John Waruita Wakibia & Samuel Wanjui Gitonga v Dalmas Pose Kileyia [2014] KEHC 22 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA ATNAKURU

CIVIL APPEAL N0. 20 OF 2011

JOHN WARUITA WAKIBIA....................1ST DEF/APPELLANT

SAMUEL WANJUI GITONGA..............2ND DEF/ APPELLANT

VERSUS

DALMAS POSE KILEYIA..............PLAINTIFF/ RESPONDENT

RULING

Aggrieved  by the  dismissal of their application dated 21st December, 2011 by the  trial  magistrate (D.K Mikoyan) on 7th February, 2011,  the   appellants brought the appeal herein  seeking to set  aside and/ or  vary  that decision on the  grounds that   the  trial magistrate erred by  failing to consider  that   the    accident  which   constituted   the substratum of the  suit was  denied by the  appellant and that the  defence filed  raised triable issues. The  trial magistrate is  also  faulted for  having failed to appreciate that the appellants were not  served  with   summons  to enter  appearance  and  for   holding that  the   impugned service was  proper.

On 19th December, 2013 counsels for the respective parties filed consent in the following terms:-

"By consent of the Advocates for both parties:-

1. This appeal be heard by way of written submissions.

2. The submissions be filed for highlighting on 4th March, 2014. .."

Subsequently   the advocates  filed their respective submissions and highlighted them on 23rd June, 2014.

The appellants' submissions

In  the  submissions filed  on  behalf  of the  appellants it  is pointed out   that the   appeal herein is against the lower court's refusal to set  aside its ex parte judgment in favour of  the   respondent (the  judgment is  in  respect of  a fatal road  traffic  accident  which  occurred  on  4th  January, 2009 along Tippis-Albao road  in Mau Narok). The appellants contend that if they had been granted an. opportunity, they   would have   proved that the   deceased contributed to the occurrence of the accident.  That way, they would have changed the trial magistrate’s judgment on liability.

In  his  ex  parte judgment, the  trial  magistrate had found the  appellants 100°/o liable for causing the  accident and awarded the  deceased's estate Kshs. 100,000/ = for  loss  of expectation of life;  Kshs. 80,000/= for  pain and suffering and  Kshs.  35,000/=   for   special damages and Kshs. 480,000/= on account of lost years.

When the appellants were   notified of  the   judgment they sought to set  aside the proceedings leading to entry of the judgment and the   consequential  decree therefrom. They also sought leave to  file  their defence out of  time. Their application to set  aside the  ex parte proceeding was  heard but dismissed on  7/2/2011. Consequently, they filed  the present appeal on  the grounds that they were  not  served with summons to enter appearance, that the ex-parte proceedings were  taken without their knowledge and that they were  not  given  a chance to  be  heard. The  appellants also contended that service of summons was not   proper and that their defence raised triable issues.

Referring  to   Mwalia  v.   Kenya  Bureau  of   Standards (2001)1 E.A  151 where Ringera J. (as  he  then was)  drew a distinction between a regular and an irregular ex parte judgment and laid  down the factors to  be  considered in setting  aside  judgments  in   default  of   appearance   or defence; the  appellants have submitted that the ex  parte judgment hereto was irregular and should be  set aside ex debito  justiciae.

Service was  not proper

It is the appellants' case that the service of process herein was not   proper. That fact  is  said to  be born out by the affidavits of the  process server, Wilson  Wanjohi, and that of the  respondent's advocate, Elizabeth Omwenyo, which illustrate failed  attempt to effect  service to the  appellants. Subsequently, the respondent's application for substituted service, dated 51812009, was allowed on 19I 10I 2009. It   is    contended   that,   under   the   Civil Procedure Rules, substituted  service can only  be  resorted to  as a last resort (where all  efforts of effecting service to the  defendant have failed  or have been exhausted).

In   the    circumstances  of   this  case,  the    respondent's advocate is blamed for  having failed to get  the address  of the 1st appellant from   his  insurance  company yet  after the   suit was  heard and determined ex  parte, he  quickly forwarded the  judgment to the  1st appellant's insurer.

It  is  further submitted that Order  5 rule   17  of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 does not  provide for  substituted service of suit papers through registered post but only  by advertisement in   the   media. That being the case, it is argued that, the option of substituted service was not available to the respondent.

The  defence and triable issues

The appellants contend that the trial magistrate did not consider their defence as he was  by  law  obligated to  do. In this regard, it is submitted that whereas the burden of proof   lay   with   the   respondent, the   appellants had  the burden to  proof  contributory negligence and reduce their extend of liability. Citing the decision in Jones v.  Livox Quarries Ld.,  (1952) 2  Q.B  608 and the   provisions of Section 4 of  the   Law  Reform  Act,   Cap   26   Laws   of Kenya, where the   right to  plead and  prove   contributory negligence is  acknowledged, the  appellants contend that they have evidence capable of  proving that the deceased contributed to the  occurence of the  accident.

Based on the  observation of Sir  William  Duffus, P.,  in  the case of   Patel v.   East  Africa Cargo   Handling Services( 1974)  E.A   75   quoted  with  approval  by   the  Court  of Appeal  in   Ceneast  Airlines  Ltd  v.  Kenya  Shell  Ltd (2000)  2  E.A  362, it  is  submitted that  the appellants' defence has triable issues which should be  heard and determined by way  of trial so  as to  ensure that justice is not  only  done but is  manifestly seen to  have been done. In  Patel v.  East  Africa    Cargo    Handling Services (supra), Sir  William  Duffus, P., observed:-

"The main concern of the court is to do justice to the parties, and the court will not impose conditions on itself to fetter the wide   discretion given to it by    the rules. I  agree that where it is a  regular judgment as is the case here, the court will  not ...set aside the judgment unless it is satisfied that there is a  defence on the merits. In   this  respect defence on the merit does not mean, in  my  view, a defence that must succeed, it means as Sheridan J.,  put it "a triable defence," that   is an issue which raises a prima facie defence and which should go to trial for  adjudication."

Whether any prejudice occasioned on  the defendant is compensable It is the appellants' case that any  delay occasioned by the appeal will  be  compensated. In this regard, it is pointed out that a sum of Kshs.754,785/= has been deposited in an  interest  earning account in   the   joint   names of  the parties'  advocates. That being the  case, the   appellants argue, the  respondent will be reasonably compensated regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

In conclusion, the  court was  referred to Article 50 ( 1) of the   Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and  the   decision  in Maina v.Mugiria Civil   Appeal  No.27  of   1982 (unreported) where it was  held:-

"...there are no limits or restrictions on the judge's discretion except  that if  he does vary  the   judgment he   does so on such terms as  may  be just....The main concern of  the court is  to do  justice to the    parties,  and  the    court  will    not impose conditions on  itself to fetter the wide  discretion given it by  the  rules...."

Article 50( 1)  of  the   Constitution of  Kenya on   the  other hand, gives  every   person the   right to  have any dispute that can be  resolved by  the  application of law  decided in a fair  and public hearing before  a court or,  if appropriate another independent and impartial tribunal or  body.

Submissions by the  respondent

The respondent has opposed the appeal on three limbs namely, the legality of   the    application which is   the subject  matter of  the   appeal;  the   issue of  service and whether there is a defence on  merit.

Legality of the  application

On  this limb, it  is  submitted that the appellants having moved  the   court  by   way   of  a  chamber summons, (a procedure  not   provided  for   under  the   Civil   Procedure Rules, 2010),  the  trial magistrate was justified in  holding that:-

"Finally there   is   attack   on    the provisions invoked  by   the defendant. The defendant's have filed chamber summons which is not registered in the Civil  Procedure Rules which came into force   on    10th  December, 2010.   As  if that   is    not   enough,   defendant   has invoked a  non existent provision of  the law  to  seek the  setting aside of  ex-parte proceedings,  judgment as  well   as  leave of the  court. The  defects deals a blow  to this application."(Emphasis supplied).

The respondent contends that Order 51 Rule 1  of  the Civil  Procedure Rules, which was  applicable at the  time, required that the  application be  by notice of motion; that failure to bring the application by way  of notice of motion meant that the   court's hands were   tied   as it  could not adjudicate on  pleadings based on  non existent provisions of the  law. The  respondent contends that the defect in  the application was  not  a procedural technicality and that  it went to the  substance of the  application.

Service of summons

Concerning the question of service, the trial court is said to have been right when it observed:-

"Going by chronology of events, the last known address to the plaintiff is that found  at   the  Registrar of   vehicles  in Exh. P3, copy of records. Those records were gotten on 7/9/2009.  unlike the details in  the  police abstract given on 16/2/2009. 1 am  satisfied  that  service was  proper."

The  address indicated on   the   police  abstract is  said   to have  been  given  by the  1st   appellant. Further that when the  appellants filed their application for stay of execution, the     2nd appellant    swore   an    affidavit   dated    the 21/12/2010 in  which his  address his  given  as P.O  Box 17311 Nakuru (the  same address used to send demand letters).   Although   the     address   used   to    effect     the impugned  service is  different from   the   one   indicated  in the  police  abstract, it is submitted that the  reason for use of a  different address was   properly explained  (certificate of official  search yielded a different postal address  of the 2nd  appellant who  was  the  registered owner of the motor vehicle which caused the  accident).

Arguing that Order 5 rule  17(1) of the  Civil  Procedure Rules allows for  substituted  service, it  is  submitted that it  was perfectly  logical    to   send  the   pleadings  to   the address provided in the  certificate of official  search.

Concerning the  contention that  the  respondent did   not put enough efforts to  effect  personal service on  the appellants, it  is  argued   that the  affidavits filed   on  the attempts made to locate the  appellants and the  search at the   motor  vehicles  registry   is   enough  proof   of   the measures taken to establish the  whereabouts of the appellants.

Whether there is a defence on merit

On  this question it  is  acknowledged that  the   court has wide   discretion  to  set   aside ex  parte  judgment but   the contention  is  that  the   court  equally has  discretion  to refuse to  do  so.  Arguing that this is  a good   case where the  court would  be justified in refusing to exercise its discretion  in  favour  of  the   appellants,  the  respondent submits that all  materials on  record show that the appellants'  failure to  enter appearance and file  defence was  deliberate.

Arguing that  exercise of  judicial discretion ought  to  be guided  by  the  facts surrounding  the   circumstances of each case, the  respondent insists that the  overall conduct of  the   appellants  disentitles  them  good   standing  in   a court of equity.

As  for  the   defence on   record, it  is  submitted that it  is improper as the  appellants  purported to  file  a  defence without leave  of the  court. The respondent contend that the appellant ought to have filed a "draft defence" and not a "defence."

Should this court be inclined   to allow  the  impugned defence  to  stand, it  is  nevertheless,  urged  to  refuse  to exercise its  discretion in favour of the  appellants because the other issues raised   in opposition  to the appeal outweigh  any   reason to allow the exhibited defence  to stand. In this regard, the court is referred to Michael Kamau Gakundi  v. Daima   Bank Ltd. Nairobi HCCC No.43 of 1999  where Havelock J. quoted with approval the  decision in Maina v. Mugaria thus:-

"this discretion is intended  so to be exercised to avoid injustice or hardship....but is not designed to assist the person who has deliberately sought, whether by  evasion or otherwise, to obstruct  or delay   the   course   of  Justice… "

Principles and/ or factors  to consider  when determining  an  application for   setting  aside  an  ex parte order or  judgment:

The  principles  and/ or  factors  that  a  court  should consider  when  determining  an   application  for   setting aside an ex parte judgment or order were  set  down by the Court  of  Appeal  in   Pithon    Waweru Maina  v.  Thuku Mugiria C.A No.27 of 1982 (1983)eKLR thus:-

"(a) Firstly, there are no limits or restrictions on the judge's discretion except that if he does vary the judgment he does so on such terms as may be just ... The main concern of the court is to do justice to the parties, and the court will not impose conditions on itself to fetter the wide  discretion given it by  the rules. Patel v EA Cargo Handling Services Ltd  (1974] EA 75 at 76 C and E

(b) Secondly, this discretion is intended so to be  exercised to avoid injustice or  hardship resulting  from  accident,  inadvertence,   or excusable mistake or  error, but is not designed to  assist   the   person  who    has   deliberately sought,  whether  by   evasion  or   otherwise, to obstruct or  delay the course of  justice. Shah v Mbogo [1967] EA 116 at 123B, Shabir Din   v Ram Parkash Anand (1955) 22 EACA 48.

(c) Thirdly the Courtof Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a judge unless it is satisfied that the judge in exercising his discretion has misdirected himself in some matter and as a result has arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the judge has been clearly wrong in the exercise of his  discretion and that as a result there has been misjustice. Mbogo v Shah (1968] EA 93. Some of  the matters to be  considered when an application is made  are,         the facts and circumstances, both prior and subsequent, and all  the respective merits of the parties together with any other material factors which appear to have entered into the passing of  the judgment, which would            not  or might  not have been present  had the  judgment not  been ex parte and  whether or  not it would be just  and reasonable, to set aside or  vary the  judgment, upon  terms to be  imposed (Jesse Kimani v McConnel (1966] EA 547, 555 F).  The  nature of the action should be  considered, the defence if one  has  been brought to the notice of the court, however irregularly, should be  considered; the question as  to whether the  plaintiff can reasonably be compensated  by costs  for any delay occasioned should be considered; and finally, it should be  remembered that to deny the subject a hearing should be  the last resort of a court.(Jamnadas v  Sodha  v  Gordandas Hemraj ( 1952) 7 ULR  7)."

Applying  the  foregoing principles to  the  circumstances of this case,   I note  that the  trial  magistrates refusal to  set aside his  ex parte judgment was informed by:-

a) His belief that the appellants had full knowledge of the case but failed to enter appearance and/or file a defence;

b) That no reasonable explanation was offered for failure to enter appearance or file a defence and

c) That applicants cited non-existent provisions of the law.

The  question of service

It is noteworthy that the documents that were allegedly sent to the   appellants namely, demand letter and the summons to enter   appearance   were     sent   through different postal addresses.  The demand letter was sent through the address indicated in the Police Abstract to wit, P.O BOX   17311-20100  Nakuru.  The   summons  to enter  appearance  were   subsequently  sent  through  P.O BOX  1001-20117 which   according  to  the   certificate  of search provided by the  registrar of the  motor vehicle  was the  2nd  appellant's postal address. The 2nd appellant’s denial of the   2nd address  was   rejected  by   the   trial magistrate. In so doing the  trial  magistrate observed:-

"Going by chronology of events, the last known address to the plaintiff is that found at the Registrar of vehicles in Exh. P3, copy of records. Those records were gotten on 7/9/2009. Unlike the details in  the  police abstract given on 16/2/2009. 1am satisfied that service was  proper.......There is  no  other reasonable explanation for that delay."

Was the trial magistrate justified in concluding that the service was proper and that no reasonable explanation was offered for the delay?

My answer to this question is in the negative. This is because there were two postal addresses linked to the 2nd respondent. Secondly, the there was no evidence that the 2nd appellant was frequently using the last known address.  Thirdly, as  there were  two  possible addresses through  which the   appellant could   be  reached, there is no way  the  service can  be said  to have  been proper when it was  only set to one  of the  possible addresses through which  the  2nd  appellant could  be reached. The possibility that summons were send to the wrong address,  in  the circumstances of this case, cannot be ruled out. Competency of the application relied on to set aside the trial magistrate's judgment:-

As  was  pointed in  the   respondent's  submissions  above, the  other   reason  for   rejection   of   the  appellants' application  is   the   fact    that  it   was    brought  under provisions of law  that had  ever  since been repealed to wit, Order IX  A  Rule   10   and  11   of  the   repealed  Civil Procedure  Rules.   It is noteworthy that the   application was also brought under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act.

Under that Section 3A, the  trial  magistrate had  power, notwithstanding  the   defect   in  the   application  to  make such orders as might have  been  necessary for  the  ends of justice. Article   159(2) (d)  of  the   Constitution  of  Kenya, which was  in  force  at the  time  the  trial magistrate made his  decision, also  put  an  obligation on  the  trial magistrate to   dispense  justice   without  undue   regard  to technicalities.

Since   the  trial  magistrate  was able  to   appreciate  the nature of orders sought, and  their being  no prejudice suffered  by  the  applicant's  for  the  application  having being  brought under  the  wrong   provisions of  the  law,  I cannot agree  that the application, even  though defective, was fatally  defective.

As concerns the  appellant's defence, I am  of the  view that failure to  describe the  defence annexed  to  the   affidavit sworn  in   support  of   the    application  hereto  did   not prejudice any  of  the   parties. In  any   event, pursuant  to the    orders  sought  in   the   impugned  application,  the appellant had  referred the  court to no  other statement of defence but  the  statement of defence annexed to his supporing  affidavit and  in  respect  of  which  he  sought leave   to  file  defence  out   of  time.   See   prayer 5 of the impugned application.

In  paragraph 6  of the  appellant's intended statement of defence,  the  appellant  contended  that,   if   at  all   the accident  occurred,  it  was   caused  and/ or   substantially contributed to by the  negligence of the  deceased. The particulars of negligence on the part of the deceased are listed there under.

In  my  view,  the  defence filed  by  the  appellants raised a triable issue namely, whether the  deceased contributed  to its   occurrence?   Consequently the  exparte judgment entered is set aside.

The upshot of the foregoing is that the appeal has merit and is allowed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the respondent

Delivered and dated this 7th day of October, 2014 at Nakuru.

H. A. OMONDI

JUDGE