DADZIE VRS BENSO PALM PLANTATION LTD (E3/2/21) [2022] GHAHC 142 (19 October 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, WESTERN REGION, HELD AT SEKONDI ON THE 19TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022 BEFORE HER LADYSHIP AFIA N. ADU-AMANKWA (MRS.) J. ISAAC DADZIE VRS. SUIT NO. E3/2/21 PLAINTIFF BENSO PALM PLANTATION LTD DEFENDANT JUDGMENT The defendant employed the plaintiff as a maintenance worker in 1996. The plaintiff supplemented his income by running a taxi business with his car after the close of work. His employment was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the defendant and the General Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to which the plaintiff belonged which came into force on 1st January, 2020. On 7th August, 2020, at about 9 pm, in the usual course of running his taxi business, three young men engaged the plaintiff's services at a place opposite the Abe Pepa office on the defendant’s compound. When he got to the defendant's gate, the security officers stopped him and demanded that the passengers produce their receipts for the containers of palm oil they had boarded the taxi with. Upon their failure to produce receipts for the oil, the plaintiff and the passengers were charged for the theft of the oil in the gallons. The defendant constituted a five-member committee to investigate the allegation of crude oil theft and the plaintiff's involvement in the saga. The committee found that the plaintiff knowingly aided the unlawful transportation of the ten gallons of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) from the defendant’s premises to Adum Banso. By a letter dated 13th October, 2020, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s appointment with effect from 19th October, 2020 for gross misconduct following the investigations by the disciplinary committee. The plaintiff contends that the termination of his appointment is wrongful hence his action against the defendant for the following reliefs: “a). Declaration that the termination of his appointment is premature and wrongful. b). A publication of the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee, its composition, questions put to the plaintiff and the result. c). Re-instatement of the Plaintiff’s appointment. d). Restoration of the Plaintiff’s salary till date of Judgment. e). An order for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant Company from ejecting the Plaintiff from his place of abode until the Final Judgment”. After the close of pleadings, the court set down the following issues and additional issues for trial: i. Whether or not the Plaintiff had been running his taxi on the defendant’s compound before the incident involving him and the three passengers. ii. Whether or not the three people the plaintiff picked as passengers appeared with the plaintiff before the 5-man committee for investigation. iii. Whether or not the plaintiff knew the three persons as conductors of the Tanker parked on the Company’s Compound and knowingly planned with them to board his taxi with the ten gallons of crude palm oil. iv. Whether or not the plaintiff was made aware of the result of his meeting with the five-man investigating committee in accordance with the natural justice principle. v. Whether or not the Plaintiff as an Employee of the Defendant Company misconducted himself as far as the event of 07/08/2020 is concerned. vi. Whether or not the Plaintiff was given a fair hearing by the defendant before his termination. vii. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to his reliefs. It is a fundamental principle of the law of evidence that the burden of persuasion on proving all facts essential to any claim lies on whosoever makes the claim. Section 10(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975, Act 323 defines burden of persuasion as: “(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.” and Section 11 (1) defines the burden of producing evidence as: (1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.” This being an action for wrongful termination of employment, the plaintiff assumes the burden of proving the terms of his employment and how the termination is in breach of the terms of his employment. Where a plaintiff fails to satisfy the court on these points, his claim must fail. In the case of Tagoe vrs. Accra Brewery Ltd [2016] 93 GMJ 103 @ 123, the Supreme Court stated thus: “…in a claim founded on wrongful termination of employment contract, the plaintiff assumes the initial burden of producing evidence to satisfy the court about his terms of employment and that the termination of his appointment was contrary to terms of his appointment or existing law. The Defendant would then be obliged to produce evidence to justify the termination”. The reasons assigned by the plaintiff for the wrongful termination of his employment are both substantive and procedural in nature. First, he denies the charge of collusion of theft levelled against him, which was the basis of the termination of his employment. Secondly, as long as the District Court, Takoradi, had not established his guilt of the offence charged, there was no basis for the termination of his appointment. Again, the investigations leading to his termination were improper because the committee failed to give him a copy of the proceedings to apprise himself of whatever answers he had given to the various questions before the committee. The plaintiff did not adduce evidence on his terms of employment. He did not tender in evidence any contract of employment between him and the defendant. However, as has already been stated, the plaintiff's employment with the defendant was governed by a CBA, which the defendant's representative tendered in evidence as exhibit “3”. The plaintiff vaguely alluded to the CBA when he stated that he had never been queried since the defendant employed him in 1996 in accordance with Article XV(b)(i) of the CBA. Article XXIX(a) of the CBA provides the termination of appointment or summary dismissal as one of the modes of leaving the defendant's employment. Per Article XV of the CBA, proven misconduct in the form of stealing and dishonesty is grounds for summary dismissal. The defendant grounded the termination of the plaintiff's appointment on this ground. Exhibit “4”, the termination letter reads: “…Your action warrants summarily dismissal in accordance with our Collective Agreement (CA) Article XV (a)(i) which states “proven misconduct such as stealing is tantamount to summarily dismissal”. However upon further consideration Management has agreed to terminate your appointment.” Where a CBA exists between an employer and employee, the agreement is the yardstick in determining the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of the employee’s contract. Thus, once an employer follows the procedures as laid out in the CBA and follows the mandatory requirements regarding the hearing under the agreement, the termination of the contract is valid. The letter terminating the plaintiff’s appointment with the defendant provides the reason for the termination. The letter, exhibit “4”, states: “The Committee established that you indeed colluded to put the ten gallons of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) in your commercial vehicle from where the Tankers were parked at Bopp to Adum Banso. As an employee of BOPP, you should have refrained from such an unlawful act or at least reported to the Security Guards on duty for the arrest of the culprits. Your action warrants summarily dismissal in accordance with our Collective Agreement (CA) Article XV (a) (i) which states “proven misconduct such as stealing is tantamount to summarily dismissal”. However upon further consideration Management has agreed to terminate your appointment.” Thus, the gravamen of the defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s appointment stemmed from his collusion with some persons to convey stolen CPO from her premises to Adum Banso. The defendant took the view that the plaintiff's conduct was a misconduct under the CBA, which was subject to summary dismissal and, by extension, termination of the plaintiff’s appointment. The plaintiff has denied the charge of colluding with others to transport stolen oil. The issue, then, for consideration is whether the evidence presented to the defendant’s disciplinary committee is reasonably capable of supporting the decision of the defendant to terminate the plaintiff’s appointment. The plaintiff's testimony was just a rehash of the averments in his statement of claim. He testified that he had been supplementing his income by running a taxi service with his car after the close of work. He had been running this taxi service for a long time without stepping on any toes. On 7th August, 2020, at about 9 pm, he rendered a service to three young men as passengers at a place opposite the Abe Pepa office on the defendant’s compound. When he got to the defendant’s compound, the security officers stopped him and demanded that the passengers produce their receipts for the containers of palm oil they had boarded his taxi with. Subsequently, he was charged with the passengers and sent to the defendant’s security office to make a statement. The security officers claimed that the oil in the gallons had been stolen. He was sent to the police station at Benso, where he was also made to make a statement to that effect. He was arraigned before the District Court, Takoradi, on a charge of stealing. He pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the case was yet to be tried. One of the security guards of the defendant company who arrested the plaintiff, Gunkui Wise (DW1), testified as the defendant’s first witness. He recounted that on the night of 7th August, 2020, he and his colleague security guards on duty at the Ahinkrom security gate intercepted the plaintiff, who was then in charge of a commercial vehicle with passengers on board. They found ten gallons of CPO in the car. They asked the plaintiff and the passengers to produce receipts covering the ten gallons of oil, but they failed to produce any, and this heightened their suspicion that the goods might have been stolen from the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff was charged with the persons on board his vehicle and sent to the defendant’s security office to make their statements. They were immediately transferred to the Benso police station for their statements to be taken. Subsequently, the Benso police arraigned the plaintiff before the District Court, Takoradi, to answer to charges levelled against him. The Human Resource Manager of the defendant company testified on behalf of the company. He testified that the plaintiff had been in the defendant's employ as a maintenance worker for twenty-four years until the termination of his employment on 19th October, 2020. The plaintiff also operated a commercial vehicle with registration number AW 1214-14 alongside his work with the defendant company. He further testified that, on 7th August, 2020, around 10pm, the plaintiff, in collusion with three crude oil conductors, acted together to unlawfully and dishonestly appropriate ten gallons of CPO belonging to the defendant. The plaintiff’s commercial vehicle was used to convey the ten gallons of CPO from the defendant's premises until they were impounded by the defendant's security at Ahinkrom Division Gate. Recounting how the plaintiff was arrested, the defendant’s representative testified that on the night of the incident, when the plaintiff’s vehicle carrying the ten gallons of CPO got to the defendant’s security gate, the security guards stopped the vehicle and ordered three passengers onboard to step down and produce receipts covering the ten gallons of CPO. The plaintiff and his accomplices would have successfully transported the ten gallons of crude oil to Adum Banso but for the swiftness and diligence of the security guards. The plaintiff and the passengers on board his vehicle were charged and sent to the defendant's security office to make their statements. They were immediately transferred to the Benso police station for their statements to be taken. Subsequently, the plaintiff was arraigned before the District Court, Takoradi, to answer to charges levelled against him. From the evidence led, three significant facts were undisputed by the parties. i. Quite apart from being a maintenance worker at the defendant company, the plaintiff operated a commercial vehicle with registration number AW 1214-14. The defendant’s representative alluded to this fact in his testimony even though he claimed not to have known of this until the incident occurred. ii. On 7th August, 2020, whilst operating his commercial vehicle, the plaintiff was apprehended by the defendant’s security personnel at the Ahinkrom gate with four passengers (a lady and three men) on board. In the car were ten gallons containing CPO. iii. The plaintiff was not the owner of the gallons containing the oil. The passengers claimed ownership of the gallons but could not produce any receipts to cover the oil in the car. There was evidence led by the defendant’s representative that one of the products produced by the defendant was palm oil which he described as Crude Palm Oil (CPO). The defendant also claimed ownership of the ten gallons of oil found in the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff did not dispute this fact. The plaintiff claims to have had no knowledge of the contents of the gallon containing the oil. According to him, the three passengers who chartered his vehicle put the gallons of oil in the car. He usually did not examine the contents of the luggage of his passengers, including the gallons of oil found in his car. Moreover, he thought the gallons contained water fetched from the standpipe close to the security point and not oil. The defendant contends that the plaintiff knew the contents of the gallons and used his vehicle as a conduit for the carriage of the stolen goods. Therefore, he was in collusion with the men to steal her oil. The question then is whether the evidence on record is enough to impute knowledge of the contents of the gallons to the plaintiff. The proof of knowledge or mens rea is not capable of direct proof, but same may be inferred from established facts as stated in section 18(2) of the evidence decree 1975, NRCD 323. Not much from the parties' testimonies is sufficient to infer that the plaintiff knew the gallons contained CPO. However, through cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff, the defendant and her witnesses were given a second opportunity to fill in the blanks and shed more light on what happened on the date of the incident. According to DW1, when he stopped the plaintiff’s vehicle, he saw the luggage at the back and demanded to know the owner of the things in the boot. The passengers claimed ownership of the items. He told the plaintiff he was going to open the jerry cans. At that point, the plaintiff and the passengers started to beg him. This is what he said: “When they got to the gate, I asked the plaintiff who the things in the boot belong to. He said the owner was in the car. At that point, no one wanted to claim ownership over the items. Then I told the plaintiff to open the boot for me to see what was in the jerry can. The passengers got down and they claimed ownership of the items. They said the things were from Benso. I told them the items could not be from Benso as the distance from the gate to Benso could not be done in 15 minute moreso when the road was bad. Then I told the plaintiff I was going to open the jerry can. When I opened it, saw that 10 gallons (jerry can) contained oil. Then the plaintiff and the passengers started to beg me. I asked him where the waybill covering the items was. One of the passengers then told me that the gallons of oil were from BOPP yard. The plaintiff entreated me not to tell any officer of the company as he would be sacked.” The witness further stated that at the committee sitting, the plaintiff begged the members for forgiveness when they realised he had lied to them. According to the witness, the plaintiff told the committee that he crossed the gate once when he had crossed it three times. When the committee checked with the vehicle's movement book and saw the number of times he had crossed the gate, they told the plaintiff he had been lying to them. It was at that juncture that the plaintiff begged for forgiveness. The chairman of the disciplinary committee(DW2), Robert Damoah, testified under cross-examination that one of the security guards called, K. Manu @ IGP, testified before the committee that he saw the plaintiff passing through a bypass to where the tankers were parked to pick yellow gallons. According to the witness, upon receipt of this testimony, they recalled the plaintiff that very day and confronted him with this evidence. The plaintiff accepted it as accurate and pleaded for mercy. This fact was also corroborated by DW3, Abu Alhassan, the Vice Chairman of the Local Union Executive of Benso Oil Palm Plantation Workers of the General Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) and a member of the five- member committee. According to him, James Manu testified of seeing the plaintiff entering the defendant’s tanker yard to take ten jerry cans of oil. He further testified that: “When the plaintiff was called before the committee, he accepted that he sent the taxi into the company’s tanker yard and that alone convinced the committee that he aided the unlawful transportation of 10 gallons of oil”. Thus, at the committee sitting, it came to light that the plaintiff begged for forgiveness for among other things lying to the committee and driving into the defendant’s tanker yard. Two committee members, i.e., DW2 and DW3, have stated that a security guard saw the plaintiff at the Tanker yard of the defendant company. This fact is also found in the committee’s report tendered in evidence as exhibit “2”. The report stated that James Manu had seen the plaintiff drive through a bypass to the parking space for the tankers to pick up some persons. The plaintiff lost his credibility before the committee. He had not been candid with the committee, for which they could not bring themselves to believe that he did not know the contents of the gallons. When DW2 was asked about how dishonest the plaintiff was, this is what he stated: “Initially, he denied the knowledge of the contents of the items in the gallons. Secondly, the route he took to load the gallons in his car and how much he charged them. The people/passengers complained that he charged them GHc30.00 but he denied charging the passengers. At the committee, he said it took him more than 45 minutes to get back to the gate before he was arrested. The log book at the gate proved otherwise.” In exhibit “2”, the committee noted that upon further interrogation, the plaintiff admitted using the route as testified by James Manu, who had stated that the plaintiff came to the parking space where the tankers were parked to pick up some persons. The report further noted that the plaintiff admitted it took him about fifteen minutes to get to Ahinkrom gate after entering the estate from Adum Banso. It was established during the trial that the plaintiff usually plied his route through the main gate of BOPP to Benso. DW1 and the defendant's representative testified that it was impossible to drive from the gate to Benso in fifteen (15) minutes, more so when the roads were in a bad state. DW1 testified that from the time the plaintiff exited the gate to Benso to the time he got back to the gate was in less than fifteen (15) minutes which was an impossible feat. This would lend credence to the testimony of the committee members that evidence was led before them that the plaintiff was seen at the defendant’s tanker yard taking the jerry cans. This would explain why he could get to the security gate and back within fifteen (15) minutes from his last appearance. DW2 further testified under cross-examination that the plaintiff accepted before the committee that he charged the passengers GHc30.00. According to the witness, the arresting guards told the committee that the plaintiff initially denied charging the passengers stating that they would discuss the fare upon getting to their destination. The passengers told the security guards that the plaintiff had charged them GHc30.00 to carry their goods. The committee’s report (exhibit “2”) also indicates that even though the plaintiff initially denied charging the passengers GHc30.00, he later admitted charging them GHc30.00, as testified by one Prince Yegbe. It has been the plaintiff’s case that he charged the passengers GHc30.00 for chartering his taxi. DW1 indicated that upon his arrest, there were four persons in the car, three men and a lady. The plaintiff testified that he picked up the lady before picking up the three passengers. If it was a chartered ride, how come the lady was still on board? GHc30.00 would not have been the usual amount to charge for a regular journey. The defendant's representative testified that a 5km journey could not attract the charge of GHc30.00 GHc3.00. The only inference one could make of the high charge is his knowledge that he was taking a risk by carrying goods in his vehicle that belonged to the defendant. The plaintiff has been an employee of the defendant for about 24 years prior to the termination of his appointment. He had also been plying his trade as a driver for quite some time. And according to him, he was conversant with the defendant's regulations. The defendant's primary product was palm oil. Palm oil would usually be stored in gallons. There was also evidence that there was a standpipe in front of the security gate where people could fetch water in gallons and take them outside. That notwithstanding, I find it a bit odd on the part of the plaintiff that he usually did not ask passengers about the content of their luggage, particularly the contents of gallons, when he knew or ought to have known by his long service as an employee of the defendant and driving for some time that they would be the object of scrutiny from the security officials. The defendant’s representative explained that: “Not all luggage require receipt except palm oil. I have already stated that even me as a top official, if I am seen with palm oil in my vehicle, they would stop me and ask for receipt. Every worker of BOPP is aware of this”. Containers that could potentially store oil would be the subject of check at the security gate. Thus, even though people could carry water in gallons, the plaintiff ought to have known that it would be checked at the gate and, therefore, should have enquired from the passengers about the contents of the gallons. The plaintiff's involvement in the oil theft has been proven by his admissions and testimonies of persons present at the scene. There is evidence that at the committee meeting, the plaintiff admitted being at the tanker yard and using his vehicle to convey the gallons containing oil for the three passengers. Two witnesses have confirmed that he pleaded for mercy at the committee meeting. There is also evidence that he lied to the committee on several facts. One cannot blame the committee members for taking the view that he knew of the contents of the gallons and hence the need for him to lie to them and then plead for mercy. DW1’s evidence that the plaintiff pleaded for mercy when he found out it was oil in the car and his lies to the committee point to the fact that he knew the contents of the gallons to be oil. Enough evidence was led at the committee sitting to show that he had colluded with the passengers to convey ten gallons of oil from the company’s yard to Adum Banso. The passengers fled and, therefore, could not be prosecuted. By conveying the defendant's stolen oil in his vehicle, he had colluded with the passengers and abetted the oil's theft. Per the CBA governing the employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, misconduct in the form of stealing is tantamount to dismissal. Therefore, the defendant cannot be faulted for terminating her employment relationship with the plaintiff. The second leg of the plaintiff's complaint concerns procedural improprieties. It has been submitted on his behalf by his counsel that he was not given a fair hearing. According to counsel, the plaintiff appeared before a committee composed of the defendant’s employees. Other employees of the defendant testified before the committee. In his opinion, there was no way any witness was going to say anything in favour of the plaintiff. In his view, the plaintiff ought to have been given the option of engaging the services of a lawyer to boost his confidence to defend himself. As the CBA (exhibit “3”) between the defendant and GAWU is the primary document regulating the relationship between the parties, the termination of the plaintiff’s contract ought to be in accordance with the provisions of the CBA. Even though the CBA requires investigation to be carried out concerning an employee's alleged misconduct, it does not provide an established procedure for setting up a disciplinary Committee to investigate such offences. That notwithstanding, once the plaintiff was allowed to react to the charges laid against him, that should satisfy the requirement of fair hearing. The underlying principle of natural justice is that the affected person should be allowed to be heard. It does not suggest that a committee should always be set for him to appear to be heard except where there is a contract between the parties, and it provides that he should appear before a committee. Thus, in the case of Aryee vrs. State Construction Corporation [1984-86] 1 GLR 424, the Court of Appeal held as follows: A hearing did not necessarily, at all times, involve the physical presence of the employee before the board of directors to be examined viva voce. Where a board wrote to an employee drawing his attention to alleged acts of misconduct and impropriety and invited a written explanation, it would be thought that the employee would have been given an opportunity to be heard. If the employee wrote back answering the queries and offered explanations and justifications for his conduct, or otherwise, upon "sober reflection", withdrew the allegations and insinuations and apologised for his conduct, then indeed, he would have taken advantage of the opportunity offered him and would have been heard. The board would then be entitled to decide based on the employee's answers, explanations, justifications or apologies. The audi alteram partem rule would have been complied with. Again, in the case of Justice Awuku Sao vrs. Ghana Supply Company Ltd [2009] SCGLR 710, the Supreme Court held that once the plaintiff was given a chance to answer to the charges, it should satisfy to give him a hearing. The court stated as follows: “Both the trial and the appellate courts were of the view that in the absence of any requirement in the service contract between the plaintiff and the board for the setting up of disciplinary proceedings, what was essential for determination is whether the plaintiff was given an opportunity to react to the charges laid against him. We are in agreement with the proposition, for if the plaintiff was given a chance to answer to the charges even if not directly to the board or to a body set up by it, this should satisfy the requirement of natural justice.” The plaintiff testified that by a letter dated 10th September, 2020, the Human Resources manager invited him to appear before a Disciplinary Committee on 14th September, 2020 where he was quizzed about his involvement in a stealing case, after which he was handed his termination letter. After the meeting with the committee, he was asked to leave. He did not hear from the committee until 13th October, 2020, when the Human Resource Manager gave him a letter stating that his appointment with the defendant had been terminated. The termination was based on the committee's findings that he had colluded to put ten gallons of CPO in his commercial vehicle from where the tankers were parked at the defendant’s premises instead of reporting for the arrest of the culprits. He contended that as long as the District Court had not found him guilty on the charge of stealing, there was no basis for the termination of his appointment. DW2, the chairman of the five-member committee, testified that on 10th September, 2020, a five-member committee was constituted by the Human Resource manager of the defendant company to investigate the plaintiff for his alleged involvement in the theft of ten (10) jerry cans containing CPO stolen from a tanker with registration number AS 1214 15 on 7th August, 2020 on the estate. The committee comprised himself as chairman, Gordon Y. Assan (secretary), Margaret Kainyah Arthur(member), Samuel Oteng Okyere(member) and Abu Alhassan(union representative). According to the witness, the committee invited the plaintiff, Fredrick Abdullai(Security Coordinator of BOPP), Prince Yegbe (Acting Guard Force Commander of Yutees), James K. Manu (Supervisor-Yutees), Wise Gunkui (Guard-Yutees) by a letter dated 10th September, 2020 to appear before the committee to give their testimonies to aid the committee in its investigations. The plaintiff and all the witnesses who appeared before the committee were given a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Following investigations and a careful examination of all the circumstances and evidence adduced from the witnesses, the committee concluded that the plaintiff took the ten gallons of CPO from the Tankers Parking space to Adum Banso and that he used his commercial vehicle as a conduit for transporting the stolen CPO from the estate. The committee, per its report, recommended that the plaintiff’s contract with the defendant be terminated as stipulated in the CBA with particular emphasis on Article XV (a), subject to management's consideration. DW3, a member of the committee testified and essentially corroborated the evidence of DW2 regarding the composition of the five-member committee, how it conducted its investigations and its recommendations. It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff was invited to appear before the disciplinary committee and given the opportunity to tell his side of the story. His qualms with the committee was that he was not given the committee's proceedings to verify the record for himself. DW2 indicated that the committee was not mandated to give the plaintiff a copy of its proceedings. It was only members of the committee who were entitled to and given copies of the recording of the committee. The report was sent to management to take a decision. Indeed, looking at the CBA, there is no provision requiring the defendant to give a copy of the committee’s proceedings to the plaintiff. As has already been stated, the CBA does not specify any specific disciplinary procedures the defendant should do. In the absence of such, the only duty of the defendant is to act fairly and comply with the rules of natural justice, which is, giving the plaintiff the opportunity to make out his case. It is clear from the evidence that the plaintiff was given a fair hearing as the defendant allowed him to make out his case. At the end of the proceedings, he was told the outcome of the investigation in a language he understood. Counsel for the plaintiff's misapprehension that as long as the witnesses were employees of the defendant, nothing favourable would be said of the plaintiff is misconceived. Witnesses are generally persons who see an event taking place and can speak to it. The plaintiff was arrested on the defendant’s premises by the security guards, who are employees of the defendant. As long as they interacted with the plaintiff prior to and after his arrest, they were the ones to testify to help the committee unravel the case. It is presumed that they would testify to events as they saw them. Counsel has not pointed out the motive any witness would have had in testifying against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has led no evidence to show that any of the witnesses lied against him. The plaintiff further contends that the termination of his appointment is premature, given that the District Court has not pronounced him guilty of stealing. However, it was his counsel’s submission that the court acquitted and discharged him of the charges even though there was no evidence proving this fact. The fact that the plaintiff was arraigned before the District Court does not preclude the defendant from enquiring into the matter for purposes of disciplinary action. The disciplinary committee was not required to prove the charge against the plaintiff beyond a reasonable doubt as the District Court is required to do. The proceedings before the disciplinary committee are not akin to a court of competent jurisdiction. The committee is only a body set up to investigate the charges levelled against the plaintiff and make its conclusions and recommendations to the appropriate authorities for it to take action. See the case of Alex Coleman and David Koomson vrs. Newmont Ghana Gold, Emmanuel Atsiafu [2021] DLSC10161. By virtue of this, different sets of rules would govern the different fora enquiring into the matter and therefore are not mutually exclusive of each other. An employee can be acquitted and discharged by a court for the offence charged and yet be found culpable of that offence by the disciplinary panel set up to investigate the matter. This is so because different sets of standards govern the procedures. Moreover, the suggestion by the plaintiff for the defendant to await the outcome of the case at the District Court, in my view is preposterous. The defendant has no control over that case, which is essentially between the State and the plaintiff, and could take some time before its resolution. Should such an employee continue to remain in the defendant’s employ even though she suspects him to have colluded with others to steal from her? Certainly not. The defendant complied with the terms of the CBA regarding the termination of the plaintiff’s appointment. The plaintiff was found to have misconducted himself by colluding with others to steal from the defendant. Per article XV(a)(i) of the CBA, such conduct warrants a summary dismissal. However, the defendant failed to exercise this option after considering the plaintiff’s long service of work with her and chose to terminate his appointment instead. There are two sets of provisions in exhibit “3” that govern the severance of the employer/employee relationship by the defendant. First is the termination of the appointment, and the other is summary dismissal. These two modes of severance will generally result in the termination of the employee's contract in the sense that he ceases to be an employee of the defendant. However, there are different methods under the contract of bringing about the same result with different consequences. A summary dismissal does not attract severance benefits from the company, whereas an employee would be entitled to his benefits upon the termination of his contract. Where an employee’s appointment was terminated on grounds other than summary dismissal, the employee was to be given notice and reasons for the termination of his contract. Article XXX of the CBA states: “ARTICLE XXX RESIGNATION AND TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT a. NOTICE In the event of resignation or termination of appointment on grounds other than summary dismissal, an Employees (sic) shall give notice and reasons of resignation or be given notice and reasons of termination of service as indicated below i. Less than three (3) years’ service- Two (2) weeks’ notice or payment in lieu thereof. ii. Three (3) years and above-One month notice or payment in lieu thereof. b. Repatriation i. An Employee whose services terminates after five (5) years’ service excluding summary dismissal shall be given the option to decide where to be repatriated to; either to his hometown or permanent place of residence and in consultation with the Employee, the Employer shall provide transport or cash in lieu of transport for luggage as follows 0-100KM- One (1) month basic salary Above 100KM-Two(2) months basic salary Above 200KM-Three(3) months basic salary Above 300KM-Four(4) months basic salary Above 400KM-Five (5) months basic salary The defendant’s representative testified that following the committee’s recommendations, the defendant in accordance with Article XV of (A)(i) of the CBA between herself and the General Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), to which the plaintiff belonged rightly terminated the plaintiff's appointment for indulging in the act of dishonesty. The said provision provided the grounds for summary dismissal to include proven misconduct such as dishonesty, bribery, and stealing, among others. In his opinion, the defendant was more than charitable with the plaintiff by merely terminating his appointment, as the plaintiff's conduct warranted a dismissal. The representative added that upon the termination of the plaintiff’s appointment, the defendant instructed her financial controller by a letter dated 13th October, 2020 to pay into the plaintiff's bank account all the entitlements lawfully due him. The letter provided that the plaintiff be paid all his earned salary up to 18th October, 2020, a refund of Provident Fund Contribution, one basic salary in lieu of notice, repatriation expenses of one month salary to the plaintiff's hometown and transport fare of GHc45.00 to employee, spouse and child. Under cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted to being paid all his entitlements by the defendant. From the totality of the evidence adduced on record, the plaintiff misconducted himself whilst in the defendant's employ. He has failed to show that the defendant's termination of his appointment was unlawful. The defendant's termination of the plaintiff's appointment was lawful and in accordance with the CBA reached between them. In the circumstances, the plaintiff’s claims are dismissed. (SGD.) H/L AFIA N. ADU-AMANKWA (MRS.) JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT. COUNSELS D. A. Otoo appears for the Plaintiff. Ben Ackaah-Gyasi appears for the Defendant. 21