John Amarere Swati v Republic [2014] KECA 19 (KLR)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT KISUMU

CORAM:  AZANGALALA, GATEMBU & KANTAI, JJ.A)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 393 OF 2012

BETWEEN

JOHN AMARERE SWATI.............................................APPELLANT

AND

REPUBLIC...................................................................RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal  from a conviction and or Judgment of the High Court of Kenya

at Kakamega (Chitembwe & Thuranira, JJ) dated  28th June, 2012

in

HCCRA  NO. 19 OF 2005)

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1. John Amarere Swati, the   appellant, was on 26th January, 2005 convicted by the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Kakamega for   three offences and sentenced.  The   first  offence    was robbery with  violence contrary to  section 296(2)  of the  Penal Code  for  which he  was  sentenced to  death. The second and third   offences were    assault causing actual bodily    harm contrary to section 251 of the  Penal Code. For that he was sentenced to prison terms of one  year  each.

2. The  appellant   appealed   against   the     convictions and sentences to the High Court. In  that appeal he  asserted that the            evidence  presented   before    the    trial  magistrate  was unreliable as  practically all   the   prosecution witnesses are related; that  the   evidence  was   insufficient  to   sustain  the (convictions; that the  appellant was  not  positively identified as the  perpetrator of the  offences; and that the  charges were  not proved to the  required standard.

3. After  hearing the  parties, the  High  Court was  not  persuaded that there was  any merit in  those complaints and dismissed the  appeal in a judgment delivered on  28th  June, 2012.

4. The appellant was not satisfied with the judgment of the  High Court. He  filed   the   present appeal. He  says that the   High Court should  not   have   upheld the   convictions by  the   trial court as the  prosecution did  not  prove  its  case beyond reasonable doubt; that the  learned judges should have held that  identification of the appellant was not   safe; that  the learned judges did  not  carefully and properly re-evaluate the evidence; that no  weight was  attached to the  appellant's own testimony and  that  his   rights  under  section  200   of   the Criminal Procedure Code  were  violated.

Submissions by counsel

5. At the  hearing of the  appeal, the  parties were  represented by   learned counsel. Mr.  Onyango Jamsumbah  for  the  appellant reiterated          the       complaints  in the       grounds of       appeal  and submitted that the  prosecution failed  to  prove  its case to  the required standard; that all the  witnesses who  testified for the prosecution are   relatives save for  the   police  officer  and the doctor; that the  appellant was  arrested after one  year after the   alleged incident and  no  evidence, whether  by  way  of  a warrant  of   arrest  or    other   documentary  evidence  was produced  to  show that  the   appellant was   hiding to  avoid arrest;  that  the    lower    courts  erred  in   finding that  the appellant  was   recognized  amongst  the  . attackers;  that  in relation  to   the    evidence   of   PW1,   one    is  at  a  loss  to understand why  he  failed   to  disclose to  the   police   that the attacker was  a fellow village  mate if indeed he identified him.

6.  Counsel for  the   appellant further submitted that witnesses said that youth wingers went to  the  appellant's home after the   incident but it  is  not   clear why,  if that was  indeed the case, the  youth wingers did  not  arrest him;   that the  youth wingers would have   been important witnesses and yet  they were  not  called to testify and an inference should therefore be drawn that  their evidence would have   been adverse to  the prosecution; that the  witnesses contradicted themselves and that the  circumstances were  generally not  conducive to  safe identification of the  assailants.

7.  Mr.  Jamsumbah  concluded his  address by  submitting  that section 200  of the  Criminal Procedure Code  was  not  complied with; that when a new  judicial officer  takes over the  conduct of a case from  another officer,  the  accused should be  given an opportunity to  recall earlier witnesses so  that the new officer  can assess the  demeanour of the  witnesses; that that was  not  done in  this case and that the  appellant was  thereby prejudiced  as  it  was   important for   the   court  to   hear the witness.

8. Opposing the appeal  Mr. Abele, the learned  Assistant Director  Public Prosecutions submitted that identification of the    appellant  was   beyond error; that the appellant was identified by   recognition at  the   scene  by   five   witnesses, namely PW1,2,3,4 and 5 and subsequently by  PW7  at a neighboring dispensary; that torch light  aided the  witnesses in identifying the  appellant who  was  also seen carrying a club and a radio; that the  appellant's voice was  also recognized by PW5 when  the appellant  was    commanding  other  gang members to  cut and kill  PW5;  that the appellant was   the most prominent and most vicious member of the  gang as he was the one giving commands; that  the appellant  was mentioned  by   the witnesses the same  night  the   incident occurred and youth wingers went to  his house but did  not arrest him;  and that the police  also  went to  the  appellant's house but did  not  find  him; that recognition is a reliable and assuring form  of identification and there is  no  basis in  the claim by the  appellant that the  witnesses made up a story to fix him.

9. While conceding that section 200  of the  Criminal Procedure Code was not complied  with    when  Mr.   S.  M.   Kibunja Principal Magistrate took over the conduct of   the trial proceedings from   Ms.J  Thuita, Principal Magistrate, Mr. Abele submitted that at the time of the take over, only one witness had testified; that the appellant had had an opportunity to  cross examine and  did   cross examine that witness; that there was  no  material prejudice occasioned to the  appellant and that there was  no  basis for  ordering a new trial.

10. Mr. Abele  concluded his  arguments by  submitting that the complaints by the  appellant against the  lower  courts have no basis and urged us to dismiss the  appeal.

11. In his  brief  reply,  Mr. Jamsumbah submitted that it  is mandatory under section 200(3)   of  the   Criminal Procedure Code  for  an accused to  be  informed of his  rights under that provision; that there was  material prejudice to  the  appellant by  reason of non compliance with  that provision and that it was  important for the  court to see  and hear the  witness.

Our determination

12. This is  a second appeal. As  a second appellate court, our role in this  appeal  is  limited by  section  361(1)(a)  of  the Criminal Procedure Code  to  matters of law.  We are  bound by the concurrent  findings of  fact   by  the   lower   courts unless those findings have   no  basis in evidence. The position has been stressed  in   many  decisions  of   this  Court.  See  for instance   Peter Sabem  Leitu -vs.-  Republic [2013]  eKLR; Nioroge -vs.-  Republic [1982]  KLR  388;  M'Riungu -vs.­ Republic [1983] KLR 455.

13. The legal  questions for  our determination in  this appeal are whether the  offences for  which the  appellant was  convicted were proved  to   the   required  legal   standard;  whether  the evidence of identification met  the  legal  test of safety; whether the  1st appellate court discharged its obligation to re-evaluate the   evidence and  draw  its  own   conclusions; whether the evidence of  the  appellant was   considered and whether the High  Court was  obliged to  order a re-trial on  account of non compliance with   the   section 200 of  the   Criminal Procedure Code.

14. We begin with the overriding question whether the  evidence of identification met  the  legal  test of safety. We will consider that together with the issue whether the   High  Court as the first appellate court discharged its obligation of re-evaluating the  evidence and drawing its own  conclusions.

15. In  Cleophas Otieno Wamunga V R Criminal Appeal 20 of 1982 Kisumu, this Court had to  decide whether evidence of  identification in that case formed a  secure basis for a conviction. In doing so,  the  Court stated:

"…Evidence of visual identification in criminal cases can bring about miscarriage of justice and it is of  vital importance that such evidence is examined carefully to minimize this danger. Whenever the case against a defendant depends wholly or to a great extent on the correctness of one or more identification of  the accused which he  alleges to  be  mistaken, the  court must   warn itself  of the  special need  for  caution before convicting the  defendant in reliance on the  correctness  of identification..."

And  in  R vs.  Eria Sebwato [1960] EA 174, the  High  Court of Uganda held  that:

"Where the evidence alleged to implicate an accused is entirely of identification, that evidence must be absolutely water tight to justify a conviction."

16. What then was  the  evidence before  the  trial court regarding the  appellant's identification and did it meet that test?

17. The evidence by the  prosecution was  that on  the  night of 2nd  May,  2003 at about 10. 30 pm, Geoffrey   Machachu, PW  1, and his  wife were  asleep when they  were  woken up by noise. A gang  of   over 10   people  broke  into  their  house.  The assailants broke   their   television  screen,  took mobile telephones and cash before  leaving the  house. According to PW 1, he was "through use of torch lights  from the other thugs" able to  identify the  appellant as one  of the  attackers. When cross-examined by  the  appellant, he  stated, "I  saw you  very clearly  through the use of the people torch light." PW1 went on to  say   that the  appellant was  carrying a stick and that he knew the appellant's brother and his father.

18. PW1's father, Joash  Licheni Musiomi (PW 2) was  asleep in his  house in  the  night of 2nd May,  2003 when he  saw  torch light at the  window; he  then heard his  son, PW1, raise alarm; he  went out with  a torch and saw  two  people one  of whom he recognized as the  appellant carrying a club and a radio; the other person cut him  on  the  left  cheek. Cross-examined by the appellant, PW2 was  categorical that he " ...personally saw [the  appellant] through the  torch light...[who] had  a long  black trouser and  pullover."

19. Wafula Nekati Malinyi  (PW 3) and his  wife Julia Kasika (PW5)  were  also   asleep on  the   night of  2nd and 3rd May,  2003 when they were   woken up  by  an alarm from   the   home  of PW2;  they proceeded to  PW2's  home where, on  reaching the gate, they met  assailants carrying pangas and rungus; some of the  assailants apprehended them and started cutting and beating them up;  one  of the  assailants lit  a torch and PW3 was   then  able   to  recognize  the   appellant, a village   mate. According to PW5, the  appellant shone a torch at her  and she was   able   to  recognize him. She  also   recognized  his   voice. Under   cross-examination   by    the     appellant,   PW3    was confident that  he   was   not   mistaken as to  the   appellant's identity.

20. Daniel Machika (PW4), a brother to  PW1, was  also  asleep at his  home during the  night of 2nd and 3rd May,  2003 when he was  woken up by  dogs barking; on  attempting to  open the door  to  his  house, he  discovered that it  was  locked from  the outside;       he   looked  through   the   window and  saw    people outside his   brother's  house  demanding that  his   brother should open his  house; that he  got  out through the  window and went to check on  a neighbours watchman who  he  found had been cut; upon his  return he  was  attacked, beaten up and cut; he  recognized one  of  the   robbers as the  appellant "through the   light   from   the   torch";  he   also   recognized  the appellant's voice;  that later that night along with  others they went  to  the   appellant's house but  did   not   find   him;   that youth  wingers had  also   gone   to  the   appellant's house but could not  arrest him  as his  father was  a, village  elder.

21. Joshua Musiayi (PW 6)  also   a brother to  PW1 was  asleep during the  night of 2nd  and 3rd  May  2003. He was  woken up by  noise outside his  house; on  checking his  door  he  found it locked from  the  outside; he  got  out of  his  house through a window and found  an assailant  directing a torch at PW 2; he hit  the  assailant with  a piece  of timber but the  assailant cut him; he was  not  able  to recognize any of the  robbers.

22. Josephat Eyeswa Malinyi (PW7), a watchman, was  guarding a clinic in  North  Butsotso location on  the  night of 2nd  and 3rd May,  2003 when he  heard a knock at the  gate; on  opening the  gate  he flashed his  torch and saw  the  appellant and other persons carrying somebody who,   according to  the  appellant was  unwell and required medical attention;  on  opening the gate the  appellant and his  group attacked PW7 and cut him injuring him. Under cross-examination by the  appellant it emerged that  the   appellant and PW 7 were  known to  each other for a long  time  having been schoolmates.

23. Police constable    James   Kiogora of CID Kakamega accompanied another officer  to the  scene of crime on  3rd May, 2003 on  receiving a report that PW 1 had been attacked; he stated that PW1 informed him   that he   had identified the appellant as one  of the  robbers.

24. Upon considering the  evidence of PW1,2,3,5 and 7 the  trial court found as a fact  that "the  accused  was  among  the group of people  who  attacked them  on the  night of 2nd  and  3rd  May 2003. "

25. On its part, the  High  Court referred to  the  decision of this Court in  Okeno v R [1972] E A 32 regarding the  duty of the first appellate court;    re-evaluated   the   evidence  and concluded, correctly in our view, that:

"What comes out through the evidence of the witnesses from the scene is that they saw the appellant who was known to  them and they recognized him. Only PW6 who fell unconscious did not identify the appellant. The witnesses from the scene who  stated that they saw the appellant are   six  in  total.  Each described how   the torch lights assisted them to see."

26. For our part, we are   satisfied that the  decision reached  by the  lower  courts on  identification was  the  correct one. In  our view,  the   evidence on  identification was  overwhelming. The appellant is well known to the  witnesses. His identification is without any possibility of error.

27. We are  also  satisfied that the  lower  courts proceeded on  the correct legal   principle and  arrived at  the   correct decision. Clearly the  High  Court was  alive  to its duty to re-evaluate the evidence. It did  so.  It reconsidered the  evidence on  record as a whole. It reviewed the   testimonies of  all  the   witnesses. It subjected  it   to   a  fresh  examination. It   formed  its  own conclusions.  The    High    Court  did   not    simply adopt  the findings  of  the   trial court. The   High   Court evaluated the evidence and came to its own  conclusions.

28. The complaint by  the   appellant that his  evidence was   not considered has no  merit. The  total sum of his  evidence was that he  was  found at his  place of work  in  April  2004 by  an assistant chief with three    other   persons;   that    he accompanied them to Kakamega Police  Station where he  was later  charged  with   an  offence   he did not   know anything about. The  trial court considered and correctly found that the appellant's evidence was  in  relation to his arrest and that the appellant did    not    challenge   or    shake  the    prosecution evidence.

29. The last issue  for  our consideration is in relation  to  the complaint by the appellant that section 200(3) of the Criminal  Procedure Code which  provides  that "Where  a succeeding magistrate commences the hearing of proceedings and part of  the evidence has been recorded by   his   predecessor,  the  accused  person may  demand that any witness be  summoned and  reheard and   the succeeding magistrate shall inform the  accused person of that right"was  not  complied with.

30. The record  shows  that  the trial  commenced before the Honourable Principal Magistrate J.  Thuita  who   took  the evidence of  PW 1 on  21st  June,  2004. On 14th  September, 2004  the record indicates that  the matter was before the Honourable Senior Principal Magistrate when in  the  presence of the  appellant, the  court recorded that "case is partly  heard. Proceedings to be typed."

3l. When the hearing resumed on  21st  October 2004 before the Honourable Principal Magistrate S.  M.  Kibunja, there is no indication that  the   appellant  was   informed  of   his   rights under section 200  of the  Criminal Procedure Code. In  effect there is  no   record that  the   right  of  the   appellant under section 200(3)  was  ever  explained to him. The  Honourable S. M. Kibunja  carried   on    with    the    trial  from    where  the Honourable Principal Magistrate J.  Thuita  left   off  to   the conclusion of the  trial.

32. This Court dealt with   a similar situation in   Evans Kiratu Mwangi v R  [2011] eKLR  where the  appellant complained that  there was   a  procedural irregularity in   that  the   trial magistrate failed  to comply with  section 200 (3)  of  the CPC which  gives   an  accused  person a  right to   demand that witnesses who  had given  evidence before a magistrate  who has ceased to  exercise jurisdiction be  re-summoned and re­heard by  the  succeeding magistrate, and, further that such right be explained to him.

33. After  reviewing the   circumstances in  that case the   Court took  the  view  that it  was  not apparent from  the  record that the  appellant would have been materially prejudiced, as only 4 out of 11 witnesses had testified before the  magistrate who had ceased to  exercise   jurisdiction.    The  Court   also considered that the  appellant had the  typed proceedings and that at the  close  of both the  prosecution and defence case the appellant ably  submitted before   the   trial magistrate on  the entire evidence relied on  by the  prosecution.

34. Under Section 200 (4)  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code the  Court has discretion to set aside a conviction based upon evidence  not   wholly   recorded  by  the   convicting magistrate and order a retrial, if it  is  of  the  opinion, that the  accused person was  materially prejudiced.

35. In the  present case, only 1 of the 9  witnesses had testified before  the   Honourable Principal Magistrate J.  Thuita. The appellant cross-examined that witness as he  did   the   eight other witnesses who  testified before  the  Honourable Principal Magistrate S.  M. Kibunja. Typed proceedings with respect to the   testimony of  the   first witness were   ordered and  would have been available for reference.

36. In our  view, it is not  apparent and  neither did  the  appellant demonstrate that  he  was   prejudiced  so  as to  require the setting  aside  the   conviction under  section  200(4)   of  the Criminal Procedure Code and  order  a trial.

37. For the above reasons, there is no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed.

Date and delivered at Kisumu this 18th day of July 2014

F. AZANGALALA

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

S. GATEMBU KAIRU

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JUDGE OF APPEAL

S. ole KANTAI

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JUDGE OF APPEAL