Jaffer Brothers Ltd vs Mohamed Magid Bagalaliwo and 2 Others (Civil Appeal No 43 of 1997) [1998] UGCA 18 (3 July 1998)

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Jessica chemeri} {\operator Wor. Jessica chemeri}{\creatim\yr2008\mo8\dy5\hr14\min3}{\revtim\yr2008\mo9\dy15\hr11\min51}{\version3}{\edmins115}{\nofpages22}{\nofwords6779}{\nofchars33897}{\*\company }{\nofcharsws40508}{\vern24689}} \widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\noxlattoyen\expshrtn\noultrlspc\dntblnsbdb\nospaceforul\hyphcaps0\formshade\horzdoc\dgmargin\dghspace180\dgvspace180\dghorigin1800\dgvorigin1440\dghshow1\dgvshow1 \jexpand\viewkind1\viewscale100\pgbrdrhead\pgbrdrfoot\splytwnine\ftnlytwnine\htmautsp\nolnhtadjtbl\useltbaln\alntblind\lytcalctblwd\lyttblrtgr\lnbrkrule\nobrkwrptbl\snaptogridincell\allowfieldendsel\wrppunct \asianbrkrule\rsidroot7407635\newtblstyruls\nogrowautofit \fet0\sectd \linex0\endnhere\sectlinegrid360\sectdefaultcl\sectrsid11799947\sftnbj {\*\pnseclvl1\pnucrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl2\pnucltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxta .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl5\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl6\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl8\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain \s15\qc \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 THE REPUBLIC OF }{ \b\ul\insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 UGANDA}{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\b\ul\insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 IN TH}{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 E COURT OF APPEAL OF }{\b\ul\insrsid11548640 UGAND}{ \b\ul\insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 A \line AT K}{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 AMPALA }{\b\ul\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\b\ul\insrsid11548640 CORAM:}{\insrsid11548640 \tab }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 HON. MR. JUSTICE G. M OKELLO, }{\insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 JA;}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\insrsid11548640 \tab \tab HON. MR. JUSTIC2 J. P. BERKO}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 , }{ \insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 JA;}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 AND \line }{\insrsid11548640 \tab \tab HON. MR. JUSTICE S. G. ENGWAU, }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 JA. \line }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\qc \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\b\ul\insrsid11548640 CIVIL APPEAL NO.43 OF 1997}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 JAFFER BROTHERS LIMITED::::::::::::::::}{\insrsid11548640 :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ::::::::::APPELLANT }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\qc \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\b\insrsid11548640 VERSUS}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 MOHAMED MAGID BAGALALIWO & 2 OTHERS:::::}{\insrsid11548640 :::::::}{ \insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 ::}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ::}{\insrsid11548640\charrsid11548640 ::::}{\insrsid11548640 :::}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ;RESPONDENTS \line }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi720\li1440\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin1440\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [Appeal from the Ruling and Orders of the High Court at Kampala (Kato J. as he then was) dated 18th August, 1997.) \line }{\insrsid11548640 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\b\ul\insrsid11548640 JUDGEMENT OF G. M. OKELLO, JA.}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid11548640 \par T}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 his }{\insrsid11548640 ap}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 peal is against the Ruling and}{\insrsid11548640 Orders of the High Court (C. M. Kato J. as he then was)}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 dated 18th August, 1997, in Civil Suit No.}{\insrsid11548640 31 of 1995, whereby he dismissed with costs the ap}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 pellant\rquote s Suit on the }{\insrsid11548640 ground}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 that it was time barred and disclosed no cause of action against the respondents. He held that the 1st Respondent\rquote s counter-claim had abated and awarded costs thereof to the respondents. \line }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The backgro und to this appeal may be stated simply, that the appellant is a Ugandan incorporated limited liability Company whose shareholders are all of Asian extraction. All the shareholders fled Uganda in 1972 following the expulsion of Asian from Uganda in 1972. At the time of expulsion, the appellant was the registered proprietor of Plot No. 9 HILL LANE, KOLOLO, KAMPALA, comprised in Lease hold Register Volume 354 Folio 17, which for convenience, I shall hencefo}{\insrsid9204900 r}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 th refer to as the suit prope}{\insrsid9204900 rty. }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Subsequently, Gove}{\insrsid9204900 rnment of Uganda (3rd respondent}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ) took over the suit property and}{\insrsid9204900 by virtue of Decree No. 27 of }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 1973, vested it in the Departed Asian Properties Custodian Board (DAPCB) (2nd respondent) for management. This Decree 27 of 1973 came into force on 7/12/1973. S ometime in 1977, the DAPCB sold the suit property to one Francis Nyangweso who in turn transferred it t}{\insrsid9204900 o Bagalaaliwo, (1st respondent)}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 . Mr. Bagalaaliwo \line was on 21/4/80 registered as the new proprietor of the suit property. By a consent judgment dated 18/11/87 between Bagalaaliwo and the Attorney General in High Court Civil Suit No. 310 of 1987, the suit property was decreed in favour of Bagalaaliwo. }{ \insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In November, 19}{\insrsid9204900 9}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 3, however, the appellant obtained from the Minister of State for Finance and Economic Plan ning in-charge of Custodian Board (DAPCB), a letter dated 7/12/93, Annexture \lquote B\rquote to the amended Plaint, }{\insrsid9204900\charrsid11548640 authorizing}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the appellant to repossess the suit property. This letter was clarified by a subsequent letter dated 28th September,, 1994, Annexture \lquote F\rquote to the amended plaint. Armed with these letters, the appellant filed the original suit against Mohammed Magid Bagalaaliwo and Ronald Muwenda Mutebi to secure inter-alia, vacant possession of the suit property. The Plaintiff later withdrew the claim again st Ronald Muwenda Mutebi. At the instance of Bagalaaliwo, DAPCB and the Attorney General were joined as defendants. }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In}{\insrsid9204900 his amended Written Statement o}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 f Defence, the 1st respondent countered the appellant\rquote s claim by a counter claim in which he claimed inte r alia, compensation as an alternative remedy against the 2nd and 3rd respondents. }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 When the suit came for hearing, the respondents raised three preliminary objections, namely: }{\insrsid9204900 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid9204900 {\insrsid9204900 [1] \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 tha}{\insrsid9204900 t the suit was time barred, it }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 having been i}{\insrsid9204900 nstituted allegedly well after 12 years from the date }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 whe}{\insrsid9204900 n the cause of action occurred }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 thus violating Section 6 and 7 of Limitation Act Cap. 70; }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid9204900 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sb100\sa100\sbauto1\saauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid9204900 {\insrsid9204900 [2]\tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 t}{\insrsid9204900 hat the plaintiff has no locus }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 st}{\insrsid9204900 andi in the suit since it does not hold any valid certificate of repossession; \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [3] }{\insrsid9204900 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 th}{\insrsid9204900 at the suit discloses no cause of action against all the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 defendants. }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The trial Judge heard the objections and upheld all the g}{\insrsid9204900 rounds and dismissed the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 appellant\rquote s suit. Hence this appeal. }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 There are seventeen grounds of appeal namely: }{\insrsid9204900 \par [1]\tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Th}{\insrsid9204900 e learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the time began to run against the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 pl}{\insrsid9204900 aintiff in respect of the suit }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 property from 7/12/}{\insrsid9204900 73 as far as }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 t}{\insrsid9204900 he second and third defendants }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 are concerned}{\insrsid9204900 . \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [2]}{\insrsid9204900 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Th}{\insrsid9204900 e learned trial Judge erred in }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 law}{\insrsid9204900 in holding that time began to run a gainst the plaintiff from the moment the first defendant }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 a}{\insrsid9204900 cquired the suit property from }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Major General Nyagweso i}{\insrsid9204900 n 1980 and not from 7/12/93. \par [3]\tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Th}{\insrsid9204900 e learned trial Judge erred in law in concluding that in the absence of any disability on the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 par}{\insrsid9204900 t of the plaintiff or fraud on }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the part of the defendants in the}{\insrsid9204900 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 plaintiff\rquote s pleadings, the plaintiff\rquote s claim was time barred}{\insrsid9204900 in respect of the defendants. \par [4]\tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that Annexture \lquote B\rquote to the Amended Plaint was a mere administrative letter outside the ambit of the Expropriated Properties Act (E. P. A) No. 9 of 1982 and cannot be used by the plaintiff}{\insrsid9204900 to recover the suit property. \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [5]}{\insrsid9204900 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in finding that the Plaintiffs have never been issued with a Certificate }{\insrsid9204900\charrsid11548640 Authorizing}{ \insrsid9204900 Repossession of the suit }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 property. }{\insrsid9204900 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [6] }{\insrsid9204900 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in concluding that since the plaintiff was not issued with a Certificate of Repossession of the suit propert y, they had no locus standi to sue the three defendants on the matter}{\insrsid9204900 concerning the suit property. \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [7] }{\insrsid9204900 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in failing to find that the consent judgment in HCCS No. 310 of 1987 (Mohamed M. Bagalaaliwo Vs the Attorney Gene ral) was null and void since it contravened the express provisions of E. P. A. No. 9 of 1982. \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid9961779 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [8] }{\insrsid9204900 \tab In the alternative but without }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 pr}{\insrsid9204900 ejudice to ground 7 above, the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 le}{\insrsid9204900 arned trial Judge erred in law in failing to hold that the plaintiff was not bound by the }{\insrsid9961779 co nsent Judgment in HCCS No. 310 of 1987, since they were not parties to the said suit and consent }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Judgment. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [9]}{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge misdirected himself when he concluded that the effect of }{\insrsid9961779 the consent Judgment in H}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 CCS No. 310 of }{\insrsid9961779\charrsid11548640 1987}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 was to remove the Suit Property from the amb}{\insrsid9961779 it of the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 E. P. A. No. 9 of 1982. }{ \insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [10] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he assumed that when the Attorney General Consented to Judgment in HCCS No. 31}{\insrsid9961779 0 of 1907 contrary to Sections }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 1 (2) of the E. P. A. No. 9 of 1982 which he had pleaded, the Attorney General must have }{\insrsid9961779\charrsid11548640 realized}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 that the Act was not applicable to the Suit Property. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [11] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact in assuming that the Attorney General cannot consent to an illegality. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [12] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that }{\insrsid9961779 even if the provisions of S. 1 (2) of the Expropriated Properties Act 1982 were }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 applicable to the Suit Property the first respondent remained the undisputed owner of the Suit Property as long as the consent Judgment in HCCS No. 310 of 1987 stands. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [13]}{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that the Plaintiff had no vested interest in the property since they had no legally }{ \insrsid9961779\charrsid11548640 recognized}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Certificate of Repossession. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [14]}{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that the plaintiff did not have any cause of action against any of the three defendants. }{\insrsid9961779

\par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [15] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learn}{\insrsid9961779 ed trial Judge erred in law in}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 upholding the }{\insrsid9961779\charrsid11548640 defendants \rquote }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 preliminary objections and dismissing the suit with costs. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [16] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The learned trial Judge erred in law by awarding costs of the counter claim to the defendants when they had not addressed Court on costs of the counter claim. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [17] }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The trial Judge generally faile}{\insrsid9961779 d to properly evaluate all the pleadings of the parties and }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 t}{ \insrsid9961779 hereby reached wrong decisions }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 and dismissed the suit. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Before I consider the merits of these grounds, there was an oral application by Counsel for the 1st respondent, seeking leave to argue ground, other than the ones upon}{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 which the trial Judge relied, to affirm the decision of that Court. Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents had no objection to the application being granted. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 On the other hand, Counsel for the appellant, opposed the application. We allowed the application whilst reserving our reasons which I propose to give now. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Mr. }{\insrsid9961779\charrsid11548640 Serwanga}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 learned Counsel for the 1st respondent\rquote s argument was that he desired to contend at the hearing that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed on the ground other than that upon which High Court relied. The ground he sought to argue was that:}{\insrsid9961779 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid9961779 {\insrsid9961779 \'93The }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Suit wa}{\insrsid9961779 s time barred in as far as the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 appellant did not follow the procedure under Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 in time.\rquote }{\insrsid9961779 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid9961779 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 He blamed his failure to give the Notice of that ground und}{\insrsid9961779 er Rule 91 of the Rules of this }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Court, on oversight and numerous interlocutory applications which distracted his attention. \line }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Counsel for the appe}{\insrsid9961779 llant gave the following three g}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 rounds for his opposition:}{\insrsid9961779 -}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid9961779 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid9961779 {\insrsid9961779 [}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 l}{\insrsid9961779 ]\tab }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Th}{\insrsid9961779 at the application should have been made formally before a }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 s}{\insrsid9961779 ingle Judge in accordance with Rule 52 (2) read together with }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Rul}{\insrsid9961779 e 42 both of the Rules of this Court. \par [2]}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid9961779 \tab }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Th}{\insrsid9961779 e Notice was not lodged within }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 t}{\insrsid9961779 he period prescribed in Rule 9 }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 (2) o}{\insrsid9961779 f the Rules of this Court and was too general to comply with Rule 9 (1) \par [3]}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid9961779 \tab That the proposed ground was a new matter which was neither }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 r}{\insrsid9961779 aised nor canvassed before the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 trial Court. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 On those grounds he prayed that the application be rejected. }{\insrsid9961779 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In a brief response, Mr. Serwanga }{\insrsid9961779 contended that the application }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 could be made orally. He cited }{\b\ul\insrsid9961779\charrsid5193144 Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1992, }{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid5193144 GOUALDAS LAXMIDAS TANNA VS SR ROSEMARY MUNINZA AND DAPCB (Sc) }{\b\ul\insrsid9961779\charrsid5193144 (unreported).}{\b\ul\insrsid5193144 \par }{\insrsid5193144 I}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 agree with Mr. Walubiri, Counsel for the appellant, that}{\insrsid5193144 Rule }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 91 of the Rules of this Court provides for procedure and time limit for giving Notice of grounds other than or additional to those relied on by the trial Court, for affirming the decision of that Court. I am however, persuaded by the decision in TANNA \rquote S c}{\insrsid5193144 a}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 se (supra) by which I am bound, that under certain circumstances, oral application of this type can be allowed to argue ground other than or additional to those upon which the trial Court relied, to affirm the decision of that Court. }{\insrsid5193144

\par }\pard \s15\ql \fi-720\li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid5193144 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In that ca se, the appellant had in 1982 bought the Suit Property, Plot 12 Hannington Road in Kampala from a Public Auction ordered by UCB as the Mortgagee to recover a loan. The original owner of the Suit Property who had mortgaged it had left the Country as a Depa rted Asian\'94 following the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 before he repaid the loan. Government of Uganda expropriated the Suit Property and by virtue of Decree 27 of 1973 vested the same in the DAP}{\insrsid5193144 CB for management The appel1ant}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 became the registered owner of the Suit Property in 1986. In the meantime the Suit Property was occupied by the 1st respondent as a tenant of the DAPCB. She refused to }{ \insrsid5193144\charrsid11548640 recognize}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the Appe1lant\rquote s ownership over the Suit Property }{\insrsid5193144\charrsid11548640 and}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 resisted his attempt to evict her. Consequen tly, the appellant sued the 1st respondent and the DAPCB in the High Court claiming inter alia vacant possession. At the hearing, the question of the effect of Section 1 of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 on the sale of the Suit Property to the appe llant was raised and argued. The trial Judge dismissed the appellant\rquote s suit on a different ground other than on the basis of Section 1 of the Act. }{\insrsid5193144 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 On appeal, Counsel for the respondent sought orally in the}{\insrsid923747 cause of the hearing, leave to }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 argue the effect o f Section 1 of Expropriated Properties Act on the sale of the Suit Property to the appellant as a ground for affirming the decision of the trial Court. \line }{\insrsid5193144 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In an unanimous decision, Wambuzi, CJ, said at page 4 of his judgment that:}{\insrsid5193144 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid5193144 {\insrsid5193144 \'93It }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 would have been preferab}{\insrsid5193144 le for Counsel }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 for the r}{\insrsid5193144 espondent to have given Notice }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 under Rule 91}{\insrsid5193144 of the Rules of this Court of }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 grounds for}{\insrsid5193144 affirming the decision of the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 superior }{\insrsid5193144 Court on grounds other than or }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 additional to}{\insrsid5193144 that relied on by that Court. }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 However, in the circumsta}{\insrsid5193144 nces of this }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 appeal, we a}{\insrsid5193144 llowed learned Counsel for the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 respond}{\insrsid5193144 ents to put forwards arguments }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 relating to}{\insrsid5193144 Section 1 of the Expropriated }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Properties Ac}{\insrsid5193144 t, 1982 to enable the Court to }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 reappraise }{\insrsid5193144 the issues and decide the real }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 issues between the parties.\'94 }{\insrsid5193144 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid923747 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The circumstances of that appeal as contained on page of the Judgment of Oder JSC were} {\insrsid5193144 :-}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid923747 \par }{\insrsid5193144 \'93Both }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the respondents in their Written Statement of Defence relied on the effect of that Act as the ground for resisting the appellant\rquote s claim. In the agreed facts, the seco nd respondent reiterated its contention that the transaction between the Uganda Commercial Bank and the appellant was nullified by the provisions of the Act.\'94 \line }{\insrsid5193144 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid5193144 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The gist of the above circumstances is that the point sought to be argued was not new. It was pleaded and canvassed at the trial. It was central to the case. }{\insrsid5193144 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The above principle, in my view, applies to the case before us as the circumstances of the two cases are similar. In the instant case, the issue of procedure to repossess property under the Expropriated Properties }{ \insrsid5193144\charrsid11548640 Act}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 was pleaded by the second respondent in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its Written Statement of Defence. It was also canvassed at the trial by Counsel for the second respondent. He argued at the trial that the Suit Property was not return ed to the appellant under the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982. This ground is therefore not new. It is also central.to this appeal. \line It was therefore necessary that Counsel for the respondent present their arguments relating to that procedure to enable the Court to consider the point and effectually determine the real issue between the parties. It was for this reason that we allowed the oral application. \line I now turn to the grounds of ap}{\insrsid5193144 peal. The appeal was argued on }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 a broader question whether the appe}{\insrsid5193144 llant applied to repossess the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Suit Property under the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 in time. \line }{\insrsid5193144 The argument put forward f}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 or the respondents, as I understand it, was, that the appellant did not apply to repossess the Suit Property within the ninety days prescribed under the Act and did not comply with the procedure prescribed for such application. }{\insrsid5193144 In Counsel\rquote s view, Annexture \lquote B\rquote }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 wa}{\insrsid5193144 s }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 not issued under the Act as it did not refer to application nor did it even talk of returning property and was not signed by the Minister responsible for Finance. For these reasons, Mr. Sekandi, Counsel for the second respondent, submitted that th e suit was time barred. \line Counsel for the 1st and 3rd respondents associated themselves fully with the submission of Counsel for 2nd respondent. \line On the other hand, Counsel for the appellant contended that Annexture \lquote B\rquote was issued under the Act to return the Suit Property to the appellant, a former owner. He submitted that as the substance of Annexture \lquote B\rquote and \lquote F\rquote to the amended Plaint tallies with the purpose of the Act, which is to return the properties to their former owner, Section 5 (1) of the Act and Regulation 10 (3) of Regulations 1983 (S. 1 No. S of 1983) should be interpreted liberally so that Annexture \lquote B\rquote should be regarded as a Certificate of Repossession. \line Section 3 of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 sets time limit within which a former owner may apply to repossess .his/h}{\insrsid5193144 er/its property which had been e}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 xpropriated by the Military Regime and vested in the Government under Section 1 of the Act. It reads:}{\insrsid5193144 - \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid5193144 {\insrsid5193144 \'93Any }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 f}{\insrsid5193144 ormer owner of the property or }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 business vested in the Government under \line Section 1 }{\insrsid5193144 of this Act, may within ninety }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 days of the commencement of this Act, apply \line to the Minist}{\insrsid5193144 er in writing and in such form }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 as may be prescribed for repossession of the \line property or business.\'94 }{\insrsid5193144 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid5193144 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The effect of the above Section is }{\insrsid5193144 that a former owner who wished t} {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 o repossess his/her/its property has to submit his/her/its application on a pre}{\insrsid5193144 scribed form within ninety days }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 from the date when the Act came into force. The Act came into force on 21/2/83 by Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1983. By a simple calculation, the ninety days ended on 22/5/1983. }{\insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 However, there was General Notice No. 88 of 1993 issued by the Minister responsible for Finance and published in Uganda Gazette, Vol. LXXXVI No. 20 of May 13th 1993, and a Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 1994. The St atutory Instrument referred in its preamble to the General Notice. The General Notice invited former owners, both citizens and non-citizens whose properties had been expropriated by the Military Regime to apply up to 30/10/93, to repossess them. The Gener a l Notice and the Statutory Instrument in effect amended Section 3 of the Expropriate Properties Act, 1982 by extending the ninety days period prescribed in the Section. None of the Counsel for the parties had alluded to these documents when they argued th e appeal. We therefore invited them to address us on the effect of the two documents. \line }{\insrsid8131468 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Mr. Sekandi, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent, argued that the General Notice was issued by the Minister as Chairman of the DAPCB under Decree 27 of 1973 in a mist aken belief that he had powers under Section 17 of the Decree to return properties of citizens. Yet, that Section 17 of the Decree had been repealed ten years ago wh}{\insrsid8131468 e}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 n the Expropriated Properties Act came into force. And that the distinction between citizens and no}{\insrsid8131468 n c}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 itizens had been abolished from the day of the judgment of the supreme Court in }{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 The}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute Vs DAPCB - Civil Appeal No. 21 of}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 1993 (unreported).}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 According to that Judgment, all expropriated properties, whether b elonging to citizens or non-citizens now fall under the Act. In Counsel\rquote s view, the Minister has no power under the Act to issue such a Notice or to amend any provision of the Statute. That the General Notice is a mere administrative \'93confusion \'94 without any legal effect on the case in hand. He cited }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 TARMAL INDUSTRIES LT VS CO}{\b\ul\insrsid8131468 MM}{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 ISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE (1986) EA 471}{ \ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 . }{\insrsid8131468 He }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 concluded that it was a misconception on the part of the Minister to have referred to the General Notice in the preamble of the Statut ory Instrument No. 1 of 1994. }{\insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Counsel for the 1st and 3rd respondents associated themselves fully with the above submission. }{\insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 From the outset, I agree with Counsel for the respondent that as from the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 Th}{\b\ul\insrsid8131468\charrsid8131468 e}{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute (supra),}{\i\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 all expropriated properties whether belonging to citizens or non- citizens of Uganda at the time of expropriation, now fall under the Act. I am however, unable to agree that the General Notice was issued b y the Minister under Decree No. 27 of 1973 nor that he did so under a mistaken belief that he had powers to return expropriated properties of citizens under Section 17 of the Decree. There is no suggestion that that was the case. Reference to Decree No. 2 of 1973 in the General Notice was to show the origin of the DAPCB which manage the expropriated properties. The Minister must have known of the repeal of that provision because he never referred to it in the Notice. He must have, wrongly or rightly, issu ed the Notice under the Act since he referred to a provision of the Act in the Notice. \line }{\insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The salient question to be answere}{\insrsid8131468 d here, in my view, is whether }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the Minister has powers under t}{\insrsid8131468 he Act to issue such a General }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Notice which has the effect of amending a provision of the Act? }{\insrsid8131468 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid8131468 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Mr. Bamwine, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that the Minister has powers under Section 8 of the Act to issue such a Notice to enable him receive late applications and deal with them to carry out the purpose of the Act . His argument was that Expropriated properties Act being a remedial Statute, must be given liberal construction to achieve the purpose of the Act. In Counsel\rquote s view, Sections 3 and 8 read together, would show that Parliament did not intend, that Section 3 should be }{\insrsid8131468 mandatory. He argu}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ed, that these two Sections be interpreted liberally. He cited }{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY VS LANGRIDGE (1991] 3 ALLER 591 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 as authority for the principles for determining whether a Statutory provision is mandatory or directory. }{ \insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I am persuaded by the argument that Expropriated Properties Act being a remedial Statute must be interpreted liberally to give effect to the purpose of the Act. To adopt a strict interpretative approach canvassed by Counsel for the respond ents, would only help to perpetuate the mischief which the Statute intended to combat and to provide no remedy to the former owners for wrong done to them by the Military Regime. This is infact what Odoki JSC as he then was, said in the unanimous decision in }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 The Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute (supra).}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 He said on page 6 of his judgment that:}{\insrsid8131468 - \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid8131468 {\insrsid8131468 \'93The }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Expropria}{\insrsid8131468 te Properties Act is therefore }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 a remedial Act. I agree that such a Statute must construed liberally and not restrictively. To do otherwise would be to perpetuate the mischief intended to be redressed and not to provide a remedy to the injustice which was occasioned by the Military Regime to the former owners. It would be wrong and unjust to return property which the Milit}{\insrsid8131468 ary Regime took over lawfully }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 and refuse to return property which was illegally taken over. This Court cannot approve of an interpretation which would result in such an injustice and which runs contrary to the plain meaning of the words and the purpose of the Act.\'94 }{ \insrsid8131468 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I have perused the }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid8131468 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY (SUPRA)}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 to which Counsel for the appellant referred us. That case concerned interpretation of Section 16 (1) of the Company }{\insrsid8131468 Directors Disqualificati}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 on Act, 1986. The Section requires that Notice of Intention to apply for disqualification order \lquote shall\rquote be given to the person against whom the order is sought not less than ten days before filing the application. The Secretary of State gave to Mr. Langridge less than ten days Notice. The question before Court was whether the }{ \insrsid923747\charrsid11548640 statutory}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 provision for ten days Notice period is mandatory or mere directory. What is the effect of failure to given the ten days }{\insrsid8131468\charrsid11548640 Notice?}{ \insrsid8131468 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The Court adopted the following principles from the}{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11497233 }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11497233 Smith\rquote s Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn, 1980 pp 142- }{ \b\ul\insrsid8131468\charrsid11497233 143 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 to resolve the questions before it:}{\insrsid11497233 - \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid11497233 \'93When }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Parli}{\insrsid11497233 ament prescribes the manner or }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 form in which a duty is to be performed or power exercised, it seldom lays down what will be the legal consequences of failure to observe its prescripti}{\insrsid11497233 ons. The Court must therefore for}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 mulate their own criteria for determining whether the procedural rules are to be regarded as mandatory, in which case disobedience will render void or voidable what has been done, or as directory, in which case disobedience will be treated as an irregularity not affecting the validity\bullet of what has been done (though in some cases it has been said there must be \'93substantial compliance\'94 with the Statuto ry provisions if the deviation is to be excused as a mere irregularity) . Judges have often stressed the impracticability of specifying exact rules for the assignment of a procedural provision to the appropriate category. The whole scope and purposes of e nactment must be considered and one must assess \'93the importance of the provision that has been }{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 disregarded}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act.\'94 In assessing the importance of the provision, particular regards may be had to its significance as a protection of }{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 indi}{ \insrsid11497233 vi}{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 du}{\insrsid11497233 a}{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 l}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 rights, }{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 the}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 relative value that is normally attached to the rights that may be adversely affected by the decision and the importance of the procedural requirement in the overall administr ative scheme established by Statute. Although nullification is the natural and usual consequences of disobedience, breach of procedural, or formal rules is likely to be treated as a mere irregularity if the departure from the terms of the Act is of a triv i al nature, or if no substantial prejudice has been suffered by those for whose benefit the requirements were introduced, or if serious public inconvenience would be cause by holding them to the mandatory, or if the court is for any reason disinclined to i nterfere with the act or decision that is impugned.\'94 }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I find the above principles}{\insrsid11497233 relevant and also persuasive. I }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 shall adopt them to handle the question in hand. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid923747 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The purpose of the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982, is contained in its long title or preamble which reads:}{\insrsid11497233 -}{\insrsid923747 \par }{\insrsid11497233 \'93}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 An Act to p}{\insrsid11497233 rovide for the transfer of the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 properties and businesses acquired or otherwise expropriated during the Military Regime to the Ministry of Finance to provide for the return to the former owners or disposal of the same by Government and to provi}{\insrsid11497233 de for other matters connected }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 therewith or incidental thereto.\'94 }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The purpose of the Act is in a nutshell to provide for the return to the former owners of the properties that had been expropriated during the Military Regime. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Section 3 of the Act which is said to have been disregarded was set out earlier in this judgment. It is intended to urgently ascertain former owners and the properties they claim repossession of, to enable government to deal with their matters speedily. The Secti on is in my view, procedural in nature. It is intended to benefit the former owners and to protect them and government against fraudulent claimants. A strict interpretation of the provision as Counsel for the respondents }{ \insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 canvass}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 would produce substantial prejudice to the former owners for whose benefit the provision was intended. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 It would result in former owners not receiving back their properties. That would perpetuate the mischief Parliament intended the Act to combat. The effect of that interpretative a pproach is to deny the administrative scheme established by the Statute enough time to deal with the load of work to implement the purpose of the Act. I cannot imagine Parliament to waste so much time and public funds to make this Act if its objectives we re not to be carried out. }{\b\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The Section cannot be construed restrictively. I would interpret the word \lquote may\rquote in Section 3 to make the Section directory so that non compl}{\insrsid11497233 iance with it, is only an irreg}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ularity. That is the only sensible meaning which Parliamen t must have intended. The provision to Section 8 gives the Minister discretion to give direction as he deems fit, if he is satisfied that retention of the property would be prejudicial to the minority interest in a registered enterprise or business. The p rovision strengthens the view that Parliament did not intend that Section 3 be mandatory but directory. \line In view of the above, I am satisfied that the Minister has powers under Section 8 of the Act to issue the General Notice and there was no misconception to have referred to the Notice in the preamble of Statutory Instrument No. 1 of 1994. He is empowered so to do under Section 15 (b) of the Act. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I now revert to the argument that the appellant did not apply to repossess the suit property under the Act in time. For this argument to succeed, it had to be shown that the appellant\rquote s application was submitted after the 30th day of October, 1993. The onus is on the respondent who alleged the lateness of the appellant\rquote s application. Unfortunately no such facts had been shown. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Annexture \lquote B\rquote was issued on 7/12/93. It was explained by a subsequent letter dated 28/9/94 (Annexture \lquote F\rquote ). }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 It was argued that Annexture \lquote B\rquote was not issued under the Act because it did not refer to application, did not even talk of return property and was not signed by the Minister responsible for Finance. }{ \insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I think that these are matters of technicality relating to form which should not override substance. If the substance of the letter complies with the intent and purpose of the Act it should be given effect. To do otherwise would be going contrary to Article 126 (2) (e) of the Constitution which provides that \'93 Substantive justice shall be administered without undue regard to technicalities.\'94 This is also in line with the provision of Section 43 Interpretation Decree No. 18 of 1976 which provides that: - }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li1440\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin1440\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \'93 Where any form is prescribed by any Act or Decree, an instrument or document which purports to be in such form shall not be void by reason of any deviation }{\insrsid11497233\charrsid11548640 there from}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 which does not affect the substance of such}{\insrsid11497233 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 instrument or document or which is not calculated to mislead.\'94 }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Annexture \lquote F\rquote which explained Annexture \lquote B\rquote reads in part as follows: - }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi720\li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \'9328th September, 1994. }{\insrsid11497233 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11497233 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 M/S Kwesigaba, Bamwine and \line Company Advocates, \line }{ \b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11497233 KAMPALA}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 . }{\ul\insrsid11497233 \par }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11497233 RE: PLOT 9 HILL LANE, KOLOLO, KAMPALA \line LEASEHOLD REGISTER VOLUME 354 FOLIO 17}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 . }{\insrsid11497233 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I acknowledge receipt of your letter CIV/75/94 dated 6th September, 1994 with regard to the above subject. For a long time properties of Uganda citizens have been returned using letters of repossession while these of non-citizens are issued Certificates. }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 Therefore the letter dated 7th December, 1993 is a bona fide document }{\b\ul\insrsid11810937\charrsid11810937 authorizing}{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 the owner to repossess his property.\'94 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 [emphasis mine)} {\insrsid11810937 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11810937 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 It is clear from the above that the Minister intended i}{\insrsid11810937 n the letter dated 7th December, 1}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 993 which is Annexture \lquote B\rquote , to return the Suit Property to }{\insrsid11810937 the appellant. That is what the }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 purpose of the Act is and that is what Section 5 (1) thereof and regulation 10 (3) of the Expropriated Properties (Repossession and Disposal) Regulations, 1983 (S. 1 No. 6 of 1983) are intended to accomplish. Deviation of Annexture \lquote B\rquote from Form (3) prescribed in Regulation 10 (3) above should not render Annexture \lquote B\rquote void since its substance is not affected. It was meant, to return the property to the former owner. }{\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The issuance of Annexture B and F shows that the Minister was satisfied under Section 5 (1) of the Expropriated Properties Act, 198 2. }{\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I am satisfied that the appellant }{\insrsid11810937 applied and obtained Annexture }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 B which amounts to a Certi}{\insrsid11810937 ficate of Repossession under }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Expropriated Properties Act, 1982, in time. The Suit is \line therefore not time barred. }{\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 As I have held above, Annexture B and F constitute a Certificate of Repossession. The Certificate immediately clothed the appellant with equitable right over the Suit Property, pending the transfer of the legal right by Government on registration. Registration is a formality as Government is

bound under the Act to transfer the property to former owner with a Certificate of Repossession. The equitable right enabled the appellant to serve a quit Notice to the 1st respondent who occupies the Suit Property as a Statutory tenant under Section 9 of the Act. Failure by the 1st respondent to comply with the quit notice gave the appellant a cause of action against the 1st respondent. The appellant therefore has locus standi to bring the. Suit and has a cause of action against the 1st respondent. }{ \insrsid11810937 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Finally, dismissal of the main suit does not automatically a}{\insrsid11810937 bates the counter claim. Under O}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 8 R2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, a counter-claim is a cross claim. It should have been heard on the merits. The trial Judge was therefore wrong in holding that the counter-claim abated. \line In the result, I would allow the appeal with costs to the appellant. I would set aside the dismissal and other consequential orders made by the trial Judge and remit the case to the High Court for hearing on merits as there is a cause o f action against 1st respondent. As Berko JA and Engwau JA both also agree the appeal is allowed. }{\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The dismissal and other consequential orders made by the trial Judge are set aside. The case is remitted to the High Court for hearing on merits. The }{\insrsid11810937 respondents shall pay appellant }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 costs of this appeal. \line }{\insrsid11810937 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11810937 {\insrsid11810937 Dated at Kampala this 3}{\super\insrsid11810937 rd}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 day}{ \insrsid11810937 July}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 1998. \line G. M. OKELLO \line }{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 JUSTICE OF APPEAL. }{\insrsid11810937 \par \par \par }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 JUDGMENT OF BERKO, JUSTICE OF APPEAL. }{\b\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I agree that an Order should be made as proposed by }{\insrsid11810937\charrsid11548640 Kilo}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 , J. A. I add some observations of my own because we are differing from Kato J. (as lie then was) on one point of general importance and out of deference to the arguments of Counsel. \line The facts of this appeal are set out in the judgment of Okello, J. A. which I have had the advantage of reading in draft. I find it unnecessary to restate the facts, submissions and legislation save in so far as this is necessary to give point to the }{ \b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 reasoning }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 in }{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 my }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 judgment. }{\insrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The main issues in contention in this appeal are: \line }{\insrsid11810937 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11810937 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 (1) Whether the Judge was right in holding that the appellant\rquote s }{ \b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 suit }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 against all the def}{\insrsid11810937 endants was time barred, \line (ii) }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Whether the appellants have ever been issued with a certificate of repossession of the suit property, \line (iii) Whether the appellants had locus standi to sue the defendants concerning the suit property, }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 (iv) The legal effect of the consent judgment in H. C. C. S. No. 310 of 1987 and \line (v) Whether the trial Judge was correct when lie held that the counter \emdash claim of the First respondent abated when th e appellant suit was dismissed. \line }{\insrsid11810937 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11810937 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 It is a common ground that after the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 the Government took over the suit property and by virtue of Decree No. 27 of 1 973 vested it in the Departed Asian Properties Custodian Board to manage. Some time in 1977, the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board sold the property to one Major Francis Nyangweso who in turn sold it to the first respondent who was registered as the proprietor of the suit property on 21/4/80. The purchases and tr a nsfers of the suit property from the Departed Asians Properties Custodian Board to Major Francis Nyangweso and from Major Francis Nyangweso to the first respondent were nullified by S. 1(2)(a) of the Expropriated Properties Act 1 1982, Act 9. Section 1(a) of the Act vested the property back in the Government and brought it under the management of the Ministry of Finance. See: }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Gokaldas Laxirnidas Tanna v Sr Rosemary and Departed }{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Asian }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Property Custodian Board }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \emdash }{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Civil Appeal }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 No. }{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 120 of 1992. } {\b\insrsid11810937 \par }{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Thereafter }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 the first respondent ceased to have tittle to the suit property. His right to occupy the property was regulated by Section 9(1) of the Act which provides: }{ \insrsid12718791 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li720\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11304294 {\b\i\insrsid12718791 \'939(1) Any person who, at th}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 e commencement of this Act is legitimately occupying or managing proper}{\b\i\insrsid12718791 ty}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 or business affected by the provisions of Section 1 of (his Act, shall continue to so occupy or manage the property or business until such (line as the prop}{\b\i\insrsid12718791 erty or business is returned to t}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 he}{ \b\i\insrsid12718791 form}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 er owner or is }{\b\i\insrsid12718791 sold or otherwise disposed of u}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 nder the }{\b\i\insrsid12718791 pro}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 visi ons of this Act. \line (2) An officer, or employee of the Government, G}{\b\i\insrsid11304294 overnment Institution or parastal}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 body or }{\b\i\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 other legitimate tenant }{ \b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 shall be entitled to not less than ninety da}{\b\i\insrsid11304294 ys notice to vacate any residen}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11810937 tial property he is legitimately occupying, where such property is returned to a former owner, sold or \line }{\b\i\insrsid11304294 otherwise disposed of in accordance with th}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 e }{\b\i\insrsid11304294 provisions}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line of this } {\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11304294 Act\'94.}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid11304294 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11304294 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 It is plain from the above provisions that after the First respondent\rquote s purchase of }{\insrsid11304294 th}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11304294 e suit}{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 property }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 had been nullified by the Act of 1982, he had only a right under the Act to occupy the property until it was returned to the former owner or sold or disposed of by the Minister of Finance in accordance with the provisions of the Act. That right to occupy the property did not confer on him a right to prevent the Minister from }{\insrsid11304294 returning the property to its fo}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 rmer owner. Consequently he cannot set up a Statute of Limitation to defeat the appellant\rquote s right to repossess his property from the Minister of Finance. Th}{\insrsid11304294 e first respondent cannot set u}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 p }{\b\i\insrsid11304294\charrsid11304294 jus}{\i\insrsid11304294 }{\b\i\insrsid11304294 terti}{ \i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 against the appellants claim. }{\insrsid11304294 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The situation, however, will be different, if after the former owner had repossessed his property, he went to sleep for over twelve years without taking action to recover the pro perty from the person in occupation by virtue of S.9 of the Act. In such a case, the occupant can resist the former owner\rquote s claim to recover possession from him by a plea that his claim is time barred. }{\insrsid11304294 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In the instant case the evidence on record shows tha t the appellant was issued with a letter of repossession by the Minister of the 7/12/93. Therefore the Judge erred when he held that time began to run against the appellant from the moment the first respondent acquired the suit property from Major Francis Nyangweso in 1980. }{\insrsid11304294 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The next point I want to deal with is the effect of the consent judgment in the HCCS 310 of A\rquote 1987 between Mohammed Bagalaliwo }{\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 v }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Attorney General. In my view the consent judgment is not worth the paper on which it was written. My reasons are firstly}{\insrsid11304294 , that the appellant cannot be }{\insrsid923747 s}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ound by a judgment in }{ \b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 personam }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 when he was not a party to it; Secondly, as the provisions o}{\insrsid11304294 f Section 1 of the Expropriated }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Properties Act, 1982 nullified tile sale and purchase of the suit property by the first respondent, the consent judgment cannot restore to him what had been taken away from him by an Act of Parliament: See: }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Gokaldas }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11304294 Laximidas}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Tanna (Supra). }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The objective of th}{\insrsid11304294 e Act was to correct a historic}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 al wrong that was done to the Asian Community in Uganda by the then Government in power and in a way to prevent the endless mischief and injury: See Constitutional Petition No. 9 of 1997: } {\b\i\insrsid11304294 PyraIi Abdul Rasul Esm}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ail }{\b\i\insrsid11304294\charrsid11548640 vs.}{\b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 Adrian Sibo, }{\b\i\insrsid11304294 court of Appeal (}{ \b\i\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 unreported,). }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 That objective cannot be defeated by a consent judgment recorded behind the back of the former owner.}{\insrsid11304294 The learned Judge therefore err}{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 ed when he held that so long as the consent judgment stands the respondent remains an undisputed owner of the property. The other points are adequately covered by Okello, J. A. \line }{\insrsid11304294 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 For the above few observations, I agree that the appeal be allowed. }{\insrsid11304294 \par }\pard \s15\ql \fi720\li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1593584 {\insrsid11304294 Dated at Kampala this 3}{\super\insrsid11304294\charrsid11304294 rd}{\insrsid11304294 day of July }{\insrsid11304294\charrsid11304294 1998}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11304294 }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line }{\insrsid11304294 \par }\pard \s15\qc \fi720\li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1593584 {\insrsid1593584 J. P. Berko \par }\pard \s15\qc \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11304294 {\ul\insrsid11304294 JUSTICE O}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 F APPEAL }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line } {\b\insrsid7407635\charrsid11304294 \par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\sb100\sa240\sbauto1\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 {\ul\insrsid1593584 \par \par \par }{\b\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid1593584 JUDGMENT OF ENGWAU, JA.}{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 }{\insrsid1593584 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of G. M. Okello, JA in draft and I agree with it. It is common knowledge that after the expulsion of the Asian community from Uganda in 1972, the suit property was among the properties expropriated and vested in the military Government of the day and to be managed by the Departed Asian Properties Custodian Board by virtue of Decree No. 27 of 1973. }{\insrsid1593584 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In that Decree the Departed Asians Property Custodian Board was empowered to manage the expropriated properties as the former owners could do. So in 1977, that Board sold the suit property to one Major Francis Nyangweso who was in active service during the military era. Major Francis Nyangweso later sold the same property to the first respondent. The latter was regis tered as the proprietor of the suit property on 21/04/80. }{\insrsid1593584 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 The purchases, transfers and all dealings of whatever kind with the expropriated properties were nullified by the Expropriated Properties Act, No. 9 of 1982. Consequently, the sale and transfer tra nsactions between the Departed Asians Property }{\insrsid1593584 Custodian Board and Major Francis Nyangweso and also between Major Francis Nyangweso and the first respondent were affected by the provisions of that Act. The objective of that Act was to return to the former owners their expropriated properties. In so doing the act removed the \'93evil\'94 imposed on the former owners by the military Government by returning the properties. \par In compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1982, the Minister issued the appellant with a letter of repossession of the suit property on 7/12/92, Annexture F. In my view, those letters authorizing the appellant to repossess his property }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 under dispute, have the same legal effect as repossession certificates issued by the same Minister to the former owners pursuant to the provisions of the No. 9 Act of 1982. }{\insrsid1593584 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In order for time to start running against the appellant the 7/12/93 would be the starting point, in my view, when the Minister issued him with that letter of the repossession of the suit p roperty. The learned trial Judge, with due respect, }{\insrsid1593584 erred in h}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 olding that time started to run against the appellant in 1980 when the first respondent had acquired the suit property from Major Francis Nyangweso. }{\insrsid1593584 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 By the issuance of the letter of repossession by the Minister, the appellant has since had locu}{\insrsid13894151 s standi to sue anybod}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 y blocking him from repossessing his property including the respondents in the instant case. It is also my well considered view that the consent judgment in the HCCS NO. 310 of 1987, between the first respondent and the Attorney General was and is still of no legal consequence as far as the appellant is concerned. It does not bind him as he was not a party to it. In any case the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 nullified the sale an d purchase of the suit property between Major Francis Nyangweso and the first respondent. Therefore, the consent }{\insrsid13894151\charrsid11548640 judgment}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 cannot restore to the first respondent what had been taken away from him by an Act of Parliament. The objective of that Act was to remo ve the wrong that was done to the former owners by preventing continuous injury caused by the then Government in power. \line }{\insrsid13894151 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 On the issue of a counter-claim, my understanding is that that was a separate and distinctive suit which should have been heard and de termined on its merit regardless of the dismissal of the lead suit instituted by the appellant. Therefore, the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the counter-claim of the first respondent abated when the appellant\rquote s suit was dismissed. \line }{\insrsid13894151 \par }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 In the result, I would allow the appeal with orders made by Okello, JA. \line \line Dated at Kampala this }{\insrsid13894151 3}{\super\insrsid13894151\charrsid13894151 rd}{\insrsid13894151 }{ \insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 day of J}{\insrsid13894151 uly}{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 1998. \line S. G. ENGWAU \line }{\ul\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 JUSTICE OF APPEAL. }{\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \par }\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\sl360\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11548640 \fs24\lang2057\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp2057\langfenp1033 {\lang1033\langfe1033\langnp1033\insrsid7407635\charrsid11548640 \line \line

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