JK Patel v Uganda Revenue Authority - (HCT-00-CC-CS 14 of 2003) [2006] UGCommC 24 (4 June 2006)

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Mak}{\creatim\yr2006\mo7\dy14\hr12\min40}{\revtim\yr2006\mo7\dy14\hr12\min40}{\version2}{\edmins0}{\nofpages3}{\nofwords3491} {\nofchars19902}{\*\company Courts of Judicature}{\nofcharsws23347}{\vern24579}}\margl1728\margr1152 \widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\noxlattoyen\expshrtn\noultrlspc\dntblnsbdb\nospaceforul\formshade\horzdoc\dgmargin\dghspace180\dgvspace180\dghorigin1728 \dgvorigin1440\dghshow1\dgvshow1\jexpand\viewkind1\viewscale100\pgbrdrhead\pgbrdrfoot\splytwnine\ftnlytwnine\htmautsp\nolnhtadjtbl\useltbaln\alntblind\lytcalctblwd\lyttblrtgr\lnbrkrule\nobrkwrptbl\snaptogridincell\allowfieldendsel\wrppunct \asianbrkrule\nojkernpunct\rsidroot6950769 \fet0{\*\ftnsep \pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\insrsid8274964 \chftnsep \par }}{\*\ftnsepc \pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 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\li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6950769 {\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA \par \par IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA \par (COMMERCIAL COURT DIVISION) \par \par HCT-00-CC-CS-0014-2003 \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6950769 {\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 \par J. K. PATEL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: PLAINTIFF \par \par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11239296 {\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 VERSUS \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6950769 {\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 \par UGANDA REVENUE AUTHORITY ::::::::::::::::::: DEFENDANT \par \par \par BEFORE: }{\b\f36\fs28\ul\insrsid6950769\charrsid11239296 THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE YOROKAMU BAMWINE}{\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 \par \par }{\b\f36\fs28\ul\insrsid6950769\charrsid11239296 J U D G M E NT}{\b\f36\fs28\insrsid6950769 : \par }{\b\f36\fs28\insrsid4336120 \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid4336120 THE case for the plaintiff which the defendant disputes is that he paid his tax liability to the defendant for the period}{ \f36\insrsid9786476 1982 \endash 1991 in which there was an overpayment of Shs.55,517,870-.}{\f36\insrsid4336120 \par }{\f36\insrsid9786476 \par These were the points of agreement at the scheduling conference: \par 1.\tab URA issued an agency notice to M/S Spear Motors Ltd to recover taxes payable \tab by the plaintiff for the period 1982 \endash 1991. \par 2.\tab M/S Spear Motors Ltd made payments on behalf of the plaintiff in the sum of \tab Shs.192,539,314- to the defendant, URA. \par 3.\tab The plaintiff made direct payments to the defendant on account of his tax liability \tab in the sum of Shs.37,280,286-. \par 4.\tab The High Court of Uganda paid directly to URA a sum of Shs.17,503,574. \par \par When the }{\f36\insrsid5066995 sums}{\f36\insrsid9786476 above }{\f36\insrsid5066995 are}{\f36\insrsid9786476 put together, }{\f36\insrsid5066995 you get a total of}{\f36\insrsid9786476 Shs.247,323,174-. It has taken the parties over ten years to reconcile the figures. \par \par There are three issues for determination: \par 1.\tab Whether the plaintiff\rquote s claim is barred by limitation. \par 2.\tab Whether the plaintiff is entitled to refund of Shs.55,517,870-. \par 3.\tab Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the other reliefs sought. \par \par }{\f36\ul\insrsid9786476\charrsid4403620 Counsel: \par }{\f36\insrsid9786476 Mr. Richard Okalany for the plaintiff. \par Mr. Habib Arike and Ms Stella Nyapendi for the defendant. \par \par A brief background to the case is necessary if the context in which the decision in the matter is to be understood. \par \par The defendant is a statutory body responsible for collection of taxes. The plaintiff is a tax payer. Between 1982 and 1986, he did some cons truction work for M/S Spear Motors Ltd. The said company defaulted in payments and the plaintiff took them to Court vide }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid9786476 HCCS No. 103/88 J. K. Patel \endash Vs- Spear Motors Ltd. \par \par }{\f36\insrsid9786476 The award in that case attracted the attention of URA which}{\f36\insrsid8415373 empowered the judgment debtor, Spear Motors Ltd, to act as its agent in collecting taxes payable by the plaintiff then estimated at Shs.315,064,338-. On 18/11/92, R. Rajasingham J, made the following order:}{\f36\insrsid9786476 \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid9002219 {\i\f36\insrsid8415373\charrsid9002219 \'93I do therefore, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in the interests of justice order that all future sums due on the instalments shall be deposited in Court to the credit of the case and that no sums shall be withdrawn from the }{\i\f36\insrsid9002219\charrsid9002219 monies so deposited, without notice to the Revenue Authority.\'94}{\i\f36\insrsid8415373\charrsid9002219 \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid9002219 \par On the strength of this order several }{\f36\insrsid8339917 installments}{\f36\insrsid9002219 were deposited into Court until the issue of the excess payment arose after Spear Motors had made yet another direct payment to URA in an apparent violation of the Court order. \par }{\f36\insrsid8339917 \par I will not go into the details of the acrimonious correspondence between the plaintiff and URA, URA and Court. Th}{\f36\insrsid5066995 at}{\f36\insrsid8339917 story is too long for our purposes herein. The long and short of it is that when the parties failed to agree on the way forward, the plaintiff filed this suit on 21/1/2003. \par \par From the points of agreement, both parties now accept that the plaintiff\rquote s tax obligation for the period in question was Shs.191,805,304- and that the total amount paid by the plaintiff through Spear Motors Ltd, Court and directly by the plaintiff to URA was Shs .247,323,174-. The difference between the two figures is Shs.55,517,870-, the amount claimed by the plaintiff herein. \par }{\f36\insrsid11932504 \par The plaintiff had another claim of Shs.41,712,148- but the parties opted for a settlement out of Court in respect of it. A consent order is on record as P. Exh. XV. The claim of Shs.55,517,870- has }{\f36\insrsid5066995 to-date }{\f36\insrsid11932504 remained a thorn in the flesh of the defendant}{\f36\insrsid5066995 .}{\f36\insrsid11932504 \par \par As to whether the plaintiff\rquote s claim is barred by limitation, it must be appreciated that this is a matter that has been in the corridors of High Court for close to 20 years now. The thrust of the defendant\rquote s case is that the plaintiff \rquote s cause of action arose over six years}{\f36\insrsid2770876 before 21/1/2003 when this suit was filed. Hence the argument that it is time barred.}{\f36\insrsid11932504 \par }{\f36\insrsid2770876 \par Money which is paid to one p erson which rightfully belongs to another, as where money is paid by A to B on a consideration which has wholly failed or by mistake is said to be money had and received by B to the use of A. It is recoverable by A. The paying of A to B, according to th e learned author of A CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY by P. G. Osborn, 5}{\f36\super\insrsid2770876\charrsid2770876 th}{\f36\insrsid2770876 Edition at p. 212, becomes a quasi-contract, an obligation not created}{\f36\insrsid4459767 by, but similar to that created by contract, and is independent of the consent of the person bound. The author gives the basis of the action for money had and received as being rooted in quasi-contract on the footing of an implied promise to repay. The other view is that in an action for money had and received, liability is based on unjust enrichment, that is, the action i s applicable whenever the defendant has received money which, in justice and equity, belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which render the receipt of it by the defendant a receipt to the use of the plaintiff. Whichever way it is looked at, there must be evidence of the payment sought to be recovered. If an overpayment similar to the one in dispute cannot be looked at in similar light, then I have misunderstood the dispute between the parties. I believe I have understood it.}{ \f36\insrsid2770876 \par }{\f36\insrsid4459767 \par In the instant case, payments were made to the defendant by the plaintiff}{\f36\insrsid14563032 or on his behalf. Originally, the defendant denied most alleged payments. In view of the admitted facts, I don\rquote t intend to re-open debate on it. The debate that should henceforth pre-occupy the parties and the Courts should be whether or not the plaintiff\rquote s claim of Shs.55,517,870- was time barred by the time the suit was filed in 2003. At the face of it, the suit would be time barred but for a letter dated 4/8/1997 from the defendant to the Registrar of the High Court. Counsel for the plaintiff argues that it amounted to an acknowledgment of a debt in terms of S.22 (4) of the Limitation Act. Learned defence counsel doe}{\f36\insrsid5066995 s}{\f36\insrsid14563032 not agree. }{\f36\insrsid4459767

\par }{\f36\insrsid14563032 \par The section reads: \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid5580569 {\i\f36\insrsid10825846\charrsid5580569 \'93Where any right of action has accrued to recov er any debt or any other liquidated pecuniary claim \'85\'85\'85\'85\'85\'85. and the person liable or accountable therefore}{\f36\insrsid10825846 }{\i\f36\insrsid10825846\charrsid5580569 acknowledges the claim, the right shall be deemed}{ \f36\insrsid10825846 }{\i\f36\insrsid10825846\charrsid5580569 to have accrued on and not before the date on the acknowledgment \'85\'85\'85\'85\'94 \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid2523030 \par Whether or not the section applies to suits against the Government or government bodies such as the URA has been a subject of determination in a number of cases including }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid2523030 National Pharmacy Ltd \endash Vs- K. C. C. [1979] HCB 256 and Sour Fap Famous RZ Promet Belgrade Fransuska 61-65 & Anor -Vs- A. G. HCCS No. 18/2001 reported [1997-2001] UCLR 396.}{\f36\insrsid2523030 \par }{\f36\fs16\insrsid404193\charrsid5066995 \par }{\f36\insrsid404193 In the two particular cases above, Courts held that the section applies to the government and its statutory bodies. The effect of acknowledgment or part payment of a debt or other liquidated sum i s that time which had started to run against the creditor may be stopped and made to start a fresh by an acknowledgment of liability or by a part payment made by the debtor. I am inclined to adopt the view of the learned editors of Halsbury\rquote s Laws of England, 3}{\f36\super\insrsid404193\charrsid404193 rd}{\f36\insrsid404193 Edn; para 594 at p.300 that if a debt is acknowledged, it is immaterial that the amount of debt claimed is disputed in the acknowledgment. The amount of the debt can always be proved at the hearing. I must decide therefore whether the defendant\rquote s letter to the Registrar of the High Court amounted to an acknowledgment of the plaintiff\rquote s claim to the plaintiff. It reads: \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid5580569 {\i\f36\insrsid404193\charrsid5580569 \'9304 August 1997 \par The Registrar of the High Court \par P. O. Box 785 (sic) \par Kampala \par Dear Sir, \par }{\i\f36\insrsid16216110\charrsid5580569 Re: }{\b\i\f36\ul\insrsid16216110\charrsid5580569 JADVA KARSAN PATEL: TAX AFFAIRS 1982 \endash 1991 YEARS OF INCOME \par }{\i\f36\insrsid16216110\charrsid5580569 I have reviewed the tax position of Mr. Jadva Karsan Patel for the years 1982 \endash 1991. \par }{\i\f36\insrsid5206437\charrsid5580569 \par The records available with my office indicate the following: \par (a). Total tax payable per assessments for 1982 }{\i\f36\insrsid2457397\charrsid5580569 \endash }{\i\f36\insrsid5206437\charrsid5580569 1991}{\i\f36\insrsid2457397\charrsid5580569 :}{\i\f36\insrsid5206437\charrsid5580569 \par }{\i\f36\insrsid2457397\charrsid5580569 Shs.208,645,912- \par Less amnesty (1989) Shs.16,840,608- \par }{\i\f36\insrsid5273657\charrsid5580569 Balance payable Shs.}{\i\f36\ul\insrsid5273657\charrsid5580569 191,805,304}{\i\f36\insrsid5273657\charrsid5580569 - \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid5273657 \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid5580569 {\i\f36\insrsid5273657\charrsid5580569 (b). Tax paid: 1982 \endash 1991 under the Agency Notice: \par }{\i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 (i). By Spear Motors directly to URA Shs.192,539,314- \par (ii). By the High Court to URA Shs.17,503,574- \par (iii). By J. K. Patel to URA Shs.37,280,286- \par Total payments per file Shs.}{\i\f36\ul\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 247,323,174- \par \par }{\i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 (c). According to Spear Motors Limited, total tax withheld and remitted through the High Court was Shs.122,525,018- made in seven equal installments. \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid16407129 \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid5580569 {\i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 (d). Of Shs.122,525,018- records indicate the High Court having passed over to URA Shs.17,503,574-. There is no evidence on file that the balance of Shs.105,021,444- was ever passed on to URA by the High Court. \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid16407129 \par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid5580569 {\i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 This is therefore to ask you to clarify on this position, and }{\i\f36\insrsid5066995 w}{ \i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 here payment was made by the High Court, please provide evidence. Your quick response will be most appreciated to enable me finalise this case. \par \par Yours faithfully, \par Sgd: \par C. K. Kaweesa \par }{\b\i\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid5580569 SENIOR PRINCIPAL REVENUE OFFICER \endash NAKAWA}{\b\f36\insrsid16407129\charrsid15803687 \'94 \par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sl480\slmult1\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4336120 {\f36\insrsid4858559 \par The letter was copied to all parties concerned, including the plaintiff. It is not clear from the records whether the Registrar offered a prompt response or at all. }{\f36\insrsid2974766 I should state that for quite some time, the reconciliation of records to determine the amount payable and what the plaintiff had already paid remained quite a problem to the parties. It is not clear why this was so since URA had records indicating as per Mr. Kaweesa\rquote s letter. It would appear that what was confusing the defendant was the original estimated tax value of Shs.315,064,338-. So up to 1997, there was }{\f36\insrsid5066995 no agreed position}{ \f36\insrsid2974766 between the parties. I cannot blame it on any of the parties. Matters of money are like matters of the heart.}{\f36\insrsid4858559 \par }{\f36\insrsid2974766 \par From the pleadings, Court is able to tell that there were negotiations between the parties on the way forward. In the end, the negotiations bore no fruit. It is trite that negotiations between parties to a dispute have no effect on Limitation}{ \f36\insrsid4270123 . A party seeing no end to such negotiations files a suit while negotiations continue to avoid the claim being caught up by the law of Limitation: See: }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid4270123 Allen Nsibirwa \endash Vs- NW & SC HCCS No. 811/1992 }{\f36\insrsid4270123 reproduced }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid4270123 [1995] VI KARL 41.}{\f36\insrsid2974766 \par }{\f36\insrsid4270123 \par I have read P. Exh. X again and again. In my view it provided a vital break through to the parties in as far as the impasse over the plaintiff\rquote s alleged over payment was concerned. For the first time, the defendant stated in clear terms what according to their }{\f36\insrsid4421904 assessment and records the plaintiff should have paid to URA and what he had actually paid. The other bit about Spear Motors Ltd and payments by High Court to URA were beside the point. In fact when information was provided, the defendant had to relinquish part of the claim it had over the whole amount and hence the payment of Shs.41,712,148- to the plaintiff by consent of the parties vide the order of this Court dated 27/5/2003, P. Exh. XV. Since this was a settle ment out of Court and the parties have opted to have the dispute resolved on arguments only, I have not understood the basis for the }{\f36\insrsid6904627 concession}{\f36\insrsid4421904 when it too should have been part of the alleged time barred claim. }{\f36\insrsid4270123 \par }{\f36\insrsid4421904 Be that as it may, to the extent that the plaintiff\rquote s claim had all along been that he had made an overpayment in the sum of Shs.55,517,870-; and to the extent}{\f36\insrsid6292339 that the defendant\rquote s stand this time (as at 4/8/97) was that the difference between what had been paid and what should have been paid was Shs.55,517,870- implying that they were agreeing with the plaintiff\rquote s claim; and to the extent that this was according to records available with URA and therefore undisputed, this was an implied acknowledgment of the plaintiff\rquote s claim. As stated above, I hav e read the letter over and over again. I cannot come to any different conclusion. The only issue as I see it is whether since this was a letter addressed to a person other than the plaintiff the same was an acknowledgment within the meaning and context of}{\f36\insrsid6904627 S.22 (4) of the Limitation Act.}{\f36\insrsid4421904 \par }{\f36\insrsid6292339 \par I have devoted considerable time to this point as well. \par \par The general principle is that an acknowledgement must be made to the creditor by the debtor. What then happens when it is not made to the creditor but only copied to him? \par \par There is very little literature on the matter. What has been provided by counsel is not altogether helpful on that point. However, the Singapore Court of Appeal had an opportunity in }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid8221054 CHUAN & COMPANY PTE LTD \endash VS- ONG SOON HUAT [2003] 3 SGCA 15}{\f36\insrsid8221054 to explore the meaning of \lquote acknowledgment of debt\rquote under the Limitation Act in pari materia with ours. I applied the same principle in }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid8221054 MADHVANI INTERNATIONAL S. A \endash VS- ATTORNEY GENERAL HCCS NO. 787/2002}{\f36\insrsid8221054 (Civil Division). The case is unreported and it would appear there has not been any attempt to have that decision over-turned on appeal as yet. [I accessed it on Internet, Yahoo Search, ACKNOWLEDMENT OF DEBTS]. To understand its relevancy to this case, I will set out the facts as they appear in that write- up.}{\f36\insrsid6292339 \par }{\f36\insrsid4868733 \par CHUAN & CO. Pte Ltd (C}{\f36\insrsid2378947 H}{\f36\insrsid4868733 UAN) was a family company formed by Ong Toh. Ong Toh had passed away.}{\f36\insrsid3620156 During his life time, Ong Toh dealt with the assets of C}{\f36\insrsid2378947 H}{ \f36\insrsid3620156 UAN as if they were his own. Even after he }{\f36\insrsid4403620 ceased}{\f36\insrsid3620156 to be a shareholder and director of C}{\f36\insrsid2378947 H}{\f36\insrsid3620156 UAN, he con tinued to withdraw money from the company. Ong Toh acknowledged the moneys taken by him from CHUAN by signing yearly confirmation of debts statements sent to him by the company auditors. The last statement was sig}{\f36\insrsid8788687 n}{ \f36\insrsid3620156 ed by him on 10}{\f36\super\insrsid3620156\charrsid3620156 th}{\f36\insrsid3620156 March 1994, where by he acknowledged owing CHUAN a sum of about S $7 million (the Debt). }{\f36\insrsid4868733 \par }{\f36\insrsid3620156 \par On 9 December 1995, the executor of Ong Toh\rquote s estate filed an estate duty affidavit (}{\f36\insrsid8220921 the Affidavit) with the Estate Duty Department (EDD) in which the date was included as a debt owed by the estate to CHUAN. The EDD required the executor to furnish documents to support the claim that the estate owed the Debt to CHUAN. The executors solicitors wrote a letter to CHUA\rquote s Auditors (the Letter) on 17}{ \f36\super\insrsid6228102\charrsid6228102 th}{\f36\insrsid6228102 January 2001 explaining the EDD\rquote s requirement. The letter further explained that without such documents, the EDD would refuse to }{\i\f36\insrsid6228102\charrsid5580569 \'93 make a deduction for the alleged debts}{\f36\insrsid6228102 .\'94}{\f36\insrsid3620156 \par }{\f36\insrsid6228102 The letter concluded by asking CHUAN\rquote s auditors to let the executor have }{\i\f36\insrsid6228102\charrsid5580569 \'93Copies of all the documents substantiating the alleged debts.\'94 \par }{\f36\insrsid5860569 \par CHUAN went into voluntary liquidation. The liquidator of CHUAN}{\f36\insrsid5529191 commenced the present action to recover the Debt from Ong Toh\rquote s estate.}{\f36\insrsid5860569 \par }{\f36\insrsid5529191 \par Ong Toh\rquote s estate pleaded, as in the instant case, that the liquidator\rquote s action was time barred on 10}{\f36\super\insrsid5529191\charrsid5529191 th}{\f36\insrsid5529191 Ma rch 2000 (i.e. six years from March 10, 1994). S.6 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act of Singapore provides that an action founded on a contract must be brought within 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. \par \par In response, the liquidator of Chuan argued that Ong Toh\rquote s estate had acknowledged the Debt. The liquidator claimed that the Affidavit or the }{\f36\insrsid4403620 letter constituted}{\f36\insrsid5529191 an acknowledgment of the Debt by Ong Toh \rquote s estate. Hence, the date of accrual of the cause of action was postponed to the date}{\f36\insrsid16408439 of the Affidavit or the Letter. S. 26 (2) of the}{\f36\insrsid8788687 ir}{\f36\insrsid16408439 Limitation Act }{\f36\insrsid13528052 provides }{\f36\insrsid16408439 that where a person liable}{\f36\insrsid10117500 for any debt \'93acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof\'94, the right of action to recover the debt shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the acknowledgment.}{\f36\insrsid5529191 \par }{\f36\insrsid13528052 \par }{\f36\insrsid10117500 The judge at the first instance held against the liquidator. The liquidator appealed to the Court of Appeal. The issue on appeal was whether the Affidavit or the Letter was an acknowledgment of a debt within the meani ng of S.27 of the Limitation Act. S}{\f36\insrsid13528052 ection }{\f36\insrsid10117500 27 defines \'93acknowledgment of debt\'94. }{\f36\insrsid13528052 Under section }{\f36\insrsid10117500 27 (1) an acknowledgment of debt }{ \i\f36\insrsid10117500\charrsid5580569 \'93shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment}{\f36\insrsid10117500 .\'94 S.27 (2) further provides that \'93any such acknowledgme nt may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made and made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged.\'94 \par }{\f36\insrsid1655310 \par As to whether the Affidavit was acknowledgement of debt \'93made to CHUAN or to an agent of CHUAN within the meaning of S.27 (2) of the Act, the Court of Appeal held that the Affidavit was not \'93made to\'94 CHUAN or its Solicitors. It was addressed to the EDD. CHUAN only secured a copy by virtue of an order of Court. Such a delivery, by c ompulsion of an order of Court, would not suffice to constitute an acknowledgment. The Court held, and this is very crucial for purposes of the instant case, that }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid1655310 an acknowledgment involved some intention to convey the contents of the document to the credit}{\b\f36\ul\insrsid749798 or}{\b\f36\ul\insrsid1655310 or his agents either deliberately or impliedly.}{\f36\insrsid1655310 The emphasis is mine. \par }{\f36\insrsid14044565 \par As to whether the Letter was an acknowledgment of debt, the rule governing the construction of a document was applied to determine whether it constituted an acknowledgment of debt . The letter constituted an acknowledgment if the maker intended it to be. Where a word in a document is clear, the Court will take its clear meaning. It is only if the word is ambiguous that the Court may refer to extrinsic material and give the word a meaning which is different from its plain meaning. \par The Court concluded that the Letter that referred to CHUAN\rquote s \'93allegation\'94 of a debt and asked CHUAN}{\f36\insrsid6640326 for documents \'93}{\i\f36\insrsid6640326\charrsid5580569 substantiating the alleged debts}{\f36\insrsid6640326 \'94 did not amount to an acknowledgment of a debt. The Court said that it came to this conclusion}{\f36\insrsid476691 by reading the plain words of the letter.}{\f36\insrsid14620917 \par \par The Cour}{\f36\insrsid13390512 t of Appeal dismissed the liquidator\rquote s appeal and confirmed that their claim was time barred. \par \par In the instant case, the plaintiff was not the addressee of P. Exh. X. }{\f36\insrsid10301341 He was the subject matter. But besides being the subject matter of that letter, the }{\f36\insrsid13390512 defendant considered}{\f36\insrsid7411928 it necessary to copy it to him. This distinguishes the facts }{\f36\insrsid4403620 in this}{\f36\insrsid7411928 case from those in CHUAN where the creditor got it through an order of Court.}{\f36\insrsid14044565 }{\f36\insrsid7411928 Indeed in the Madhvani case, supra, Court refused to accept as an acknowledgment of a debt a letter that had not been copied to him. In the instant case, if the author had intended that the content be not conveyed to the plaintiff, or had intended that the contents be not acted upon, I do not see why he should not have written a confidential letter to the Registrar or }{\f36\insrsid13519354 just }{\i\f36\insrsid7411928\charrsid5580569 a \'93without Prejudice}{\f36\insrsid7411928 \'94 Letter. He freely copied it to a number of people, including the plaintiff. He put in black and white, in (a) and (b), what the records available with his office indicated at the material time. What they indicated is what the plaintiff had been saying all along. In my view the letter involved some intention}{\f36\insrsid16590264 to convey the contents of it to the plaintiff, deliberately or impliedly. It }{\f36\insrsid4403620 carried a}{\f36\insrsid16590264 very clear message, whether the author intended it that way or not, that the plaintiff had made an over payment to the tune of Shs.55,517,870-. It was not saying that this}{\f36\insrsid14163324 was \'93an alleged payment\'94 but that the plaintiff ha d paid Shs.247,323,174- according to their records when he should have paid Shs.191,805,304-. It\rquote s only the subject matter of (c) and (d) that required verification by the Registrar since the Registrar could not have been expected to know how much had bee n paid directly to URA by Spear Motors Ltd and the plaintiff. When all is said and done, Court is satisfied that the Letter constituted an acknowledgment of the fact that an over payment had been made by the plaintiff to URA. It is immaterial that Mr. K a weesa chose to address the letter to the Registrar of the Court rather than the plaintiff for as long as through it he could kill many birds with one stone. For as long as it was copied to him, it was as good a message to him as it was to the Registrar a nd vice versa. }{\f36\insrsid14044565 \par }{\f36\insrsid14163324 \par Accordingly, I accept the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the Letter was a solid and sufficient acknowledgment of a debt to the plaintiff. It }{\f36\insrsid4403620 rekindled the}{\f36\insrsid14163324 plaintiff\rquote s claim such that by the time he filed the suit on 27/1/2003, the cause of action was still within the six years period. \par \par I would answer the first issue}{\f36\insrsid10385038 in the negative and is do so.}{\f36\insrsid14163324 \par }{\f36\insrsid10385038 \par As to whether or not he is entitled to the claim of Shs.55,517,870-, the answer is in my view quite obvious from my assessm ent in the first issue. Having stated that he made an over payment, which is conceded in P. Exh. X by the defendant, I hold that he is entitled to a refund of that much. \par \par As to whether he is entitled to the other }{\f36\insrsid4403620 relief\rquote s}{\f36\insrsid10385038 sought that is, interest and cost s, it has been submitted that this was business income; that the defendant has utilized it for a long time and deprived him of its use; and that he should be compensated for that non-use by way of interest. I agree. \par \par The principle that emerges from decided cases, notably }{\b\f36\ul\insrsid10385038 Sietco \endash Vs- Noble Builders (U) Ltd, SCCA No. 31 of 1995,}{\f36\insrsid10385038 is that where a person is entitled to a liquidated amount and has been deprived of it through the wrongful act of another person, he should be awarded interest from the date of filin g the suit. The circumstances of this case warrant that the plaintiff be awarded interest on the decretal amount. It shall be at the current commercial rate of 25% per annum from the date of filing till payment in full. \par \par Finally, my interpretation of the Letter, P. Exh. X}{\f36\insrsid6641196 ,}{\f36\insrsid10385038 could of course be wrong. Even then there is }{\f36\insrsid6641196 irrefutable }{\f36\insrsid10385038 evidence that the plaintiff was supposed to pay Shs.191,805,304- and that he paid Shs.247,323,174-. That much is stated}{\f36\insrsid2235238 in the letter, whether or not it amounts to an acknowledg ment of a debt. My understanding of the law is that a Statute barred debt is still payable despite the fact that its payment cannot be enforced by an action: Cheshire, Fi}{\f36\insrsid10317280 f}{\f36\insrsid2235238 oot & Furmston\rquote s LAW OF CONTRACT, 14}{\f36\super\insrsid2235238\charrsid2235238 th}{\f36\insrsid2235238 Edn, at p.713.}{\f36\insrsid7027960 }{\f36\insrsid10317280 Save for the psychological sa tisfaction derived from the pendantic application of laws, some of which may be unrealistic; and given that the defendant has already made part settlement of the debt through a consent order, I\rquote m unable to discern any moral justification the defendant can advance to deprive the plaintiff of Shs.55,517, 870- that clearly belongs to him; and this after levying from him another Shs.191,805,304-.}{\f36\insrsid2121538 \par }{\f36\fs16\insrsid10317280\charrsid11162354 \par }{\f36\insrsid2121538 This would appear to me to }{\f36\insrsid749798 be }{\f36\insrsid11162354 the sort of }{\f36\insrsid2121538 mischief, the unsatisfactory state of affairs which the wise framers of o ur constitution meant to remedy in Article 126 (2) (e) thereof. It would appear to me that on equitable }{\f36\insrsid11162354 considerations as well;}{\f36\insrsid2121538 }{\f36\insrsid11162354 given the many years the plaintiff has spent seeking recovery of a fairly obvious claim; and considering that even if the statutory period expires before an action is brought the plaintiff\rquote s rights are not necessarily extinguished, this would be a fit and proper case to be considered for a remedy under S.98 of the Civil Procedure Act if only that would bring litigation in this particular case to an end. I would allow the plaintiff\rquote s claim under this head as well in accordance with S.98 of the Civil Procedure Act and 17 (2) (c) of the Judicature Act, cap 13 (as amended by Act 3 of 2002, S.4 thereof) and I do so. \par \par }{\f36\insrsid12405426 For reasons stated above, the plaintiff\rquote s claim is allowed on terms set out herein above, with costs to him against the defendant. I so order. \par \par Yorokamu Bamwine \par }{\b\f36\insrsid12405426\charrsid12405426 J U D G E \par }{\f36\insrsid12405426 05/06/2006 \par }{\f36\lang1024\langfe1024\noproof\insrsid12285727 {\shp{\*\shpinst\shpleft1620\shptop540\shpright1800\shpbottom1620\shpfhdr0\shpbxcolumn\shpbxignore\shpbypara\shpbyignore\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt0\shpz0\shplid1028 {\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 88}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLayoutInCell}{\sv 1}}}{\shprslt{\*\do\dobxcolumn\dobypara\dodhgt8192\dppolyline\dppolycount59\dpptx0\dppty0\dpptx18\dppty2\dpptx35\dppty7\dpptx43\dppty11\dpptx50\dppty16 \dpptx57\dppty21\dpptx64\dppty26\dpptx69\dppty33\dpptx75\dppty40\dpptx79\dppty48\dpptx83\dppty55\dpptx86\dppty64\dpptx88\dppty72\dpptx90\dppty81\dpptx90\dppty90\dpptx90\dppty450\dpptx90\dppty459\dpptx92\dppty468\dpptx94\dppty477\dpptx97\dppty485 \dpptx101\dppty493\dpptx105\dppty500\dpptx111\dppty507\dpptx116\dppty514\dpptx123\dppty520\dpptx130\dppty525\dpptx137\dppty529\dpptx145\dppty533\dpptx162\dppty538\dpptx180\dppty540\dpptx162\dppty542\dpptx145\dppty547\dpptx137\dppty551\dpptx130\dppty556 \dpptx123\dppty561\dpptx116\dppty566\dpptx111\dppty573\dpptx105\dppty580\dpptx101\dppty588\dpptx97\dppty595\dpptx94\dppty604\dpptx92\dppty612\dpptx90\dppty621\dpptx90\dppty630\dpptx90\dppty990\dpptx90\dppty999\dpptx88\dppty1008\dpptx86\dppty1017 \dpptx83\dppty1025\dpptx79\dppty1033\dpptx75\dppty1040\dpptx69\dppty1047\dpptx64\dppty1054\dpptx57\dppty1060\dpptx50\dppty1065\dpptx43\dppty1069\dpptx35\dppty1073\dpptx18\dppty1078\dpptx0\dppty1080\dpx1620\dpy540\dpxsize180\dpysize1080 \dpfillfgcr255\dpfillfgcg255\dpfillfgcb255\dpfillbgcr255\dpfillbgcg255\dpfillbgcb255\dpfillpat0\dplinew15\dplinecor0\dplinecog0\dplinecob0}}}}{\f36\insrsid11563997 5/6/2006 \par Habib Arike \par Stell}{\f36\insrsid3949566 a}{\f36\insrsid11563997 Nyap}{\f36\insrsid3949566 e}{\f36\insrsid11563997 ndi for defendant \par Richard Okalany for plaintiff. \par \par }{\b\f36\insrsid11563997\charrsid11563997 Court:}{\f36\insrsid11563997 Judgment delivered. \par \par Yorokamu Bamwine \par }{\b\f36\insrsid11563997\charrsid11563997 J U D G E \par }{\f36\insrsid11563997 5/6/2006}{\f36\insrsid11563997\charrsid10385038 \par }}