Joseph John Ndirangu (Suing on behalf of the Estate of Lydia Wanjiku Kamau v Meru Greens Horticulture Ltd [2020] KEHC 5238 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KERUGOYA

HIGH COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO. 70 OF 2018

JOSEPH JOHN NDIRANGU (Suing on behalf of the

Estate of LYDIA WANJIKU KAMAU…………………..………APPELLANT

VERSUS

MERU GREENS HORTICULTURE LTD……………..….......RESPONDENT

(The appellant above named against the ruling and/or order of the Senior Resident  Magistrate   NYAMBOKE  siting  at  Wang’uru  Civil  Suit   No. 61  of  2017  on  19th  November, 2018   in  Wang’uru  Civil  Suit  no.  61. 2017)

JUDGMENT

This appeal arises out of Proceedings in Wanguru Civil Suit No.  61 of 2017in Wang’uru Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court.  The trial magistrate gave a Ruling dated 19th of November, 2019 which dismissed the Appellant’s application  seeking  to  set  aside  an  order  issued  on  30th  July, 2018  dismissing   the   suit.

The   appellant was dissatisfied with the Ruling   and filed this    appeal   which raises the followinggrounds;

(i) The Learned   trial  magistrate erred  in  law  and  fact  in  delivering   a  ruling  that  dismissed   the  application  to  set  aside the  dismissal of suit  order.

(ii) The Learned   trial  magistrate erred  in  failing  to  evaluate   and  appreciate   the   strength   and  weight   of  the  evidence tendered by the appellant.

(iii) The Learned  trial   magistrate  erred  in  law  in dismissing  the  application  for  reinstatement   of  suit  due  to  want  of  prosecution.

(iv) The  learned  magistrate  erred  in  law  and  fact  in  finding  that  the  cause   was  within  the  limited  time.

(v) The  Learned  trial  magistrate  erred  in  law  and  in  fact  in  not  finding  that  the  Plaintiff/applicant  claim  in  Civil  Suit   no.  61 of 2017 should have  proceeded  to be  heard  on  merit.

(vi) The  Learned  trial  magistrate   erred  in  law  and  fact  in  failing  to consider  that  the  suit  had  earlier  been adjourned  by  the  insistence  of  the  Defendant’s Advocate.

(vii) The  Learned  trial  magistrate  erred  in  law  and fact  in  failing  to  consider that  the  appellant   had  sought  justice  in the  same  court  and  in  event   punished  the  appellant  due  to  the  mistake  of  his  Advocate.

(viii) The  Learned  trial  magistrate  erred  in  law  and  fact   in failing   to  consider  that  the  appellant  was  ready  to  have  the  suit  concluded  to  its  logics.

(ix) The  Learned   trial  magistrate  erred  in  law  and  fact  in dismissing  the appellants’  case  despite  the  obvious  fact  that  the  application  for  reinstatement  had  triable  issues.

(x) The  Learned   trial  magistrate  erred  in  law  and  fact  in  failing  to  adhere  to  equity  and  justice  in  entering  a  dismissal   order  of  the  suit.

(xi) The  Learned  trial  magistrate  erred  in   law  and  facts  in applying  the  wrong  principles  of  law  and  failing  to  consider   matters  that   she ought  to  have  considered  in  his  ruling.

(xii) Magistrate erred in  law  and  facts  by  failing  to  appreciate   or  consider  the  fact  that  the  appellant  has already  committed  himself  to  the  cause  hence  making  a  ruling   against   the  weight   of  the   evidence  adduced  before  the    court.

(xiii) The Learned trial  magistrate  ignored  the f act   that  the  appellant  lost  a   niece  and  life  was  lost  in  the  cause  before   the  claim.

(xiv) The Learned trial magistrate erred  in  law  and  facts  by  failing   to  consider   the  appellant  entire  evidence  but  instead  improperly   analyzed   the   evidence  for  the  respondent  in  isolation  and  hence   arrived  at  a  wrong  conclusion.

The brief facts of this case are that the appellant had filed Originating Summons in the   High Court of Kenya at Nairobi dated 2nd May, 2010 seeking an order that the Appellant Joseph  John Ndirangu  be allowed  to  file  a  suit  out  of  time  on behalf  of  the  estate  of Lydia  Wanjiku  Kamau   (deceased)  who had   died  in  a  Road  Traffic  Accident  on 22nd  October, 2006.

It is  not  clear  from  the  record  whether   the  Originating  Summons  were determined  as  the  Judgment  and /or   the   Ruling   does  not  form   part  of  the  Record  of   Appeal.

The appellant proceeded to file  Civil Suit  No. 21  of  2017   vide  a  Plaint  dated  9th of  May, 2017,  which  was  Amended   on  17th  May, 2017  claiming;

(a) Special damages

(b) General   damages under the  Law  Reform  Act  ( Cap  26)  for  the  benefit  of  the  deceased  estate,   general  damages  under   the  fatal  accident   Act  for  the   benefit  of  the   plaintiff,   loss  of  life  expectancy,   pain  and  suffering  under  the   English  Common  Law, plus  interest  thereon  at   Court  rates.

(c) Costs  of   this  suit  and  interest  on   a,  and  b  above.

(d) Any  other  relief   that   this  honourable   court  may  deem  fit   to  grant.

It would seem the Respondents filed a defene but their defence does not form part of the Record of Appeal.  The matter was then set down for hearing and on 30th July, 2018 the Trial Magistrate following the failure by the plaintiff to appear in court on the date of hearing, ordered that the suit be dismissed with costs.

The Appellant filed an application dated 16th August, 2018 seeking an order, that   the   Order dismissing the suit on 30th July, 2018 be set aside and the suit be reinstated for hearing.

The   Court gave its Ruling on 19th November, 2018 and dismissed the Application.

When the   Appeal  came  for  directions  the  parties  agreed  to  proceed  by  way  of  written  submissions.

FOR  THE  APPELLANT:

Submissions were  filed  by  Kahuthu  & Kahuthu  Advocates;

He submits that on the   9th  of  November, 2018   when   the  suit  was  dismissed   the  appellant  would  have  proceeded,  had  the  defendants  advocate  not written  a  letter    inferring   the  suit   be   adjourned   on   that  day,  that is 9th   November, 2018  as  they  would  not  be  able  to  proceed.   However, the   Record does not  show  any  proceedings  which  were  supposed  to  take   place  on  9th  November, 2018  and  the   impugned  Ruling  was  delivered  on  19th  November, 2018,  on  that   day   the   Counsel  for  the   Appellant  was  not  in   Court.

He  further  submits  that   being  an  elderly  person  then  aged   75  years  only  failed  to  attend  Court  because  he  was  sickly  and  his   advocate   had  already  alerted him  that  the  respondents  advocate  had  requested  for   adjournment  of   the   matter   on  19th  November, 2018,  hence  the  mistake  of  advocate  should  not  be   visited  on   a  party  as  it  is  a  genuine  mistake.   However, the Appellant does not give an  explanation  as  to  why  he   was  not  in  Court   on   30th  July, 2018  when  the   suit  was  dismissed.

From the record the date of 30th July, 2018 was fixed by consent of the  parties  in  Open  court   on  25th  June, 2018,  and  the   Court  indicated  that  the  appellant  was  given   a  last  adjournment.   When the   matter came up for hearing on 30th July, 2018, Mr. Ogweno appearing for the appellant   informed  the   court  that  there  are  no  witnesses  in  Court  and  the  case  was  dismissed.

The Appellant submits  that  he  resides  in  Nairobi  and  hence  the  mistake  of  his  Advocate  informing  him  that  the  defendant’s  advocate  had  requested  for  adjournment   and  that   the  matter   in  the  event   the  matter  would  not  proceed,  should  not  be  visited   on  the   respondent.

He has relied on the case of; Belinda Murai & others -vs-  Amoi Wainaina (1978) Majen J( the  proper   citation  was  not  given)  to say  that  a  party  should  not  be  locked  out  of   the  seat  of  Justice  on  account  of  a  mistake.

He further submits  that  when  the  suit  was  dismissed  the  plaintiff  immediately   filed  an  application  for  reinstatement  of  the  suit  which  the  court  declined  to  exercise  its discretion  Judiciously  based  on  facts  and  the  Law.

That the Appellant  demonstrated  good  faith  by  indulging  Counsel f or  the   defendant/ respondent  and  hence  the   lower  court  failed  to  consider  the  principles  of :  Shah  -vs-  Mbogo  In  exercise  of  its  discretion.     That dismissal of   the case upon summary   procedure is a draconian measure that will  forever   live  the   appellant  suffering  along  without  a  remedy.

He further  submits  that   Justice  and   equity and  fair  play   should   prevail   as  the  appellant   has  painfully tried  to  prosecute   this  matter  to  ensure  justice for the  deceased’s  estate.

He prays that the Appeal  be  allowed  and  the   Plaintiff  be  allowed  to   prosecute  the   suit   in  the  lower  court.

FOR   THE  RESPONDENTS

Submissions were filed   by; Njeru Nyaga & Company Advocates for the  Respondents.

It  is  submitted  that    Litigation  must come  to  an  end.  They have  relied  on  the case  of;  Republic  -vs- City  Council  of  Nairobi  & 2  Others ( 2014) eklrwhere   it  was  stated  that:

“one  of  cardinal principles  of   law  is  that  litigation   must  come  to  an  end  and  were  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction   has  pronounced  a  final  decision   on  a matter  to  bring  fresh  proceedings  whether  as  judicial  review   proceedings  or  otherwise  would  amount  to  an abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court  and  would  therefore   not be  entertained.  The Court in terminating the  same  would  be  invoking   its  inherent   jurisdiction  which is  not  a  jurisdiction  conferred  by  Section  3A  of  the  Civil Procedure  Act as  such  but  merely   reserved  thereunder.”

He further submits that a matter cannot be litigated  endlessly.   By this Appeal the appellant is asking the court to dwell on this single file for as long as it takes. That it is not worthy  that despite the matter  been  time  bad  the  sub-ordinate  court  continue to  entertain  the  same,  yet  the   appellant  was  not  vigilant  enough   to bring  it  to  a  conclusive  close.

It is  further  submitted  that  the  appeal   is  not only  veiled  in  equity     but  also  a  clear  demonstration  in  disinterest  in disguise.

That the appellant is simply engaging in blame game blaming the   respondent for not proceeding with the hearing  when  they  ought  to  have  done  so.

That  this  court  should  put  finality  to  this  matter.   He has relied on the case of :  William  Koross  ( legal  representative  of Elijah C.A.  Koross. –vs-- Ezekiah  Kiptoo  Komen  & 4  others  ( 2015)eklr  where  it  was  stated  that   “……………………..is  that  it  has  to be  finality;   litigation  must  come  to  an  end.  It is a rule   to counter the all too human propensity   to keep trying   until something   gives.   It is   meant to provide, rest and closure   for endless litigation  and  agitation   does  little   more  than  vex    and  add  to  costs,  a  successful   litigant   must  reap  the  fruits   of   his  success  and  the   unsuccessful  one  must  learn  to  let   go.”

It  is  further  submitted  this  Appeal  is  mere  impendent  to  the  Respondent  reaping  the  fruit  of  their  hard  labour.

That  the  court  on  19th  November, 2018   pronounced  itself  with  clarity  and  they  urged  the  court  to  honour  and  affirm  that  decision.

It is  submitted  that   an  arguable  appeal   is  not  one  that  will  necessary   succeed  but  one  which   raises  triable  issues.

There are no valid issues raised in the matter at hand.  The appellant is simply groping  in  darkness.   Ordering this matter to be  heard  afresh  or  at all,  will be  a  waste  of  courts  precious  time  and  scare  resources,  the  appeal  has no  reverence  in  law  and  should  die  a  natural  death.   He relies on the  case of; CMCHoldings  limited  -vs-    James Mumo  Musyoki  ( 2004)  1  KLR  181,  where  the   court  quoted  with  approval   the  case   of;  Shah  -vs-  Mbogo  &  Another  ( 1967)  EA  116  where   the   court  held  that..

“Applying   the  principle  that the  courts  discretion  to  set  aside  an  ex-parte  judgment  is  intended  to be  exercised  to  avoid  injustice  or  hardship  resulting  from accident  inadvertence  or excusable  mistake  or  error   but  not  to  assist a  person   who  has  deliberately   sought  (whether   by  evasion  or  otherwise)   to  obstruct   or   delay   the  course   of  justice,   the  motion  should  be  refused. ”

He further submits that setting aside judgment or order of the court is in the discretion of the court, and such discretion must  be  exercised  upon  reasons,  and  must be  exercised  judiciously.

The respondent submits that the actions of the   appellant and his advocate   do not amount  to  an  excusable  mistake.

That in the matter at hand,  the  Appellant  refusal   to   provision  to  be  heard  either   in  ex-parte  or  otherwise  can   neither  be  said   to  have  been  inadvertent  or  occurred  as  a result  of  an  accident.

The appellant just intends to delay justice in this case,  by  intentionally  failing  to  attend  to  the  matter  hoping  for  the  courts  indulgence,  and   thus  the  appeal  ought  to  be  dismissed.

The respondent submits that the appeal is only aimed at unnecessarily protracting   the matter   which   will occasion the respondent great injustice and prejudice,  considering  that  the  respondent  witness,   the  driver  at  the time  of  the  accident  is  ill  and  often   in  and  out  of  hospital.

That this case has been in court for a while and if the appellant was desirous   of having this matter been dealt   with conclusively then he should have been active in prosecuting  this   suit  from the  beginning.

That it will be unfair   and unjust   for the negligence and   indolence of   the appellant to be visited upon the respondent.

Finally the Respondent submits that the appellant chose to sleep on his right, yet equity imputes an intent to fulfil an obligation and it aids the vigilant and not the indolent. That both Equity and the Law demand that this appeal be dismissed.

I have considered the Appeal and the submissions.

ANALYSIS & DETERMINATION

The Issue which arises for determination is;

-  Whether  the appellant has shown good cause for the court to order the setting aside of the Ruling by the Trial Magistrate   refusing   to   reinstate   the suit which had been dismissed.

The Appellant is seeking the exercise of these courts’ discretion so that the suit   before the Trial Magistrate can be reinstated and be heard on merit.

Order  12  Rule  3 of  The  Civil  Procedure  Rules  Provides  as  follows;

“ if   on  the  day  fixed  for  hearing,  after  the  suit   have  been called  on  for  hearing   outside  the  court  only the  defendant  attends   and  he  admits  no  part  of  the  claim,  the  suit   shall be  dismissed   except  for  good  cause  to be  recorded   by  the  Court.”

The Provision provides for the dismissal of the suit for nonattendance of   the Plaintiff.

However, the court has discretion to adjourn the suit   where a good cause has been shown and is recorded by the trial court.

The court however has discretion to reinstate a suit that has been  dismissed.  Order  12   Rule  7  of  The  Civil Procedure  Rules  provides as follows;

“Whereunder  this  order   Judgment   has  been  entered  or   the  suit  has  been   dismissed   the  court  on  application   may  set  aside   or  vary  the   judgment  or  order   upon  such  terms  as  may  be  just.”

It  is  trite  that  the  discretion   of   the  court  must  be  exercised  judiciously.  In this case   the   record shows that the plaintiff failed to attend court when the matter came up for hearing after the date was taken by consent.  From the record of   the Lower Court it shows that   the   appellant was not in court   but   there   was an advocate   who was appearing for him.   The   Advocate informed the court that   the witnesses   were not in court.

The appellant filed an application for the suit to be reinstated, but the Trial Magistrate held that he had considered the   conduct of the appellant and dismissed the application.

In the Supporting  affidavit  which  was  sworn  by  Anthony  Kahuthu  he  has  deponed  that   on  the  day  the  matter came  up f or  hearing  on   30th   July, 2018  for  the  main  suit   the  appellant  would have been  ready  to  proceed  but  the  defendant    advocate  Mr. Nyaga   called  the  deponent   and  informed   him that  he   shall  not  be   able  to  proceed  as  his  client  is unwell  and indisposed  and  wrote a  consent   agreeing  to  take  out  the  matter  from  the  day’s  cause list   which  the  Plaintiff  advocate   reluctantly  agreed   to,  but   executed  the  consent   which  was  already  filed   as  part  of  the  record.

The consent which was annexed  to   the  Supporting  affidavit  at  page  81  of  the  record  stated  that;   The   matter  be  taken  out  from  the   cause  list  of 30th July, 2018  and  the   letter  is  signed  by  both  counsels  for   the   appellant  and   the  respondent.    It would seem that   when the  matter  came   before  the  trial magistrate  on  30th  of  July, 2018  the  court  was  not  informed  that  the  parties  had  agreed  to  take  out  the  matter  from  the  days  cause list.

When  considering  this  application   the  trial  magistrate stated  that  on  the  day   the  counsel  for  the  appellant  sought  adjournment  due  to lack  of  witnesses,  and  the   defendant   left  the  final  decision  to  court.

The  counsel  for  the  respondent    who  was  before  the  court,  failed  to  inform  the  court  that   they  had  entered  a  consent  to  take  out  the  matter  out  of  day’s   cause list.    The  appellant   was  therefore   not  to  blame  for  the  state  of  affairs   that  led  to  the  dismissal   of  the  suit.

The application  to  re-instate   the  suit  was  filed   on  16th  August, 2018. The delay in filing  this  application  to  re-instate   the  suit  was  not  unreasonable  or  inordinate. The  mistake  was  not  by  the  appellant failing   to  attend  court.

The  court  should   therefore  exercise   the  discretion  judiciously,  consider  the  circumstances   leading   to  the  dismissal  of  the  suit.

It  has  been  stated  dismissing   a  case  is  draconian  and  a  party  should  not  be  locked  out  of   the   Sit   of   Justice. As  stated  in  the  Case of;

Belinda  Murai  & Others  -vs-  Amoi  Wainaina  ( 1978)   Majen  J.

“  The  door  of  Justice  is  not  closed  because  a mistake  has  been  made  by  a  lawyer  of  experience  who   ought  to  know  better   the  court  may  not  condone   it  but  it  ought   certainly  to do  whatever  is  necessary  to  rectify  it   if  the  interests  of  justice  so dictate….”

Apaloo JA  outlined  the  following  approach  to a  similar  question  in  Phillip  Chemwolo  and  Another  -vs-  Augustine  Kubede  ( 1982 -1988)  KAR  103;

“Blunder  will  continue  to  be  made  from  time  to  time  and  it  does not  follow  that because   a  mistake  has been  made  that  a  party  should  suffer  the  penalty  of  not  having  his  case  heard   on  merit,  I  think  the  broad   equity   approach  to  this  matter  is  that unless   there is  fraud   or  intention  to  overreach,  there  is  no  error  or  default  that  cannot  be  put  right  by payment  of   costs.  The courts as is  often  said  exist   for  the  purpose  of  deciding  the  rights  of  the  parties  and  not the purpose  of  imposing  discipline.”

In the  exercise  of  discretion  the  court  has  a free  hand  and  has  to  consider  the  reason   on  non –attendance   in  court  by  the  applicant  as  to  whether he  is  deserving or  undeserving    the  exercise  of  discretion  in  his  favour.

The  purpose   for  the  court  to exercise   discretion  is  to  ensure   that   a  party  does  not  suffer  injustice  or  hardship. In the  case  of:  Shah  -vs-  Mbogo    which  was  cited  by  the   appellant   was  stated  as  follows;

“  Applying  the  principles   that  the  courts  discretion  to  set aside  an  ex-parte  judgment  is  intended  to be  exercised   to  avoid  injustice  or  hardship  resulting  from  accidents,  inadvertence,  or  excusable  mistake,  or  error   but  not  to  assist  a  person  who  has  deliberately  sought  (whether  be  evasion  or  otherwise)  to  obstruct  or  delay   the  cause  of   justice.”

In this case, the appellants did not attend court as  he  had  been  informed  by  the  counsel  for  the  defendant    that  he  would  take  out  the  matter  from  the  hearing  list   of  that  day.

In most  cases where  parties   have  filed  a consent  in  a  matter,   courts  normally   allow  the  consent  or  adopt  the  consent   as  the  order  of   the  court.

The  appellants’  advocate   cannot  be  faulted   for  not  presenting  his  witnesses  in  court,   after  signing  the  consent  where  the  party  had  consented  to  take  out  the  matter.

The defence counsel who  appeared  before  the   Trial   Magistrate  was  not  candid   as  he  failed  to bring  it  to  the  attention  of  the  court  that  there  was  a  consent  to  take  out  the  matter  out  of  the  cause  list  of   that  day.

This facts  were before   the  Trial  Magistrate  when  she   delivered  the  impugned   Ruling   on  19th  November, 2018.

The Trial Magistrate erred   dismissing   the application to dismiss the suit where    it  was  clear   it was  not  the  fault  of  the  appellant  that  the  case  could  not  proceed  on  that  day.

The Trial Magistrate erred by  stating  that   having  dismissing   the  suit  she  could  not entertain  the  application  for  re-instatement.   This was made in   error  because  on  ORDER  12   Rule  7 (supra),   the  court   has  discretion  to  set  aside   or  vary   the  Judgment  or  the  order  dismissing   the  suit  upon  such  terms  as  may  be  just.

This   is   a case   where   the  court  ought  to  have  exercised  discretion   to  re-instate   the    suit  as  the  appellant   had  shown  a  good  cause  why   he  was  not  in  court.    Article  159  (2)  ( d)  of   the   Constitution;

“In exercising Judicial   authority, the Courts and Tribunals   shall be guided by the following principles;-

-  Justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural   technicalities.

This calls on the court to aim at doing substantive justice other than dismissing the suit.”

In the case of; Phillip  Chemwolo  &  Another –vs-  Augustine  Kubede  (  1982  -1988)  KAR   quoted  in   Pan  African  Paper  Mills  Limited  -vs-  SilvesterNyarango  Obwocha  ( 2018)   eklr.   it was stated:

“ Blunders  will  continue  to  be  made  from  time  to  time  and  it  does  not  follow   because  a  mistake  has  been  made,  a  party  should  suffer   the  penalty   of  not  having   his  case  heard   on  merit.    I think the broad   equity approach to  this  matter  is  that,   unless  there  is  fraud   or  intention  to   over reach    there  is  no  error  or  default  that  cannot be  put  right  by   payment  of  costs. The court as is often said   exists for  the  purpose  of  deciding   the  rights  of   the  parties,  and not   the  purpose  of   imposing   discipline.”

In the case of;  Richard  Ncharpi   Leyagu  -vs-   I.E.B.C  &  2  Others  (  Civil  Appeal:18/2013)   the  Court  of  Appeal  stated  that;

“ The   right  to  a  hearing   has  always  been  a  well-protected  right   in  our  Constitution  and  is  also  the  cornerstone  of   the  rule  of  Law.   This is why even  if   the  courts   have  inherent   jurisdiction   to  dismiss  suits,   this  should  be  done   in  circumstances   that   protect   the   integrity  of   the  courts  process  from  abuse   that  would  amount  to  injustice  and   at  the  end of  the  day  there  should  be  proportionality”=

In  this  case  failure  by  the  appellant  to  attend  court  has  been  explained.

The explanation  is   plausible  as  the   Counsel  for  the  appellant  has  exhibited    the  letter  of  consent  by  the  parties   that  the  case  would  not  proceed   on  that  day  and   the  Court  in  this  matter   should  exercise   discretion  in  his  favour   to  avoid     hardship  and  injustice     which  are     Factors   which   the  court  must  consider   while  exercising   discretion.

In   the case of;   Richard  Ncharpi   Leyagu  -vs-  I.E.B.C  & 2  others  ( supra)   the   Court  of   Appeal   stated  that;

“We  appeal  with  the  noble   principles   which  go  further   to  establish  that  the   courts  principles  to  set  aside  an  ex-parte  judgment  or  order  is  intended  to  avoid  injustice  or   hardship   resulting   from  an  accident,  inadvertence  or  excusable  mistake   or error  but  not  to  assist  a  person  who  deliberately   seeks  to  obstruct  or  delay   the   cause  of  justice.”

Although  the   respondent  have  submitted  that  litigation  must  come  to  an  end,    It  should  not  be  by  default  but  as  much  as  possible   on  merits  of   the  case  which   can  only  be  where  both  parties  have  been  heard.     The   respondents   created   the  state  of  affairs  by  failing  to  disclose   to  the   Trial  Magistrate   that  they  had  persuaded  the  counsel  for   the  appellant   to  sign   a  consent   removing    the  matter   from  the  hearing  list.

It  would  be  unfair   and  an  injustice  to   allow  the  respondents  benefit  from  that  kind  of  conduct.

I  find  that   the  appellant  has  shown   a  good  cause  why   he  was  not   in  court  when  the  suit  was  dismissed,   it  was    through   no  fault   of  his   own.

The   Trial Magistrate ought  to  have  exercised   discretion  in  his  favour.

IN  CONCLUSION

- This   court has  a  duty   to  do     substantive   justice   to all  parties   who  appear   before  it  to  seek   justice.

- The   appellant   had  pursued   this  matter   and    his  expectation   that  justice  would  be  done  should  not  be  dashed.

- I   find  that  this  application  has  merit

I  make an Order that;

(i) The  Ruling of  the  Magistrate  dated  19th  November, 2018  is  set  aside  and  replaced  with  an  order  allowing      the  appellants  application  to  re-instate   the  suit,   and  substitute   it  with  an  order  reinstating   the  suit.

(ii) Consequently, the order dismissing  the suit is set  aside.

(iii) The parties  shall   appear before the Trial Magistrate  or  any  magistrate with jurisdiction at Wang’uru Law Court for the hearing  and  determination  of   the  suit.

(iv) On costs’   costs  of this appeal   to   the appellant.

Dated,  signed at Kerugoya this 29th day  of  May 2020

L. W.  GITARI

JUDGE