Hope Foundation v Linyati (SCZ 8 54 of 2013) [2015] ZMSC 45 (17 September 2015)

J1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Appellate Jurisdiction) Appeal No. 70/2015 SCZ/8/54/2013 BETWEEN: HOPE FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN APPELLANT AND MUNALULA LINYATI RESPONDENT Coram: Phiri, Wood and Malila, JJS On 11th August, 2015 and 17th September, 2015. For the Appellant Mr. E. B. Mwansa SC, EBM Chambers For the Respondent Mr. C. L. :Y1undiaSC, CL Mundia & Co. JUDGMENT Malila, JS, delivered the judgoent of the Court. Cases referred: 1. 2. 3. Zu:u v. Avondale Housing Project Limited (1981) ZR 172 Attorney-General Limited (! 995-1977) ZR 54 London Ngoma, Joseph Biyela and Other v. LCM Company Limited and United Bus Company of Zambia (1999) ZR 95 v. Aboubacar Tall and Zambia Ain.uays Corporation J2 4. Deve1opme!lt Bank of Zambia v. Sunvest Limited(l995/ 5. Euro Africa Kalengwa Mines Ltd ar,d Hetro Mining and Ore ;Jealers Ltd 1997) ZR 187 SCZj8/237/2012 6. Mususu Kaler:ga Building Limited, Winnie Kalenga v. Richman's Money SC Judgment NO.4 of 1999 Lenders Ente~rises, 7. Mabenga r;. The Post Newspaper Limited, Appeal No. 69 of2012 8. Twa'1lpane Mining Cooperati:Je Society Ltd. v. E. and M. Storti Mining Company, SCZjudgment NO.20 of2911 Abel Mulenga and Others v. Chikwr,bi and Others (2006) ZR 23 9. 10. Simbeye Enterprises Ltd and Another v. YOu.suf/' SCZ judgment No. 37 of This appeal has a cheque::-edhistory. It arises from the ruling of the High Court (Mchenga J,) delivered on the 24th January, 2013, declining the appellant's application to join as 2nd and 3rd respondent, Sepiso Simonda a-'"ldthe Attorney-General, respectively to the proceeding before the High Court. The dispute between the parties relates to Stand No. 4607 Lusaka, a government pool hcuse which was subject of sale under the policy on the sale of gover::lmentpool houses to sitting tenants. The proposed 2nd respondent was the adrrjnistrator of the estate of :3imonwa Simonda who was a government employee an:! occupied Stand No. 4607 by virtue of his employment. By arrangement with the late Simonwa Simonoa the respondent occupied part of the subject property. The deceased sought to purchase the said J3 :;>ropertyunder the government home empowerment scheme for sitting tenants. The government, however, rejected his offer on the basis that the subject property was earmarked for demolition. The deceased then commenced legal action in the High Court against the decision refusing to sell him the house. He was successful in the High Court and the Attc-rney-General then appealed to the Supreme Court. As at the e.ate of the rclling giving rise to the present appeal, it was unclear what the fate of the Supreme Court judgmen: in that 3.ppealwas. Meanwhile, the respondent suffered an eviction from the property by the Sheriff of Zambia at the instance of the appellant. It transpired that the appellant had taken out an originating notice of motion on the 28th February, 2006 and an order of eviction was granted by the Subordinate Court. That order was subsequently stayed, and t~e respondent _odged an appeal to the High Court against the oc-der of the Subordinate Court. Before that appeal could be heard, the appella.:-_traised a preliminary issue as to whether the appeal was properly before the Court considering that the respondeEt had not complied with the procedure relating to the J4 filing of appeals from the Subordinate Court to the High Court. The Court agreed with the appellant on the preliminary issue and directed be respondent to comply with the procedure set out for appeals from the Subordinate Court as provided in Order 47 of the High Court rules and Order 44 of the Subordinate Court Rules. The responcent applied for special leave to appeal but the High Court, in a ruling delivered on 5th June, 2006 declined to grant the special leave sought. The respondent then applied to the High Court for it to review the aforesaid ruling, but this too was 1..illsuccessful,:?rcmpting the respondent to appeal the said ruling to the Supreme Court. In a judgment dated 27th May 2008, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered the rehearing of the matter be-forea different judge. It was in the course of the rehearing that the application for joinder was made. In a brief ruling covered in only two pages, the learned judge rejected the application. He reasoned that Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, pursuant to which the application was mace, did not apply to this case as it is not a t:"ial but an appeal. Further:nore, that as the appeal before him was anchored J5 on whether or no: the correct procedure was complied with when those proceedings were in the Subordinate Court, the determination of the appeal wou~d not affect the rights ane. interests of the parties sought to be joined to the proceedings. It is from that brief ruling of the High Court that the appellant has appealed on three grounds, complaining about several misdirections and errors in law on the part of the learned judge. These grounds were framed as follows: "1. That the honourable Court below erred in law and in fact when it held that the determination of the appeal will not affect the rights or interests of the parties sought to be joined to the proceedings namely, Sepiso Simonda (Administrator of the Estate of the late Simonwa Simonda) and the Attorney-General when in fact there were sufficient reasons advanced to show that they ought to be joined to the proceedings to ensure that aU issues in dispute involving the subject matter and all parties concerned are determined in finality. 2. That the honourable Court below erred in law and in fact when he held that the appeal from the Subordinate Court Ruling of 6th April, 2006 was being anchored on whether the correct procedure was complied with in the Subordinate Court when these proceedings were instituted without reference to the Notice of Appeal filed J6 by the Appellant to the High Court appealing against the aforesaid Subordinate Court Ruling of 6th April, 2006. 3. The honourable Court below erred in law in considering only the provision of Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia when the application before the Court was based on both Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia and Order 15 Rule 4(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1999 edition together with additional authorities in support thereof and furthermore in holding that the aforesaid order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia was not applicable to this matter as this matter was an appeal and not a trial." Both parties filed heads of argument upon which tr_ey placed reliance. In regard to ground one, Mr. Mwansa SC, with circumlocution and repetition, argued that the issues in this case cannot be effectively determined without bringing before the court all the relevant parties that will be affected, or have an interest in the determination of the main subject matter. He cited Order 15 Rule (2)(b)(i) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (White Book) (1999 edition), which provides that the court may order any party who ought tc have been joined as a party, or whose presence before the J7 court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in a cause or matte::- are effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. Acccrding to Mr. Mwansa SC, there were two factors the lower court oug~1.tto have considered in deciding whether joinder of the intending parties was to be allcwed or not; first, whether the parties had suffident interest in the outcome of the determination of the appeal, and second, whether the presence of the intended parties before the court was necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute were effectually determined. In State Counsel's view, both these questions should have, on tile evidence before the court, been answered in the affirmative. As the court below took only into account the question whether or not the intended parties' interests or rights would be affected by the determination of the appeal without considering the need to determine all questions in dispute in finality, the court, according to the State Counsel Mwansa, fell into errcr. J8 The learned counsel referred us to the case of Zulu v. Avondale Housing Project Limited!l) and c.uoted a passage in our judgment that: "...we would express the hope that trial courts will always bear in mind that it is their duty to adjudicate upon every aspect of the suit between the parties so that every matter in controversy is determined in finality. A decision which because of uncertainty or want of finality, leaves the door upon for further litigation on the same issues between the same parties should be avoided." The learned counsel also referred us to the case of the Attorney- General v. Aboubacar Tall and Zambia Airways Corporation Limited!:!:, where we emphasized that it is important to avoid multiplicity of proceedings acd that, therefore, it was imperative that all relevant parties to a cause of action are hea:-d at once. Under ground two, the a?pellant disputed the holding of the learned High Court judge that the appeal from the Subordinate Court was anchored on whether or not the correct procedure was complied with. J9 Mr. Mwansa SC, argued that the appellant had raised a preliminary issue that the appeal before the High Court was improper as the procedure fo::-appealing had not been complied with. In dismiss~ng that preliminary issue, the High Court ruled that the issues to be determined, as per S-J.premeCourt judgment, involved the rehearing of the appeal. The learned counsel referred us to the four grounds of appeal from the Subordinate Court to the High Court as set out in the record of appeal, and stated that those grounds did not include any ground premised on procedure in the initiation of proceedings in the Subordinate Court. According to Mr. Mwansa SC, it can therefore, not be held as the lower court did, that the appeal was only anchored on whether or not the correct procedure was complied with when proceedings were initiated. Mr. Mwansa SC, also submitted that the proceedings from the Subordinate Court were not part of the proceedings before the High Court as the procedure for initiating an appeal to the High Court had not been followed and, therefore, the respondent (being the appellant in the court below) did not transmit the full record of appeal containi:lg a transcript of proceedings in the Subordinate no Court. The appeal before the High Court was from an interlocutory decision of the Subordinate Court discharging an order of stay of execution. The grounds of appeal advanced against the same decision cannot be held to mean that the appeal was anchored on whether or not the correct procedure was complied with when commencing proceedings in the Subordinate Court. The learned State Counsel contended that the court below ought to have exercised its power on appeal to make an order for joinder of the intended parties so as to determine all the questions in controversy in terms of Order 47 Rule 20 of the High Court Rules. We were beseeched to uphold ground two of the appeal. In ::-egardto ground three State Counsel Mwansa, raised an issue wi:h the lower court's confinement to Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Act in determining the application when in fact the application was based, not only on that Rule but also, on Order 15 Rule 4(1: of the Supreme Court Rules (1999 edition) together with other authorities. According to Mr. Mwansa SC, the provisions of Order 1~ Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, which the learned High Court judge based his ruling on when he held that the provision J11 was not applicable, are abbrev:ated and restrictive, and therefore, tr_e court should have gone further and taken into account the provIsIOn:;of a similar Order in the White Book, being Order 15 Rule 6 of the Rules of the ~upre:ne Court (1999 edition). The learned State Counsel quoted verbatim, the provisions of that Rule which allows the court to join a party at any stage of the proceedings in any case. C:ting the case of London Ngoma, Joseph Biyela and Other v. LCMCompany Limited and Unified Bus Company of Zambia(3 ) to support the proposition that a party may be :oined t::> proceedings at any time even on appeal, the learned counsel submitted that in the present case, it did not matter at what stage the proceedings were for purpose of joinder of any party with an interest in b.e matter. The learned State Counsel then adverted to Section13 of the High Court Act, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia to support ~is submission that the court was sufficiently invested with the necessary jurisdiction to determine all matters in controversy. After reiteracing the provisions of Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, Mr. Mwansa SC, argued that in the present case, the subject matter of the suit was Stand No. 4607, Lusaka in which Sepiso Si:nonda as administrator of the estate of Simonwa Simonda was inte:-ested, just as the government, through the Attorney- General was inte:-ested. The court should, therefore, have joined fnese two parties to the pro::eedings. Failure to do so was a oisdirection. We were accordi:lgly urged to uphold this ground of a:;Jpeal. On behalf of the respondent, learned State Counsel Mundia compositely opposed all the g:-ounds of appeal on the basis of the reasons set forth in his written heads of argument. The learr-ed State Counsel supported the lower court's holding that the :.nterests or rights of the parties sought to be joined to the appeal would not be affected by the appeal. According to State Counsel Mundia, although the parties intended to be joined did invariably have an interest in Stand No. 4607 Lusaka, such interest would by no means be affected by the outcome of the appeal before the lower court as it hinged on whether or not procedure was J13 followed by the Subordinate Court in hearing a matter involving a property under a certificate of title. The other issue before the Subordinate Court, in the view of State Counsel Mundia, was whether or not the applicant ~n the Subordinate Court had locus standi to commence such an action against the respondent in this appeal who was at all material times a caretaker of the Stand No. 4607, Lusaka. Mr. Mundia SC, further submitted that the learned judge in the court below was right in declining to grant the application for joinder as to do S::J would have entailed defeating ground four of the appeal before that court which questions whether the present respondent was the rightful party to be cited in the matter before the Subordinate Court as opposed to the intended 2nd respondent, which the appellant in the present appeal sought to join to the appeal before the learned puisne judge. Mr. Mundia SC, further submitted that any rights or interests of the intended 2nd and 3rd respondents will be addressed effectively and without pr(udice to any of the parties in the court below, at the full trial under cause No. 2000/HP/0263 between Sepiso J14 Sirnonda (as administrator of the estate of Simonwa Simonda) and Golden Mandandi and Attorney-General. An application for joinder to an appeal questioning the procedure in the Subordinate Court is, 3.ccordingto State Counsel Mundia, inapropos. It is not enough, submitted the learned State Counsel, to simply show that the intended parties have some form of interest in S:and No. 4607, Lusaka, since the issues at hand are entirely d:.fferenta.ld cannot be classed together in an attempt to satisfy the nJtion of undesirability of multiplicity of actions. The learned State Counsel further argued that although the guidance given by this court in numerous decisions including Development Bank of Zambia v. Sunrest Limited(4) and Euro Africa Kalengwa Mines Ltd and Hetro Mining and Ore Dealers Ltd(5) regarding the need to avoid multiplicity of actions, is wel1- taken, the circumstances in the present case are distinct and c'.istinguishable. Although the subject matter of the appeal is Stand No. 4607, Lusaka, the appeal before the lower court challenges a procedural matter - where :he appel1an: commenced an action against a wrong party in the Subordinate Court when an action J15 involving the same property was subsisting in the High Court. The learned judge in the court below could therefore, according State Counsel lvIundia, not be faulted in refusing to join the intended parties since the appeal bef:re him is one that deals with a procedural question adopted by the appellant before the Subordir.ate Court. Mr. Mundia SC, also sucmitted that the issue whether or not the appeal before the High Court was properly before that court, is a fresh issue which cannot be raised in this appeal. We were referred to the cases of Mususu Kalenga Building Limited, Winnie Kalenga v. Richman's Money Lenders Enterprises(6) and Michael Mabenga v. The Post Newspaper Limited(71where we reiterated that issues not raised in the court below may not as a general rule, "Deraised on appeal. It ViaS Mr. Mundia's fl:rther submissions that all the four grounds of appeal from the Subordinate Court to the High Court were centered on procedural questions, and therefore, the learned judge in the COl:rtbelow was right in holding, as he d::d, that the appeal before hi:n was anchored on whether the correct procedure J1G was complied with. Mr. Mundia also argued that the judge below was righr: to hold that, as wr_at was pending before him was an appeal and not a trial, the prm'isions relied upon by the appellant, namely Order 14 Rule 15 of the High Court Rules and Order 15 Rule 4(1: of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1999 edition) were inapplicable. Mr. Mundia SC, argued that the rules cited by the appellant as grounding the application for ~oinder related to joinder of parties at trial as opposed to joinder at appeal. According to the learned counsel even if the application had been pursued under the provisions of Order 15 Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1,1999) Lie appEcation before the Judge ought to have failed for :nordinate de~a'y. The case of Twampane Mining Cooperative Society Ltd. v. E. and M. Storti Mining Company(S) was relied upon. Mr. Mundia SC, finally complained about the long delay in having this matter disposed of; that the action was commenced in April, 2006 and has to-date not been hea:-d on the merits; that this J17 was a second appeal to this court; was a waste of time; was frivolous and vexations and should be dismissed. We have carefully considered the documents on the record of appeal, particularly the ruling of the learned judge In the court below. We have also paid very close attention to the rival a:-guments submitted to us by able State Counsel. We are of the view that :he issues raised in the grounds of appeal are integrally linked. We propose, therefore, to deal with the grounds of appeal globally. The sole question we have to answer is whether be learned judge in the court below was right to decline the application for joinder on the grounds that ~e stated in his ruling subject of :he present a:?peal. According t:J the endorsemect on the summons filed in the High Court on 17th August 2012, the application by the appellant for joinder was taken out under be pro\'isions of Order XIV Rule 5(1) of the High Court Rules Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia and Order 15 Rule 4(1) of the Supreme Court Rules (1999 edition). Order XIV Rule 50 (1) of the High Court Rules provides that: "...if it shall appear to the court of a judge, at or before the hearing of a suit, that all the persons who may be entitled to, or claim some share or interest in, the subject matter of the suit, or who may be likely to be affected by the result, have not been made parties, the court or a judge may adjourn the hearing of the suit to a future day, to be ilxed by the court or judge, and direct that such persons shall be made either plaintiffs or defendants in the suit, as the case may be..." Order 15 Rule 4(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1999 edition) on the other hand, reads so far as is material to the present appeal, as follcws: "...two or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or as defendants with the leave of the court or where - (a) If separate actions were brought by or against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of law or fact would arise in all the actions, and (hI All rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or alternative) as in respect of or arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. " In his brief ruling which has now been appealed against, the learned judge in the court below, in rejecting the application for joinder, gave three reasons as :ollows: J19 1. "I am satisfied that order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules is not applicable to this matter as this is not a trial but an appeal." 2. "...the appeal before me is anchored on whether the conect procedure was complied with when these proceedings were instituted in the Subordinate Court" and 3. "It is my assessment that the determination of the appeal will not affect the rights or interests of the parties 1 have been asked to join into these proceedings." The learned counsel for the ap?ellant has impugned these reasons given by the learned judge. The grounds of appeal as framed impeach the learned judge's reasoning on each of the above three, albeit in reverse order. Ground one of the appeal effectively attacks the third reason of the judge's holding. And we ask ourselves whether the determination of the appeal beiore the learned trial judge was likely :0 affect the rights and interests of the parties sought to be joined, namely the administrator of the estate of the late sitting tenant of Stand No. 4607, Lusaka, and the Attorney-General. J20 In Abel Mulenga and Others v. Chikumbi and Othersl9 ) we stated that the mere fact that a party may be affected by the decision of the court does not clothe that party with sufficient interest or locus standi to entitle that party to be joined to the action. It ought to be shown that the par,y has an interest in the subject matter of the action. The well settled position of the law for JOIn1nga person to an action is that he should be bound or otherwise affected by the results of the action. The issues to be settled in :he action must be questions which canr-ot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The court is, therefore, expected, in the interests of justice, to join as plaintiff or as defendar_, anyone who may have a stake in the subject matter of the suit ':;Irwho may be affected by the decision. In our view, given that it is rightly common cause that the parties intended to be joined to the action had in interest in the subject matter of the litigation: they were ex facie likely to be affected by the outcome of any litigation involving the subject property. J21 In the case of Attorney-General v. Aboubacar TaHl2)which was cited by both learned counsel, we intimated that the court has inherent jurisd:ction to make an order of joinder of par:ies in the interest ofjustice. We have perused the aEidavit in support of summons for joinder of parLes sworn by Dessislava Findlay filed in court on the 18th August 2012. To it is attached as exhibit 'DF1" another , affidavit sworn in cause No. 2006/HPA/022 between the respondent and be appellant. From the two affidavits, it is clear to us that the persons intended to be joined to the action ~lad, prima jacie, an interest in the subject matter of the action, namely Stand No. 4607 Andrew Mwenya Road, Rhodes Park, Lusaka. Simonwa Simonda, as sitting tenant of the subject property, was on the face of it, entitled under circular No. 12 of 1996 which set out the guidelines on the sale of gov-::rnmentpoo' houses, to be sold the said property. This legitimate expectation to be sold the said property created an interest in the litigation involving :he subject property. The administrator of his estate became entitled upon the deceased's death, to pursue that interest. The property in question J22 was a governoent pool house, and the interest of the Attorney- General in the property, and by necessary implication, in the ciispute, is therefore, clear. We do not at this stage consider it necessarj to delv-einto the question whether the respondent to this appeal equally had an interest. That issue is irrelevant to the present e:.ppeal. Sta:e Counsel Mundia in his submission, has conceded that the parti=.s sought to be joined "invariably have an interest in Stand No. 4607, Lusaka," but argue::1that such interest is unlikely to be affected 'JYthe appeal pending in the High Court. We are satisfied in the present case that the parties intended to be jo:ned to the appeal were demonstratably interested in the subject matter of the appeal, and by logical and necessary implicat:on, in be litigation relating to that subject matter. Any order that a court would make in respect of the property was bound to affect these parties, especially the administrator of the estate of the late Simonwa Simonda. J23 Having established that the intended parties did indeed have ir-terest in the litigation to which they were intended to be joined, and were likely to be affected by any decision made in respect of that property, we next have to consider whether the provisions of Order 14 Rule 5 cf the High Court Rules applied. We have already quoted be provisions of that rule. They allow a court or judge w join any interested party to a suit pending before him. The learned judge opined that the provisions of tha: rule applied only to a trial and not to an appeal. A perusal of that rule reveals that there is not a single mention in it of a 'trial' or 'appeal'. The Order provides for "hearing a suit" "subject matter of the suit" and being made party to "the suit". We are at a loss as to where the learned judge in the court below drew the distinction between an appeal and a trial which he sought to introduce in the construction of Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules. As we have already pointed out, :he applicant for joinder also relied on Or::ier 15 Rule 41.1) of the Supreme Court Rules (1999 edition). That Order too, does not confine the instances of joinder to trials only. J24 In o'~r respectful view, the learned tria: judge had no basis for holding that Order 14 Rule 5 of the High Court Rules was inapplica':Jle. We accept, therefore, the appellant's submission that this was a misdirection on the part of the learned judge, Joinder of a party to an action or cause, where it can be justified, can be done at any stage of the proceedings and may be done upon application by a party to the litigation or a non-party thereto intending to be joined, Moreover joinder can be ordered at any time even after judgment has been passed in an action. The case of London Ngoma and Others v. LCMCompany Limitedl31 referred to by both learned c':Junse1, remains good authority for this position. Joinder may also be done by the court suo moto. Order 15 Rule 6(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (1999 edition), is instructive in this respect. We :lOW turn to the question whether the determination of the appeal before the High Court will not affect the rights and interests of the parties sought to be joined to the proceedings. J25 We have examined the notice of intention to appeal which has been produced as part of the record of appeal. There are four grounds of appeal which the lower court was called upon to determine. These are: 1. whether or not :he originating notice of motion was regularly issued in respect of Stand No. 6407 Rhodes Park, Lusaka, 2. whether the court did or did not take into account the doctrine of res judicata when the matter before it was decided by a superior court, namely, the High Court, 3. whether Hope Foundation for Women and Children had locus standi in the matter as it allegedly had no title or interest ~n the subject matter of the litigation, ar_d finally 4. whether or not the present respondent was the correct party to sue in the Subordinate Court. J26 A reading of the issues for consideration In the appeal from the Subordinate Court to the High Court, makes it plain to us that the appeal was not merely anchored on whether or not the correct procedure was complied with when these proceedings were instituted in the Subordinate Court. They clearly went beyond that. In addition to determining the overarching procedural question whether the precondition for appealing from the Subordinate Court to the High Court were complied with, the lower court is expected to deal with the substantive issues raised in tile notice of appeal such as who had an interest in the subject property, the nature of that interest and who could maintain an action. Whatever decision is made on these issues is bound to define and, therefore, t::>affect the interests and rights of the intended parties to the appeal. To us, it is idle to argue tha: merely because what is intendee. to be determined in the appeal is procedural, (and we do not believe in the present case that this was so), then the rights of those properly interested in the subject matter of the litigation are unlikely to be affected. To the contrary, we are of the considered view that joinder of the intended parties to the action , J27 before the court at that stage, was m fact late in the day, and should have been sanctioned earlier so as to enable all those who had an interest in the property. subject to :he litigation, have their day in court. We think with utmost respect to the judge in the court below that there was no basis for him to employ timidity in dealing with an application for joinder of pa.rties who are clearly interested. By holding in effect that his power to order joinder is circumscribed by the stage at which the proceedings are, coupled with his failure to appreciate fully the interests of the intended parties to the action in the subject matter of the litigation, and the probable consequences on these parties of any court order ::hat could be made in relation to the subject property, constituted, in our view a misdirection. We accept the arguments of the lo:arned counsel for the appellant that the approach a.dopted by the learned judge in this case would have :he effect of going against the &Uidancethat we have so consistently recordec., namely, that there is public interest in litigation being brought to a binding conclusion and that matters in dispute should, as much as possible be determined at once. This view was • ." r J28 so '0':" __ :-~. 2.-1dclearly carriec. in the case of Simbeye Enterprises Lt . ~ - Another v. yousuff'lO) where it was held that: •_i- had been the practice of the Supreme Court to join any person - the appeal if the decision of the court would affect that pe;son or "is interest. The purpose :s to bring all parties to disputes relating to one subject matter before the court at the same time so that disputes may be determined without the delay inconvenience and expense of separate actions and trials." It is for all these reasor.s that we are inc1inc::dto uphold be ='P?eal on all grounds. The ir.tended parLes should have been, and must now be joined to the proceedings in the lower court to enable the lower cour: deal effectually with all mc-tters in contention. Costs to the appellant. . J:-ii2 G. S. ~hm ............. 'I~~~~~~tl~ . SUPREME COURT JUDGE ........~~ . .. ~ SUPREME COURT JUDGE SUPREME COURT JUDGE