Jason Akhonya Makokha v Republic [2014] KECA 23 (KLR)

IN THE COURT  OF APPEAL

AT KISUMU

(CORAM: NAMBUYE, AZANGALALA & KANTAI, JJ.A)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 131 OF 2012

BETWEEN

JASON AKHONYA MAKOKHA..........................APPELLANT

AND

REPUBLIC.....................................................RESPONDENT

(Appeal from a conviction and or Judgment of the High Court of Kenya  at Kakamega (Lenaola Onyancha, JJ) Dated  23rd February, 2012

in

H.C.C.RA. No. 1 of 2007)

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1. The  appellant herein  Jason Akhonya Makokha was charged alongside six  other  persons  in   the    Chief    Magistrates  Court  at  Kakamega vide Criminal Case No. 3770 of 2006 with  two  counts of the  offence of robbery with  violence contrary  to  Section 296   (2)  of  the Penal Code  Chapter 63 Laws  of Kenya.

The particulars in count 1 read as follows:-

"On the 12th day of December, 2006 at Mundoli Jaggery Shamberere sub-location South Kabras-Location in Kakamega District within Western Province, jointly with others  not   before Court, while armed  with  dangerous weapons namely iron bars, rungus and   pangas robbed one  Reuben Ingulushi Muheli of  his torch valued at Kshs. 100. 00 and   at or  immediately after the time of   such robbery used actual violence to the said Reuben Ingulushi Muheli".

Those in count 2 were  as follows:-

"On the 12th  day of  December, 2006  at Mundoli Jaggery, Shambarere Sub-location, South  Kabras location in Kakamega District within Western Province jointly with others not  before Court while armed with dangerous weapons namely iron bars, rungus, and   pangas  robbed one  Patel  Naran Laiji  of  his mobile phone Nokia 1110 valued at  Kshs. 4,500. 00,  two torches valued at  Kshs. 240. 00, office records and  Cash Kshs. 60,000. 00  all   to the total tune of  Kshs. 65,000. 00 and  at or immediately before or immediately after the time of such robbery used actual violence to the said  Patel Naran Laiji"

2. The  appellant and  his  co accused appeared before  Mr. Obaga SRM on  the 22nd  December, 2006  for purposes of plea  taking. The charges were  read  to the  appellant and  his  co-accused. The appellant replied that "it is true" and a plea  of guilty  was  accordingly entered against him.  The  same routine was repeated for the  second charge and  the  appellant replied in a like manner.

3. The learned  trial Magistrate cautioned the appellant of the serious implications of him  pleading guilty  to the  charge as follows:-

"Court to first accused. Are you aware that the charge to which you have pleaded carried a mandatory sentence of death?"

"Accused. I am aware that the charge carried a death sentence. I was involved in the  robbery. I am ready to suffer death"

4. On account of the  above  sequence of events, the  learned trial Magistrate entered a plea  of guilty  as against the  appellant. The  facts of the  offence were  outlined to  the  appellant. The  appellant was  asked if the  facts were correct. He is indicated to have  replied thus:-

"Facts are correct. I was arrested after we robbed  the complainant."

The  Court after  reading out  and  explaining the  facts to the  appellant asked the  appellant for the   second time  if he was  ready  to plead  guilty  to the  charge and he is indicated to have  replied  thus:-

"Accused.  I  admit  the   charges. The  accused  person with whom I have  been  charged were  not  with me."

5.  On  all  the   above   instances  when the   Court  engaged  the   appellant in  a conversation, the  language of the  conversation was  not  indicated. This notwithstanding,  the   learned  trial    Magistrate  proceeded  to   convict .the appellant on  his own  plea   of  guilty   and   then  sentenced him   to  hang in accordance with  the   law.

6.  The appellant was  aggrieved by that decision. He appealed to the High  Court of  Kenya   at  Kakamega vide  Criminal Appeal   No.  1 of  2007 raising three grounds of  appeal  summarized  as;   the     appellant  pleaded guilty   to  the charges in  a state of confusion as he  was  just recovering from  the  grievous harm he had  sustained from  a mob;  that the  learned trial  magistrate did  not warn him   (appellant)  of  the   consequences of  pleading guilty   to  a capital charge; that the  learned Magistrate did  not  give the  appellant ample time  to gather  himself up  before  taking the  plea;  that the  learned trial  Magistrate also   erred  in   failing   to   warn  himself  of  the   dangers  of  convicting the appellant without informing him  of   the  consequences of pleading guilty  to the  charges.

7. The appellant was heard on the merits of his appeal. In his submissions to the   High Court, the   appellant reiterated the   grounds of appeal set out above.  The   submission of   the State in   response to   the    appellant's submission is missing from   the   record. The learned judges of the  first Appellate Court, the Hon. Mr.  Justices D.A. Onyancha and  I.  Lenaolaupon setting out  the  prerequisites on  plea  taking as set  out  in the  reknown decision of this Court in the  case of Adan  versus Republic [1973] EA445, delivered themselves inter alia  thus:-

"In this   case,   the   trial magistrate repeatedly warned the appellant of the consequences of his plea but he stood his   ground   and   even   attempted to   exonerate his   co ­ accuseds.  Can his   explanation on   appeal   that   he   was beaten to confusion hold water?  This  is a court  of record and without any  evidence that  he was so  injured  as to fail to  understand  his   surroundings,  we  have   no  reason to accept that  explanation.

9.  In any  event the  appellant was arrested at the  scene soon   after  the  robbery  and  his  own   words were  "I  was arrested after we robbed  the  complainant"

10.  There   is no  reason in  fact   and   in  law  to  temper with the  conviction as the  plea  was clearly unequivocal."

8. The  appellant is  once  more  aggrieved by  the  High  Courts' dismissal of his appeal. He has appealed to this Court firstly  in a home  made petition of appeal lodged  in the  registry of this Court on 29th day  of May, 2012. It set  out  eight  (8) grounds of  appeal. These were   however   supplemented with   two  grounds of appeal contained in a supplementary memorandum of appeal filed on 9th June, 2014 by learned counsel on record. They  read  thus:-

(1) That the  learned judges of the  Superior Court  erred in law  and   in  fact   in  failing to  note  and   consider that the  plea  was not  properly taken and   it was not  done in      the      language    (the     accused)    the     appellant understood.

(2) The  Judges of the  Superior Court  erred in  law  and  in fact   in  Jailing  to    re-evaluate  the   evidence  and    to arrive        at   its   own     independent   conclusion   and judgment"

9. On  the  hearing date C.Omollo-Oron (Ms) appearing for the  appellant urged us to  allow  the   appeal on  the   grounds that  plea   was   not   taken in the language the  appellant understood; that the  plea  was  thus taken contrary to the  prerequisites in  Sections 77  (2) (b) of the  retired Constitution; that the record  is  clear  that the  language used  to  read  the  charges to  the  appellant was   not   indicated; that  though the   record appears  to  indicate that  the appellant replied to the  charge in  Kiswahili  language, it is learned counsels' stand that the  appellant did  not  understand the swahili language.

10. Turning to  the  findings of the  first  appellate Court, M/s  Omolo  Oron, maintained that  the  learned Judges failed to  note   that, the  learned trial Magistrate had  not  followed  the  prerequisite steps in  plea  taking set  out  in the  said  Adan's case  (supra) hence the  appellant's trial  was  vitiated.

11. Learned counsel urged us  to  find  that  since the   appellants' trial   was vitiated he  should be  released forthwith. It was  Oron's  contention that  a retrial would   not  serve   the  ends of justice herein for  the   reason that the appellant has been  incarcerated for long  since 2006, and  subjecting him  to a  further  indefinite period   of  incarceration  to   await a   retrial  would   be extremely harsh; that  there are   no  peculiar circumstances   herein which can  warrant a retrial; that due  to the  length of time  that has elapsed  since the  commission of the  alleged  offence,  obtaining witnesses to testify against the  appellant might prove  a challenge to the  prosecution.

12. In  response, Mr.  C.N Abele, Assistant Director of  Public Prosecutions conceded       the    appeal  on    the    grounds  that   since  the    appellant  was unrepresented the   trial   Court should have   exercised caution  during  plea taking, that  nowhere in the  entire proceedings is the  language of the  Court indicated as it  is  required  by  law;  that the   appellants plea   was   not   un equivocal; that the trial Court should have  satisfied itself   that the  appellant had  understood the  charge properly before  moving  to enter a plea  of guilty.

13. On  a retrial, Mr. Abele, agreed that ordering a retrial would   not  serve any  interest of justice as a successful trial  would  not  be  achieved; that the offences occurred in  2006, a period  of eight  years ago and  getting witnesses might prove  an  uphill task for the  prosecution; that potential witnesses who were  the  employer and  employees of the  factory may  have  moved  on;  that the  circumstances of the  robbery were  not aggravated as no  life was  lost; and  lastly  this  is not  a case of great public importance.

14. On case  law,  learned counsel for the  appellant relied  on  the  case of Mbae Morison and  another versus  Republic Nyeri CRA 306 &305 of 2006 for the  proposition that in  the  absence of the  Court having recorded so,  there is no  reason for  the  Court to  presume that an  accused  person(s) spoke and understood the  language in  which they  are  recorded to  have  answered the charge and conducted their defence. The  case of  Vincent  Omondi Obeto and  another versus  Republic Nakuru CRA 250 of  2006 (UR) for  the proposition         that   failure  to   record   the    language   of   the    Court   is    a contravention of Section 77(2)  (b) of the  retired constitution and  Section 198 of  the   Criminal Procedure Code.  The  case of  Zephania  Okwoyo Gesure versus  Republic [2010] eKLR for  the  proposition  that in  a case where the offence  charged carries a death penalty, before  a plea  of  guilty   to  such a charge is  accepted and acted upon, the  Court before  whom  an accused is taken to be pleading guilty  must in its record indicate that the  substance of the   charge and  every  element  or  ingredient constituting  the   offence   has firstly  been  explained to the  accused in a language that he  understands and that with  that understanding and out  of his  own  free  will the  pleader admits the  charge; secondly that, the  Court recording the  plea  of guilty  must show in  its record that the  person pleading guilty  understands the  consequences of his  plea.  The  case of Antony Kamau Githuka versus  Republic Nairobi CRA  No.  330 of  2007 for  the   proposition that  for  the   Court  to  nullify proceeding on  account of lack  of language used during the  trial, it must be clear   from   the   record,  beyond  doubt  that  the   accused  did   not   at  all understand  what went   on  during his   trial. The  case of  Francis Koikai Katikenya  versus   Republic  Nairobi  CRA   No.   280  of   2006 for   the proposition that  a  failure to   show   demonstrably  the   language  used  in criminal  proceedings,  in   contravention  of  Sections  197   and  198   of  the Criminal Procedure Code  will in appropriate cases vitiate the  trial. The  case of Joseph Kamau versus  Republic [2013] eKLR for the  proposition that it is a fundamental right  in  Kenya  whatever the  position is elsewhere, that an accused is  entitled to  the  assistance of an   interpreter through whom   the proceedings shall  be  interpreted to  the   accused in  a  language which he understands. The case of  Kiyato versus Republic [1982-88]1KAR 974]  for the   proposition that it is a fundamental right  of an  accused person charged with  a criminal offence  to have  the  assistance of an  interpreter, a breach of which   is  fatal to  the   proceedings. The  case of  Abdalla versus  Republic [1989] KLR  456 and  Simiyu versus  [2006] KLR 100)  for  the  proposition that it  is  not  in  every  case where language was  not   shown  which would make an  appellant to  successfully raise the   issue of  language before   the Court.  (See also  Mugo  and  2 others versus  Republic) [2008] KLR  19)

15. This being  a second appeal, our   mandate is  limited to  interrogation of issues of law only  as provided for in  Section 361  of the  Criminal Procedure Code.  See  also  the  case of Chemagong versus  Republic [1984] KLR  611 wherein this Court reiterated that it  had  stated many times before  that, it will not  normally interfere with  concurrent jurisdictional findings of facts by two  Courts below   unless  such  jurisdictional findings were   based  on   no evidence, or  a misapprehension of  the  evidence or  the  Courts below  were demonstrably shown to  have   acted on  wrong principles  in  making these findings. Also the case of  Gacheru versus Republic [2005] KLR  688 in which  this  Court stated inter alia that:-

"as a second appeal  only points of   law   may be  raised since the Court will  not   disturb  concurrent  findings of facts made by the two Courts below unless these findings are shown to be based on  no evidence."

16. From the concurrent arguments herein, the following legal issues have arisen for our determination namely:-

(1) Whether the   learned trial magistrate duly complied with    the    legal prerequisites on plea taking.

(2) Whether the    learned Judges of the    first    Appellate   Court properly exercised their mandate.

(3) Whether in the circumstances of this appeal, it is prudent to order a retrial.

17. Section 77(2) (b) of the retired constitution provided thus:

"Every person who is charged with a crime and or offence-

(b) Shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable in a language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence with which, he is charged.

Whereas Section 198(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code   provided thus:-

"Whenever any  evidence  is  given  in   a  language not understood by  the accused, and he  is present in person, it  should be   interpreted  to  him  in   open  Court  in   a language which he understands."

18. As was  stated in  the  case of Kiyato  versus Republic (supra) stating or reading a charge to an  accused person in a language that he understands is a fundamental right  and  where an accused person does  not  understand the language  of  the   Court,  he   must  be   provided  with   the   services  of  an interpreter. In   Abdalla versus Republic (supra) the  Court moved  a notch higher when   it  reiterated that,  failure to  comply with   the  above   principle would  in  appropriate cases be   fatal to the  proceedings. However,  the  trend in recent decisions of this Court appear to have  moderated the  harshness of the  consequences of non  compliance with  the  above  principle. In the  case of Simiyu and another versus Republic (supra) the  Court reiterated that the provisions  of  Section 77(2)   (b)  and    (f)   of  the   retired Constitution and Section198 of the  Criminal Procedure Code  make it clear that in a criminal trial, the  language of the  trial  must be understood by the  accused person. In the case of  Mugo  and 2 others versus Republic [2008] KLR  19 on  the other hand, the  Court softened its stance. It  stated that it is not  every  case where language  was  not shown  which would make          an appellant to successfully raise the  issue of language before  the  Court. Each case has to be considered in the light of its peculiar circumstances. See also   the  case of Gichangi and 3 others  versus  Republic  [2005[  2KLR 177for   the proposition that there was  a grave  danger in the  failure by the  trial  Court to record  the   language  of  the   proceedings  and   the   language  used  by   the witnesses as these are  as important as the  evidence itself;   and   secondly, that these also  form  part of the  fair  process of justice, the  omission of which might affect  an  otherwise sound conviction.

19. The   cardinal principles that  we  can   draw  from   the   above   case  law propositions are  that, one,  any  Court of law  taking a plea  from  an  accused person has  to  ensure that the  language of the  Court and the  language the accused person wishes to  use to  communicate with  the  Court is  indicated on  the   record and  where an   accused  person  is  not   conversant with   the language of the  Court, he  should be  afforded the  services of an  interpreter; two, an  unexplained violation of a constitutional right  to  language   would normally  result in an  acquittal irrespective of the  nature and strength of the evidence which  might be  adduced in  support of the  charge; save  that each case has to  be determined on  its  own  facts and circumstances; three, that there was  a reciprocal duty on  the  part of an accused person to indicate to the  Court, for instance that he  was  not  able  to  understand the  language of the   proceedings although   this does not   however lessen  the   duty of  the Court of being  satisfied that the  accused was  able  to follow the  proceedings; four,  that where some doubt exist  as to  whether or  not  an  accused person was  accorded the  services of an  interpreter, the  doubt must be  resolved in his  favour.

20. It is undisputed that the  appellant herein was  unrepresented at the  time his   plea   was  taken by  the   trial   Court; that  the   trial Court recorded the presence of  a Court Clerk   named, Everlyn, that  in  normal practice the presence  of a  Court  Clerk   would imply   use of  such  a  Court Clerk   for purposes of interpretation  services in  addition to  any   other Court duties; that  interpretation services would   be  called into  play   where an   accused person does  not  understand the  language of the  Court; that if such a service is invoked, then it is usually prudent  on  the  part of  the  presiding officer  of the  Court to  indicate the  language of  the   Court and   the  language of  the interpretation.

21. From  the  content of the  record before  us, it is evidently clear  that neither the  language of the  Court nor  of the  interpretation was  indicated. There is no record as to whether the   Court asked the appellant the language he wished to use to communicate with the Court in.  Neither do we have a record of the appellant himself asking the Court to   provide him   with interpretation services.

22. It is not in doubt that the appellant faced two counts of a serious offence of robbery with  violence which carries a death penalty. In the  case of Boit versus Republic [2002]1KLR 815, this Court was  categorical that "there is no  law   in  Kenya which would prevent a person charged with an offence punishable by  death from pleading guilty to such a charge." Save that the following safeguards have to be complied with namely that:-

(a) The  Court before  which such an  accused person has been   taken  for plea  has to ensure that the  accused person pleading guilty  fully understands the  offence  with  which he  is  charged as provided for  in law.

(b)  The   accused  person(s) should  be  told   in  detail and  in  a language familiar  to   him    the   substance  of   the    offence,  the    elements  or ingredients which constitute it,  the  date and the  approximate time  on which the  offence  was  committed and the  person (s) against whom  the offence  was  allegedly committed.

(c) Where  the   offence   charged  is  one   punishable  by  death,  the   Court recording the  plea  must show  in  its  record that the  person pleading guilty   to the  charge understands that as a consequence of his  plea  he will face an  instant sentence of death.

(d)  Where   the   record  of  the   trial   Court shows that  such  an  accused person(s) has been  so  informed but  has nevertheless chosen to  plead guilty,  then there cannot be any  genuine complaint thereafter.

23.  Herein  the  record indicates clearly that when  the  charges were  read  to the appellant by the  learned trial  Magistrate, he  replied, "it  is true" against each charge. In the  case  of Oremo versus Republic [1990] KLR290 the  Court ruled that the  sentence "It is true" does  not  realy  amount to a plea of guilty.  See also the  case of Kenes versus Republic [1994] KLR614, also  for  the  proposition that  the  words "It is true" may  not  amount to a plea  of guilty  and that where an accused person gives an  explanation and  qualifies the  facts, it  means that he  was   not   accepting the   facts and   a plea   of  not   guilty   should  have   been entered.

24. The sequence of what transpired during the appellant’s plea taking has already been   set   out   above.   To  us,  these  demonstrates clearly that  the appellant was  either  confused or  did   not  understand the   proceedings. This should have  put  the  trial  magistrate on  guard so  as to  rethink the  next  step especially  where   the   language  of  the   Court,  had   not   been   indicated.  The appellant's responses to the  charges made it imperative on  the  trial  magistrate to go further and inquire from  the  appellant whether he  had  really  understood what had  transpired in the  proceedings and  possibly defer  the  entry of the  plea of guilty  to  another date. Such a step taken as a cautionary measure would have gone a long way to allow the confusion in the appellant if any to subside. We say confusion because we do not understand how an accused person could say “we robbed” and then shortly thereafter absolve the co-accused persons from   blame. This  is  a clear   indication that  the   appellant was  in  a state of mental confusion as at the  time  his  plea  was  taken. We are satisfied that the State has properly conceded the appeal.

25. The  question we have  to ask  ourselves now  is whether this is a proper case for  a  retrial.  In  the   case of  Mbae   Morison  and   another versus   Republic (supra) it  was   held   inter   alia  that  a retrial should only   be  ordered  where interests of justice require it.  In  Kanyeki versus  Republic [2004] 2KLR 164 there is  the  proposition  that a retrial will be  ordered where witnesses could be easily traced.  In   Sinaraha &  another versus  Republic [2004] 2KLR  328, the  proposition is that a retrial will be ordered only  when the  original  trial was illegal  or defective but  not  for the  purpose of enabling the  prosecution to fill up gaps in  its  evidence at the  first  trial. In  the  case of Ekimat versus  Republic [2005]1KLR 182  there is the  proposition that a retrial should not  be ordered unless the  Court is of the  opinion that on  a consideration of the  admissible or potentially admissible evidence, a conviction might result and   should not   be ordered  where   it  is  likely   to  cause an   injustice  to  an   accused  person.  In M'Obici & another versus  Republic [2006] 2KLR 166, the  Court ruled that a retrial should not  be ordered unless the  appellate Court was  of the  opinion that on  a proper consideration of the  admissible or  potentially admissible evidence, a  conviction might result'. See   also   the   case  of  Kedisia versus   Republic [2009] KLR  604 for  the  proposition that regarding an  order for  a retrial, the Court of Appeal  is  entitled to  look  at all  the  circumstances surrounding the case,  taking into  account the   admissible or  potentially admissible evidence available for determination as to whether a conviction was  likely  to be obtained or not;  save  that each case  must depend on its own peculiar circumstances.

26.  Applying the above principles, to the circumstances displayed herein, we are inclined not to order a retrial. Our  reason for saying so are  that the  offence took  place  way  back  in  2006; the  appellant who  was sentenced to death has been in  custody all along since  conviction; the   potential  witnesses  were  a factory employer and  his  employees who  may  have  moved  on.  The co-accuseds were acquitted of the same charges at a no case to answer stage. There  is thus nothing before  us to  show  that not  only  a fair  trial  but  a conviction would  be achieved. In the circumstances, we find it not prudent to order a retrial.

We therefore find that the state properly conceded the appeal. We allow the appeal in its entirety. We direct the appellant to be set at liberty forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held.

Dated and delivered at Kisumu this 18th day of July 2014.

R.N. NAMBUYE

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

F. AZANGALALA

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

SANKALE ole KANTAI

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JUDGE OF APPEAL