ l