Harambee Sacco Society Limited v Lawrence Njagi Mbungu, Benard Mwawaza Mwakitawa & Antony Kiiru Mbuthia [2016] KEHC 4612 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO.  484 OF 2015

HARAMBEE SACCO SOCIETY LIMITED ……………...…….APPLICANT

VERSUS

LAWRENCE  NJAGI MBUNGU ……………………….1ST RESPONDENT

BENARD  MWAWAZA MWAKITAWA ……....………..2ND RESPONDENT

ANTONY KIIRU  MBUTHIA ……………………....……3RD RESPONDENT

RULING

1. By a Notice of Motion dated 4th November  2015  and filed on  the same day, the applicant Harambee Sacco Society  Limited seeks  from this court   orders for  enlargement  and extension  of the time within which  the applicant   may file   an appeal against the  ruling of the magistrate’s  court (Nchoe Ag SRM)  delivered  on 25th September, 2015 to fourteen  days from the  date  of determination  of this application. That the court  be pleased to grant   exparte conservatory orders of  stay of the proceedings  in CMCC 1050 of 2015  pending the  interpartes hearing  and determination of this application.  Costs of the application be provided for.

2. The application is predicated on  the grounds on the face of the application and supported by an affidavit sworn by Glady’s  Gichohi  the applicant’s  Head of  Legal and Company Secretary.  The said affidavit  basically contends that the delay in  filing the  appeal following the ruling of 25th September  2015  by the trial magistrate dismissing  the applicant’s preliminary objection (“ the decision”) was due to the fact that  the advocate  had to inform the  applicant who had to convene a  Board of Directors  meeting  to discuss  the decision and reach a consensus  on the way  forward  and hence the  time for  appeal lapsed  in between.

3. Further, that the  appeal as  intended   has good  chances of  success and is meritorious: that  the respondents  will not  suffer  any prejudice  which cannot  be compensated  by way of costs.  That it is in the best interest  of justice that  the application  be allowed to  enable  the applicant pursue its  right of appeal and that the  application had been brought without  inordinate delay.  The affidavit  annexes  a draft  Memorandum of Appeal setting  out  6 grounds  of appeal.

4. The application is opposed by  the respondents through a replying  affidavit sworn by Ian Maina  Mbuthia advocate on  26th January  2016.  Mr Maina deposes contending  that the application lacks merit  and is only intended  to deny the  respondents the right to  speedy trial enshrined in the Constitution.  That the applicant’s application  is an abuse of the  court process and is meant to frustrate  the cases  and only being  used as a  delaying  factor; that  the case  proceeding  in the magistrate’s  court  will not prejudice the applicant  and that  the appeal has no  chance of  success.

5. The application  was argued  before me orally on 27th January  2016  with Mr  Odundo submitting  on behalf  of  the applicant is  whilst  Mr Maina  Mbuthia  submitted  on behalf of the respondents.

6. The advocates rival submissions  largely mirrored  the grounds  and supporting affidavit  and the replying  affidavit while reiterating the same with  Mr Odundo maintaining that the application  was filed  without inordinate  delay as  soon as  instructions to appeal  were received  by the applicant’s  Board of  Directors.  That in any event  any delay  can  adequately be compensated  by an award of costs since  the intended  appeal is meritorious .

7. In opposition to the application, Mr Maina  Mbuthia  submitted  that the  delay  was inordinate  as it could  not have  taken 30 days   for the Board to sit  and decide  whether or  not to file an appeal.  Further, that the lower court had  jurisdiction to hear the dispute.  In addition, it  was contended that  had   the impugned  ruling  been attached  to this application the court would  appreciate the reasoning of the  trial magistrate.

8. None of the parties   advocates  relied on any decided cases.  I have anxiously  considered  the application  by the applicant, the grounds, supporting affidavit, draft  Memorandum of Appeal  and the replying affidavit  together with the brief  submissions by the parties advocates.

9. Whereas I quite agree that a party’s right of appeal  should not be  impeded  some delay which  can be  explained to the satisfaction of the court, I took the  liberty  at the close of the  submissions to ask the  applicant’s advocate  whether  he sought  leave of the court  below to  appeal against  that  decision  which arose  as a result of the applicant raising a  preliminary objection to the entire  suit to the effect  that the trial  magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear and determine  a dispute  which  was governed  by the provisions  of the Co-operative  Societies   Act ( Section 76 thereof).  The  said Section of the law  ousts the jurisdiction of  the courts in entertaining  disputes  between Co-operative  Societies  and their members  or past members  or  between or  among members  and or past members   of the Co-operative Society.  The Act  confers jurisdiction to hear such  disputes to a Co-operative  Societies  Tribunal.

10. Regrettably the  ruling of the  trial court  which the applicant’s Head of Legal  Ms Gladys  Gichohi the  deponent  of the supporting affidavit  deposes  at paragraph 2 thereof  read  was  never annexed  to the said  affidavit.  It is therefore   difficult  for this court to tell  precisely what the  reasoning  of the trial magistrate   was  in her decision wherein she  dismissed   the preliminary  objection  raised by the applicant.

11. Nonetheless, from the  draft  Memorandum  of Appeal, this court  has been able to gauge  that the applicant  raised a Preliminary Objection  on the trial  court’s jurisdiction to hear  and determine the dispute which Preliminary Objection  was dismissed.

12. There is no evidence that  the Preliminary Objection   was raised by  way of  a chamber summons  or Notice of Motion, but since  a Preliminary Objection  can  be raised   at any time  and even by  an oral or written notice, in the absence of  any evidence  that it  was  taken  by way of a written  application, this court  presumes   that it  was  taken by way  of a notice of preliminary  objection   and canvassed  by  the parties’  advocates.

13. The next  question would be, would  such a decision be appealable as of right without first  seeking leave of the trial  court to appeal against  that decision?

14. This court appreciates  that it  has the  jurisdiction to hear  and determine  appeals  from  decisions  of subordinate  courts, tribunals, bodies or authorities as espoused  in Article  165  of the Constitution  and any other written law.

15. On the other hand, a party who  desires  to exercise  the right  of appeal  whether  by way of seeking extension  of time which has lapsed or directly  upon the  impugned  decision  being made, must   and has  a duty  to demonstrate   under what law  that right to be  heard on an appeal is   conferred or  accrued and if not, show that  the leave  by the trial court has been granted  to file an appeal.

16. The above  strong position is  supported by the decision of the Court of Appeal in  Nyutu  Agrovet Ltd V Airtel Networks  Ltd [2015] e KLR  wherein  the Court of Appeal held that  leave to appeal  does not constitute  the right to appeal.  The right must precede leave.  The same  court cited with  approval Ringera J ( as he then  was ) in Nova Chemicals  Ltd V Alcon International Ltd  HC Miscellaneous  Application 1124/2002 wherein  the learned Judge   pronounced  that :

“ The point of departure  must be the recognition that the right of appeal, with or without  leave, must be  conferred  by statute  and the same is  never to be implied”.

17. The Court of Appeal then  went  on to state that:

“……….and even  Section 75 of the Civil Procedure  Act giving  this court jurisdiction to hear  appeals from the High Court, should  be read  to mean that  these provisions  of law also  confer  the right of appeal on  the litigants.  The power  or  authority to hear an appeal  is not  synonymous  with the  right of appeal which  a litigant  should demonstrate  that  a given  law gives  him or her to come  before this court.  To me, even  if jurisdiction and the right  of  appeal may  be referred  to side by side or in the same  breath, the two terms  do not  mean oneand the same  thing.

It is not in dispute that jurisdiction  as well as the  right of appeal  must be  conferred  by law, not by implication or inference.  If   he power and  authority  for a court to  entertain  a matter (jurisdiction) is not  conferred  by the law then court  has no business  to entertain  the matter(see owners of motor vessel “ Lilian S”  V Caltex Oil (K) Ltd  [1989] KLR1. ”

18. It is  not in dispute  that the  intended  appeal arises  from the preliminary objection ruling  made  by Honourable  Nchoe Ag Senior Resident Magistrate.  Section 75  of the Civil Procedure Act  specific the orders  from which parties  have a right of appeal without  leave, which implies that in certain  other orders, a party  would require  leave of the  court to seek to file an  appeal.

19. That leave, it must be  understood, is not  the same  as leave to appeal out of the stipulated  statutory period  as espoused  in Section  79G of the Civil Procedure  Act.   It is the permission of the court that  made the order  allowing an appeal   to lie  to the appellate court.

20. My careful perusal of Section 75  of the Civil Procedure Act  reveals  that the  order dismissing  the preliminary   objection raised   by the applicant is not  listed  as one of those  orders which an aggrieved  party may file  an appeal challenging the decision   as a matter  of right.  That being the case.  Leave  of the court  that made  the order  was  necessary.  Since that decision (order is not  exempt  from leave as  provided for  under Order 43  Rule  6  of the Civil Procedure  Rules).

21. Without   leave of  the trial  court first  being  sought  and obtained, this court would  be acting in vain if it   was  to grant  the orders  sought  herein as  it is devoid  of the jurisdiction to hear the  intended appeal  even if it  was  to grant  leave extending  the  period within  which the  appeal  is to be filed.

22. A jurisdictional issue  is not  a matter  a procedural  technicality.  It goes  to the  root of the matter  at hand  and without jurisdiction, this court  would be  making  orders  which are  void ab initio ( see Owners of  Motor Vessel “ Lilian S” V Caltex  Oil (K) Ltd (supra) case.

23. The Court of Appeal, quite  recently again in Nairobi CA 86/2015 Peter Nyaga Murage  V Joseph Mutunga, pointing    to the applicant’s failure to seek  leave of court to file an  appeal from an order  held that:

“ Without  leave of the High court, the applicant  was not entitled to give  Notice  of Appeal where, as in this case, leave  to appeal is necessary  by dint of Section 75  of  the Civil Procedure Act  and Order 43  of the Civil Procedure Rules.  The procurement  of leave  to appeal is since  qua non to the lodging  of the Notice of  Appeal without leave, there  can be  no valid Notice of  Appeal.  And without a valid  Notice of Appeal, the jurisdiction of this court  is not properly invoked.  In short, an application  for stay in an intended  appeal against  an order  which  is appealable  only with leave  which has not  been sought  and obtained  is dead  in the water.”

24. An earlier  decision  by the  Court of Appeal in Kenya  Commercial Bank Ltd V Tony  Manaseh Esipiya  CA  105/98 further supports the position material to this application that :

“……….but having   chosen to raise  the limitation point by way of a preliminary objection under  no particular order under the  Civil Procedure Rules, an appeal  lay to this  court only  with the leave  of the  superior court  which  was  neither sought  not obtained.”

25. The Court of Appeal in the KCB  Ltd V Toney Manaseh  Esipiya (supra) case further cited with approval G.R. Mandaria V Rattam Singh [1965] EA 118 where  it  was  held that:

“  Where  a preliminary issue alleging misjoinder, limitation lack of jurisdiction or resjudicata  fails and  a suit  is permitted to proceed, no preliminary  decree  arises but  only an order, the  unsuccessful  party has a  right  of appeal with leave  and accordingly the appeal was incompetent  for want of  leave.”

26. Law JA at page 124  of the same decision expressed  himself thus:

“ The position is, in my opinion, clear: when a suit  is disposed of  on a preliminary  point, an appeal will lie  from the decree  dismissing  the suit, and where  an issue  such as  liability  is tried as a preliminary issue, and finally disposed  of at first instance, a preliminary decree arises which  an appeal lies; but where  a preliminary issue alleging  misjoinder, limitation, lack of jurisdiction or resjudicata  fails, no preliminary  decree  arises  from which the unsuccessful  party has  a right  of appeal.”

27. With the above   authoritative  and binding  decisions  in mind, I have no doubt that  the application   for extension  of time under  Section 79 G of the Civil Procedure Act  to file an appeal out of time  presupposes  that first, the  applicant has  an automatic right of appeal  from a decision/order  of the subordinate  court to the High Court and secondly, that time  for filing of that appeal could  be extended hence, the prayer  for enlargement  of that time to accommodate  the intended  appeal.  But that  is not  the scenario in this case  where there  was no  automatic  right of appeal and no leave  of the trial court  was sought and obtained  to lodge  an appeal from the ruling on  a  preliminary objection.  Had  that leave been granted  in the first instance , then this application for  leave to file  an appeal out of  time would  not arise.

28. It is  that initial  leave  of the trial court that  would  clothe   this court  with jurisdiction to consider any appeal.  In other words, the applicant as the unsuccessful party in the  preliminary objection raised  had  no right to appeal  against  that dismissal by the trial  court except  with leave of that court.

29. I reiterate  that a jurisdictional issue  is not   a procedural technicality curable by the application of Article  159 (2) (d) of the Constitution  since the said Article does not  oust  or confer  jurisdiction  and without  jurisdiction, a court of law acts in vain.  In Kakuta Maimai Hamisi V Persi Pesi  Tobiko and 2 Others[2013] e KLR  the Court of Appeal was categorical  that:

“ the right  of appeal goes to the jurisdiction and is so fundamental  that we are  unprepared  to hold that  absence  of statutory  donation or conferment  is a mere  procedural technicality to be  ignored  by parties  or a court by  pitching tent  at Article  159(2)  (d)  of the Constitution.  We  do not  consider Article  159(2) (d)  of  the Constitution  to be a panacea, nay, a general white wash,  that cures  and  mends   all ills, misdeeds and defaults of litigation”

30. The Court of Appeal  in Mumo Matemo V Trusted  Society of Human Rights  Alliance  & 5 Others CA 290/2012 comprising  a five Judge Bench warded that:

“ In our view it is a misconception  to claim, as it  has been in  recent times with increased  frequency that compliance   with rules of procedure  is antithetical  to  Article  159  of the Constitution  and the overriding   objective  principle  of Section 1A and 1B of  the Civil Procedure Act Cap 21 and Sections 3A  and 3B of the  Appellate  Jurisdiction Act ( Cap 9).  Procedure us also a hand maiden of just determination  of cases.”

31. Consequently, it is  my humble  view that  despite the  fact that none of the parties  hereto raised  this very  important  issue, this court  is deemed  and presumed  to know the law and   the court follows the law.  It must  therefore,  before  determining the merits of any matter or  cause before  it determine  whether it  has jurisdiction  to venture into the  merits territory since, as I have  previously held in Josephat  Muchiri Muiruri and Another V Yusuf Abdi Adan [2015] e KLR,………jurisdiction stands on a higher pedestal and in a more preemptory  position than procedure rules  and that the requirements  for leave to appeal as  was in  this matter is a jurisdictional issue. I can only reiterate  that it goes  to the very heart  of  substantive  validity of court  processes  and determination and certainly does not run a foul the substantive  procedure, dichotomy of Article 159 of the Constitution.

32. I  also reiterate  the often cited decision  of Nyarangi JA in the  case of Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” V Caltes Oil (K) Ltd  (supra)  that:

“…….jurisdiction is everything without it, a court has no power to make one more step.  Where a court has no  jurisdiction, there would be  no basis  for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence.  A court of law down its  tools in respect  of the matter before  it the moment   it  holds the  opinion that it  is without jurisdiction.”

33. In the instant case, albeit  what prompted the applicant to approach this  court is the very issue of jurisdiction , regrettably, this court’s hands are firmly tied  to the law  as  espoused  in the many binding  decisions  of the Court of Appeal that I have cited and relied on in my recent past decisions.

34. The upshot  of  all  the  above is that  I hereby  strike out  the applicant’s application dated  4th November  2015 and dismiss it.

As the reasons  for the dismissal  have been researched  by the court  in extenso on its own motion, without  the assistance of the parties  advocates, I decline to award  any costs  and order that each party shall bear  their own costs  of the application.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 10th day of March 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE.

In the presence of Mr Odundo for the applicant

N/A for the Respondent

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