PVI GROUP INC. (GH) LIMITED vrs GHANA AIRPORTS COMPANY LIMITED (J4/37/2024) [2025] GHASC 3 (15 January 2025)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA – AD. 2025 CORAM: BAFFOE - BONNIE, JSC (PRESIDING) PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS), JSC ACKAH-YENSU (MS), JSC ASIEDU, JSC GAEWU, JSC CIVIL APPEAL NO: J4/37/2024 15TH JANUARY, 2025 PVI GROUP INC. (GH) LIMITED …. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/ APPELLANT VRS GHANA AIRPORTS COMPANY LIMITED …. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT /RESPONDENT JUDGMENT ACKAH-YENSU, JSC: Page 1 of 25 INTRODUCTION My Lords, intentionalism is the accepted approach to the interpretation of deeds and documents such as a written contract between the parties thereto. By this interpretative approach, the task of the interpreter is to ascertain the intention of the parties as per their written agreement. In undertaking this exercise, the intention must be gathered from and within the four corners of the document. The policy is to avoid a usurpation of what the parties deemed prudent to define their course and substitute the same with external thoughts. It is therefore not the function of the courts to think for parties to a written agreement, particularly parties who transact at arm’s length. The Court’s function when called upon to interpret a document is to decipher the intention of the parties from the document itself. What has led to the instant appeal is a dispute regarding the construction of a sub- lease agreement that exists between the parties. The Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant is the sub-lessee whereas the Defendant/Respondent/Respondent is the sub-lessor. The compass of the dispute is, however, limited to a determination of the contractual date of performance at clause 3.3 thereof. The said clause mandates the Defendant/Respondent/Respondent to construct parking spaces at the Airport City and allocate three hundred (300) of them to the Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant. Although the principal contract does not stipulate any due date for performance, the Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant contends that the same should be elucidated from an earlier contract as well as the parties’ correspondence and conduct. For the Page 2 of 25 Defendant/Respondent/Respondent, the absence of any stipulated time frame in the contract absolves them of any liability to the Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant. For purposes of uniformity, the parties shall maintain their respective designations at the trial court. The Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant shall therefore be referred to as the “Plaintiff”. The Defendant/Respondent/Respondent shall also be referred to as the “Defendant”. BACKGROUND On the 27th of April 2016, the Plaintiff issued a writ of summons against the Defendant for the following reliefs: i. A declaration that by virtue of the terms and conditions of the indenture of sub-lease made the 23rd day of August 2012, between the Defendant as sub-lessor of the one part and Plaintiff as sub-lessee of the other part, Defendant is enjoined to construct and complete and hand over to Plaintiff 300 parking spaces within a multi-storey car park at the Airport City; ii. A declaration that the failure of Defendant to construct, complete and handover 300 parking spaces within a multi-storey car park to Plaintiff within the stipulated period constitutes a breach of contract. Page 3 of 25 iii. A declaration that the inability of Defendant to deliver to Plaintiff the 300 parking spaces within the stipulated period is largely responsible for the “stalling” and “degraded status” of Plaintiffs’ project and condominium/hospitality outlet and corporate offices) at the Airport City. iv. A declaration that the non-availability of parking spaces is obstructing and impeding Plaintiff’s capacity to solicit and/or attract funding to complete its envisaged project at the Airport City and to put same to profitable operations. v. An Order directed at Defendant to furnish Plaintiff with a comprehensive and entailed plan and /or timetable on the delivery of the 300 parking spaces. vi. USD$50,000,000.00 general damages for breach of contract vii. Mesne profits for loss of use viii. Costs ix. Any further or other orders as in the circumstances of this case may seem just, meet and appropriate. Page 4 of 25 Per the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff averred that it is a limited liability company engaged in the business of marketing and consultancy services, construction and real estate development, managing of hotels, conference centres, shopping mall, movie theatres, restaurants, entertainment and tourism services. Plaintiff averred that by an offer letter to its Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Kofi Amoah, the Ghana Civil Aviation Authority demised all that piece or parcel of land situate and lying at the Airport City, delineated as Airport City Plot No. 18, for a term of forty-five (45) years commencing from June 13 2000 to June 12 2045, renewable for a further period as may be determined, which plot was assigned to Plaintiff. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s company was incorporated in 2006 to take over the control and management of all airports and airstrips in Ghana, which airports include the Kotoka International Airport and related lands. Plaintiff avers that by a Deed of Assignment dated 13th July 2011, the Ghana Civil Aviation Authority assigned all its interest in the parcel of land situate and lying at Kotoka International Airport known as the Airport City land, to the Defendant. Plaintiff claimed further that by virtue of a sub-lease made on the 23rd of August 2012 between the Defendant, as sub-lessor, and Plaintiff, as sub-lessee, the said land, No. 18, situate at Airport City, was sublet to the use of the Plaintiff for a term of forty-five (45) years with an option to renew for a further term of fifteen (15) years Page 5 of 25 commencing from the 13th of June 2000 to the 12th of June 2045, renewable for a further period as may be determined. Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant acknowledged that the total consideration of the plot of land in the sum of GH¢738,440,000 had been paid. The Plaintiff’s principal plaint is that the Defendant is obligated under the sub-lease agreement to build a multi-storey parking facility out of which 300 spaces would be allocated to it. According to the Plaintiff, the success of its intended project depended on the completion and honouring of the obligation on the Defendant to see to the building and allocation of the 300 parking spaces. The Plaintiff claims that it has suffered enormous injury and damages and infact several investors have turned down the request to enter into a joint venture with it as a result of the absence of the parking spaces. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT The Defendant denied the material averments of the Plaintiff. According to the Defendant, the Ghana Civil Aviation Authority sub-leased Plot No. 18, Airport City Enclave to a company separate from the Plaintiff called PVI Ghana Limited for the development of a multiple-use facility including recreational facilities, restaurants, retail and condominium/hospitality outlets and business complex. According to the Defendant, PVI Ghana Limited was expected under the contract, to complete the Page 6 of 25 multiple-use facility within three (3) years from the commencement of the sub-lease agreement in April 2004. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff could not complete the building put up by PVI Ghana Ltd and is rather making up excuses and turning around to blame the Defendant. Defendant maintained that the sub- lease agreement executed with the Plaintiff in 2012 did not specify anytime line to provide for the 300 parking spaces and as such the Plaintiff is misleading the Court in compelling any such timelines. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT In a judgment delivered on 11th of November 2020, the trial High Court Judge dismissed the claims of the Plaintiff, save for the first relief declaring that by virtue of the terms and conditions of the Indenture of Sub-lease dated the 23rd of August 2012 between the parties, the Defendant was enjoined to construct, complete and handover to the Plaintiff 300 parking spaces within a multi-storey car park at the Airport City. Regarding the second relief, the trial High Court held that since there was no timeline stipulated in the contract within which the Defendant was to have completed and handed over the parking spaces to the Plaintiff, and further that even if reasonableness as a principle was applied, the circumstances of the case would not warrant holding that the Defendant had breached the said term of the contract, hence the Defendant was not liable. Page 7 of 25 For the third and fourth reliefs, the Court found that there was no correlation between the seeking of investors and the provision of the parking spaces, and thus denied both reliefs. Regarding the fifth relief, the court reasoned that it had no knowledge of the circumstances that implored the parties to negotiate without stipulating a time line for the provisions and delivery to the Plaintiff of the 300 parking spaces. The Court was therefore of the opinion that to accede to the demands of the Plaintiff as stated in relief (v) and direct the Defendant to furnish the Court and the Plaintiff with a comprehensive and detailed plan and/or timetable on the delivery of the 300 parking spaces, in the view of the Court, would amount it writing new terms into the contract executed by the parties. Since the Court held that there was no breach of the contract, it refused to award the general damages prayed for. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial High Court, the Plaintiff appealed against same to the Court of Appeal which Court delivered its judgment on the 29th day of June 2023 dismissing the entire appeal. In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Court affirmed the findings of facts and holdings of the trial court. The Court was of the considered opinion that the trial Judge made no error in concluding that since there was not specific time line negotiated and agreed between the parties in the contract, it ought to be accomplished within a reasonable time. Consequently, there had not been any breach. Page 8 of 25 The Court of Appeal delivered itself in its conclusion as follows: “As previously mentioned, the Court below interpreted the contract by taking into consideration the words used, the entire contract and the surrounding circumstances. On whether there had been a breach of the agreement, the trial judge, considered the fact that the parties did not insert a timeline into the agreement for the performance of the Respondent’s obligation and therefore the concept of reasonableness was applicable and concluded that based on the facts and circumstances, there had not been a breach. Turning to the surrounding circumstances, the trial judge noted that the Respondent has made efforts to have investors to partner it to put up the parking spaces and had in fact engaged with one by the name Farbissoti, which was yet to commence operation. In addition, the court below found that there was no nexus between the Respondent’s ability to deliver the 300 parking spaces within a stipulated period and the stalling of the project. The Court found that the project stalled long before the foundational document, Exhibit “A”, which regulates the relationship of the parties was executed in August 2012. WE accept the findings and conclusions of the trial judge that the Appellant failed to prove its case on the balance of probabilities. The Appellant’s contentions are based on its disagreement with the trial judge’s conclusions and not because the trial judge overlooked and/or Page 9 of 25 ignored certain pieces of evidence on record which if applied correctly, would have led the judge to come to a different conclusion in favour of the Appellant. In our respectful opinion, the judgment was never against the weight of evidence as contended by the Appellant. Also, the other grounds of including the allegation of misdirection were only a rehash of the arguments made under the omnibus ground of appeal. Consequently, the reasons and conclusions of the court below are affirmed. In the end the appeal is dismissed in its entirety.” APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT Still dissatisfied, the Plaintiff mounted the instant appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal which affirmed the judgment of the trial High Court, per a Notice of Appeal filed on the 4th day of September 2023. The sole ground of appeal is the omnibus ground of appeal, that; the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. Despite indicating in the Notice of Appeal, that additional grounds would be filed, none was filed. EVALUATION AND CONSIDERATION. It is rudimentary law that when a person anchors an appeal on the omnibus ground of appeal that the judgment being appealed from is against the weight of evidence on record, what that person implies is that the court below failed to properly evaluate the evidence. The attack on improper evaluation of the evidence may arise from an allegation that certain vital pieces of evidence were not considered; or that Page 10 of 25 immaterial matters were considered in the evaluation of the evidence before the court; or that, the court failed to properly apply the law to the evidence. The resultant allegation simply is that the outcome of the alleged mis-evaluation flies in the face of the evidence adduced at the trial, and thus the decision arrived is wrong. In such situations the Appellant carries the onus of pointing out to the court the errors in the evaluation of the evidence just as the appellate court is also expected to comb through the entire record and arrive at its own findings. The statement of law was expressed profoundly in the case of Djin v Musah Baako [2007-2008] SCGLR 686 that: “It has been held in several decided cases that where an appellant complains that judgement is against the weight of evidence, he is implying that there were certain pieces of evidence on the record which, if applied in his favour, could have changed the decision in his favour, or certain pieces of evidence have been wrongly applied against him. The onus is on such an appellant to clearly and properly demonstrate to the appellate court the lapses in the judgment being appealed against.” See also Tuakwa v Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61. It needs to be noted however that this Court, especially as a second appellate court, is at all times very slow to disturb concurrent findings of facts made by the trial and first appellate courts, except the existence of special situations such as the Page 11 of 25 commission of a grave error which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. In Koglex Ltd v Field [1999-2000] 2 GLR 437, the Supreme Court held that: “Where the first appellate Court had confirmed the findings of the trial Court, the second appellate Court was not to interfere with the concurrent findings unless it was established with absolute clearness that some blunder or error resulting in a miscarriage of justice was apparent in the way in which the lower Court dealt with the facts. Instances where such concurrent findings may be interfere ed with included where the findings of the trial Court were clearly unsupported by the evidence on record or where the reasons in support of the findings were unsatisfactory; where there was improper application of a principle of evidence or where the trial Court had failed to draw an irresistible conclusion from the evidence; where the findings are based on a wrong proposition of law and that if that proposition be corrected, the findings would disappear; and where the finings was inconsistent with crucial documentary evidence on record.” See also Gregory v Tandoh IV & Hanson [2010] SCGLR 971; Achoro & Another V Ankafela & Another [1996-97] SCGLR 209. In similar vein, this Court speaking through Ansah JSC in the case of Fosua & Adu- Poku v Dufie (Deceased) & Adu Poku Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310, pronounced that: Page 12 of 25 “A second appellate court would justifiably reverse the judgment of a first appellate court where the trial court committed a fundamental error in its findings of facts but the first appellate court did not detect the error but affirmed it and thereby perpetuate the error. In that situation, it becomes clear that a miscarriage of justice had occurred and a second appellate court will justifiably reverse the judgment of the first appellate court.” THE LAW ON THE CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION OF DEEDS AND DOCUMENTS. We use this opportunity to re-state the law governing the construction of deeds and documents. This overview is even more pertinent when regard is had to the principal subject of the present appeal, being the sub-lease agreement executed between the parties and dated 23rd August 2012 (Exhibit A). The agreement defines and regulates the affairs of the parties as regards the construction of the 300 car parks. To begin with, and as already observed, when faced with an action requiring the interpretation of a written document, our role is to carefully analyze it to determine the true intentions of the parties involved. That exercise should not admit of external factors that will cloud the same, but we must limit ourselves to the four corners of the agreement. Indeed, we should not be seen to be re-writing the parties’ agreement for them, that will be an irregular usurpation. As observed by Justice Francois in the case of Allan Sugar (Products) Ltd v Ghana Export Co Ltd [1982-83] GLR 922: Page 13 of 25 “It is no function of the court to rewrite an agreement for the parties by inserting terms that would have been beneficial but were overlooked especially when such an interpolation would amount to an interference with a third party’s bargain.” There is sufficient case law jurisprudence from our courts and even statutory empowerment that in the construction of deeds and documents, the principal consideration is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and that the said intention must be gathered from the document itself. The case of Biney v Biney [1974] 1 GLR 318 outlined the guiding principles on this intentionalist approach regarding the construction of deeds and documents as follows: i. The construction must be as near to the mind and intention of the author as the law would permit; ii. The intention must be gathered from the written expression of the author’s intention; and iii. Technical words of limitation in a document must have their strict legal effect. Page 14 of 25 In a subsequent decision by this apex court, the above principles were reiterated by Wood JSC (as she was then) in Nana Yaw Osei v Australian Gold Ltd [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 69 as follows: “The above construction does in my view conform to the basic rules of interpretation of documents, namely that the interpretation must be nearly as close to the mind and intention of the maker as is possible and the intention must be ascertained from the document as a whole with the words used being given their plain and natural meaning and within the context in which they are used.” Similarly, in Gorman & Gorman v Ansong [2012] SCGLR 174, the Supreme Court held that: “The general rule regarding the construction of documents was that the court must give effect to the intention of the parties as found in the document and not what was intended to have been written so as to give effect to the intention expressed. The courts would be `hesitant to construe private documents outside the four corners of the documents for good reason. Contracts and other written documents between private individuals were presumed, unless otherwise proven, to represent the intentions of the parties. Thus, any undue inference by the courts, would fly in the face of the sanctity attached to such documents. However, the general rule was not in any way Page 15 of 25 absolute. Ultimately, interpretation of contracts or documents of any kind must give effect to the true intent of the parties. The courts were in duty bound to give effect to the parties’ written intentions. But the courts must also consider in appropriate case, surrounding circumstances, which had the effect of elucidating the intentions of the parties.” In considering the true intention of the parties, if the words used in the document would lead to absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the document, the court should consider an approach that will avoid the incongruity whiles effectuating and not defeating the true intention of the parties. See Impraim v Baffoe [1980] GLR 520. Also, in ascertaining the intention from the written instrument itself, the court is not expected to think for the parties and thus substitute a presumed intention which is not expressed. See Prempeh v Agyepong [1989-90] GLRD 116; Allan Sugar (Products) Ltd v Ghana Export Co. Ltd (Supra). In Gorman & Gorman v Ansong (Supra), the Supreme Court remarked that: “It was not the duty of the courts to make contracts for the parites. And, where the terms of the contract had been reduced into writing, the court would interpret them to give effect to the intentions of the parties.” In engaging in this exercise, it is paramount that the document is not read piecemeal. It must be read as a whole to ensure that the resultant intention fortifies a harmonious acceptance of what is contained therein. The above discourse makes it Page 16 of 25 quite clear that the law frowns upon interpretations which seek to substitute the intention of the parties with another. And that, any construction that does not effectuate the intention of the parties at the time of entering into the transaction must be rejected. Section 177 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) amplifies these principles as follows: “(1) Except as otherwise provided by the rules of equity, terms set forth in a writing intended by the party or parties to the writing as a final expression of intention or agreement with respect to those terms may not be contradicted by evidence of a prior declaration of intention, of a prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement or declaration of intention, but may be explained or supplemented, (a) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the Court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the intention or agreement, but a will and a registered writing conveying immovable property shall be deemed to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the intention of agreement; and (b) by a course of dealing or usage of trade or by course of performance. Page 17 of 25 (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude the admission of evidence relevant to the interpretation of terms in a writing.” EVALUATION AND CONSIDERATION It can be easily observed from the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff at the trial court that the foundation of the entire dispute rests on the sublease agreement made between the parties dated the 23rd of August 2012. This is more evident when regard is had to the first substantive relief which reads: “A declaration that by virtue of the terms and conditions of the indenture of sub-lease made the 23rd day of August 2012, between the Defendant as sub- lessor of the one part and Plaintiff as sub-lessee of the other part, Defendant is enjoined to construct and complete and handover to Appellant 300 parking spaces within a multi -storey car park at the Airport City.” A reading of the other reliefs puts beyond doubt that the Plaintiff’s action is founded on this sub-lease agreement of 2012 and none other. As was rightly found by the trial court, and the same affirmed by the Court of Appeal, the parties do not dispute that the Defendant was contractually obligated to build and hand-over the 300 parking spaces to the Plaintiff. What however is the bone of contention is when 300 parking spaces were supposed to be completed and Page 18 of 25 handed over? To this question, the Plaintiff contends of a certain stipulated time period. So, what is this time period? Before considering this question, it is important to observe that at all times the Plaintiff was consistent regarding a certain stipulated time period in its pleadings and reliefs before the trial court. For purposes of emphasis, the other reliefs before the court as regards this issue read: “i. …………… ii. A declaration that the failure of Defendant to construct, complete and hand-over 300 parking spaces within a multi-storey car park to Plaintiff within the stipulated period constitutes a breach of contract iii. A declaration that the inability of Defendant to deliver to Appellant 300 parking spaces within the stipulated period is largely responsible for the “stalling” and “degraded status” of Plaintiff’s project (a multiple use complex comprising recreational facilities i.e., movie theatres, restaurants, retail and condominium/hospitality outlet and corporate offices) at the Airport City iv. ……….” Clearly, the subsequent reliefs which contend a breach upon the basis of non- performance within “the stipulated period” assumes a supposition of a period of Page 19 of 25 time within which performance ought to have been performed under the Sub-lease agreement (Exhibit A) dated the 23rd of August 2013. The interrogatories that therefore immediately flow from this observation become, a. What is the stipulated period under the sub-lease agreement dated the 23rd of August 2013? b. Did the Defendant fail to deliver as per the date of performance being the stipulated period? From the evidence adduced at the trial, it is beyond dispute that the sub-lease agreement dated the 23rd of August 2012 did not obligate the Defendant by any stipulated period to perform its obligations as regards the construction and allocation of 300 parking spaces to the Plaintiff. This fact is an admission even by the Plaintiff’s own representative during cross examination. During cross-examination of the Plaintiff’s representative on the 16th of May 2019, at page 271 of Volume 1 of the Record of Appeal, this is what ensued: “Q: You would agree that paragraph 4.3 does not specify a stipulated time frame for this construction? Page 20 of 25 A: No, my Lady, it does not, however, the time has already been established in 2003.” The Plaintiff’s reference to 2003 was to find solace under Exhibit 1, an initial sub- lease agreement executed in 2001 between PVI Ghana Limited and the then Ghana Civil Aviation Authority. It needs to be mentioned that although Plaintiff appears to be the successor of PVI Ghana Limited the two are not the same. And, nowhere in Exhibit A was any reference made to the existence of any such relationship nor a continuation of the obligations under Exhibit 1 which mandated a three-year completion of the project. During cross examination of the Plaintiff’s representative, on this point he testified as follows: “Q: You would agree that as at the year 2001 the Plaintiff herein had not been incorporated as a company here in Ghana? A: My Lady, it was not incorporated at that time. Q: And that as at 2001, you were the Chief Executive Officer of PVI Ghana Limited, correct? A: My Lady, that is correct Page 21 of 25 Q: And that you signed a sub-lease dated 17th April, 2001 on behalf of PVI Ghana Limited A: Yes, my Lady.” This testimony further puts to rest the separateness of the two companies: “Q: But you would agree that PVI Ghana Limited and PVI Group Inc Ghana Limited are separate companies, not so? A: Yes and no. Yes, they ware separate legal entities but not in the sense that the link is the succession of PVI Group Inc. Ghana Limited to Plot No. 18. Q: You would agree that they have different shareholdings? A: Yes, they do have different shareholdings.” Therefore, it is completely erroneous, in the absence of any positive evidence from Exhibit A itself, that the obligations of the present parties arose from 2001 or 2003 under Exhibit 1 of which the present Plaintiff was not even a party. Infact, the Plaintiff had not been incorporated at the time. It is therefore not surprising that in praying for the reliefs before the trial court, the Plaintiff stuck to the 2012 sub-lease and none other. Page 22 of 25 Yet, Counsel for the Plaintiff in his Statement of Case has argued that the Court ought to construe the obligations as having arisen from the earlier 2001 sub-lease agreement which is no longer live. That argument cannot by any stretch of imagination be accepted to define the relationship between the present Plaintiff and the Defendant. Nowhere in their enabling contractual document, the sub-lease agreement of 2012, did they make any such reference. To that extent, the court will be seen to be substituting its intention with that of the parties should that course be pursued. Such is deprecatory in the construction of documents. We therefore find no struggle at all in affirming the findings and conclusions of both the trial and first appellate courts; that there was no stipulated time period within which the Defendant was to see to the construction and allocation of the 300 parking spaces to the Plaintiff. We equally share in agreement with both the trial and first appellate courts, that even if the concept of a reasonable time period was to be presumed into the contract, the circumstances of the case did not demonstrate any unreasonable delay on the part of the Defendant in the performance of its duties. This is especially so because there is positive evidence on record of the several efforts by the Defendant to get an investor to partner it for the construction. A default or delay in the realization of such efforts cannot, in the absence of an expressed intention of the parties, be deemed to be unreasonable. The parties knew what they were contracting for at the Page 23 of 25 time of entering into the contract. The Court ought to therefore give effect to their intentions. They decided not to constrain themselves with timelines as regards the construction and allocation of the car parks. This must be respected especially when there has been a woeful failure on the part of the Plaintiff to lead positive evidence to prove any unreasonableness on the part of the Defendant. The allegation by the Plaintiff that the judgement of the Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence is not borne out of the record in the instant appeal. The said ground of appeal therefore fails as it does not meet the acceptable judicial test. It is accordingly dismissed. CONCLUSION After thoroughly reviewing the entire record, and from the analysis made as aforesaid, we reject the case of the Plaintiff in the instant appeal. On the contrary, we affirm the concurrent judgements of the two lower courts in the context of the accepted principles governing the construction of deeds and documents. The appeal fails, and the same is hereby accordingly dismissed in its entirety. (SGD.) B. F. ACKAH-YENSU (MS.) (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) Page 24 of 25 (SGD.) P. BAFFOE – BONNIE (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) PROF. H. J. A. N. MENSA – BONSU (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) S. K. A ASIEDU (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) E. Y GAEWU (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) COUNSEL NANA AGYEI BAFFOUR AWUAH ESQ. WITH BLESSING DARKO ADUTWUMWAA OTCHERE FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/APPELLANT MAWUENA AGBENOTO ESQ. WITH GEORGE ESSEL ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT Page 25 of 25