Gregoire’s Company Limited v Payet ((SCA 19/2025) [2025] (Arising in CS 112/2022) (15 December 2025)) [2025] SCCA 36 (15 December 2025)

contents of #navigation-content will be placed in [data-offcanvas-body] for tablet/mobile screensize and #navigation-column for desktop screensize. Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [{"id": "h1_1", "type": "h1", "title": "IN THE COURT OFAPPEAL OF SEYCHELLES", "children": []}, {"id": "h1_2", "type": "h1", "title": " JUDGMENT", "children": []}, {"id": "h1_3", "type": "h1", "title": "Background facts", "children": []}] IN THE COURT OFAPPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (15 December 2025) SCA 19/2025 (Arising in CS 112/2022) In the Matter Between Gregoire's Company Limited (rep. by Ms. Edith Wong/ And Brigitte Payet (rep. by Mr. Guy Ferley) Appellant Respondent Neutral Citation: Before: Summary: Delivered: Gregoire’s Company Limited v Payet (SCA 19/2025) [2025] (Arising in CS 112/2022) (15 December 2025) Gunesh-Balaghee, Sharpe-Phiri, Sichinga JJA Civil trespass — Article 1382 — credlbility of witnesses 15 December 2025 The appeal is dismissed with costs. ORDER JUDGMENT GUNESH-BALAGHEE JA (Sharpe-Phiri, Sichinga JJA, concurring) This is an appeal against a judgment of the Supreme Court whereby it dismissed the plaint lodged by the appellant (then plaintiff) against the respondent (then defendant) and the motion for injunctive relief in MA 416/2023 applied for by the appellant and also discharged the order of interim injunction granted against the respondent in MA 236/2022. Background facts The appellant is a company with a share capital of 1000 shares of which 999 shares are held by Grégoire Payet, and the remaining one share is held by his daughter, Brigitte Payet, the respondent. In its plaint lodged before the Supreme Court, the appellant alleged that: it owns a hotel known as “La Digue Lodge” on the island of La Digue. The hotel is situated on several parcels of land and, on one of the parcels namely LD23, there is a building known as the “Manager's House”. on 5 September 2020, the respondent entered the hotel, began to “cause disturbances with the staff’ and created a commotion on the hotel premises; as a result, the appellant, through its lawyer, issued a letter dated 21 September 2020 informing the respondent that she no longer had any permission to come onto the hotel's premises, except as a visitor or with its permission; in the evening of 30 October 2020, contrary to the letter, the respondent entered the Manager's House and refused to vacate it when aslced to do so by an employee of the appellant; the respondent left the laotel and the Manager's House at a date and tlme unknown to the appellant, but she returned on 6 July 2021 with several other persons, demanding to have her belonglngs brought to the Manager's House; she insulted and threatened the appellant’s employees and caused a commotion on the hotel premises requiring the intervention of the police; on 19 August 2022, the respondent agaln entered the hotel without the permission of the appellant and, contrary to the letter, caused the locks on the office door to be changed so that she alone could have access thereto; on 26 August 2022, the respondent called one of the appellant’s employees and verbally assaulted her and she also insulted Grégoire Payet who is one of the appellant's directors; on 27 August 2022, she entered the reception area of the hotel and started swearing and causing disruptions, forcefully entered Grégoirc Payet's office and insulted him in the presence of other staff and entered into a shopping complex known as “Grégoire's Shopping Complex” and made disparaging remarlis about Grégoire Payet's employees; and the actions of the respondent on 5 September 2020, 6 July 2021 and 27 August 2022 drew the attention of the hotel clients and guests. The appellant claimed that “the actions of the respondent amount to the faute of trespass” and particularised the faute as follows at paragraph 12 of the plaint: appearing on the hotel's premises without permission; occupying the Manager's House without permission; failing to leave the Manager's House when asked; changing the locks on the office door; e, insulting the members of staff of the appellant; and f. causing a commotion at the hotel premises. The appellant alleged that it had suffered loss and damage as it faced inconvenience in dealing with the respondent and sustained reputational damage. It claimed SCR 100,000 as damages with interest and costs from the respondent and sought an order that the respondent be declared a trespasser on the appellant's premises and be prohibited from entcring thereon. 7 In a gist, the case for the respondent was that, prior to her being unlawfully removed in July 2020, she was also a director of the appellant company. The Manager's House had always been used and treated as the family home by her family members, including her father and herself. It was the family house in which she grew up and which she had continuously occupied ostensibly with the permission of her father. The alleged disturbances were merely an argument between herself and her father and a responsc to the assistant manager of the hotel who had disturbed her in her house. On S September 2020, she was entering the family home which she had been occupying since 2017 when, Emmanuella Hassan, the appellant's assistant hotel manager attempted to prevent her from accessing her home. She refused to vacate the Manager's House as she had been occupying it since 2017 with her father's consent. There were a number of miscellaneous applications which were made by the parties but which are not relevant for the purposes of the present appeal. However, for the sake of completeness, I find it relevant to set them out below: on 14 October 2022, the appellant (then applicant), relying on the same facts as set out in the plaint, lodged an application for an injunction against the respondent ( MA 236/2022); in a ruling delivered on 27 April 2023 ([2023] SCSC 319 MA 236/2022), Judge Esparon declined to grant the injunction and dismissed the application with costs; on 29 December 2023, the appellant (then applicant) again sought an injunction from the Court against the respondent (MA 416/2023). The orders sought were as follows: an order of injunction preventing the respondent from accessing the appellant's premises; or in the alternative, an order of injunction requiring the respondent to act in a reasonable manner at all times whilst on the appellant's premises and that only she be allowed on the premises; on 16 January 2024, the respondent gave an undertaking that she will go through the property of the hotel only to access the Manager's House, will not interfere with the management of the hotel or staff and keep peace with the management and owner of the hotel and staff. She was also allowed to have visitors provided they also complied with the above conditions; on 13 March 2024, since the learned Judge was satisfied that, ex facie the affidavit of the appellant, thcie was “a continuous breach” by the respondent and the respondent had not yet filed her affidavit in reply as ordered by the Court, he granted an interim order Of injunction against the respondent ([2024a SCSC MA 416/2023 (13 March 2024)), prohibiting and preventing her from accessing the appellant's premises; on 21 Marcla 2024, the respondent lodged an application to set aside the interim order of injunction and sought leave to file her reply (MA 71/2024) arising from CS 112 of 2022); on the same day, the respondent filed a second applicstion for an urgent hearing on the application to set aside the interim order of injunction granted on 13 March 2024, on the ground that she had no home to reside in since she had had to rent her home situated in Carana, Mahe to earn an income because the appellant had refused to pay her any employment dues and all her clothes were located in the Manager's House; on 2 May 2024, the respondent lodged a third applicatlOli (MA 101/2024) seeming leave to file a further affidavit in view of the fact that she had made searches at the Land Registry and found that the road used by her to access the Managers House does not belong to the appellant, but to the Government of Seychelles; the miscellaneous applications were fixed for mention to be put in shape on a number of occasions and, on 19 February 2025, the Court granted a last opportunity to the parties to file their written submissions within one month before the judgment which was fixed to 16 May 2025. However, since the judgment was not ready on that date, it was delivered on 12 June 2025. The learned Judge dismissed the claim for damages. He found that the appellant had failed to prove that the respondent had committed the /au/e of trespass. He also found that there was no evidence that the respondent's presence or conduct was lntended to cause damage or that it constituted unlawful trespass and that the appellant had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that it had suffered damage being inconvenience and reputational ham as allcged in the plaint, The learned Judge also found that the prerequisites for granting an injunction had not been established to a degree necessary to justify an injunctive relief and dismissed the interim injunction that had been granted in MA 236 of 2022 as well as the miscellaneous application in MA 416 of 2023. The appellant is appealing against the judgment on three grounds which I need not reproduce at this stage and is seeking an order that the respondent pays SCR 50,000 to it. I have duly considered the heads of argument, authorities referred to by the parties and the submissions of Counsel. I do not propose to reproduce the submissions in my judgment and shall refer to them when considering the different grounds of appeal. The present case turns on whether the respondent was trespassing on the property belonging to the appellant and, if so, whether there was any damage sustaltied by the appellant as a result of the trespass. The Seychellois law of civil trespass Trespass generally occurs when an individual intentionally enters or remains on the property of another without per-mission. Trespass law protects the actual physical control and exclusive possession of property from unwarranted interference. The core elements of trespass to property (land) involve an unauthorized, intentional, and direct physical intrusion onto land in someone else's possession, In the case of Thailamai Karpagam Senthil I£umar v James Low-Kion Low-Hang [2023] SCCA 44 (25 August 2023), the Court of Appeal gave guidance as to the Seychellois law of civil trespass as follows: “The Seychellois law of civil trespass f14] As I have alluded to above, it i.s necessary to set out the law oj civil trespass in Seychelles at this juncture. While English common law developed the law of trespass from a limited approach linked to its unique procedural, writ-centered history to constitute tortious liability in specific and nominate torts such as negligence, detinue, and nuisance, French law developed broad and general provisions of liabili g› through the concept of fault on the part of the torffeasor. Hence, the nominate torts af negligence, trecpass or nuisance are not specifically provided for in the Civil Code,- instead, they are encapsufated in the general delict provisions under Artfcfe 1382. The complication arising from our laws of trespass is the often misunderstood connection between the definition of ownership as contained in Article 544, the principles of delictual liability in Article 1382 and those of neighbourhood obligations as developed in Seychellois jurisprudence (see Alherl & Anor v Vie. He, Grc•ei1 v IIiillocl‹’, and Desaubin v United Concrete Products (Sc•yclielle.) I imited). [16] I yause to obset ve float Seychelle.s Isa.s develof›e‹l its own princif›les and regime ‹›f trouble. Ju voisinafe within the j’rainewoi'k o/’Arti‹ le 1382 and vol as a separate can. e of’action derived [rom French juri. prudence as stated in tht› ‹'u,se of sunset Beach (Pty) Ltd v Dorsi Raihl & Anor. The Mauritian jurisprudence cited in Sunset Beach on this issue only serves to illustrate the obligations of neighbours towards each other and standaFds for permissible inconveniences. fI 7] While these principles and obligations cannot be confiated, a fair summary of how they interface with each can be stated as follows. the rights established by Article 544 of the Civil Code are limited by the obligation not to cause harm to others, but when such Jamage is caused one can obtain redress under the regime of Article 1382. [18] To succeed in such an action, the claimant has to prove fault, damage and a causal linlc belween the tortfeasor and the damage. Specifically, the rules regarding trespass are derived front the Roman actio negatoria, an action to protect property rights.” [emphasis ours] It can be gathered front the above that trespass in itself is not an actionable wrong under Seychellois law, but that a claim for damages may be brought as a result of an act of trespass provided certain conditions are met. It is of interest to note that, in the case of Itumar (supra), Mr. Low-Haiag, the plaintiff before the trial court, laad brought an action based on f'aute against Mr. I€umar and his wife. One of the heads of claim of the plaintiff was for damages in the sum of SCR 200,000 for trespass to his property. At paragraph 40 of the above judgment, the Court stated: “[40] In light of Seychellois law, the damages, as particularised, are problematic on many levels. First, one’s right to ownership or privacy makes any unjustified entry to one’s property theoreticall y a trespass, even if no damage occurs. However, as trecpass r$ pursued as a delictual claim, the three elements af delict must be yraved, namely: fault, damage, and a causal link between the tortfeasar an J the dazriage. Whfle fault and the causal fink have been established in the present case, there fs scant evidence of the damage. The case of Cresle v Sophola & Or is highly instructive on this point and re/ei›anf to the present case. Perera J as he then way stated.’ “As regards "trespass to land“, not every entry span the property of another, gives right to a Jelictuol claim. Delictrtal liability is based on damages caused by the «cf or OznfSSion of a person. Hence, mere entry for a lawful purpose is not actionable. Sa also, is entry tvi/h notice ar with express ar implied authority. Trespass is an invasion of privacy or of proprietary rights over property. HoweveF, if the dominant purpose of the entry is to cause harm or damage to the property, even if it appears to have been done in the exercise of a legitimate interest, it would constitute a fault within the meaning ofArticle 1382 (3) of the Civil Code.” [emphasis ours] It can be gleaned from the above extract that for a claim in damages bascd on trespass to succeed, the plaintiff must, firstly, establish that there was an unauthorized intrusion onto his property. Secondly, the plaintiff must prove that lie sustained damages as a result of the act of trespass and, thirdly, that the damages sustained were due to the act of the trespasser. Before turning to the grounds of appeal, I must highlight that, in its plaint, the appellant has particularised the acts of trespass as follows: (a) appearing on the hotel's premises without permission; (b) occupying the Manager’s House without permission; (c) failing to leave the Manager's House when asked; (d) changing the locks On the office door; (e) insulting the members of staff of the appellant; and (II causing a commotion at the hotel premises. As stated in the case of Ciresle v Sophola & Anor CS (447/1999) {2002] SCSC 7 (1 July 2002) by Petera J, “[t]respass is ay invasion of privacy or of proprietary rights over property. I fail to see how the acts particularised under paragraph (e), namely, insulting members of staff of the appellant can be said to constitute an invasion of privacy or of proprietary rights over property or fall within the ambit of the definitlon of trespass. Before turning to the grounds of appeal, 1 must also turn to another issue which goes to the root of this case. The link between the appellant and Gregoire's Company (Proprietary) Limited Learned Counsel for the respondent argued that the present action was brought by the appellant “Gregoire's Company Limited”, yet, ex facie item 1, which was produced by witness Moutia, a director of the appellant, the land registration certificate of official search for parcel LD 23 on which the Manager's House is situated shows that the land parcel belongs to “Gregoire's Company (Proprietary) Limited”. Witness Moutia explained that the above two companies are the same and that “/t wet moved from Gregoire’s Company Proprietary Limited to Gregoire Company Limited about a year or so”. Learned Counsel for the appellant undertook to caII a witness to clarify the issue as to whether the two companies are the same. However, no such witness was called so that I am in the dark as to whether the two companies are indeed the same. It is undlsputed that the hotel is situated on several parcels of land, blot, ln so far as the Manager's House is concerned, the evidence adduced by the appellant showed that it was found on land parcel LD23. There was therefore clearly a missing limb in the evidence before the trial Court as to the rights of the appellant over land parcel LD 23 and consequently over the Manager's House. As stated above, the particulars of the trespass as per paragraph 12. b. and c, of the appellant's plaint are that the respondent was occupying the Manager's House without permission and that she failed to leave the Manager ’s House when as1‹ed. Given the missing linlt referred to above, the appellant's claim that the respondent trespassed onto its property when she occupied the Manager's House or refused to leave same is clearly unfounded. To sum up therefore, the only acts of trespass which the trial Court should have considered were those which were particularised as follows under paragraph 12 of the plaint: “a. appearing on the hotel's premises without permission,’ d. changing the locks on the office door,' and f, causing a commotion at the hotel premises.” Having dealt with the above issues, 1 shall now turn to the grounds of appeal. Ground 1 Ground 1 reads as follows: “The learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the Respondent had a right to occupy the house because she had received permission from her father to do so and therefore could not be a trespussen but failed to consider the separate corporate personality between the Appellant and the Respondent ’s father, the latter who is a shareholder of the Appellant.” In the light of what I have stated above regarding the failure of the appellant to establish that it was the owner of the land parcel where the Manager's House is situated, there is clearly no merit in the above ground. However, even if the land parcel on which the Manager's House was situated belonged to the appellant (which the evidence on record fails to establish), the learned Judge wlao proceeded on that basis was not wrong to have held that the respondent had a right to occupy the Manager's House. I say so for the following reasons. There was before the learned Judge the ilnrebutted and unchallenged testimony of the respondent that the hotel was being run as a family business by the respondent's family. She had been staying in the Manager's House since 2017 when she came back to help her father rim the business. Her brother who had been in the Manager's House wanted to move back and her father told her to stay there. She never had any contract to live in the Manager's I-rouse and, although she was removed as director in July 2020, slae continued to live there. It is amply clear from the above that, if believed, the respondent had a licence to stay in the Manager's House. In this respect, it is relevant to point out that the respondent and her father were the only two directors of tlae a 1°e1lant company prior to July 2020. An authorisation from her father to stay in the Manager's House was therefore akin to an authorisation from the appellant company itse11\ The learned Judge, who had the undeniable advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses depose, found the respondent to be a credible witness and accepted her testimony that she had been staying ln the house with her father's authorisation and rejected the testimony of the appellant’s witnesses on that score. The case for the appellant was that, although the respondent may have had a licence to stay ln the Manager's House before 21 September 2020, the said licence was revoked through the letter dated 21 September 2020 sent by it to the respondent (Exhibit P1) (hereinafter referred to as “the September letter”). It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that, unless the respondent proved that she had permission from the appellant company to remain in the Manager’s House, the learned Judge could not have concluded that she had a right to occupy the Manager's House without considering questions of ownership of the Manager's House. A perusal of the September letter shows that the appellant made reference to an incident involving the respondent which had occurred on the hotel's premises on 5 September 2020 and warned her that her “behaviour over that weekend was unacceptable” and that since she was no longer in a managerial post, she should cease to interact with the employees “to ensure that the situation does not repeat itself'. She was also informed that she “nay visit the hotel as any visitor may be permitted”, but was not a11o\red to treat the hotel as if it were her own nor cause any interruptions nor disturbances”. The use of the Manager's House by the respondent was at the heart of the dispute between the parties. However, it is significant io note that the letter through which the appellant alleges the respondent's licence to stay in the Manager's House was revolted does not even allude to the Manager's House, let alone inform her that her licence to use same was revoked. The letter can hardly be construed as one whereby the licence to use the Manager's House was being revoked. For all the reasons given above, I find that the learned Judge neither erred in law, nor on the facts, in finding that the respondent had a right to occupy the Manager's House because she hud received permission from her father to do so and therej'ore could not be a trespasser without considering that the respondent's father‘ and the appellant were two different persons in law, There is no merit in ground 1 whlcli is accordingly dismlssed. Gi-ound 2 Ground 2 reads as follows: “The learned trial JuJge erred in fact in hnding that the memos and letters issued by the Appellant to the Respondent preventing the latter from accessing its house constituted harassment b) the Appellant despite acceptance of ownership of the house by the Respondent.” Before addressing tlae above ground, I must, at the outset, point out that the learned Judge did not find that the inenaos and letters issued by tlae appellant to the respondent constituted harassment, but rather that the memos, visiting the respondent at the Manager's House and asking her to leave, as well as stopping her at the gate, amounted to harassment. 43, Witness Moutia, testified that the Manager's House is situated in the middle of the hotel complex and that, to access it, olae has to go through the hotel premises as there is no other way to access it. It follows that the respondent who had been living in the Manager's House from 2017 must have had access through the hotel pi-ernises to the Manager's House for years. The evidence on record shows that the respondent continued to llve in the Manager's House after July 2020 when she was no longer a director of the company. As explained above, although the appellant sent the September letter to the respondent purporting to prevent her from using the Manager's House, the licence which she had to use the said house was not revolved by the said letter. It is relevant to observe that, just as the letter made no reference to the Manager's House, it also made no reference to the fact that the respondent should stop itsing the hotel's premises to access the Manager's House, Witness Hassan testified that there were several memos which wei‘e issued by the appellant to its staft, one memo was posted at the staff entrance and it was also distributed around to the staff. The memo was to tile effect that the respondent was no longer allowed on the hotel's property. The appellant was evidently aware that the respondent was still living in the Manager's House which had been her home for years and that she had no other way to access 1t Other than by going through the hotel's premises, and yet, without in effect revoking her licence or giving proper notice that she could no longer rise the Manager's House or access it through the hotel's property, it issued the memo, Taking all the above into consideration, I am of the considered view that the learned Judge was perfectly entitled to find that the memos ..,issued by the Appellant to the Respondent preventing the latter from accessing its house constituted harassment by the Appellant. For all the reasons given above, I find that ground 2 is devoid of any merit. I accordingly dismiss ground 2. Groand 3 50, Ground 3 is reproduced below: “The learned trial Judge erred in fact in determining that there was no credible evidence that the Respondent ’s presence was intended to cause damage or constituted an unlawful trespass and binding thnt the Appellant ’s witnesses were not credible.” Before proceeding further, it is important at this stage to reiterate that the plaint particularised the faute of trespass as covering the following acts of the respondent: “a. appearing on the hotel's premises v›ithout permission,' occupying the Manager’s House without permission,’ failing to leave the Manager’s House when asked; changing the locks on the once door,' insulting the members ofstaffoj the plaintiff,’ / causing a commotion at the Hotel premises”. I have already ruled that insulting members of staff does not constitute trespass, so that I shall now proceed to analyse the evidence before the trial court with regard to the acts referred to under the other sub-paragraphs of paragraph 12. In so far as the acts referred to under sub-paragraphs b. and c. are concerned, 1t is important to emphasise that the learned Judge found that the respondent had a right to occupy the Manager's House as she had her father's consent to do so, which I have found eatller was tantamount to a licence granted to her by the company. Moreover, I have also found above that there was insufficient evidence before the trial Coutt to show what were the appellant's rights over the Manager's House which, as per the evidence produced by the appellant itself, was found on land parcel LD 23 which belonged to another legal entity “Gregoire's Company (Proprietary) bimlted. Although the learned Judge did not stake any finding regarding the appellant's riglat over the Manager's House, in the light of the above finding made by him that the respondent had her father's consent to stay in the Manager 's Nouse, the respondent was perfectly entitled to occupy the Manager's HouSe without any further permission and to refuse to leave the Manager's House when asked by the hotel staff, until the licence that she held was lawfully revoked. I shall deal with the acts of “appearing on the hotel’s premises without permission” (sub- paragraph a.) and “causing a commotion at the hotel premises” (sub-paragraph f.) together. In so far as the act of appearing at the hotel premises is concerned, since the only access to the Manager's House, which was in the middle of the hotel complex, was through the hotel's premises, it stands to reason that the respondent could not avoid being on the premises for the purpose of accessing the Manager's House. However, there was evidence before the trial Court tlaat the respondent not only accessed her premises through the hotel but was also involved in a number of incidents on thc hotel premises. I propose to consider each of the incidents in kim. Although the plaint refers to a disturbance caused by the respondent on 5 September 2020, where she allegedly entered the hotel and caused disturbances with the staff, and created a commotion, there was barely any evidence adduced by the appellant in this regard. At any rate, the case of the appellant was that she had no right to be on the hotel premises after the September letter (i.e., after 21 September 2020). Witness Hassan testified that, on 30 October 2020, the respondent entered the Manager's House and refused to leave when asked to do so by her. The respondent explained that, on that day, she came back from Matte where she had gone to meet hcr lawyers and she was in het house talking a bath when witness Hassan came there. Since the respondent had a licence to stay in the house and it ha4 not yet been revoked, she was perfectly entitled to stand her ground anti refuse to leave. Clearly, the respondent was not trespassing at that time and her act cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered to be for the purpose of causing damage. According to witness Hassan, tlae next incident which took place was when she was standing close to the main entrance tallting to her previous General Manager, Roland Georges. She stated that the respondent was accompanied by two persons and was bringing back her things to the Manager's house. She asserted that they were shouting and “throwing verbal stuff” around and that the fight was over access to the Manager's House. The respondent explained that she had been iia Mahe regarding a case and the Court had ruled that she could not be removed from her house, but all her personal belongings had been removed and they had ended being on her aunt's veranda as she had aslied to keep them. It was as a result of the above that she was returning to the Manager's House with her personal belongings together with her brother, She tiever swore or yelled at them but simply told them she would go to the police. According to the respondent, she was simply accessing the hotel premises to gain access to the Manager's House. As already explained above, this cannot be considered to be an act of ti‘espass or an act whereby she intended to cause damage to the appellant. The last incident in respect of which evidence was adduccd was one which took place on 27 August 2022. The respondent is said to have entered her father’s office; she was aggressive with him, she then went at the reception where there were two guests while yelling and, on being removed by security officers, she finally cycled to Gregoire shop which is found on the hotel premises and made disparaging remarks about her father's employees. The respondent asserted that she went to see her father because of the memo which had been issued to prevent her from accessing the hotel premises. I agree that, during the above incident, the respondent committed an act of trespass as the September letter had already been issued to her, clearly stating that she was not allowed on the hotel premises, and, unlike what obtained with iegard to the Manager's House, she had no licence to be in her father's office, the reception or the slaop. I shall for the sake of convenience refer to the above incident as the August 2022 incident and shall return to it later in this judgment. As regards “changing the loclz on the office door,’ ” (sub-paragraph d,), there was scant evidence from witness Hassan who simply stated that one of the appellant’s cx-einpIoyees, Barry Pool, had been given instructions to change the lock on one of the doors of an asset of the hotel and instead of giving the lieys to tlae appellant, he gave them to the respondent. Witness Hassan stated that it was the respondent who gave instructions to him. Witness Moutia also deposed in this tegaTd, but his account was slightly different. He stated that Barry Pool opened the Manager's House for the respondent contrary to the appellant's instructions. However, the respondent stated that the locli was brolien when Barry Pool opened the door for her when she went to the office. The respondent clearly had no authorisation to go to the offtce which was the appellant's property. The above act would therefore qualify as a trespass. The learned Judge was faced with two versions regarding the acts of trespass as particularised at paragraph 12 of the plaint, that of the witnesses for the appellant and that of the respondent. After analysing the evidence on record, he preferred the version of the respondent and he made a finding of fact that there was no credible evidence that the respondent's prcsence on the premises or her conduct was intended to cause damage. Given that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, it was best placed to assess the veracity and reliability of their evidence. As aptly stated in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. (1955) 1 All E. R. 326, 328): “... the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, whereas the appeal court is denied that adv‹sntage and only has before it a written transcript of their evidence. No one would seek to minimise the advantage enjoyed by the trial judge in determining any question whether a witness is, or is not, trying to tell weal be believes to be the truth, and it is only in rare cases that an appeal court could be satisfied that the trial judge has reached a wrong decision aboyt the credibiliiy of a witness. But the advantage of seeing and hearing c witness gocs beyond that. The trial judge may be led to a conclusion about the reliability of a witness's memory or his powers of observation hy material not available to an appeal court. Evidence may read well in print hut may be rightly Jiscounted by the trial judge or, on the other hand, he may rightly attach importance to evidence which reads badly in print. Of course, the weight o,f the other evidence may be such as to show that the judge must have formed a wrong impression, but an appeal court is, and should be, slow to reverse any finding which appears to be based oy any such considerations.” The trial court remains sovereign in its appreciation of the facts adduced and its assessment of witnesses called during the proceedings. The advantage that the trial court has over an appellate court with respect to the assessment of witnesses will only be interfered with on appeal if, on the face of the record, the assessment is found to be perverse. In the present case, I have no reason to interfere with the learned judge's above finding of fact which was not perverse. The leaned Judge also made a finding that there was no evidence that there was any trespass. Determinlng whether the acts of the respondent amount to trespass is a question of law. I do not agree with the above finding for the simple reason that, pursuant to the September letter, the respondent only had the authorisation to be on the hotel premises as a visitor and, unlike what obtained with regard to the Manager's House, she had no licence to be in her father's office, the reception or the shop. The same applies to the changing of the office lock. 71, The case for the appellant was that it suffered inconvenience and reputational damage due to the trespass. The witnesses for the appellant testified that when the respondent went into the office of Gregoire Payet there were only the hotel staff present there and there were 2 guests near the reception, while there was no evidence adduced as to whether any persons other than the hotel employees were present in the shop. Witness Hassan stated that the appellant faced inconvenience as lts employees had to go to thc police several times, however, there was no evidence on record to establish that any inconvenience which may have been caused to the appellant was specifically due to the August 2022 incident or the breaking of the lock. Moreover, she admitted that the profits of the appellant were not affected by the August 2022 incident and that the hotel did not have any adverse reviews following the sald incident. However, although the learned Judge was wrong to have found that there was no trespass in so far as the Augitst 2022 incident and the breaking of the locli are concerned, he was in the end perfectly entitled to find that the appellant's witnesses laad failed to substantiate the claims for inconvenience and reputational damage in a sufficient manner and to dismiss the plaint. For the reasons given above, the learned Judge's finding that there was no trespass in so far as the August 2022 incident and the breaking of the locI‹ are concerned was incorrect, Ground 3 is therefore allowed to that extent only and is otherwise dismlssed. 75, To conclude, therefore, although the learned Judge made a wrong finding as stated above, he was perfectly right in concludlng that the appellant had failed to establish its case under Article 1382 and to dismiss the plaint. 76. This appeal is therefore dismissed, with costs. I concur: concur: Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025.