Julien Mwape (Female) v the Attorney General (Application 67/2022; CAZ/08/461/2021) [2022] ZMCA 226 (12 August 2022)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) CAZ/08/461/2021 Application 67 /2022 IN THE MATTER OF: THE CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA CHAPTER 1, VOLUME 1 AND 2 AND IN THE MATTER OF: ORDER 53 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1965 (RSC), WHITE BOOK, ( 1999 EDITION) AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 19 OF THE PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT No.6, OF 2012 AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION OF THE INTERPRETATION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS ACT CHAPTER 2 OF THE LAWS OF ZAMBIA AND IN THE MATTER OF: A RENEWAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE MATTER OF: A DECISION OF THE MINISTER OF Y OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL it-? C ..., ~ IC OF o, . -I S:Pi OPM • · sl;1UitcYA2 '- F:U..ii~f · l 5';(, (7 , ' BETWEEN: JULIEN MWAPE (FEMALE) APPLICANT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT CORAM: Chishimba, Ngulube and Banda-Bobo, JJA On 19th May, 2022, 4 th August, 2022 and 12th August, 2022 For the Applicant: Mr. Make bi Zulu and Mr. M. Khanga of Make bi Zulu Advocates For the Respondent: Ms. P. Mwanza, Senior State Advocate, Attorney General Chambers RULING Banda-Bobo, JA, delivered the Ruling of the Court. Cases referred to: 1. 2. 3 . 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11 . Ridge v Baldwin ( 1964) A. C 40 Council of Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985) A. C.374 at 408 Mercury Energy Limited v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand LTD (1994) 1 WLR 521 IVC v National Federation of Self-Employed Business Limited (1982) AC 6 17 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affair s, Ex parte World Development Movement (1995) 1 All ER 611 Fredrick Chiluba v Attorney General (2003) ZR 153 165 R v Secretary of State for Education Science, exp. Avon Country Council (1991 ) 1 Q. B. 558 Wynter M Kabimba v The Attorney General and Lusaka City Council S. C. Z Judgment No. 13 of 1996 Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) v Attorney General (1995-1997) Z. R. 9 Zambia Wildlife Authority & Others v Muteeta Community Resources & Another SCZ Judgment No. 16 of 2009 R v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex parte Rukshanda Begum ( 1990) COD 107 12. Sharm v Brown-Antoine (2007) 1 WLR 780 at 787 13. Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba v Attorney General SCZ Appeal No.125 of 2002. 14. Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Limited (1983) 3 ALL ER 300 15. Regina v East Berkshire Health Authority Ex parte Walsh (1984) 3 ALL ER 425 16. Bibiana Bulaya Kearns v Attorney General (Unreported 2011 / HP/9 1) 1 7 . Associated Provin cial Picture Houses Limited v Wednes bury Corporation ( 1948) 1 KB 223 18. Lieutenant Alick Bruce Makondo v The Attorney General (Appeal 56 of 2016) 19. William Harrington v Dora Siliya and the Attorney General (2011) 2 ZR 253 Other Works and Legislation to: 1. The Rules of the Supreme Court of England (White Book) 1999 Edition R2 2. Review of Administrative Action 4th Edition 1980 3. Judicial Review (2nd ED) Michael Fordham 4. Judicial Review by Graham Aldous and John Alder 2 nd Edition Buttersworth London (1993) 5 . Cabinet Handbook, Third Edition, October 2010 6. The Interpretation and General Provisions Act Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia 7. The Persons with Disabilities Act No. 6 of 2012. 1.0. INTRODUCTION 1.1. This is a Ruling on the Applicant's renewed application for leave to apply for judicial review proceedings which was declined in the court below. The notice of renewal is made pursuant to Order 53 Rule 14 (65) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1965 (White Book) 1999 Edition (RSC) 1 and is accompanied by a statement of facts dated 23rd November, 2021. 1.2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review is in relation to a decision made by the Minister of Community Development and Social Services, through a letter dated 4 th October, 202 1 wh erein the Minister suspended the Applicant from her office, by suspendin g her powers and functions and instructed her to handover her office keys, motor vehicle, and any other equipment in her possession with immediate effect to the Senior Social Welfare Officer. The Applicant claimed that the Minister's R3 decision was ultra vires the provisions found in clause 8.11 of the Cabinet Handbook5 • 2.0. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION: 2 .1. The Applicant filed an affidavit in support of notice of renewal of an application for leave to apply for judicial review on 23rd November, 2021. The Applicant, Julien Mwape, deposed that, she was employed as Acting Director General by the Board of Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities and that she performed her duties under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities Act No . 6 of 2012 ("the Act") 7 • 2.2. She deposed that she received a letter on 4 th October, 2021, from the Minister of Community and Development and Social Services purporting to suspend her from employment. She was allegedly charged with offences that included having authorized the harvesting and selling of timber from cottage farmland that belonged to the ZAPD in Luapula Province, on the pretext of clearing the land for agricultural purposes or income raising for empowerment in respect of persons with disabilities. 2.3. The Applicant further deposed that prior to her suspension, no meeting was convened by the Board of the Zambia Agency of R4 Persons with Disabilities and there was no resolution made nor a hearing conducted. She stated that the supervising officer did not charge her, nor was there a disciplinary hearing held in accordance with the ZAPD disciplinary code. 2.4. It was her deposition that the power and authority to suspend an employee such as herself was vested in the Board and not the Minister who is only supposed to approve decisions of the Board. 2 .5 . The deponent deposed that she was advised by her Counsel that the Minister acted in excess of her jurisdiction by making the purported decision, and this was illegal and void ab initio. Further, that the decision to suspend her was characterized by mala fides because she was not accorded a hearing and that the suspension was actuated by malicious suspicions. 2.6. As a result, the deponent filed an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings in the High Court and that by a Ruling dated 19th November, 2021 she was denied leave to commence judicial review proceedings. 3.0. AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSTION 3 .1. The Respondent filed an affidavit in opposition dated 17th May, 2022 deposed by Ms. Petita Mwanza, Senior State Advocate in RS the employ of the Attorney General's Chambers. In her affidavit, she alluded to the application made before the lower court and the decision, the subject of this reviewed application. 3.2. Ms. Mwanza deposed that the application was denied on the basis that the Minister was not exercising her public function but rather she was sitting in her capacity as a Board of Directors in relation to the Applicant's private employment contract. She deposed that the issue herein ought to be dealt with under private law and not public law. 3 .3 . Ms. Petita Mwanza averred that the application before this Court for a renewal for leave, is bound to fail because the case involved matters of private law and not public law and as such the application should not be granted. 4.0. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT 4.1. The Applicant filed skeleton arguments in support on 20th November, 2021. Counsel for the Applicant, Mr. Makebi Zulu submitted that this application was rightly before this Court and was in accordance with Order 53/ 14/65 of the RSC 1 which allows this Court to grant a renewal of the application where leave for judicial review is refused in the lower court. R6 4.2. Counsel submitted that the process of judicial review was open to a Party that has sufficient interest, who was aggrieved by a decision or action of a body performing statutory and administrative powers. Counsel submitted that the Applicant has sufficient interest as she had a direct personal interest in the relief sought and the decision in question affects her. Counsel referred to Order 53/ 14/24 of the RSC 1 to demonstrate the term interest and to reiterate that the Applicant herein had interest. 4.3. Counsel argued that the Respondent was a public body for purposes of judicial review and submitted that in the circumstances where a body is exercising public duties or functions, it is amenable to the judicial control of administrative power. Counsel placed reliance on the cases of Ridge v Baldwin 1 and Council of Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service2 . It was argued that it was evident that the Minister, from whose decision the subject of these proceedings emanates, is a body exercising administrative and statutory functions. That therefore, the Minister or Ministry is a public body whose decisions are subject to judicial review before this Court. R7 4 .4. Counsel's con ten tion was that the matter before this Court was on e founded in public, rather than private law and therefore amenable to judicial review. To buttress this point, he relied on the case of Mercury Energy Limited v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand LTD3 . Counsel submitted that in the foregoing case, it was m ade clear that where a body is exercising power derived from a statute t h e decision therefrom is a matter of public law that is amenable to judicial review. To buttress this principle, Counsel referred us to the publication, the Review of Administrative Action, 4 th Edition 1980 at page 70-71 2 , where it was said that where one is performing statutory functions, such a person is exercising administrative authority which is the province of public law, and such action is amenable to judicial review. In casu , Counsel argued, the Minister in her letter dated 4th October, 2021 purports to perform the functions that are reposed in th e Board of the ZAPD under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 20127 and as such she was carrying out a statutory function when she suspended the applicant. Therefore, she was performing public functions , h ence this application to be granted leave to apply for judicial review. R8 4.5. Counsel argued that this application was a fit and proper case to grant leave. He cited the case of IVC v National Federation of Self-Employed Business Limited4 in demonstrating that the application for leave to apply for judicial review proceedings was necessary in order to avoid abuse of court by busy bodies. Further, that leave to apply for judicial review was necessary in order for the Court to assess whether the litigant is a bona fide complainant as per the case of R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement5 . Counsel contended that 1n casu, the Applicant has demonstrated that she is a bona fide litigant and that there is a primafacie case that warrants this Court to grant leave to issue judicial review proceedings against the Respondent whose decision was not only illegal, but against the laid down procedure. To buttress the foregoing, Counsel referred to the case of Chiluba v Attorney General6 . It was argued that in this case, justice demands that this court grants leave to the applicant to issue judicial review proceedings against the Respondent. 4 .6 . Furthermore, Mr. Zulu submitted that this was a proper case to grant a Stay as the applicant has made her application promptly R9 and given notice to all the parties, thereby clearly satisfying the requirements of Order 53 of the RSC 1 . 4. 7. Further, that where leave for judicial review is sought, and the relief of an order of prohibition or certiorari is sought, leave can operate as a stay of the proceedings to which the judicial review application relates, u ntil the determination of that application or further order. Counsel cited Order 53/ 14/54 the RSC 1 and the case of R v Secretary of State for Education and Science, ex p. Avon Country CounciF. This Court was invited to consider the works of the learned author of Judicial Review (2nd Edition) Michael Fordham at page 2562 in arguing the principle that a stay is appropriate to take effect until the challenge of the decision is determined. Counsel also referred to the case of Wynter M Kabimba v The Attorney General and Lusaka City Council8 . It was submitted that the Court does not only have the discretion to order that the grant of leave operates as a stay of the decision, but also that it is desirable that the Court so orders in instances where the remedy sought is an Order of Certiorari. Thus, Counsel argued that the order for leave to issue judicial review proceedings should operate as a stay until the determination of the matter. RlO 4.8. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the Applicant has sufficient interest, the Respondent is a public body, the Applicant had a bona fide case and that this is a fit and proper case for this Court to grant leave for the Applicant to issue judicial review proceedings and that the same should operate as a Stay pending determination of the proceedings. 4 .9 . ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION 4.10. The Respondent filed skeleton arguments in opposition to the notice of renewal of the application for leave to apply for judicial review dated 17t h May, 2022. Counsel for the Respondent Ms . Petita Mwanza submitted that the purpose of the requirement for one to obtain leave to apply for judicial review was to eliminate, at early stages, any applications which were either frivolous, vexatious or hopeless and to ensure that the applicant only proceeds to a substantive hearing if the Court is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration as per Order 53 of the RSC 1 . To further buttress on the importance of obtaining leave, Counsel referred to the cases of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) v Attorney Rll General9 and Zambia Wildlife Authority & Others v Muteeta Community Resources & Another10 • 4.11. Counsel argued that the Applicant in this matter was employed as Acting Director Gen eral under the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 12, a quasi-government institution and not a government department. She argued that although the ZAPD is a creation of statute, it is governed by a Board of Directors and the Applicant was in the employment of the Board. Ms. Mwanza stated that the question that ought to be determined is whether the Minister falls under the ambit of private law or public law and conversely whether the action in this matter is amenable to judicial review. She cited the cases of R v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex parte Rukshanda Begum 11 , Sharm v Brown-Antoine 12 and Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba v Attorney General13 . Counsel argued that the letter written by the Minister expressly stated "in the absence of the Board", the Minister decided to suspend the Applicant in order to allow investigations to take place. She argued that the act of suspending the Applicant was made in accordance with her employment contract and therefore the Minister was not exercising h er public functions but rather R12 exerc1s1ng her powers in relation to the Applicant's private employment contract. She cited the cases of Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Limited14 and Regina v East Berkshire Health Authority Ex parte Walsh 15 to demonstrate that a person who is employed via a private law contract cannot be amenable to public law. She submitted that a claim for judicial review could not be used to enforce rights of a private nature arising from the employer-employee relationship. Counsel further submitted that the issue concerning the Applicant's employment contract could not be said to be one of public law and cited the case of Bibiana Bulaya Kearns v Attorney General 16 to illustrate that judicial review will not lie where a person seeks to establish that a decision of a person or body infringes rights which are entitled to protection under public law and not private law. 4 .12. Ms. Mwanza submitted that the decision by the Minister that prompted the Applicant to apply for leave to commence judicial review proceedings was purely an employment law matter which fell under the ambit of private law and not public law. Thus, she argued, the Applicant did not have good prospects of success. R13 4 .13. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the lower court was on firm ground by declining to grant the Applicant leave to commence Judicial Review proceedings and she prayed that this Court upholds the Ruling of the Court below with costs to the Respondent. 4.14. At the hearing, Mr. Makebi Zulu on behalf of the Applicant submitted that he would rely on the affidavit in support and combined skeleton arguments and list of authorities filed on 26th November, 2021 and prayed that the reliefs therein be granted. He also augmented his submissions briefly. 4 . 15. He submitted that in the application for leave, there was reference to the Cabinet Hand Book at clause 8 .115 that refers to the protocols that the Minister was allowed to adhere to . He further submitted that in the matter before this Court the Minister exercised a power that she did not have. He said, the Act relied on provides that there should be a Board but it did not provide for what ought to happen in the absence of the Board sitting. Mr. Zulu therefore was of the view that the Act did not envisage a situation where there was no Board. He submitted that the Applicant sought judicial review on the basis that the Minister exercised a power that she did not have . R14 Counsel submitted said that though the Respondent contends that this matter fell into the realm of private contract, the Act itself provided that the Minister has no role whatsoever to play in the contract nor disciplinary matter. It was counsel's view that the application for leave be granted for the reasons stated in the application and arguments. 4.16. The Respondent's Counsel, Ms. Petita Mwanza opposed the application and stated that she would be relying entirely on the affidavit in opposition to the application filed on 17th May, 2022 and skeleton arguments of the same date. 5.0. DECISION BY THIS COURT 5 .1. We have carefully considered the renewed application for leave to commence judicial review, the authorities cited including the arguments advanced by both parties and the submissions proffered at the hearing of the application. 5. 2. The issue that falls to be resolved in this matter, is whether we should grant the Applicant leave to apply for Judicial review. 5.3. In order to do so we have to consider the following issues arising from the facts and arguments advanced, namely:- (1) whether the Applicant has sufficient interest in this m a tter; (2) whether the Respondent is a public body; RlS (3) whether the Applicant has a bona fide case that is fit and proper for this Court to grant leave for the applicant to issue judicial review proceedings; and (4) whether a Stay should be granted pending the determination of the proceedings. 5.4. It is trite that obtaining leave 1s a prerequisite to making a substantive application for judicial review. The purpose of this, as already canvassed by both Counsel, is to prevent the time of the Court from being wasted with trivial and frivolous complaints. 5.5. Therefore, at leave stage the Applicant has to show that they possess sufficient interest in the matter. That is to say that they are affected in some way or another by the decision that is being challenged. There is also a requirement that the matter must be concerned with public law and the decision complained of must have been made by a public body established by statute. 5.6. Moving to the first issue, the threshold for sufficient interest or locus standi is that the decision sought to be challenged must affect the Applicant's proprietary rights. In this regard, we refer R16 to the learned author of Judicial Review by Graham Aldous and John Alder at page 1394 where it states that: "In order to obtain leave to apply for judicial review, an applicant must satisfy the court that he has sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. This in effect is the filter provided to bar from pursuing doomed applications through the courts. Following the House of Lords decision in IRC v National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Limited (1982) A. C. 617, the issue of whether a particular person or body is entitled to ask the court for relief is closely linked to the merits of the complaint which is being made. Leave ought therefore to be granted where an applicant can show that he might have locus standi to show the court for relief." 5.7. The Applicant in this matter contends that she has sufficient interest because she had a direct personal interest in the relief sought and the decision in question affects her. We note that the Respondent did not directly address the issue of sufficient interest save to say that the Applicant could not enforce her rights because they arose from a private employer-employee relationship. Order 53 RSC in paragraph 53/ 14/241 deals with the question of sufficient interest for purposes of judicial review and reads as follows, regarding locus standi: ''the question of what is a "sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates" appears to be a mixed question of fact and law; a question of fact R17 the relationship between the and degree and applicant and the matter to which the application relates having regard to all the circumstances of the case (cited with approval by Lord Roskill in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, exp. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] A C 617,659 [1981] 2 All ER 93 at 107 .... " 5.8. Our view of the above paragraph is that for an Applicant to have locus standi or demonstrate sufficient interest, one must show that he would be affected by the Court's decision in a concrete sense and not an abstract one. We are of the view that the Applicant has sufficient interest in the matter before us as she was the subject matter of the decision being challenged and therefore there is a direct relationship to the application and the Applicant. We are therefore of the considered view that the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient interest in the matter. 5 .9. Having resolved the issue of sufficient interest, the next issue to be resolved is whether the Respondent is a public body. Counsel for the Applicant argued that the Respondent was a public body for purposes of judicial review, and submitted that in the circumstances where a body is exercising public duties or functions, it is amenable to the judicial control of administrative power. On the other hand, the Respondent contends that the Applicant who was employed by the Board of Directors under R18 the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities Act does not fall under the realm of the scrutiny of public law as her employment was a private contract. That therefore, when the Minister suspended the Applicant, she was not exercising her public functions, but rather her powers in relation to the private contract between the Applicant and the Board. 5 .10. In the case of Derrick Chitala v Attorney General9 the principle of unreasonableness was summarized as a ground for judicial review by referring to the celebrated case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation 1 . The Court stated:- "The decision of a person or body performing public duties or functions will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by appropriate order in judicial review proceedings, where the decision is such that no such person or body properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached the decision." 5.1 l. We agree with Counsel for the Applicant that the Respondent was a public body for purposes of judicial review. It is clear that the Minister from whose decision the subject of these proceedings emanate, is a body exercising administrative and statutory functions. Therefore, the Minister or Ministry is a public body whose decisions are subject to judicial review before R19 this Court, and that under the circumstances, the Respondent was a body exercising public duties or functions and thus amenable to judicial review. 5 .12. The fina l issue we must determine is whether the Applicant has a bona fide case that is fit and proper for this Court to grant leave for th e Applicant to issue judicial review proceedings and that the same should operate as a Stay pending the determination of the proceedings. In the premises, the issue we must resolve is whether or not there is an arguable case meriting further investigation at the substantive hearing. In the case of Lieutenant Alick Bruce Makondo v The Attorney General 18 the Court held th at: "at leave stage an applicant has to demonstrate to the court that he has a case fit for further investigation and therefore deserves a hearing of the substantive matter at stage. Applications for leave to apply for judicial review, thus allow courts to sieve cases and weed out frivolous and vexatious and hopeless applications thereby, keeping busy bodies and vexatious litigants outside the doors of the court." inter parties' 5 .13. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of William Harrington v Dora Siliya and the Attorney General 19 held that: "a party wishing to commence judicial review proceedings must apply for leave to do so and must R20 show that there is a case fit for further investigations at a full inter parties hearing." 5.14. We have had an opportunity to peruse the Cabinet Handbook, Third Edition at clause 8.11 5 which reads as follows: "Ministers are responsible for staff promotions, transfers or disciplinary action within their Ministries. If it is the opinion of a Minister that disciplinary or other action should be taken against any Officer, the matter should be referred to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, who is the responsible officer. In such cases, the Minister should not dictate the action the Permanent Secretary should take on the matter." (underline by Court for emphasis only) 5.15. In addition, The Interpretation and General Provisions Act Chapter 2 of the Laws of Zambia6 under section 26 reads as follows: "Where by any written law a power to make any appointment is conferred, the authority having power to make the appointment shall also have power (subject to any limitations or qualifications which affect the power of appointment) to remove, suspend, reappoint or reinstate any person appointed in the exercise of the power." 5.16. As stated earlier, at leave stage, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the substantive hearing regarding judicial review proceedings, but rather, whether the Applicant has R21 demonstrated to the Court that it has an arguable case to be resolved at a full hearing. 5.17. A perusal of the Applicant's affidavit in support particularly the letter of appointment reveals that the Applicant was appointed as Acting Director General effective 13th March, 2018 and that a detailed contract providing other entitlements would follow once the Board had been inaugurated and a Chairperson appointed. We did not have sight of the letter suspending the Applicant save the excerpt from the Ruling in the lower Court which read in part as" "Therefore, in the absence of the board and in order to facilitate internal investigations on the alleged illegal harvesting and selling of muku la timber, I have decided to:- (a)Suspend you from exercising the powers and functions of your office in accordance with the provisions of the ZAPD Disciplinary Code with the outcome of the immediate effect pending investigations and: (b) ...... . 5.18. Without delving into the merits of this matter, we have perused The Persons with Disability Act No. 6 of 2012 (the "Act")7 which Act is mandated to continue the existence of the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities and define its functions and powers. The Act establishes under section 13 (1), a Board for R22 the Agency and the said section provides for its composition. Section 19 of the Act provides that the Board shall with the approval of the Minister, appoint the Director General on such terms and conditions as it may determine. Further, Clause 8.11 of the cited Cabinet Hand Book5 makes it clear that if it is the opinion of the Minister that disciplinary action should be taken against an officer, the matter should be referred to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry who is the responsible officer, and the Minister should not dictate to the Permanent Secretary what action to take. This Clause spells out the powers of the Minister and shows that powers to discipline erring officers lies with the Permanent Secretary. 5 .19. It is our view, based on the do cum en ts on record and the cited provisions above, that the Applicant has met the threshold to be granted leave to commence judicial review proceedings. Our view is that there is an arguable case fit for further investigation at a substantive hearing of the judicial review proceedings vis a-viz, the decision the Minister made to suspend the Applicant without the approval of the Board or indeed referring the matter to the Permanent Secretary. We hold this view because the power and authority to suspend an employee such as the R23 Applicant is vested in the Board and not the Minister. Further, it is clear from Clause 8.11 of the Cabinet Handbook5 that the Minister went beyond the scope of the Minister's responsibilities as stated therein. 5 .20. We accordingly exercise our judicial discretion by granting leave to the Applicant to commence judicial review proceedings in the court below. Our decision will further act as a Stay of Proceedings pending the determination of the Judicial Review proceedings . We order that the proceedings be heard before another Judge of the High Court. 5.21. Costs for this application will be in the cause . .......••••••••.......•....••......•.••.•••••. F. M. CHISHIMBA COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE ..•..•...........................•.... P. C. M. NGULUBE A. M. BANDA-BOBO COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE R24