Joseph Muisyo Nzioka v Chairman Co-operative Tribunal at Nairobi, NGOS Coordination Board &Kangundo; Multipurpose Co-operative Society Limited [2018] KEHC 8656 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.  175 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 27,47,48,50 AND 169 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 53   OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 8 AND 9 OF THE LAW REFORM ACT, CAP 26, LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, ACT NO.  4 OF 2015, LAWS OF KENYA.

AND

IN THE MATTER   OF THE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, CAP 490, LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL (PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE) RULES, 2009

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

BETWEEN

JOSEPH MUISYO NZIOKA ………………………..………….APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE CHAIRMAN,

THE CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL AT NAIROBI ….....…1ST RESPONDENT

NGOS COORDINATION BOARD…….....................……2ND RESPONDENT

KANGUNDO MULTIPURPOSE

CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED …………......…INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

1. By a chamber summons dated 10th April 2017 and filed in court on 11th April 2017, the exparte applicant Joseph Muisyo Nzioka seeks from this court:

a)  ……spent

b)That leave be granted to the applicant  herein to apply for  an order of certiorari to remove and bring to this Honourable court for the purposes of quashing, the order  issued by the  respondent  on  23rd November, 2016  in  Co-operative Tribunal case No.95 of 2014,Kangundo  Multipurpose Co-operative Society  Ltd vs  Joseph  Muisyo Nzioka.

c)That leave be granted herein to apply for an order of mandamus compelling the Co-operative Tribunal at Nairobi, the respondent herein, to hear  and  determine  the applicant’s  application dated  25th May 2015 on its merits  in Co-operative Tribunal case No. 95 of  2014, Kangundo  Multipurpose Co-operative Society vs Joseph Muisyo Nzioka.

d)That the leave granted  herein do operate as stay and/or  a  suspension of the operation of the decree dated 4th February, 2015 extracted  and  issued by  the  respondent  in  Co-operative Tribunal case  No.  95 of 2014, Kangundo Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd vs Joseph Muisyo Nzioka, pending the hearing and determination of the suit herein.

e)That costs of this application be provided for.

2. The chamber summons is predicated on the statutory statement, verifying affidavit sworn by the exparte applicant Joseph Muisyo Nzioka and the annexed exhibits.

3. The exparte applicant’s case is that the interested party  herein Kangundo Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd filed suit  against the exparte applicant before the respondent co-operative tribunal vide a statement of claim dated 24th February 2014 alleging that the applicant had been involved in the mismanagement  of  the interested party  society  while  serving  as  a member  of its management  committee, which  allegation was predicated on an impugned inquiry report  dated June, 2010.

4. An amended statement of claim was filed on 26th May 2014.  That later the interested party filed an affidavit of service showing that it had served summons to enter  appearance  and  all the pleadings and witness statements  upon the applicant  and which affidavit alleged that the applicant had not  appended  his signature  to any of the served  documents.

5. That based on the alleged service of  pleadings and  summons  to enter appearance upon the applicant, the respondent tribunal  entered judgment on 16th December 2014 in default of  appearance and defence upon  a  request  by the interested  party made on  10th December 2014  and  a decree  was drawn  to  that effect.

6. The exparte applicant asserts that he never received any summons to enter appearance or pleadings and that he was only made aware of the existence of the proceedings when he was faced with execution of decree based on exparte judgment entered against him on 16th December 2014.

7. That  vide an  application  dated  25th May 2015  the applicant sought   for setting aside of the  exparte  judgment  and all the  consequential  orders.

8. That the  interested party herein filed a preliminary objection on 5th June 2015 alleging that the tribunal was functus officio, could not  grant the orders sought  and that the applicant ought to  have filed an appeal to the High Court within 30 days on matters  of law only; which preliminary objection  was upheld  by the ruling  made on 23rd November 2016 dismissing the applicant’s  application  dated  25th May  2015.

9. The exparte  applicant claims that the respondent  in its  ruling  alleged that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen its own cases, which  was  a clear violation  of Rule  17 of the Co-operative Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2009 which provides that a judgment, Order or award made  exparte  under this Rules may, on application be set aside on  such  terms  as may be  just.

10. That therefore by upholding the preliminary objection, the respondent acted against the tenets of natural justice by infringing on the applicant’s right to be heard which has exposed the applicant to imminent threat of execution by way of attachment of his property.

11. That the matters raised are for the public interest of members of co-operative societies.  The amount which the applicant   was ordered to pay was kshs 2,900,000 together with interest and costs of the claim.

12. In response to the chamber summons, the interested party  Kangundo Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd  filed a  replying  affidavit  sworn  by John Munyao Muindi  on  16th May  2017  and  a preliminary  objection dated  the same  day  as the replying affidavit contending that the chamber  summons as filed seeks to oust  the clear  statutory  provisions  of Section  74(1)  and  (2)  of  the Cooperative  Societies Act, Cap  74 Laws of Kenya  which  provides  for  redress  for  any grievance hence Order 53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules cannot  circumvent  the  above statutory  provisions.

13. Secondly, that the  applicant  is  guilty  of  non-disclosure  of  material facts  in failing to disclose  to the court  that  on 24th February  2017 when the matter before the  tribunal  came  up for notice to show cause, an order was issued after the applicant offered to settle the decretal sum within 30 days which is  an admission  of liability.

14. Third, that the application seeks to challenge the order of  surcharge by the Commissioner of Co-operative  Development  made on  30th September  2010 and  adopted as judgment of the Co-operative Tribunal on 16th December  2014  and  which  final orders would be  subject to a Judicial Review application for orders of certiorari, and not the order  disallowing the setting aside of the judgment hence the  chamber  summons  has been filed out  of time  of six months  under  Order 53  Rule (2)  of the Civil Procedure Rules.

15. Fourth, that the orders sought to be questioned do not fall within the purview of the Judicial Review process in that the applicant must prove illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. That this was not the case here as the tribunal arrived at the decision after  an interpartes  hearing  of the  application for  setting aside exparte judgment and  the preliminary  objection.

16. The exparte  applicant filed a  further affidavit  sworn on  22nd  September 2017 deposing that the application to set aside exparte judgment was not heard interpartes because the  respondent’s ruling of 23rd November 2016 upheld the interested  party’s  preliminary  objection of 5th June  2015.

17. That the  preliminary objection  raised  irrelevant   issues  to the  application for  setting aside of exparte  judgment.  That  the  preliminary objection could only be  canvassed  after the  setting aside of the exparte judgment and that the preliminary  objection was not  a preliminary objection in law as  far as  the application for setting aside exparte judgment was concerned.

18. That by the time the applicant was made aware of the Tribunal case No. 95/2014, the 30 days for filing of the appeal had already lapsed.

19. The applicant’s counsel also filed written submissions dated   15th May 2017 but all the parties relied on their pleadings, affidavit and the preliminary objection.

20. The exparte  applicant’s  submissions sets out the parameters for grant of  Judicial Review as stated in the Republic vs Kenya National Examinations Council Exparte Gathenji & Others CA  266/1996; Municipal  Council of  Mombasa vs  Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd CA 185/2001; Pastoli  vs Kabale District Local Government Council and Others[2008] 2 EA 300; Council of Civil Unions vs Minister for the Civil Services[1985] AC 2; and an application by Bukoba  Gymkhana  Club [1963] EA  478.

21. According to the applicant, the respondent’s decision under challenge is tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety as set out in the Pastoli (supra) case.

22. On  illegality, it  was submitted that the tribunal disregarded  Rule 17 of the Co-operative Tribunal(Practice and  Procedure) Rules, 2009 which allows the Tribunal to set aside, on application, a judgment  or order  or award  made  exparte.

23. That  the decision was  irrational  because it failed to  provide  a forum for the applicant to be heard on the application to set aside the exparte  judgment  and  consequential  orders.

24. On procedural impropriety it was submitted that the respondent in making the impugned decision breached the Rules of Natural Justice as it condemned the applicant unheard.  Reliance was placed on Republic vs The Honourable The Chief Justice of Kenya & Others exparte Moyo Maiya Ole Keiwua Nairobi HC Miscellaneous Application No. 1298/2004that the right to be heard has intrinsic and instrumental facets.

25. Further reliance was placed an Article 50(1) of the Constitution of Kenya on the right to a fair hearing.  It  was submitted that the decision was made by the respondent without hearing the exparte applicant hence the case is within the purview of Judicial  Review. It  was  submitted, replying  on Section  9(3)  of the Law Reform Act and Order 53 Rule (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, that the above  provisions  permit  the bringing  of Judicial Review applications where  there is a right of appeal against the decision with a discretion to adjourn Judicial Review proceedings where an  appeal has been  filed,  until the appeal  is heard and determined or the  time for  filing  of the appeal  has expired.

26. It  was  therefore submitted that albeit  the impugned  decision is subject to appeal under Section 74(2) of the Co-operatives  Societies Act, Cap 490 Laws of Kenya, the impugned  decision  was made on 23rd November 2016 and by the time these proceedings were instituted on 11th April  2017, the time  for  appealing  had long  expired.

27. It  was  therefore  submitted that  failure  to file an appeal  is  not fatal and that as the application falls within the purview of Judicial  Review, It is properly before this court.

28.  Reliance  was placed on Eldoret ELC 5/2014 JR John Kotit  vs  Patrick K. Cheruiyot  & 3 Otherswhere  it  was   held that availability of other remedies is not  a bar  to the  granting  of Judicial Review.

29. The interested party and  the respondent did not file any  submissions but the interested party relied  on  the preliminary objection, replying affidavit and  the  supplementary  affidavit  filed on record and urged the court to adopt them as  canvassing the  application.

30. On  2nd  October  2017  the court directed  that the prelim nary  objection  as filed be deemed  to be a response to the chamber summons.

DETERMINATION

31. I have considered the foregoing and in my view, the main issues for determination in this matter are:

1)Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for leave and stay.

2)Whether the application for leave and stay is merited.

3)What orders should this court make.

4)Who  should bear costs  of the  application.

32. On whether this court has jurisdiction to hear and  determine  the application for leave  and  stay as  filed,  the interested  party raised a preliminary objection contending that the provisions  of Section 74(2) of the Co-operatives Societies Act ousts the jurisdiction of the this court to hear and determine the  application because  the  said provision makes  it clear that  any  person aggrieved  by the decision  of the tribunal should  file  an appeal to the  High Court within  30 days  of the date  of the decision.

33. On the part of the applicant, it is contended that the above  provision does not oust the jurisdiction of this court because  the provisions of Section 9(3) of the Law Reform Act and   Order 53 Rule (2) of the Civil Procedure  Rules are clear that an aggrieved party may bring Judicial Review proceedings where there is  a right of  appeal against  the  decision with a discretion to adjourn Judicial Review proceedings where an  appeal has been filed, until the appeal is heard  and  determined  or the time  for filing of the appeal  has expired.

34. It was submitted that in this case, the decision under challenge  was made on 23rd November 2016 and by the time these proceedings were instituted  on  11th April  2017, the time  for  appealing   had long expired.

35. To determine  the above  issue  of jurisdiction  the court  does appreciate  that jurisdiction is everything, without  which a court of law  acts  in vain  hence the  moment a court  of law  finds  that it  has  no jurisdiction , it must  down its  tools  and do no more.  Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or  by statute.  Where  a court of law  has no  jurisdiction or where its  jurisdiction  is ousted by statute  or the  Constitution, the court  cannot  by  craft, or by  consent  of parties  arrogate itself  or by  the parties  consent, jurisdiction to entertain  a matter  before it  as the consequences would be that such proceedings  undertaken  and  decision made without  jurisdiction  would be  a nullity ab initio.

36. The locus  classicus  case in Kenya  on jurisdiction is the owners  of Motor  Vessel ‘ Lilian S’ vs Caltex  Oil  (K) Ltd.

37. The court notes that Section 74(2) of the Co-operative  Societies  Act  ( Cap 490) Laws of Kenya) provides for an avenue for  an aggrieved  party to  challenge  the decision  of the Tribunal. It provides:

“ A party  aggrieved  by  the  decision of the Tribunal  may within  30 days  appeal to  the High Court  on matters of law.”

38.  However, the applicant claims  that he could not have  appealed  to the High Court because  by the time  he came  to learn of the existence  of the  exparte  judgment, the   judgment   and  decree were already being executed to recover the  surcharged  amount.

39. Further, that he was not served with summons to enter  appearance  and  pleadings  as amended  and  filed  before the tribunal  hence  the  suit  proceeded  exparte to his  detriment, and  that is why he  applied to set  aside  the  exparte  judgment  and all the consequential orders which application was dismissed following a preliminary objection raised by the interested  party  before the  tribunal  alleging  inter alia that the tribunal is fuctus officio upon adopting the report of  the Commissioner  of Co-operative  Development.

40. The  court notes that there  was  a  statement  of claim filed  before the tribunal by the interested party.  It is dated  24th February  2014  seeking for  payment  of  shs  2,900,000 being  the surcharged  amount by  the  Commissioner for Co-operative Development of Kenya  plus  interest  and  costs.  The applicant  never appealed to  the tribunal  challenging  the  decision of the Commissioner as stipulated by Section 74(1) of the Co-operatives  Societies Act, within  the  30 days stipulated  in the Act.

41. Thereafter the interested party  filed the statement of  claim dated  24th February  2014 before the tribunal seeking for the payment of  the surcharged  amount, and  it  obtained  exparte  judgment in default of appearance and defence,  which judgment  was is the process of being  executed when these proceedings were instituted.

42. It follows  that the applicant  could be  expected to have  filed an appeal to the  High Court  challenging  proceedings  which had  proceeded  exparte, as Rule  17 of the Co-operative  Tribunal ( Practice  Rules),  2009  are clear  that such judgment  or order made exparte  could,  on application  be set aside. It would therefore  be  expected  that the  applicant  could  appeal against a decision refusing to set aside the exparte judgment and all consequential orders since he did not  participate  in the hearing of  the  substantive claim before  the respondent  tribunal.

43. Instead, the applicant approached  this court  seeking for  leave to institute Judicial Review proceedings challenging the  decision of the respondent refusing to set aside  the  exparte judgment.

44. The  question is whether  this court  has jurisdiction to  hear and determine  these proceedings  for leave and  stay.  The  applicant  has relied  on Section  9(2)  of the Law  Reform Act and  Order  53 Rule (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules  to assert  that where  the  proceeding  is subject to  appeal and  a time  limited  by law  for the bringing of the appeal, the judge may adjourn the application for leave until the  appeal is  determined  or the  time for  appealing  has expired.

45. With utmost respect to the exparte applicant, there is no  allegation that he was not aware of the decision of 23rd  November 2016 as the decision was the outcome of his application dated 25th May 2015 seeking to set aside  the exparte  judgment  and  decree  of the respondent  tribunal  made on  16th December  2014  and issued  on 4th February  2015  respectively  in favour  of the interested party.  The applicant  therefore having known the  decision  dismissing  his application for  setting aside  exparte  judgment  as at  23rd December  2016, the question is why did he wait until  11th April  2017 when he  approached this  court by  way of an application  for leave to institute Judicial Review Proceedings?

46.  If the time for filing an appeal had lapsed, the applicant had an opportunity to apply for extension of time to file an appeal as stipulate in Order 42 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

47.  In addition the interested  party has  availed to court an order  issued on  13th April  2017 but made  on  24th February  2017  by the respondent tribunal showing that  the applicant was participating in the execution proceedings  and  made a proposal to pay  the full amount  in 30 days and in default  execution to issue  by way of warrant, but never  disclosed that fact to this court and neither  did he explain  the reason for non  disclosure  or delay  in bringing  these proceedings  after the  said order  was  made on  24th February  2017.

48. Further,  the exparte applicant’s application is not only  brought under the provisions of Section 8 and 9  of the Law Reform  Act and  Order  53  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules, but also  under the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, No. 4  of   2015 which  latter Act implements  Article  47  of the Constitution on the right to Fair  Administrative  Action, claiming that he  was  not heard  by the respondent on his  application to set  aside the  exparte  judgment  and its consequential  orders; and that  the tribunal   only  upheld  the  preliminary  objections raised  by the interested party on account that the tribunal has no  jurisdiction  to reopen  the  case; the respondent was served  with orders; and that the respondent should  appeal.

49. Section 9 of the  Fair Administrative  Action Act, 2015  which Act  came into  force on  17th June  2015  stipulates:

1)Subject to Subsection (2), a person who is aggrieved by an  administrative  action may, without  unreasonable  delay, apply for  Judicial Review  of any  administrative  action to the High Court or to a subordinate court upon which original  jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to  Article  22(3)  of the Constitution.

2)The High Court or a subordinate court under Subsection (1)  shall not review  an administrative action  or decision under this Act unless the mechanisms including internal mechanisms for appeal or review and all remedies available  under any  other written law  are first  exhausted.

3)The High Court or a subordinate court shall, if it is not  satisfied that the remedies  referred  to in  Subsection (2)  have been exhausted, direct that applicant shall first exhaust such remedy before  instituting  proceedings  under Subsection (1).

4)Notwithstanding Subsection (3) The High Court or subordinate  Court may, in exceptional  circumstances  and  on application  by the applicant, exempt  such  person  from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if  the court  considers  such exemption to be in the interest  of justice”

50. In the instant case, it is the view of this court  that the  applicant’s application for setting aside the  exparte  judgment  having been  dismissed  on a preliminary   objection, it is  not for this  court to determine  the merits  of that  dismissal.  The applicant  had an opportunity   to seek leave  to appeal to  the High Court.  The tribunal  by definition  under Article 169(1)  (d)  of the Constitution  is a subordinate  court and  therefore  even assuming that the decision based  on the preliminary  objection raised  before  the tribunal  by  the interested  party  was not appealable to the High Court as of right, as stipulated in Orders 43 & 75  of the Civil Procedure  Rules, the applicant  could still have  sought  leave to appeal  to the High Court. Instead, the applicant by-passed the appeal process  stipulated  under Section 74 of the Co-operative Societies  Act and  approached  this court seeking  leave to institute  Judicial Review  proceedings.

51. Section  9  of the Fair Administrative Action Act  is an  Act of Parliament  implementing  Article  47  of the Constitution and for  connected purposes. Although the applicant  claims  that he  was  not heard  by the tribunal and that the tribunal only determined  his  application on the preliminary  objection  raised, Order  51  of the Civil Procedure  Rules is  clear that  a party who  wishes to  oppose an application may file a replying affidavit, grounds of opposition or a preliminary  objection.

52. A preliminary objection  founded  on a pure point of law can  dispose of the  entire  application for setting  aside  an exparte  judgment.  Therefore, the fact that it is the preliminary objection  which has considered in the process of hearing  the application for setting aside the exparte judgment does not  translate  into denial  of the applicant  to have his application  canvassed  as it is the  preliminary objection that  disposed of the  application  for setting  aside of  exparte judgment. As stated earlier, whether or not the tribunal correctly arrived at the decision that it had no jurisdiction is a matter that could be competently determined by the Court on Appeal.

53. The provisions of Section 9 of  the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015  mandate this court in  exercise of  Judicial Review  jurisdiction to be satisfied that the applicant has first  exhausted the alternative remedies available under the  internal mechanisms or under any other written law, before  resorting to  court.

54. However, in exceptional  circumstances  and  on application, the court  may exempt  the  party from resorting to  alternative  remedies. In the instant case, the applicant has not  made any application for  exemption from resorting to or exhausting  the  available  remedies  through an  appeal process  to the High Court.

55. Further, he has not demonstrated  through his  application, a prayer seeking exemption on account of exceptional  circumstances  for the court’s  consideration. This court is prohibited by the Law Reform Act section 8 thereof from exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction in the exercise of judicial review jurisdiction. I find that the complaint by the applicant is akin to an appeal.

56. The Court of Appeal in Republic vs National Environment MANAGEMENT Authority (NEMA)  CA 84/2010 [2011] e KLR stated:

“ Regarding  the availability  of an alternative  remedy, such as an appeal, whereas there are occasions when the court will require exhaustion of other remedies of procedures such as execution procedures under the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 Laws of Kenya  and the Civil Procedure  Rules made  there under, the availability of such alternative remedy is not a bar  to proceedings by way  of  Judicial Review.  They have no concern with the merits of either  of the  applicant’s  or respondent’s  case.  This court  concerns  itself with  the  review of the decision  making process, not  whether  NEMA  had  authority to issue a stop order or notice, or whether is  an appeal mechanisms.”

57. The court  in the above  case however  stated further:

“……where  there  was an alternative remedy and  especially  where a Parliament  had provided  a statutory  appeal process, it is only in exceptional circumstances that an order for Judicial Review would be granted, and in determining  whether  an exceptional  should be  made and  judicial review   granted, it  was  necessary for the court  to look carefully  at the suitability of the statutory  appeal in the context  of the particular  case.  The  Learned Judge, in our  respectful view, considered  these  structures  and  came to the  conclusion that the appellant had failed to demonstrate to her what  exceptional  circumstances  existed  in its  case which would  remove  it from the  appeal process set out  in the statute  with respect, we agree  with the  judge.

58. The above  Court of Appeal decision  was rendered  before  the enactment of  the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015   but the Court of Appeal recognized the significance of  alternative remedies being exhausted first, except in exceptional circumstances. Where parliament  has provided  or a clear  procedure for  statutory appeal, the court  should not  allow the Judicial Review  process  to be invoked.

59.                        Emukule J ( as he then was ) in Rental Health Care [EPZ] Ltd & Another  v Ministry  of Health & 5 Others  [2015] e KLR citing with approval Damian Belfonte vs The Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago CA 84/2004  persuasively  observed  that:

“ where there is  a parallel remedy, constitutional relief should not be made unless the  circumstances of which  the  complaint is made include some feature which is  appropriate to take  that course.

As  a general rule, there  must  be some  feature, which, at least, arguably indicates redress  otherwise  available  would not  be adequate.

To seek constitutional relief  in the absence  of such  feature  would  be misuse, an abuse  of the court process.”

60. The same judge Emukule in Republic vs PM Lamu Magistrate’s Court & Another exparte Kenya Forest  Service citing  with  approval  the Court of Appeal  decision in Eliud Wafula Mailo v Minister of Agriculture & 3 Others [2016] e KLRwas categorical, as extract from Halbury’s  Laws of England, VOL 10, paragraph 319 that:

“ The subject’s  rights  to access  the  courts may be taken away  or restricted  by statute……..

“ where a tribunal with exclusive  jurisdiction  has been  specified  by a specific  statute  to deal  with claims  arising under a statute, the County Court’s  jurisdiction to deal with  these claims is ousted, for where an Act of Parliament  creates  an obligation for, and enforces the performance of it, it cannot  be enforced in  any manner.”

61. In this  case, as I have stated  above, the provisions  of Section  74  of the Co-operative  societies  Act provides  for  an appeal process of the decision  of the tribunal  and that is to the  High Court. judicial review jurisdiction is not an appeal jurisdiction.

62. Article  50(1)  of the Constitution  stipulates  that:

Every person has the  right to  have any  dispute  that can be  resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and  public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent  and  impartial tribunal or body.

63. The appropriate  court in the  instant case, is the High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction not judicial review jurisdiction. That is the stipulation   in Section 74  of the Co-operative  Societies  Act, and as there is  no application before this court citing exceptional circumstances and  seeking  for exemption  from  resorting  to the High Court  by way of an appeal, this court is entitled to decline to entertain the application as intended by the applicant.

64. In Mutanga Tea and Coffee Company Ltd Vs Shikara  Ltd & Another [2015] e KLR, the Court of Appeal Makhandia, Ouko & M’inoti  JJA cited Speaker of  the National  Assembly v Karume  [2008] 1KLR  425 where it   was  held:

“…..where  there  is a clear  procedure  for the redress of  any particular  grievances  prescribed  by the Constitution or the  Act  of Parliament, that  procedure  should be  followed.

The Court  of  Appeal  stated:

“……..This  court has  in the past  emphasized  the need  for aggrieved  parties  to strictly  follow  any  procedures  that are  specifically prescribe for resolution of particular disputes  (Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume) (supra)….see also  Kones  v  Republic  & Another  Exparte  Kimani  Wanyoike  & 4 others [2008] e KLR  296, it is  apparent that in the above cited cases the court  was  speaking on issues of the correct  forum for resolution of a dispute.  However, we entertain no doubt in our minds that the reasoning of  the court must apply with equal force to  require an aggrieved party, where a specific dispute resolution  mechanism is  prescribed by the Constitution  or a statute, to resort  to that  mechanism first before  purporting  to invoke  the  inherent  jurisdiction of the High Court.

The basis  for  that view is first, that Article 159(2)  ( c ) of the Constitution  has expressly  recognized  alternative  forms of dispute resolution including, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and  traditional  dispute  resolution  mechanisms.

The use of the word ‘including’ leaves no doubt that Article  159(2) (c )  is not  a closed  catalogue.  To the  extent  that the  Constitution requires these forms of dispute resolution mechanisms  to be  promoted, usurpation of their  jurisdiction  by the High Court would not be promoting, rather  undermining  a clear Constitutional  objective.  A holistic  and purposive  reading of the Constitution  would therefore  entail  construing  the  unlimited  original  jurisdiction conferred  on the High Court  by Article  165(3) (a) of the  Constitution  in a way that will accommodate the alternative dispute  resolution  mechanisms.

Secondly, such   alternative dispute  resolution  mechanisms, normally have an  advantage  of ensuring  that the issues  in dispute  are heard  and  determined  by experts  in the area; and  that  regard, the dispute  is resolved  in a much  more  cost effective  manner.  …We are  therefore  satisfied  that the learned  judge did not  err by striking  out the  appellant’s suit  and application which sought to invoke the original  jurisdiction  of  the High Court  in circumstances  whereas  the relevant statutes prescribed  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  and afforded  appellant  the  right to  access  the  High Court by way of  an appeal, which  mechanisms  he had  refused to invoke. To hold otherwise would, in the circumstances  of this  appeal, be to defeat the constitutional objective behind Article 159(2) (c) and  the very raison  de’tre  of the  mechanisms  provided under the two acts…”

65. More recently  the same  Court of Appeal  in Samson Vuko v Nelson Kilimo & 2 Others[2016] e KLR citing with approval  its previous decisions  including the  Speaker of  the  National Assembly  vs Karume (supra)  maintained that:

“ where  there is a clear  procedure  (forum for  the  redress  of any particular  grievances  prescribed  by the Constitution or the Act   of Parliament,  that  procedure  or forum  must be  followed.”

66. In the Mutanga Tea (supra)  case, the  Court of Appeal  cited the High Court  decision with approval  in Rich  Productions Ltd  v Kenya  Pipeline Company  Ltd  & Another  Petition No.173/2014  where the court  explained why it  must be slow to undermine the prescribed alternative dispute resolution mechanisms  as follows:

“The reason why the Constitution and the law establish different institutions  and  mechanisms  for  dispute resolution in different  sectors  is  to ensure that such disputes as may  arise  are resolved  by those  with technical competence  and the jurisdiction  to deal with them.

While the  court retains  the inherent  and  wide  jurisdiction  under Article 165 of the Constitution to supervise bodies  such as s the  2nd  respondent, such  supervision is limited in various  respects, which in need not go into here.  Suffice  to say that it ( the court) cannot  exercise such jurisdiction in circumstances where parties before court seek to avoid  mechanisms   and process  provided  by law, and  convert the  issued  in dispute into constitutional issues  when it is not.”

67. In Republic vs NEMA CA 84/10 (supra) the Court of Appeal  upheld  a decision of the High Court  declining  to entertain  a  Judicial Review Application by a party  who had  a remedy, which he  had not utilized , under the EMCA Act.  The Court of Appeal reiterated that where Parliament has provided an alternative remedy in the form of statutory  appeal procedure, it is  only in exceptional circumstances  that an order of  Judicial Review will be granted.  (see also Vania Investments  Pool Ltd  vs Capital Markets Authority  & 8  Others  CA 92/14”

68. Therefore, whereas this court has discretion to invoke its Judicial Review jurisdiction in matters where alternative remedies  exist, that discretion  is not  absolute.  It is  fettered  by judicial precedent  and Section  9(3)  and  (4)  of the Fair  Administrative Action Act and Article 159(2) (c ) of the Constitution.

69. There must be exceptional circumstances for this court to  bypass  the alternative procedure  stipulated  in law  and  even then, the applicant  invoking  exceptional  circumstances must  apply for such exemption from resorting to alternative  procedures/remedies  of appeal.

70. On the basis  of the above analysis, I am inclined to find and  hold that the preliminary  objection predicated  on jurisdiction of this court succeeds  and the same is  upheld, striking  out the  chamber summons dated 10TH April 2017.

71. But  even assuming that I  was  wrong on the above finding  and upholding of the preliminary objection raised by the interested  party, I would still decline  the  prayers  for leave  and  stay for  reasons  that the applicant  has not  explained  to court why upon failing to get orders in his favour  on  23rd December  2016  from the tribunal he did not lodge  the application for leave or  an appeal and  waited  until  11th April 2017 after he  had even  pleaded  with the tribunal to allow him to settle  the whole amount  within  30 days  from 24th  February  2017  on a notice  to show cause  application by the interested  party against the applicant. Delay ousts the discretion of this court in judicial review matters as judicial review remedies are discretionary in nature.

72. It would  appear  that it  was after the  applicant had defaulted  to settle  the decree and  on realizing  that the  warrant  of arrest  would issue against him that he now invoked the  Judicial Review jurisdiction of this court but even  then, there is no explanation why he had to  wait  for all that time

73. Judicial Review is a discretionary remedy  and  even were the  remedy  is available , a party  invoking  the jurisdiction  of the court must  come to court  with expedition  and  not to wait  until the appeal  period is over then seek audience before the court.  In exercising  discretion to grant or not to grant leave, the court must  consider the bona fides  of the applicant in that in this case he sought for time to settle the decreed amount, delay in  bringing  the  matter  in that albeit certiorari  has a  6 months ceiling  and mandamus has no statutory limit, the court will be  reluctant to entertain applications for leave which in its opinion, are  an afterthought  and  brought with  the intention of abusing  the court process or to defeat execution of decree of  a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

74. The applicant having  waited  from 23rd December 2016  until a notice to show cause was issued  against him  and on the  notice to show cause hearing he asks for 30 days  to comply  and  after that  takes  his time  without  explanation  for nearly 2 months before seeking Judicial Review cannot benefit  from the discretion of this court.

75. In the circumstances, I would still decline to exercise my discretion in the applicant’s favour and find that he had no prima facie arguable case for in-depth investigation at the substantive stage and I therefore proceed to dismiss the application for leave and stay.

76. I order each party to bear their own costs of the chamber summons dated 10th April 2017 which is hereby dismissed.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 25th Day of January, 2018.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Njuguna h/b for Mr Owino for the exparte applicant

N/A for Respondent

N/A for interested party

CA: KOMBO