Joyce W. Gichohi v Council of Legal Education,Kenya School of Law & Law Society of Kenya [2017] KEHC 7783 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.  492 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 23, 25, 27, 43, 50, AND 165 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL EDUCATION ACT NO.  27 OF 2012

AND

IN THE MATTER   OF THE KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW ACT 2012

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 53 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 8 AND 9 OF THE LAW REFORM ACT

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

BETWEEN

JOYCE W. GICHOHI……………………………………………...APPLICANT

VERSUS

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION ………………………......RESPONDENT

KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW………………………..1ST INTERESTED PARTY

LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA…………………….....2ND INTERESTED PARTY

JUDGMENT

1. On 2nd November 2016 this court   granted the exparte applicant leave to commence Judicial Review proceedings pursuant to the Chamber Summons dated 11th October 2016.

2. Vide a notice of motion dated 3rd November 2016, the exparte applicant Joyce W. Gichohi seeks from this court Judicial Review Orders of:

a) Mandamus directing the respondent Council of Legal  Education, its agents, employees  and  servants  to approve, sign off and finalize the application made  by the applicants  as a foreign student applying to take the Advocates Training Programme(ATP)at the institution of the 1st interested  party – Kenya School of Law with a view of  being registered  as a member of the 2nd interested party  the Law Society of Kenya.

b) Certiorari to remove and bring to this Honourable court for purpose of quashing the decision of the respondent    to reject   the application set out   by the applicant.

3. As required  under Order  53  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules, the Notice  of Motion  which  was   filed within  the  stipulated  time on  2nd November  2016 was supported  by the statutory   statement and verifying affidavit sworn by the  exparte applicant   Joyce W. Gichohi  on  11th October   2016 and  annextures, all accompanying  the chamber summons for leave to apply.

4. The exparte  applicant’s  case  as stipulated  in the facts  relied on in the statutory statement and the depositions in the  verifying   affidavit is that the applicant Joyce W. Gichohi is a 2012  Graduate  of the Bachelor  of Laws from the University of  South Africa (UNISA) by way of distance learning and has been rejected  by the Council of Legal Education as an applicant to study the  Advocates  Training programme (ATP) as a foreign  student.

5. It is averred that the applicant studied  and  completed  her KCSE in  1954 and  passed with  a mean grade of  B- and  fulfilled  the minimum   university  entry requirements for the Bachelors of Laws  at University  level.

6. That she  was admitted to the University of South Africa   in 2003  and  successfully  completed  the  training  and  graduated  in  2012 after doing  all the required  courses  as shown by  her  transcripts.

7.  That University of South Africa is  duly accredited  to the South Africa  Council  for  Higher  Education, which is  the  South African  qualification Authority and the South Africa  Department  of  Higher Education and has  more than 350,000 students worldwide  practicing  e-learning.

8. That having  so qualified  from the University of South Africa, the  applicant  sought  for  admission  to  the Kenya School  of Law  on  15th September  2016  and  paid shs 10,000 application  fees but  to her shock  and  dismay, the respondent  by letter  of  29th September  2016   rejected  her application  stating  that it does not recognize nor approve law degrees obtained through distance  learning  for purpose  of the ATP.

9. Further, that the  distance  learning  programme of the University   has  not been  submitted to the Council for Legal Education to ascertain  whether it embodies  the quality  safeguards  prescribed  by law.  The respondent therefore regrettably declined to recognize and approve the foreign application.

10. That upon receipt of the  above response, the applicant  searched  from the Law Society  of Kenya  website  and  University of South Africa website and discovered the names of the following  students  who did  an e-learning through University of South Africa and were admitted to the school of Law: Wanyoike  Hannah Ngugi, Mulochi Edwin and  several others.

11. In the  premise, the applicant   believed  that the decision  of the  1strespondent Council of Legal Education to reject her application is clearly  contrary to the express  provisions of the Kenya School  of Law Act, 2012  and  he Legal Education Act hence the decision  is an abuse of power and  malafides.

12. That she is being   denied an opportunity   to study and qualify to practice law which decision of the respondent is oppressive, vexatious and illegal.

13. The applicant annexed  copies  of her KCSE certificate, University of South Africa  degree of 8th October 2012, transcripts, accreditation  details  of University of South Africa, receipt for payment  of  shs  10,000 to the Council of Legal Education and the letter of 29th September 2016  communicating the decision rejecting  the application for  recognition  and  approval of  the  LLB degree University of South Africa  for purposes  of  ATP at the Kenya  School of Law.

14. According to the applicant, the letter of  rejection offends  Article  43(1)  of the Constitution  on the right to education  and  that having previously admitted graduates from the same    institution  who went  through  the same  mode of learning  as her, it was prejudicial and bad faith on the part of the  respondent to reject  her application  hence  the court should  intervene  and stop  the  oppressive, vexatious  and  illegal  rejection.

15. The respondent opposed the applicant’s notice of motion and swore a replying   affidavit   through Professor  W. Kulundu  Bitonye, EBS  the Secretary  to the respondent on 8th November   2016, who acknowledges the   decision taken by the respondent after learning, on the receipt of the applicant’s   application that she obtained her degree through  distance learning.

16. That jurisdiction of the respondent to certify foreign  qualifications before admission for Advocates Training  programme flow from  Section  8(1) (c) and (e)  and (f)  of the Legal  Education  Act, 2012,  2nd Schedule   to the Kenya School   of  Law Act,  2013 Section  13  of the Advocates Act ( Cap  16) and  Legal Education  (Accreditation  and  Quality Assurance) Regulations,  2016.

17. That Quality Assurance is critical to avoid applicants   being barred from sitting   the  Bar Examinations.

18. That the applicant therefore receives applications from graduates of foreign Universities and measures   the applications against the standards  set in the law   for compliance, then  makes  a suitable   decision.

19. That the applicant’s application was received and   subjected to the same threshold of suitability.

20. That the respondent exercised its discretion measuring to its standards that are necessary to uphold the standards, under the Legal Education Act, 2012.

21. That  it is in the  public interest  to ensure  that those persons joining the  Bar in Kenya  have passes   and  properly qualified  to execute  the  responsibility  of an advocate  of the High Court of Kenya.

22. That Parliament  through various  statutes has recognized  the respondent’s  role to approve  qualifications  on scales   and  progresses  measured   from time to time in order to  understand   the dynamism in the progression of legal training but nonetheless holding this progress on the professionally  measured  standards.

23. That the respondent’s role in determining   and approving   foreign qualifications is an   expert   enterprise, and therefore the court has no jurisdiction to substitute the respondent’s expert opinion for its own.

24. That in declining  to approve  the exparte  applicant’s qualifications obtained  by long  distance   learning, the  respondent determined  the  essential  training  of an  LLB  degree; the  necessity  for a student   to have actual  physical   contract   hours  with the lecturers, the need  for the student to  have society  of peers  in college for   seminars   and  broadening  of  perspectives to  understanding   legal issues   and  solving  legal problems, the  need for  access to full and  properly  stocked library  of the institution; most  court training  methodologies  of instruction including  clinical  and  practical   judicial attachment, group  discussions  among  other considerations necessitating  actual physical contract  between the student and the lecturers and the learning   environment.

25. That   long distance learning has   been determined  by the experts  that  comprise the  respondent  to fall grossly  short of the minimum environment necessary for the proper  learning  leading to an  award  of a degree  in law for purposes of the standards  of the legal profession in Kenya.  That it is for the above reason that the respondent periodically inspects  physically  the position  of legal  education  providers  in Kenya and   approves for  purposes  of admission to the  Advocates Training programme in Kenya applicants from foreign  institution whose physical  standards  the  respondent  confirms  to be  at similar level.

26. That is it upon the students studying  abroad to confirm  the respondent’s position about the Advocates Training  Programme  and the foreign  institution before undertaking  training  out there and  in default, the doctrine of volenti-non fit  injuria  applies.

27. That  in recognition of the dynamism  and  strides  in technology  and the emergence  of   long distance  learning, the Legal Education  (Accreditation and Quality Assurance Regulations 2016)   provide  for long distance  leaning but  on a course, and not on the substance of core course (residential programmes) that would lead to an award for  purposes  of the Advocates Training  Programme  and that such long distance  course must  first be accredited/licenced by the respondent.

28. That the exparte applicant’s LLB degree   was not acquired within the context    of the controls hence not compliant.

29. Further, that the exparte   applicant  can use  her LLB degree  to join the Bar in South Africa  and  join the Kenyan Bar under  Section 13  of the Advocates  Act  (Cap  16   of the Laws of Kenya).

30. That  the  right  to Socio-economic  development  are attained  within the legal framework  hence,  the applicant  can  only  join the  Bar in Kenya  within the framework  of law  laid down  to regulate  the sector which is the acceptable  limitation within the  tenor of  Article  24 of the Constitution.

31.  That qualification to the Bar is regulated world over and the insistence of the highest standards is reasonable and justifiable in an open society.

32. On the pleas  that some members  of the Bar  exist from the  same  University  via the same  mode of instruction  - distance  learning, it  was  contended and  deposed that no such   members  exit  or within the  knowledge  of the 1st  respondent and that   there is no proof.

33. The respondent denied  that its  refusal  to approve  the applicant’s  LLB  degree is  malafides  or intended  to oppress  but is regulating  the legal education  sector  and seeking attainment   of the  objectives of the Legal Education Act, 2012  as stipulated in section 3 of the Act.

34. Further, that the respondent’s  decisions  create  a precedent  accordingly, the1st  respondent  cannot bend  the  Rules to accommodate   one  party  and deny others similar  status  the same  treatment.

35. The respondent concluded, maintaining that it is in the  public interest in maintaining  highest  the standards in legal education  training   in Kenya  and  prayed that the court  does appreciate  that need and  gives  it necessary  deference.

36. The interested parties did not respond to the application

37. Parties canvassed the application orally, through their respective counsels.

38. Mr Omari counsel for the exparte applicant submitted relying on the statutory  statement, verifying  affidavit   and annextures and  statutory  and  constitutional   provisions, giving  the  history of this matter and emphasizing  that the applicant   is being discriminated upon by the denial to approve her  qualifications as she submitted names of other similar  graduates through  long distance learning  as  herself, who were  admitted  to the Advocates Training  Programme and that  there is no denial  of that  averment.

39. That the applicant’s right to fair administrative action has been violated.  That the respondent has not  specified  what modalities  are in place  to check  on the long  distance  learning  programme  and that it is the duty of therespondent to check the  programme   and  not  on the student.

40. That in any event the  respondent  does not have a list  of  approved foreign  universities  which are  accredited  to offer distance  learning.

41. That lack of   information on what is   accredited   from “time to time”gives room for arbitrary decisions on who can be admitted and who cannot be admitted leading   to impropriety and abuse of discretion.

42. That the  respondent  admits  in paragraph  4  the dynamism of legal  training  and that  we are  now in  a digital era  not  50 years  ago.  That in this digital era, distance learning is a reality   and any government entity that does not move with   the times must be moved by the court to the globalised   world.

43. That albeit   the respondent claims  to exercise   expertise  which should not  be interfered  with by the  court,  the  applicant  is  before the court for  protection from the respondent’s   impunity.

44. That physical  contact  can be  through digital processes and that  physical  contact  between   student  and teacher  is not  one of the vision 2030 aspirations for Kenyans for example, Standard 1 pupils  in 2018  will be learning through  digital  format hence it cannot  be  said that  university students  must have  physical   contact  which is  not digital.

45. That there   was no evidence  of which “experts” had determined  that long distance learning falls short of the minimum  environment  necessary  for proper  learning  leading to an LLB  degree, for purposes of the standards  of the legal  profession in Kenya.

46. Further, Mr Omari submitted that there  is no public  notice or  charter  positioned for the public to know  that a student  studying  abroad  should know the  accredited   universities   hence volenti  not fit  injuria  does not  apply in  this case  and  circumstances.

47. Mr Omari further submitted that Article  35 of the Constitution  is relevant  because the  applicant could not get documents  showing accredited mode of  learning  and  that it is  well known that the University of South Africa and Cambridge Universities’ mode of  learning is distance learning.

48. That the   respondent has failed to produce evidence of what is the approved mode of learning.

49. On the new 2016 Regulations, it was submitted that the interpretation of on course and  core courseis mischievous  and  ambiguous as only lawyers who are qualified   train in the Advocate  Training  Programme and that there is  no noncore  units since there  are no electives in the Advocate Training  Programme  unlike at the university.

50. That there is  admission by the respondent that  the  degree ( LLB) as obtained  by the  applicant  is recognized  in Kenya hence it  is  a waste of  foreign exchange resources to go to the South African  Bar  for admission then come to join the Advocates Training  Programme  at the Kenya  School of Law.

51. That  the only standards  that the 1st  respondent  can put is on who qualifies as an advocate, pursuant  to Section 13(1) of  the Advocates  Act Cap 16 Laws of Kenya and not create  any other  standard  extraneous  the Act, so long  as the person meets   the minimum  qualifications.

52. According to Mr Omari, there is no known policy on distance learning hence the applicant should be allowed to join the   Advocate Training Programme.  He urged the court to grant   the prayers sought.

53. In response, Mr Bwire counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed   the application by  the  exparte   applicant  relying on the replying  affidavit.

54. Mr Bwire submitted that the judicial review application before the court is fatally defective and incompetent because Judicial Review proceedings are made in  the name of  the Republic unlike  in the present  case where  the applicant  is Joyce W. Gichohi.

55. It  was  also submitted  that courts  should not  substitute  their decisions  for the decision of the public authorities.  Counsel relied  on the case of Eunice  Milkah Maema  Vs CLE & Others CA121/2013  and Muamar Nabed  Onyango Khan  vs CLE CA 18/2014 wherein the Court of Appeal espoused  the principle  that the court in Judicial Review  should  not question the merits  of the decision  of the public body but the manner  in which  the  decision   was taken.

56. That the respondent has the statutory mandate to regulate legal education in Kenya and that from time to time it approves foreign qualifications for Advocate Training Programme, measuring those qualifications for Advocate Training programme, measuring those qualifications on standards of this country.

57. That in the authorities cited, the Council declined to approve the qualifications because the mode of instruction was not acceptable to the standards of Kenya as regulated by the Council of Legal Education.

58. That the Legal Education Act regulates Universities in Kenya, not outside Kenya yet students study in any University outside Kenya.

59. That is  was upon those  students  studying  outside   Kenya  to seek the  1st  respondent’s  position  on the accreditation  and if they  do not, then they  have themselves   to blame.

60. That Article  35(1) of the Constitution  calls on  parties  to seek information  but that  the  applicant herein  has not sought  that information on the  accreditation  of University of  South Africa e-learning  programme  and the information  refused.

61. That the applicant is seeking out to the court to wade   into the merits of  the Council’s  decision yet the court has  no jurisdiction   to decide on the merits but on the process.

62. That standards regulating Bar Examination are world over.  That the bar has in the past denied admission to students.  Counsel cited JR 395/2013 Republic Vs Kenny Sagma & 45 Others where the students from Busoga University were denied admission and the court upheld that denial of entry into Council of Legal Education.  That it is upon students studying abroad to get information before proceeding to study.

63. That Section 13(7) of the Advocates Act gave conditional admission.  That in this case, there is no violation of right to Socio–economic Development as that right is limited by statute.

64. That there is no evidence that the applicant has been discriminated upon as  there is no evidence of  persons  who have been admitted with similar  degrees  and that it is the  duty of the person alleging  discrimination  to prove it  and not just allege.  That there  is no prejudice  to the applicants  but that it  will be prejudicial if  the  court forced  the respondent  to open up  Advocate  Training Programme to distance   learning  which  falls short  of the instructions  given to the  student and that the  integrity  of the Bar  in the Country will be affected.

65. That Regulations 45 and 10 are clear that the foreign programme must be accredited.

66. In brief rejoinder, Mr Omari submitted that the 2016 Regulations came into operation after the applicant had submitted her application for consideration hence those Regulations cannot operate retrogressively.

67. Further that  the  procedure applied  in arriving  at the decision, and the  documentation on standards  have not  been availed, and that  neither is  there any  framework  hence the decision was arrived at  arbitrarily.

68. Mr Omari   maintained  that there  are  no minutes  to show the   process  through which   the  rejection  was arrived at, and that  the  court must be  satisfied that the decision  was  judicious  and  not arbitrary.  That the applicant enjoined the Law Society of Kenya   to these proceedings but there was no response on the advocates who are practicing and on qualifications based on online learning.

69. Counsel urged the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to call for the list of all students admitted in 2015 to the Kenya School of Law and their qualifications and their mode of instructions.

70. On the cited authorities it was submitted that they are distinguishable  in that in Onyango Khan  vs CLE CA 18/2014 the applicant  had done  a  Bachelors  degree  in BA and Politics, not law  whereas  in Milkah Maema  Vs CLE & Others and Muamar Nabed  CA121/2013the question was that the applicant  had not done  the core subjects  prescribed  by law.

71. On issue of physical contact and residential training, it was   submitted that the Rules and Regulations in Section 45 of the CLE Act are clear.

72. On the protection  of the integrity of the Bar, it  was  submitted  that integrity does not come by clinging to old archaic  practices; and that  the dynamism of the legal  training  can only be protected by this court which must protest  innovation and technological development.

73. Further, that Section 13 of the Advocates Act on admission has never changed and that this is an individual and not a group case.  Mr Omari urged the court to allow the notice of motion.

Determination

74. I have carefully and anxiously considered the exparte  applicant’s  notice of motion  dated  3rd  November  2016,  the statutory  statement, verifying  affidavit  and  annextures   as  well as  the  replying  affidavit. I have given equal consideration to the respective parties’ advocates’ able terse oral   submissions.

75. The issue for determination can be summarized into:

1. Whether the Judicial Review application herein is competent before the court.

2. Whether the applicant is entitled to the Judicial Review orders sought.

3. What orders should the court make?

4. Who shall bear costs of the application?

76. On the first  issue of whether  the  Judicial Review  application is competent,  the  respondent contends that  the  Judicial Review  proceedings  ought to  have been  commenced   in the name   of the Republic, unlike  in the present proceedings where the exparte applicant is the applicant.  The exparte applicant did not respond to that issue as raised.

77. This court’s rendition on that issue is that Judicial Review  remedies  and order as currently placed are predicated on the new constitutional order and not on the historically related  prerogative  orders which   used to be  issued   in the name  of the  Republic  in all cases  and  in England, in the name  of the crown.

78. In addition, Article 23(3) of the Constitution of Kenya and Article 22 thereof guarantee every person the right to approach the court for Judicial Review remedy.

79. Article 47 (3) of the Constitution guarantees every person a right to fair administrative action.

80. The Fair Administrative Action No. 4 of 2015 which implements Article 47 of the constitution is clear that an administrator need not necessarily be a public body but any person making an administrative decision hence it cannot be true that in the modern dispensation, judicial review is issued against a public body.

81. Furthermore, under Article 159(2)(d)of the Constitution, justice shall be administered without  undue  regard  to procedural  technicalities.

82. In the  view  of this  court, the mode of  bringing  Judicial Review  proceedings  is merely one of form  and not substance. Form does not go  to the jurisdiction  of the court.  The  right to  fair  administrative  action being  a constitutionally guaranteed right under the  Bill of rights  cannot be  subjected  to procedural formal  technicalities, and  cannot,  in my view  be sacrificed  at the altar  of  substantive  justice.

83. In the old constitutional order, substance could be  sacrificed  at the altar of form.  That has since changed with the enactment   of Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution.

84. Accordingly, I find  the objection to the notice of motion  on the ground  that  the proceedings were not  instituted  in the name  of the Republic  unmerited and decline to uphold that  objection and  dismiss it.

85. On the second and most important issue of whether the exparte applicant is entitled to the Judicial Review orders   sought, Judicial Review is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary to mean 1.  A court’s power to review the actions of other branches   or levels of government; esp. the court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional 2.  The constitutional doctrine providing for this power 3.  3. A court’s review of a lower court’s or an administrative body’s factual or legal findings.

86. Judicial  Review  is the power  exercised  by the court  to check on the  excesses of  executive  or public  authorities  or other bodies  or persons  exercising  judicial or quasi Judicial authority. Judicial Review is predicated  on the rule  of law  and on the  need  to ensure that   public  bodies  or other bodies  act in accordance with the law, in the manner in which  they exercise  their mandate  and make decisions  that affect  rights  or interests of  others.

87. In other  words, judicial  review  is an  accountability  tool  used to hold those who  exercise  public  or  administrative   power  or authority  accountable  for the manner  in which they make  their  decisions.

88. Judicial Review is not an appeal forum for persons who are aggrieved with the merits of the decision maker.  It is concerned with the process or manner in which a decision is made and not the merits or otherwise   of the ultimate decision.( see Chief Constable of  the North  Wales  Police  V Evans [1982] 3 ALL ER  141  at 154per, Lord Brightman.

89. According to Halsbury’s  Laws of England  4th Edition  2001 Re issue Volume 1(1),courts  have the inherent  power  to review  the exercise by public  bodies or officers of statutory  powers impinging on legally recognized  interests. Powers must be exercised fairly, and must not be exceeded or abused.  Moreover, the repository of a statutory power or duty will be required genuinely to discharge its functions when the occasion for their performance has arisen.

90. The superior courts have a somewhat similar inherent jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals.  If  such a body  has  exceeded  or acted  without  jurisdiction, or has  failed  to act  fairly  or in accordance  with  the rules  of natural  justice, or  if it  has  committed  an error of  law in reaching  a decision, its decision may be  set aside.

91. Alternatively, a tribunal  may be  prohibited  from violating  the conditions  precedent  to a valid  adjudication  before it   has made  a final  determination.  A tribunal  wrongly  refusing  to  carry out  its duty  to hear  and  determine a matter  within its jurisdiction  may be  ordered  to act according   to law.

92. At paragraph 59 page 116  the authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England cited above  further  expound on the nature  of Judicial Review and make it  succinctly clear that  Judicial Review is the process by which the High Court  exercises its supervisory jurisdiction  over the  proceedings  and  decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are  charged  with the  performance  of public acts and duties.  In the case of Council of  Civil Service Union V Minister  for the Civil Service [1985] AC  374 at  408, it  was  stated  that  Judicial Review provides the means by which judicial control of administrative  action  is exercised.”

93. The purpose  of Judicial Review  remedy  is to ensure that the individual  is given  fair  treatment  by the  authority  to which he  has been  subjected.  It is  not part  of that  purpose for the court to substitute  the opinion  of the judiciary  or  individual judges  for that  of the authority  constituted  by law  to decide   the matters  in  question ( see Chief Constable  of the North Wales   Police Vs  Evans  (supra) and unless that  restriction on the power of the court is  observed, the court  will,  under the guise  of preventing   the  abuse of  power, be itself  guilty of  usurping  power.  That is so whether or not there is a right of appeal against the decision on merits.

94. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality.  Its  concern is whether the  decision making  authority  exceeded  its powers, committed  an error  of law, violated  the rules of natural justice, reached   a decision which no reasonable  tribunal could have reached  or abused  its powers.

95. The grounds  upon which  administrative action is  subject  to control  by  Judicial Review have been conveniently classified   as threefold; illegality; the decision  maker must understand  correctly the law that regulates  his decision  making power and must give   effect to it; Irrationality; namely Wednesbury  unreasonableness, procedural impropriety-and as to what procedure will satisfy the public law requirement  of procedural  propriety  depends  upon the subject matter  of the  decision, the executive functions  of the  decision  maker ( if the  decision is not that of an  administrative  tribunal or body) and  the particular  circumstances  in which the  decision  came to  be made.  Even where facts are jurisdictional, the court’s investigation of them is a supervisory character and not by way of appeal.

96. The scope  of Judicial Review  was  exemplifies  in the Kenya National Examinations Council(KNEC)  vs Republic  Exparte Geoffrey Gathenji  Njoroge  & Others  CA 266/96  [1997] e KLR  where the Court of Appeal stated:

“ The order  of mandamus is  of a most  extensive  remedial  nature, and  is, in form of a  command  issuing  from the High Court  of Justice, directed  to any person, corporation or inferior  tribunal, requiring  him or  them to do  some particular  thing  therein  specified   which  appertains  to his or their  office and  is in  the nature of a  public duty.  Its purpose is to  remedy the  defects  of justice  and  accordingly  it will issue, to the end   that justice may  be done, in all cases  where there is  a specific  legal  right  or no specific  legal remedy for enforcing  that right: and it may issue in cases  where, although there  is an alternative  legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial  and  effectual.

The order must command no more than the party whom the application is legally bound to perform.  Where a general duty is imposed, a mandamus cannot require   it to be done   at once.  Where a statute, which   imposes a duty leaves  discretion  as to the  mode of performing  the duty  in the hands  of the party  on whom  the obligation is laid, a mandamus  cannot  command the duty in question to be carried out in a  specific way…..These  principles mean that  an order  of mandamus compels  the performance   of a public  duty which is  imposed  on a person or body of  persons  by a  statute  and  where that person or body  on whom  the duty is  imposed  falls and  refuses to perform the same but  if the complaint  is that the duty   has been  wrongfully  performed  i.e. that the  duty has not been  performed  according  to the law, then mandamus is wrong remedy to apply for  because, like  an order of  prohibition, an order  of mandamus  cannot quash  what  was already  been  done……only an order of certiorari  can  quash  a decision already made  and  an order of certiorari  will  issue  if the decision  is without  jurisdiction  or in excess of jurisdiction, or where  the rules of natural  justice  are not complied  with or for such  like reasons.

Prohibition  looks at the future  so that  if  the tribunal  were to announce  in advance  that it  would  consider   itself  not bound  by the rules  of natural justice the High  Court would  be obliged  to prohibit  it  from  acting  contrary  to the  rules of  natural justice.  However, where  a  decision  has been made,  whether   in excess  or lack of  jurisdiction or whether  in violation  of the rules  of natural justice, an  order   of  prohibition  would not be   efficacious  against  the decision so made.  Prohibition  cannot  quash  the decision   which has  already  been made; it can only prevent  the making  of a contemplated  decision…..prohibition  is an  order from the High Court directed  to an inferior  tribunal or body  which  forbids  that  tribunal  or body  to continue proceedings  therein in excess  of its  jurisdiction or in contravention  of the laws  of the land.  It  lies, not  only for  excess  of jurisdiction  or absence  of jurisdiction but  also for   a  departure from the rules of natural justice.  It does not  however,  lie to  correct  the course, practice  or procedure  of an inferior  tribunal, or a wrong decision on the merits of the  proceedings……

97. Applying the above established principles of law to the present case, the  exparte  applicant  laments  that having  met the minimum  KCSE academic qualifications to study law, and that  having studied an LLB distance leaving programme, qualifying  and graduating  at the University of  South Africa  in 2012, her LLB  degree of the University of South Africa  for the  purposes of  Advocates Training  Programme  at the Kenya  School of Law  ought  to be recognized, so as to enable her admitted to the 1st interested party Kenya School of Law and qualify as an advocate.

98. On  the other  hand, the respondent  contends that  it “neither  recognizes nor approves law degrees  obtained   through  distance  learning  for  purposes  of  Advocates Training  Programme.”

99. Further, that the distance  learning programme  of the  university  has not been submitted to the Council for evaluation  to ascertain “whether it  embodies  the  quality  safeguards  prescribed by law” and  the  respondent  therefore,  by its  letter/decision of  29th September  2016 Ref: CE/RA/04 VOL VII/(04)addressed to the exparte applicant declined  to recognize  and  approve  the  foreign online  qualification of  LLB  University of South  Africa (UNISA).

100. Section 13(1) of the Advocates Act Chapter 16 Laws of Kenya stipulates that (1) A person shall be duly qualified if:-

a) Having passed the relevant examinations of any recognized  University of Kenya  he holds, or has   become  eligible  for  the enforcement  of, a degree in law  of that  university; or

b) Having passed the relevant examinations of such university, university college  or  other institution as the Council of Legal  Education  may  from time to  time  approve, he holds  or  has  become eligible  for the  conferment of, a degree in law in the grant of that  university, university college or institution  which  the council  may in  each  particular case  approve.

101. The above  provisions  are a kin to  the second  schedule to the Kenya  School  of Law  Act, 2013  which stipulate:

a) Admission requirements into the Advocates Training Programme

(1)  A person shall be admitted to the school if:-

a) Having passed the relevant  examination of  any recognized university  in Kenya, or  any university, university college  or any  other institution prescribed  by the Council, holds or becomes eligible  for the conferment of the Bachelor  of Laws(LLB) degree of that university college  or  institution, or

b) Having passed relevant examination of a university, university  college  or other  institutions  prescribed  by the Council of Legal  Education, holds or holds  or has become  eligible for the conferment of the Bachelor of Laws degree(LLB) in the grant of that university, university college  or other  institution.

102. The role of the respondent in the Advocates Training programme is as stipulated in Section 8(1) of the Legal Education Act, 2012   which includes:

a. regulation of legal education and   training in Kenya offered by Legal Education  providers;

b.  supervising   Legal Education providers;

c. …

d. …

e. recognition and approval of  qualifications  obtained  outside  Kenya for  purposes  of admission to the Roll;

f. administer such professional examinations  as may be  prescribed   under Section  13 of the  Advocates  Act.

103. From  the above  provisions of the law, it is clear that the respondent is mandated  by statute  to recognize  and  approve   Legal Education qualifications obtained abroad for  individuals  seeking admission to the Bar Programme (ATP) and or  to practice  Law in Kenya.

104. The information available from the respondent’s official website is that   recognition and approval services   are offered on formal application by anyone seeking to have his/her qualifications equated and approved.

105. Once the council has evaluated the qualification, it issues a recommendation on how the particular qualification compares with similar qualifications or set of qualifications in the Kenyan Legal Education system, labour market or the legal profession.

106. The form, CLE/EQ/001–APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION AND APPROVAL OF FOREIGN QUALIFICATIONS   is also available   on the respondent’s website and has the following details.

Part A:  Applicant’s details

Name …

Date of birth…..

Postal address…..

Mobile No…….

Email…….

Type of programme; certificate ( ) Diploma ( ) undergraduate

( ) post graduate ( )

B:  Details of course to be recognized/equated

Course name  :  Institution             completed  yes/no

Unit code Unit title Year completed CLE

Equivalent For official use only

**The application may be  delayed if the following  attachments  are missing

a) Original and certified copies of the academic qualifications.

b) Original and certified copies of  transcript.

c) Evidence of the institutions accreditation status certified by the embassy where the institution is located.

d) A letter  of recommendation of the applicant  from the  institution granting the academic   award.

e)A copy of the curriculum  being equated.

f) Payment  of requisite  fees”

107. Section 5(1) (g) of the Universities Act  of  2012,  the University Regulations, 2014 and the University Standards   and  Guidelines  set by the  commission for  Higher Education  (CHE)  from time to time  sets out  the mandate of  the Commission  as recognition and  Equation of  Degrees, post  - graduate Diplomas  and  Post  graduate certificates conferred or awarded by Foreign  Universities  and  Institutions.

108. For recognition of Bachelors  Degree  qualifications,  the holder  of the award must  have attained:

- KCSE  mean grade  C+ and above   or its  equivalent  or

- A diploma  from an  accredited  and  recognized  Tertiary  Institution with a minimum  of a credit  or,

- KCSE  mean grade C (plain) or equivalent  with a post  secondary certificate and Diploma from a recognized  institution or,

-  KCE, EACE, ‘O” level Division  II or equivalent, plus  a post  Secondary  certificate  and  a Diploma  from a recognized  institution or KACE ‘A’ level  with  2  principal  passes and  a subsidiary or

- Pre University  course  as a qualification for  university  entrance.

Equation of qualifications is  based  on:

- Duration of study and credit hours for a given  qualifications;

- Previous qualifications before enrolling for the given  qualification;

- Content and duration of study (Academic transcript must be presented for this.

- In case of professional  programme, registration  to practice in the country of  origin.

109. One must also pay a fee to the Commission for services   rendered for recognition and equation of degrees and other academic awards conferred or awarded by foreign universities.  It is therefore  apparent  that the respondent, just  as the Commission  of Higher Education, is  given a  statutory  mandate of recognition and approval or equation of foreign qualifications  and the criteria  for such  recognition and  approval is set  out in CLE/EQ/001: FORM.

110. From the criteria set out in the said Form, there is  no indication as to the mode of instruction of the course   at the foreign University.  And the respondent in its decision  of 29th September  2017  rejecting   the  applicant’s  application for recognition  and approval  of the LLB distance  learning  degree, from UNISA, did not  attempt  to quote  or cite any provision  of the Law or Regulation or even  Policy  Guideline  whether  from the respondent  or Commission for Higher Education  that bars one  from pursuing  an online  or distance  learning  degree  and or  warning  that such degree whether  obtained  from a university recognized  in Kenya  by CHE  shall not be recognized/equated  or approved by the Coincil-respondent herein.

111. The respondent  has not  claimed  the university of South Africa  is not  a recognized  university  in Kenya to offer LLB degree qualifications.  It only contends that the  applicant’s  LLB degree  was not  acquired within the  context of the controls pursuant to Legal Education(Accreditation and Quality Assurance ) Regulations, 2016 and  the  quality standards  set by the respondent, as  stipulated in paragraph  16  of the replying  affidavit  sworn  by Professor  Kulundu  Bitonye namely;the necessity for a student  to have  actual physical  contact   hours with the  lecturers; the  need for the  student  to have society  of peers  in college  for  seminars  and  broadening  of perspectives  to understanding legal  issues  and  solving  legal  problems; the need  for access  to full and  properly stocked  library  of the institution; moot court  training; methodologies  of  instruction including  clinical and  practical  judicial attachment; group  discussions; among other considerations necessitating  actual physical contact between the student  and the lecturers and the learning  environment.”

112. Nonetheless, the respondent  never   produced  before the court any instrument or document outlining or setting  out the  specific  standards  being  the essential  training  of an  LLB  degree, and  which the distance  learning  programme  is not  compatible  with.

113. This court does  acknowledge  that  online  or distance   learning has   evolved  into  the dynamic  and  technology driven world  of online  education, allowing  students  to learn  while   in different  locations to the  course  provider.  As to the merits and demerits of online study is beyond the scope of these Judicial Review proceedings.  However, for the respondent   to determine that it does not recognize and approve online LLB degrees, it must   have a legal basis.  The idea of recognition and approval  of  qualifications on scales  and  progress  measured  from time to time  is not any specific  measurement  scale  capable  of being  understood  by any  person especially  where  even the 1st  respondent  recognizes  the dynamism  in the  progression of legal  training  in Kenya.

114. Those professionally measured standards must be displayed to the court to appreciate.

115. In arriving at the decision to reject the applicant’s  application, it is  expected that the respondent  deliberated  upon and  based on the standards or criteria set under  the relevant statute  or regulation, they found the applicant’s  online  degree  wanting.  However, as I have stated above, no such standards  or criteria  have been  displayed  before this court.  There is also no evidence that the respondent ever undertook any evaluation or equation of the course undertaken by the applicant with the so called standards.

116. In the absence  of any  such set  criteria or standard for equating of the applicant’s qualifications from UNISA, the 1st  respondent’s decision could not  have  been objective.  It was an arbitrary decision which resulted  in unfairness.  It   was an unreasonable   decision.  In the USA case of Dixon vs Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F 2(d) at 157, the court stated:

“ The precise  nature of  the private  interest   involved  in this case is the right  to remain   at a public  university  or institution  of higher learning  in which  the plaintiffs   were students  in good  standing.  It requires   no argument  to demonstrate that education is vital  and, indeed, basic  tocivilized  society”.

117. The right to education in Kenya is expressly guaranteed   by Article 43 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Albeit  the respondent claimed  that the right  is limited by the quality  Assurance  Standards  of the respondents pursuant  to Article  24 of the  Constitution, this court  has not been shown those  standards  or criteria applicable enacted into any legislation or regulation approved by Parliament as at  29th September  2016 when the decision   to reject  the applicant’s  application for  recognition and  approval of her online  LLB  Degree  was communicated  to her.

118. Furthermore, Article 24 of the Constitution is clear that:

1. A right  or fundamental  freedom in the  Bill of Rights  shall not  be limited  except  by law, and then  only to the  extent  that the limitation  is reasonable  and justifiable in an open  and democratic  society  based on human dignity, equality  and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including-

a) The nature  of the right  or fundamental freedom

b) The  importance  of the purpose of the limitation;

c) The nature and extent of the limitation.

d) The need  to ensure   that the enjoyment  of rights  and   fundamental  freedoms  by any   individual  does not  prejudice the  rights  and  fundamental freedoms of others; and

e) The relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.

2. …….

3. The state or a person seeking to justify  a particular   limitation shall  demonstrate  to the court, tribunal  or other  authority  that the  requirements  of this Article  have been  satisfied .

119. In the instant case, with regard to the  right to education under Article  43(1) (f) of  the Constitution, the respondent  submitted that the right  was not  absolute  and that  it  was therefore  subject to the limitations  under Article  24  of the Constitution, which  limitations  are the  conditionalities on standards  set by the 1st  respondent  with  regard to  recognition and  approval of distant  learning  degrees.  However, I reiterate  that this court has not been  shown any law limiting the right to education and neither was it shown any physical  instrument, whether a statute  or Rule, regulation or guideline  as at  29th September  2016  when the  rejection  was  made  and  neither  were the set  standards for purposes of  Quality Assurance  availed  to this court for  examination.

120.  This court does acknowledge that the respondent is mandated by statute to regulate legal education and training in Kenya which is a specialized profession, and to make  regulations  in respect  of the requirements  for the admission  of persons  seeking  to enroll in the Advocates Training programme  and other  Legal Education Programmes.

121. On the  other hand, the Kenya  School  of Law  who are parties  hereto but who did not respond  to this  application are mandated  to provide Legal Education and Training in Kenya, and  admission to that School is regulated by regulations.

122.  Albeit  the respondent claims that the outline distance learning  programme mode  of instruction  does not  meet the  quality standards set  by the respondent for admission to the Advocates Training Programme and that the respondent’s experts have so established, what  this court  was not  shown  was any  scientific  research  report  showing  how such an  averment  was arrived  at and  what variables  or assumptions or hypotheses were tested  to determine  the inadequacy of distance learning  mode of  instruction.

123. The burden of proof in all cases lies on he who alleges.  In this   case,  it is the 1st  respondent who claims  to have experts  who have  allegedly determined  the inadequacy of the  distance learning  mode of instruction. It  was therefore upon them to avail  to the applicant and the court that  expert  report showing  the results of their investigations.

124. In the absence of  evidence of how such  expertise  averment  was arrived  at, the respondent’s   averments remains  a mere  presumption or assumption which has  not been  tested.  Therefore,  in my humble  view, the respondent  exercised  its discretion  in rejecting the applicant’s  application for  recognition  and  approval  of the LLB degree  from University of South Africa  obtained  through distance learning, by  the measuring the discretion to standards which are not  only non-existent but are  also unknown in any legal or regulatory regime.

125. The respondent  has not claimed that  the applicant  did not attain the minimum entry requirements for an LLB degree qualification. It has also not claimed that the applicant did not  undertake  the core course  units  required   to qualify   for LLB  degree and therefore  for admission  to the school  of law  Advocates Training Programme.  Neither  has the respondent stated that  it has  or does  monitor  and measure  progress of the student’s   learning while they  are still in their respective  universities, wherever they may be. Therefore  to find the  averment  that long   distance learning  has shortcomings  not based  on untested  assumptions  is in my humble view, irrational  as no reasonable person would  reach such a decision.

126. In addition, albeit  the respondent is or may be  involved  in the physical inspection  of the position  of Legal Education  Service  provides  in Kenya, there  is no denial that it admits  foreign   students   who study   outside Kenya and  there is no averment  that before it  does so, it physically  inspects  the  position  of those foreign  Universities  to establish  how they instruct   their LLB  students, to confirm  that those foreign  standards  are at similar   levels  with Kenyan  institutions  offering  Legal Education.

127. In addition, albeit  the  respondent  approves  foreign  LLB degree qualifications on  thresholds  established  from time to time, this court   was not  told  what  some of those  periodic  thresholds are.

128. The court   was  also not  told of what controls   were violated by the  applicant  in acquisition of  her LLB  degree  as there is no caution or  warning material  supplied to  members  of the public by  the respondent  whether by way   of gazetted  guidelines  or regulations  to the effect that  the council  does not  recognize  or approve  long distance  learning  mode of  instruction  for purposes  of admission  into the  Advocate  Training programme.

129. The  applicant  also provided  names of students graduates of the same  online  programme  who were admitted into the  Advocates Training  Programme and who  are now practicing  advocates.  In response, the respondent simply denied that it admitted any such students. The  respondent  did  not provide  any  roll of admitted  students/graduates  and their  respective pre qualifications and or mode   of instruction.

130.  Section  112  of the Evidence  Act Cap 80 Laws of  Kenya    Act  is clear that  when any fact is  especially  within the knowledge  of any party  to those proceedings, the burden of proofing  or disproving  that fact is  upon him. It is   the Kenya School of Law that   admits students   who have been cleared by the Council of Legal Education, into the Advocates Training Programme; while Law Society of Kenya is the Premier Bar Association that regulates the practice of advocates who are qualified as such and admitted to the Bar.  The two bodies did not file any response to this case, denying the averments by the applicant which depositions therefore remain uncontroverted.

131. The applicant having  supplied names  of those  persons  she  honestly  believes  had similar qualifications s as hers and  went through  similar mode   of instruction as herself, the burden   of disproving those depositions lay on the respondents and interested  party which they failed to  discharge.  Accordingly,  this court, pursuant  to the provisions of Section  119  of the Evidence Act  may presume  the existence  of any fact  which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had  to the common  course of natural  events, human  conduct  and  public  and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular  case.

132. In this case, the respondents do not disown the University of South Africa as a university recognized in Kenya.  Neither  do  they dispute  the core courses  offered  by University of  South Africa  in its  LLB  programme   as per the   transcripts  supplied  by the applicant.  What they dispute is the mode of instructions of the students.  Nonetheless, they have failed to demonstrate how that mode of instruction fails to meet the nonexistent local threshold or standards.  Accordingly, this court is  left with  no option  but to presume  that the likely  facts  are that  the online learning  mode of  instruction is  not exempted  from being  recognized  and approved  by the respondent  especially  where  there is  no evidence that the  respondent ever subjected the applicant’s qualification through  the  process  of   equation  and  was  found to be inadequate  for purposes  of and LLB  qualifications.

133. I would  therefore agree with the exparte applicant that she was unfairly and unreasonably  treated  by the  respondent, who did not even subject her qualifications to an equation, or even subject her to an oral or written interview  to determine whether her online training was effective  or equipped  her with the necessary  capacity to join the Advocates Training programme.

134. Further, it  was  upon the respondent  to demonstrate  that it had  received previous  applications based on the  same qualifications  and  rejected  them on the basis of not meeting  the threshold   and or set  standards.

135. In the absence of such, this court presumes that the respondent did accommodate the named graduates and denied the applicant herein similar treatment which is contrary to the provisions of Article 27 of the Constitution on non discrimination on any ground.  This is so because, if  there were  any bars  or standards or thresholds for admission to the Advocates Training Programme, as far as students from foreign universities with online acquired degrees are concerned, nothing  prevented  the respondent   from overtly  publishing  those standards on its  website or even gazetting them or placing them in the regulations or ensuring that they are  enacted  into legislation for all to see.

136. Although the respondent  contends  that the applicant  should  have sought  for that  information  on the standards  from the1st  respondent  by dint  of Article  35  of the Constitution, as she  has an unimpeded right  to access  information held by  the state, nonetheless, the respondent  has failed to demonstrate  before this court that it had any such important information  regarding  the  online  learning  mode of  instruction hence  it would not  have served  any  useful purpose to seek to access  information  which  was  nonexistent  in the  first place.

137. Further,  Article 35 of the Constitution places upon the state the responsibility of the state (read) respondent to publish and publicize any important information such as the one regarding the recognition or approval of online degree programmes for Advocates Training Programme.

138. Since recognition and  approval of  foreign  degree  programmes is a process  and not   an event, it follows that the respondent ought to have  carried out  an  equation of those  qualifications  of the applicant to  determine  whether they  meet the thresholds of  domestic  Universities   Legal Education Programmes.  In the absence  of any evidence  of such  equation  process, I am unable  to find any  basis  upon which the respondent  arbitrarily  decided to reject  the  applicant’s  qualification.

139. Studying law, unlike engineering, natural sciences and medicine, does not require regular access to specialized equipment which one would require to fully achieve the objectives of the study.  It  would  therefore  be unfair  and  unjust  to refuse  to equate for purposes of recognition and approval,  the applicant’s  long distance   LLB  degree,  in the absence  of any  statutory,  regulatory  or  guideline bar.

140. The duty  to act  fairly  was stated  by Lord Denning  MR  in Selvava  Jan V Race  Relations  Board [1976] 1 ALL  ER 12  as follows, by the English  Court of Appeal, deliberating  on the  matter in which  boards and  committee were urged  to conduct  investigations   to satisfy  the requirement  of fairness:-

“What the duty to act   fairly requires depends   on the nature   of the investigation and the consequences which it may have on the person affected by it.

The fundamental rule is  that, if a person  may be  adversely affected by the investigation and report, he should be informed   of the substance of the case made against him and  be afforded a fair opportunity  of answering  it.  The investigating   body is, however, the master of its own procedure.”

141. In the present  case, the respondent  in making  the decision to reject  the applicant’s  application  never called  upon her   to any forum  of hearing  and even  if that  were not  to be the  case, there is no evidence that any investigations into her  qualifications were undertaken  by the respondent  to determine  their shortcomings.

142. In Onyango Oloo V Attorney General [1986-89] EA 456 the Court of Appeal held:

“ The  principle of natural  justice  applies  where  ordinary  people  would  reasonably  expect those  making  decisions  which  will affect  others  to act  fairly and they  cannot act  fairly and  be seen  to have acted  fairly  without  giving  an opportunity to be heard.  There is a presumption in the interpretation of statutes that rules of natural justice will apply and therefore the authority is required to act   fairly and so to apply the principle of natural justice.  A decision in breach of  the rules  of natural  justice  is not cured  by holding  that the  decision would otherwise have been  right since if the principle  of natural justice is violated, it matters not that the same decision would have been  arrived at…Denial of the right  to be  heard  renders  any decision made null and void  ab initio.”

143. The court/A further stated:

“ It is  improper and not  fair that  an executive  authority  who is by law required  to consider, to think of all the  events  before making a decision which immediately results in substantial  loss  of liberty  leaves  the appellant  and  others guessing  about what matter could have  persuaded  him to  decide   in the manner  he decided.”

In the course of  decision  making, the rules  of natural justice  may require an inquiry, with the person accused or to  be punished, present, and able to understand the charge or accusation  against him, and  able to give   his defence.  In other cases  it is  sufficient  if there is an investigation  by responsible  officer, the conclusions of  which are  sent to the  decision  making body  or person, who, having  given the  person affected  a chance  to put  his side  of the matter, and  offer  whatever  mitigation he considers fit to put forward, may take the  decision  in the absence   of the person  affected.  The extent to which he rules apply depends on the particular nature of the proceedings.[emphasis added].

It is not to be implied that the rules of natural justice are excluded  unless  parliament expressly so provides  and that  involves  following  the rules of  natural justice   to the degree  indicated….courts are not to abdicate jurisdiction merely  because the proceedings are of an internal disciplinary  character.  It is a  loan, which the courts  in Kenya  would  do well to follow, in carrying  out  their  tasks  of balancing  the  interests  of the  executive  and the citizen.  It is to everyone’s advantage  if the   executive  exercises  its discretion in a manner  which is  fair to both sides, and is  seen to be fair.”

144. Thus, in the absence of any statutory regulatory or even guideline  bar to recognition and  approval of the applicant’s   qualifications, I find that it  was unfair  for the respondent  to mechanically reject the applicant’s application  as if  it  was  taking  any form of  judicial notice  of the matter  since there was no investigation carried out  to  determine  the shortcomings  of that LLB  online qualification.

145. In Dry Associates Ltd V Capital Markets Authority & Another [2012] e KLR Majanja J stated  and I agree that the element  of procedural fairness  in Article  47  of the Constitution   must be   balanced  against  reasonableness, expediency  and  efficiency  in decision  making process.

146. Furthermore, the wordings  in Section  13  of the Advocates Act   and  Section 16  and  Schedule  2 of the Kenya School  of Law Act on the admission requirement to the Advocates Training programme(ATP), are clear  that the applicant  must have  an LLB degree, and  that:

(1) A person shall be admitted to the school if:-

Having passed the relevant examination of any recognized University in Kenya holds, or has become eligible for the conferment of the Bachelors of Law Degree (LLB) of that university; or

Having passed the relevant  examinations  of University  college or other institutions prescribed by the Council of Legal Education, holds or  has  become  eligible  for the conferment  of the Bachelors of Law Degree(LLB) in the grant of the University, University  College or other  institution:

Attained a minimum entry requirement for admission to a University in Kenya; and

Obtained  a minimum  grade B  (plain)  in English  or Kiswahili and mean  grade C(plus) in the KCSE  or its  equivalent ( C) A Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from a  recognized  university  and attained a minimum  grade C+ in English and  a minimum  aggregate grade C(plain) in the KCSE, holds a higher qualifications eg A levels, a relevant diploma, other  undergraduate degree  of has  attained   a higher degree  in law  after the undergraduate  in the  Bachelor  of Laws programme.

147. This court would  indeed  be extremely reluctant  to substitute  its own  views  as to what  is wise, prudent  and  proper  in relation  to academic  matters  in preference  to those  formatted  by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich  experience of actual day today working of education and  departments controlling them, so long as the body entrusted  with the  task  of framing   the rules  and  regulations acts within  the scope  of the authority conferred on it in the sense  that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute; in which event, the court  would not  be  concerned  with the  wisdom  or efficaciousness  of such  rules  or regulations…..(See Maharashtra State Board  vs  Kumarmarsheth  & Others  [1985] CLR  1083.

148. In the instant case, regrettably, and unlike in the case of the Kenya National Examinations Council vs Republic, exparte  Kemunto Regina Ouru CA 127/09, there  are no  rules  or regulations  governing  the mode  of instruction of the LLB  qualifications which the  Council has  shown to be  adequate  and fair  and which  this court  would in  the circumstances  examine  to establish whether  they had  been applied  for many  years  or to other intending  students  of the Kenya School  of law.

149. Indeed, the decision to admit or not to admit students to the Advocate Training programme is conferred on the Council of Legal Education and Kenya School of Law.  That decision is discretionary and is guided by the relevant   statutory provisions and regulations which I have cited in this judgment extensively. it follows that this court cannot direct the respondent on the manner of or how to exercise that discretion.

150. Moreso, completion of the necessary core subjects is critical to admission of any student.  But in this case there is no question about completion of the core units.  The question is the mode or instruction for LLB qualifications training which as  I have  stated, is not  spelt  out in  any statutory or rule or regulatory  provisions as at  the time  the decision  was  made to  reject  the applicant’s  application on  29thSeptembmer 2016.

151. Therefore, since the statute gives the mandate to the respondents to recognize  and approve  foreign  qualifications  and  admit  students  who have qualified  to be admitted  to the Kenya  School of Law; and  as there is  no contrary  view that the applicant  is qualified  for admission to Kenya  School of Law, there is absolutely  no reason  why the  respondents cannot be  compelled to perform  the duty of considering  the foreign  qualifications submitted by the applicant for purposes of determining whether or not to admit her to the Advocate Training Programme at the Kenya School of Law.

152. In the present  case, I am satisfied  that the decision  to reject  the applicant’s  application  was irrational and not  backed by any  statutory  or regulatory  rule in force  at the material  time, distinguishing the modes of instruction for the LLB qualification.  The respondents were under a duty  in these  proceedings, to show  that they  were acting  within the law; that they  were subjecting  the applicant to the same standards that  other candidates  had been  subjected to, in order to  keep  the court’s  intervention  at bay.

153. This is  because  it is  not within  the province  of this court  to interfere  with the  respondent’s  statutory mandate to insist  on the highest  possible  professional standards  for those  who wish  to  qualify  as advocates.

154. The legal  Education  Act  No. 27  of  2012   Section  47  thereof  repealed  the  Council of Legal Education Act Cap  16A Laws of Kenya[1995] which had a first Schedule providing for  programme, curriculum and Examinations for the (Advocate Training Programme), not  even for the LLB  degree program and  Sections  2 & 13 of the First Schedule  provided for the  Training Methodologies which is not  the case with  the  current Act  and which  the respondent  attempted  to reproduce  in paragraph 16  of its  replying  affidavit.

155. The 2016 Regulations which the respondent attempted to invoke in these proceedings do not even bar recognition or approval of online learning qualifications.

156. As it clearly emerges from the material before the court that the respondent  did not even attempt  to equate   the  applicant’s qualifications  with the existing  standards, and  as  there are  no set  standards  for consideration  for purposes  of equation and  recognition  of the distance  learning  LLB  degree  submitted by the respondent, failure  to  recognize  and  approve  the LLB  qualifications   submitted  by the applicant  was, in my humble view, abuse of discretion.

157. However, this court cannot compel the respondent to recognize and approve the foreign qualification.  It can only compel  the 1st  respondent  to consider  the same and  make a decision  one way  or the  other, and in so doing, comply  with the provisions of Article 47(2) of the Constitution and the elaborate provisions of  the Fair Administrative  Action Act No. 4  of  2015.

158. Any  reasonable  public  body like  the respondent would only have rejected  the application for recognition  and  approval after  carrying  out an  equation exercise  and  even subjecting  the applicant to suitability test in line with any existing  thresholds/standards.  This was   not done.

159. Consequently, I find that the decision as arrived at by the respondent was outrageous and in defiance of logic or acceptable moral  standards that no sensible  person applying  his mind   to the  question to be decided  would  have  arrived   at it (see Kevin  Mwiti & Others  Vs Council of Legal Education  & Others  JR  377; 395; 295 of  2015.

160. In  deciding on what action an authority should take, it ought to apply the principle of proportionality as  was stated in the Indian case of  Borough  of Newham V Khatun –zeb  and  Igbal  [2004] EWA  Gr 55  that:

“ Clearly, a public   body may  chose  to deploy  powers it  enjoys  under  statute  in so draconian  a fashion  that the hardship  suffered by the  affected  individuals  in consequence  will justify  the court in  condemning the  exercise  as irrational or perverse…..

At all events it is plain; those oppressive decisions may be held to be repugnant to compulsory public law standards.”  (See Section 7(i) & (ii)  of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act.

161. Section 5(1)  of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act  mandates  the administrator  to consider  all views  submitted  in relation to the matter before it  before taking  administrative action  particularly in cases  where the proposed  administrative  action is  likely  to materially  and  adversely  affect  the legal  rights  or interests  of a group of persons  or the general  public.

162. For all the above  reasons, I find  that the  exparte applicant  has satisfied  this court  that she  deserves  the Judicial Review   orders  sought  in the substantive  notice of  motion dated  3rd November  2016.

163. Accordingly, I make  the following  orders:

1. Mandamus be and is hereby granted compelling  the respondent Council of Legal  Education  to receive  and consider the exparte applicant’s application  for recognition  and  equation of foreign  qualifications  for purposes  of approval for admission to the Advocates Training Programme offered at the 1st interested  party (Kenya  School of Law, with a view to  qualifying to be registered  as a member of  the  2nd  interested   party  Law  Society of Kenya.

2. An order of certiorari be and  is hereby  issued to  remove  and  I hereby  remove and  bring into  this court  for purposes of quashing  and  I hereby  quash  the decision of the respondent made on 29th September 2016  Ref CLE/RA/04/VOLVII/(04) rejecting the exparte  applicant’s  application for recognition  and  approval   of the foreign qualifications of LLB University of  South Africa(UNISA).

3. Each party to bear their own costs of these Judicial Review proceedings.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 16th day of January 2017.

R.E ABURILI

JUDGE

In the open court as scheduled at 2. 30 pm:

N/A for Mr Omari for the exparte applicant

N/A for Mr Bwire for the respondent

N /A for the interested parties

CA: George